Self-Respect and the Justification of Rawlsian Principles of Justice

ABSTRACT

In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth—namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability.

KEYWORDS:

• Self-respect
• principles of justice
• social justice
• Rawls

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In ‘Real self-respect and its social bases’ Schemmel draws a distinction between standing and standards self-respect and affirms: ‘Individuals with standards self-respect react with shame when they realise that they have failed to live up to them. Insofar as failure is not simply a matter of lacking abilities, but involves having compromised essential commitments, shame is accompanied by guilt’ (2019, 5).

2 Examples of primary goods are the basic rights and liberties, powers of offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. For Rawls, political institutions are to evaluate how well citizens are doing according to what primary goods they have. The relation between primary goods and social welfare is pointed out by Dean in ‘A Radical Humanist Approach to Social Welfare’ (2020, 354–355). Some examples of the relationship between self-respect and wellbeing can be found in ‘Feminist perspectives on well-being’ (Knowles 2018), particularly in the section ‘Valuing oneself: self-respect as a necessary precondition for achieving well-being’. More generally, the relation between self-respect and wellbeing can be found in Nussbaum’s book Nature Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution (1988).

3 See Feinberg ‘Some Conjectures about the Concept of Respect’ (1973); Darwall ‘Two Kinds of Respect’ (1977), and Dillon ‘Self-respect: Moral, emotional, political’ (1997). Darwall, for example, called this form of respect ‘recognition respect’ (1977, 38) and Dillon ‘recognition self-respect’ (1997, 229). On the other hand, Mackinnon introduced the notion of ‘egalitarian respect’ to characterise this kind of respect in contrast with ‘meritocratic respect’ (2003, 491–496). The relation between dignity and self-respect was emphasised by Dworkin in Justice for Hedgehogs where he affirms that ‘dignity and self-respect—whatever these turn out to mean— are indispensable conditions of living well. We find evidence for that claim in how most people want to live: to hold their heads high as they struggle for all the other things they want’ (2011, 13).

4 See Feinberg: ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ (1970); Anderson: ‘What is the Point of Equality’ (1999) and Olsaretti: Desert and Justice (2003).

5 Examples of this social structure are the political constitution, property, and the economic system. See Freeman: Liberalism and Distributive Justice, Part III Liberal Institutions and Distributive Justice (2018).

6 Here it is pertinent to clarify the aim of the principles of justice. The objective of those principles is not to guarantee the achievement of self-respect in psychological terms but to ensure the social bases of self-respect. If the former objective was Rawls’s intention, his theory would be subject to the same criticism Fraser made of the psychologism in Axel Honneth’s theory—namely, that the focus of social justice is not to ensure some particular psychological state of mind of the person but the social and institutional bases to produce these feelings. Here, Rawls and Fraser share the same idea: the focus of social justice are the major social institutions responsible for the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. See the Fraser & Honneth: Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) and Aguayo: ‘John Rawls on redistribution and recognition’ (2020).

7 The consciousness that our means are sufficient to carry out our lives is a constitutive feature of the definition of Rawlsian self-respect. In Political Liberalism Rawls develops the connection between self-respect and feeling like a cooperative member of society (1993: 318–319). For Penny, ‘Rawls’s account of self-respect emphasizes its importance in ensuring that each citizen feels suitably motivated to enter into cooperation with others and pursue their chosen plan of life with confidence and a lively sense of its worth’ (2015, 401).

8 The relationship between self-respect and reciprocity has been stressed by Zaino: ‘self-respect contains a notion of reciprocity—it is reciprocally self-supporting in that one’s sense of worth needs to be confirmed by others (…) In order for citizens to respect themselves and others, their common plans must be both rational and complimentary’ (1998, 745).

9 The maximin criterion is a rule for choice under uncertainty that affirms that we classify alternatives by their worst possible outcomes. We have to adopt the alternative whose worst outcome leaves us better off than the worst outcome of all other alternatives. This rule ‘directs our attention to the worst that can happen under any proposed course of action, and to decide in the light of that’ (1971, 154). For Rawls, ‘in order to see how this might be done, it is useful as a heuristic device to think of the two principles as the maximin solution to the problem of social justice’ (1971, 152).

10 It is very common in discussions on contemporary political philosophy to affirm that Rawls defends a conception of social justice characterised by blindness to differences. The belief that this blindness prevents liberals from recognising and giving just treatment to the claims of minority groups is the basis for the grammar of social conflict, which has been developed by major authors like Young (1990), and Fraser and Honneth (2003) over recent decades. Founded on what I consider to be a false dilemma, these authors confront a conception of justice centred on recognition with one focused on distribution. Even though Young, Honneth and Fraser defend different paradigms, they all share the idea that conceptions centred on distributive justice are insufficient. I consider this approach to reveal a misunderstanding of distributive justice, especially of the conception developed by John Rawls in TJ. The core of this misunderstanding is the failure to distinguish between allocative justice and distributive justice (see Aguayo 2020). I am very grateful for the comments of one of the reviewers of this paper that brought this issue to my attention.

11 For Rawls, the main feature of the original position is the veil of ignorance. To ensure impartiality of judgment, the parties in the original position are deprived of all knowledge of their characteristics and social and historical circumstances.

12 By ‘utilitarian ideals’ I understand the greatest amount of good for the greatest number, even at the cost of a detriment of wellbeing to one person.

13 See Penny, ‘Self-Respect or Self-Delusion? Tomasi and Rawls on the Basic Liberties’ (2015, 399–400).

14 See footnote 9.

15 Examples of these associations range from a political party to clubs and sports associations.

16 The relation between envy, poverty and distributive justice was developed by Frye in ‘The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice’ (2016).

17 See, for example, Zaino: ‘a society with potentially large disparities in socioeconomic conditions may in fact undermine self-respect’ (1998, 740). For the relationship between anger about inequality based in envy, inferiority or injustice, see Leach’s (2008) chapter, ‘Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice: Three Bases of Anger About Inequality’ in Smith, Envy: Theory and Research (2008).

18 See Nussbaum: ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism’ (2011).

19 The expression ‘realistic utopia’ is used by Rawls to contrast his view with conceptions which are utopian in the pejorative sense or unrealistic. The phrase applies to the possibility of reaching an overlapping consensus on a public conception of justice and the possibility to achieve a reasonably just society.

Additional information

Funding

This paper was supported by FONDECYT 11170230.

Notes on contributors

Pablo Aguayo Westwood

Pablo Aguayo Westwood is a PhD in Ethics and Democracy and he is also an Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy and Theory of Justice.