Confucian trustworthiness and communitarian education

ABSTRACT

Through the conceptual lens of ‘education-as-moulding’ and ‘education-as-drawing-out,’ this article expounds the Confucian concept of trustworthiness (xin) and its relation with communitarian education. Informed by the Analects, it is argued that Confucius envisions a community of trustworthy members who are motivated and characterised by interpersonal trust. From a Confucian viewpoint, both approaches – education-as-moulding and education-as-drawing-out – are salient for the development of trustworthiness as a moral virtue in students and relational trust in the school community. The paper also addresses a prominent criticism of communitarian education: the imposition of prescribed values and curriculum on students that suppresses their individual identities, interests and voices. From a Confucian perspective, such an imposition over-emphasises education-as-moulding and neglects education-as-drawing out, making the enforcement ineffective in the cultivation of trustworthiness as a moral virtue. What is recommended instead is the harmonisation of the self and others through both education-as-moulding and education-as-drawing-out.

KEYWORDS:

• Confucianism
• communitarianism
• education-as-moulding
• education-as-drawing-out
• trustworthiness

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. In a related passage, Confucius speaks disapprovingly of a person who ‘insists on keeping his word and seeing his actions through to the end’ (言必信，行必果) and ‘shows a stubborn petty-mindedness’ (硜硜然，小人哉！13.20). In this case, the person behaves in a trustworthy manner but is motivated by selfish interests. As explained by Wee (2011), the person ‘blindly and stubbornly insists on keeping his word, and who is petty-minded in doing so’ (520).

2. Although Lau (1997) translates yi (義) as ‘moral’ in 1.13, the word is more accurately rendered as ‘rightness’ or ‘appropriateness.’ The message here is that being trustworthy goes hand in hand with being right or prudent because such a person is perceived to be reliable (‘enables one’s words to be repeated’). The attention is not limited to trustworthy acts or consequences, but rather extended to trustworthiness as a virtue, alongside rightness.

3. That xin is a personality trait implies that trustworthiness is not purely behavioural but also and more fundamentally, dispositional. Such a person is inclined to xin and demonstrates it consistently and coherently in all situations. In this regard, Confucius, like Aristotle, subscribes to the ethical theory of virtue ethics that focuses on the moral character of a person and not simply moral duties, actions or consequences (Slingerland 2003; Tan 2020, Tan 2023.

4. The focus of this paper is on education-as-moulding and education-as-drawing-out as educational approaches. Hence I shall set aside the question of whether ‘there is an essential core of selfhood or a fixed human nature that either limits or enables possibilities of change, restricts education’ (Papastephanou 2014, 166). Although this is an important topic, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the diverse theories and arguments concerning selfhood and human nature in the Confucian traditions. A quick mention is that different Confucian thinkers have divergent and competing theories on innate human nature and related issues. On the one hand, Mencius and Wang Yangming are known for asserting that humans are born with the seeds of goodness or innate knowing. The task of education is simply to draw out the preexisting good nature in all humans. On the other hand, Xunzi rejects this view and maintains that human nature is bad; his educational programme is thus oriented towards education-as-moulding to correct human deficiency. Confucius is famously silent on the topic of human nature, and underlines instead the need of both education as moulding and drawing out for the cultivation of exemplary persons (junzi). For details, see (Tan 2020).

5. Wee (2011) alludes to the possible abuse of trust in her commentary of this passage: ‘To love trustworthiness in word without loving learning is liable to lead to harmful behaviour’ (17.8). Arguing that ‘xin is not sufficient for the possession of moral integrity or moral wholeness,’ Wee (2011) posits that ‘the person of xin can manifest xin in petty and harmful ways’ (532), behaving like a mobster who ‘engage[s] in specifically villainous or brutal behaviour’ (521–522). It is important to point out that the xin cited in 17.8 is an instance of an amoral virtue. As explained earlier, Confucius rejects an amoral understanding of xin and argues instead for xin as a moral virtue, which is the topic of this essay.

6. It is noteworthy that the Confucian harmonisation of the individual and community resonates with Peter’s idea of ‘education as initiation.’ As explained by Cotter (2013), ‘Peters’ concept of ‘education as initiation’ depends on a vision of a dynamic interaction between the individual and community that is defensible on cognitive, social and moral grounds” (172; also see Peters 1970).