Cross-tier personal gains in mixed electoral systems

ABSTRACT

We extend the research on contamination effects in mixed-member electoral systems by considering the impact of “dual candidacies” in systems that combine SMD and open-list PR rules. We make three claims. First, we argue that dual-listed candidates have incentives to run campaigns that enable them to maximize their share of personal votes in both tiers. Second, the effect of a dual listing is conditioned by incumbency and party-list position. Finally, we argue that parties themselves benefit from strong dual candidates in the PR list election itself. To test our argument, we analyze the 2016 Lithuanian parliamentary election. Using elite interviews and statistical models of electoral data, our analysis supports our claims. We provide important contribution to contamination literature by demonstrating that parties received a direct, list-tier benefit from nominating SMD candidates, who successfully build personal vote coalitions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Not all mixed-member systems allow dual candidates.

2 We typically associate electoral systems that cultivate personal votes with weaker party labels. This raises the possibility that open-list PR tiers will negatively affect the strength of party labels. Existing research on open-list PR tiers in mixed-member electoral systems has not, as far we are aware, found evidence of this.

3 The Lithuanian system, like other mixed-member majoritarian systems, differs from mixed-member proportional systems, Germany for example, where the percentage of vote a party receives in the list tier represents the overall percentage of seats a party may obtain (Shugart and Wattenburg 2001).

4 Interviews with party leaders and members showed diverse nomination patterns. For example, district party councils determined who will get nominated in SMD district among members of Liberal Movement. For Social Democrats, incumbency automatically guaranteed nomination, meanwhile the remaining seats were allocated to PR-tier incumbents and party members identified by party district councils. The Peasants and Greens had the least transparent system where a small group of party members nominated SMD candidates. Similar diversity is evident in PR tier. The Liberal Movement party allocated list placements based on votes of party council (around 200 people). The Homeland Union based decisions on votes of all party members. The Social Democrats used a point-based system where political experience determined list placement; however, they also had 40% gender quota and in every decile there needed to be one young candidate. Meanwhile, for the Peasants and Greens a small group of party members assembled the list (based on the expectation of how well candidate would perform) and the party council would approve it.

5 There were candidates, however, who did campaign nationally even though they recognized the importance of personal vote coalitions. This is particularly the case when it comes to Tomas Tomilinas and Mindaugas Puidokas (both of them from Peasants and Greens) who were responsible for coordinating and managing the election campaign. Vytautas Kernagis from Homeland Union (Conservatives) was the only other interviewee who accompanied party leaders. .Egidijus Vareikis (Peasants and Greens) also conducted national campaign, but not with party leadership.

6 Peasants and Greens party candidates, however, cooperated extensively across-districts. A few other candidates from more traditional parties mentioned that they distributed material and visited other, mostly neighboring, districts: Simonas Gentvilas (Liberal Movement) and Laurynas Kasčiūnas (Homeland Union).

7 Gintaras Vaičekauskas (Liberal Movement).

8 Exceptions were Aušrinė Armonaitė (Liberal Movement), Gintaras Vaičekauskas (Liberal Movement), Simonas Gentvilas (Liberal Movement), Rimas Andrikis (Order and Justice).

9 We use nominal count because it is the most direct way to measure the effect of dual candidacies. Alternatively, we could use the proportion of personal votes that party candidates receive in the districts. The proportion measure is a fuzzier measurement since it does not guarantee dual-listed candidate actually received more personal votes. We ensure comparability of results across different districts by using matching techniques and both district and party fixed effects.

10 The measure is calculated as $(T-P/T-1)$, where T stands for the total number of positions available on candidate list and P for the position of a candidate on the list. Unlike Zwan, Lubbers, and Eisinga (2019), we do not use multiplication by 100.

11 We are familiar with King and Nielsen’s (2019) critique of PSM as a method that could increase bias instead of reducing it. See the online Appendix 2 for our discussion of it and replication of our analsyis using CEM method.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rimvydas Ragauskas

Rimvydas Ragauskas is political science PhD candidate at Texas Tech University. His current research focuses on legislative representation and comparative political economy.

Frank Thames

Frank Thames is Professor of Political Science at Texas Tech University. His current research focuses on legislative behavior in post-communist legislatures and gender representation. He is Comparative Politics and Gender Politics Field Editor for Political Research Quarterly.