Professional Responsibility, Misconduct and Practical Reason

Abstract

This paper considers the accountability of professionals who are involved in situations of the failure of their organization to perform its expected role properly; the case of infant Caleb Ness, who died despite the surveillance of welfare agencies, is taken as an illustration. Following Bovens (“The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), it is accepted that there is an irreducible element of individual personal responsibility when preventable organizational failures occur through professional incompetence or corruption. The type of guidance available from specialized professional knowledge and from ethical codes is appraised. This is contrasted with various theoretical approaches to practical reasoning, which are offered as a more relevant perspective on professional misconduct. Practical reason necessarily addresses itself to a reality much more uncertain, fluid and contingent than envisaged by the standard conceptions of professional knowledge and ethics. Rather then being derived strictly from impersonal abstract rules and formal knowledge, practical reason in large part reflects the character and personality of its owner. It is argued that, since professional responsibility is always partly personal, professional misconduct can be understood as a failure of practical reason.

Keywords:

• Professional Responsibility
• Misconduct
• Practical Reason
• Phronesis
• Caleb Ness
• Evidence-based Practice

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Chris Clark

Chris Clark is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social and Political Studies at the University of Edinburgh