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Abstract
The January 2013 French military intervention in Mali exposed the rising threat of ‘terrorist’ and illicit networks in the Sahel, but more importantly the intertwined limits of Malian politics and of the international politics of African conflict management. While much has been written about the ‘liberal peace’, this article argues that what is at stake in this debate is the consistency of the ‘liberal peace’ ideological form and what governance requirements it imposes. Such an ideology necessarily intersects with ongoing Malian peace-, nation- and statebuilding dynamics and competing normative orders that transcend state borders and nationalist projects.
Notes on Contributors
Bruno Charbonneau is Associate Professor of Political Science at Laurentian University, Director of the Observatoire sur les missions de paix et opérations humanitaires (Center for Peace Missions and Humanitarian Studies) at the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies (www.dandurand.uqam.ca), and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada. He is author of France and the New Imperialism (Ashgate, 2008) and co-editor of Peace Operations in the Francophone World (Routledge, 2014); Peacebuilding, Memory and Reconciliation (Routledge, 2012); and Locating Global Order (UBC Press, 2010). He can be contacted at: 935 Ramsey Lake Road, Department of Political Science, Laurentian University, Sudbury, ON, Canada J0R 1H0. Email: [email protected].
Jonathan M. Sears is Assistant Professor of International Development Studies at Menno Simons College, affiliated with the University of Winnipeg. His recent publications include a forthcoming chapter (co-authored with B. Charbonneau) in The Politics of International Intervention:the Tyranny of Peace (ed. Florian Kühn and Mandy Turner, Routledge), and “Seeking Sustainable Legitimacy: Existential Challenges for Mali”, International Journal 68 (September 2013). Email: [email protected].
Notes
1 For instances of alternative master-signifiers, from a radical Islamist point of view, ‘peace’ necessitates a universal religious purification and unification. From a Communist point of view, ‘peace’ means to fight against the capitalist order.
2 Ansar Eddine has many transliterations (e.g. Ansar Dine, Ançar Dine, Ansar al-Din and Ansar ul-Din). Iyad ag Ghaly's insurgent movement is not the same as Cherif Ousmane Madani Haidara's 30-year-old movement in southern Mali, called Ansar Dine.
3 Such plural, alternately competing and overlapping sources of legitimacy were also at play during the crises of legitimacy (some since 2011, others since 2008–9) that culminated in the pro-coup mobilization, including social movements close to partisan opposition forces (see Whitehouse Citation2012).
4 If enthusiasts of Mali's democratization saw ATT's first election in 2002 as marking the end of the transition period and the start of democratic consolidation, his re-election in 2007 dampened that enthusiasm. Since that time, Malian critics of ATT's rule have not only denounced elite-level corruption, but also lamented declines in democracy and freedom from the impacts of unanimism, reconciliation and consensus-building. Moreover consensus governance has been defended and even touted by domestic political elites who are economically reliant on international donors (see Bergamaschi Citation2013c; Diallo Citation2009; Sears Citation2013).
5 According to the French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, after UNSC Resolution 2071 was adopted on 12 October, the French government received calls from several African governments which did not believe that AFISMA could perform its mission. At the end of October, France changed its strategy and planned its military support of the African force, including the presence of French troops on the ground (“Mali” 2013).
6 The French government and media reports claimed that the rebels threatened Bamako, but this is highly unlikely. The small rebel forces (estimates varied greatly but it seems safe to say between 2,000 and 3,000) could hardly have controlled both the north and a capital of 2 million people.
7 For example, notwithstanding its support for IBK's presidential candidacy, the ‘official’ grouping of Islamic associations (supported by the Malian Government's Islamic High Council), voiced disappointment in the composition of IBK's government. ‘Mouvement Sabati 2012’ president Moussa Boubacar Bah stated ‘we think president IBK has not understood the Malian people. This government does not correspond to the change wished by the people’.
8 The headquarters of the French military operation Serval were supposed to move from Bamako to N'Djamena (Chad) at the end of May 2014, but the increasing violence in Kidal has postponed it.
9 Bagayoko's ‘insurgés’ means the ensemble of those rising up against the dictatorship.
10 Created in March 2013 to support IBK's presidential bid, l'Alliance pour la démocratie et la paix (ADP-Maliba) makes explicit the political salience of ‘Greater Mali’ in 2013–14.