Minustah’s Legitimacy and the ‘Security-first’ Approach: Reassessing Statebuilding and its Violent Features in the Case of Haiti

ABSTRACT

The article aims to reassess the statebuilding endeavour of international interveners in the case of Haiti, from an interpretative and socio-historical perspective. First, the article analyses the existing critical literature on statebuilding and the growing literature on peacebuilding and legitimacy. Second, it introduces the case of Haiti, analysing the process of state formation and the production of the present conditions in the country. It then presents an assessment of Minustah, arguing that the lack of a local source of legitimacy, connected to a ‘security-first’ statebuilding approach, led the intervention to reinforce the predatory and undemocratic logics of Haitian politics.

KEYWORDS:

• Statebuilding
• peacebuilding
• Haiti
• global governance
• legitimacy
• democratisation

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Tokyo Foundation, which made possible the conduction of the field research that bases this article. She thanks for the generosity of her interviewees; the participants of the Summer School ‘Inclusive Political Settlements: the Theory and Practice of Transforming Conflict’ held at the University of Edinburgh in June of 2016 for early comments and critiques on the material of the field research; and the participants of the ‘Workshop on Conflicts and Institutions’, held at the University of Genoa on the 21 of June of 2017, who provided valuable critiques.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Mariana dos Santos Parra is PhD candidate at the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP), University of Milan, and visiting PhD fellow at the Institute of Intercultural & International Studies (InIIS), University of Bremen, Germany. She holds a Master in International Studies from the University of the Basque Country, Spain, and a degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Brazil.

ORCID

Mariana dos Santos Parra http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4933-2802

Notes

1. The concept of structural violence underlies the analysis, although it will not be discussed here, assuming it has been well defined elsewhere, especially concerning the case of Haiti (Farmer 2004), where it is present also in the discourse of individuals concerned (Muggah 2013, 300).

2. I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 36 individuals, including Haitian citizens and foreigners, members of human rights, humanitarian and development NGOs, politicians, journalists, academics, members of cultural organizations and social and communitarian leaders, Minustah employees, including military personnel, employees of international NGOs, diplomats and representatives of regional organisations. I also observed a cultural activity promoted by Minustah with young people, and discussions with students of the public university (Université d’Etat d’Haïti) about the operation. Although comprising mainly individuals belonging to civil society organisations, there is a considerable diversity of opinions, political position and social origin in the group of people I interviewed, as well as people that benefited directly from the UN mission, and people that have not. The combination of such qualitative, in-depth and interpretative approach with other evidences raised in existing literature, including articles using survey data, as well as policy documents and continuous media analysis, enables a proper evaluation of the configuration of the legitimacy of the UN mission in Haiti and its consequences. It is important to note that reliable data is scarce in Haiti, being basic population statistics, data on violence and crime, or opinion polls; researchers rely on households surveys to infer data such as number of homicides, which is evidently not precise.

3. Mann’s argument around democracy and ethnic cleansing is, again, telling in this sense (Mann 2005). The need, in democracies, for limits and counterbalances against the will of the majority, an important topic in political philosophy, illustrates this point (for instance Benhabib 1996).

4. According to World Bank data, 59 per cent of Haitians were below the national poverty line of US$2.41 per day and over 2.5 million (24 per cent) were living below the national extreme poverty line of US$1.23 per day (World Bank, Overview – Haiti, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview Accessed March 5, 2018). Adult illiteracy is around 50 per cent (UNICEF, at glance: Haiti, https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_statistics.html Accessed March 5, 2018).

5. As reflected by Arendt (2006), revolutions are not always (or are rarely) followed by the ‘foundation of freedom’, for which collective action and achievement of a minimal political consensus among those liberated with the revolutionary process are fundamental, something that did not happen in Haiti. In Arendt’s understanding, even when such ‘foundation of freedom’ took place, the case of the United States, the essential features of this foundation faded away with time. She states that ‘ … while it is true that freedom can only come to those whose needs have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it will escape those who are bent upon living for their desires’ (Arendt 2006, 130), in a clear reference to the United States.

6. The army had a more ambiguous role in Haitian politics and society before the US occupation. It became an important tool for the Haitian rentier elite to extract wealth from peasants, and source of political instability before the US occupation, as even when winning with more democratic processes, most Haitian political leaders needed to consolidate their power through military authority. Nonetheless, it has been an important mean of land distribution, during Pétion’s administration (Trouillot 1990, 321), it used to represent the ethos of the Haitian revolution, and the different poles of power, other than Port-au-Prince, also comprised different poles of military power, enabling, in this way, certain checks and balances against tyranny (Trouillot 1990; Dubois 2012).

7. ‘Although a precise count is difficult to come by, it is estimated that up to a million of Haitians – about 15 per cent of the country’s population – fled during the thirty years of Duvalier rule’. (Dubois 2012, 354)

8. Recently, civil society pressure was able to halt a similar process in the peanuts sector (see: ‘Dumping Peanuts on Haiti,’ Oxfam America, April 6, 2016. https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/04/dumping-peanuts-on-haiti/ Accessed September 7, 2018).

9. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, 16 April 2004, S 2004/300.

10. ‘Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif’ (PAPDA), and the feminist ‘Coordination nationale de plaidoyer pour les droits des femmes’ (CONAP) are examples of organisations that opposed Aristide’s government, and also denounced the conditions of the external intervention in 2004. See: PAPDA, ‘Les causes de la chute d’Aristide en 2004’, September 12, 2004. http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=44 Accessed June 7, 2018. Tellingly, Haitian historian Susy Castor calls Aristide an anarcho-populist (Castor 2008, 33).

11. PAPDA, ‘Forces vives d’Haiti décrétent le Gouvernement Lavalas hors la loi’, February 2, 2004. http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=48 Accessed June 7, 2018; Human Rights Watch, Events of 2004. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2005/country-chapters/haiti Accessed June 12, 2018.

12. Three of my local informants said that in their view this was a decisive factor for Aristide’s fall, and this is a common opinion among Haitians. For more information about Aristide's claims, and the commission created in France to decide about this issue, see: Beckett 2013.

13. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, 29 February 2004.

14. Interview with Mourad Wahba, then UNDP representative and Minustah’s humanitarian coordinator.

15. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, 16 April 2004, S 2004/300.

16. The lack of legitimacy and inaction of the transitional government, especially concerning the conflict and the violence, was emphasised by some of my interviewees, Haitians and foreigners alike.

17. Martelly’s administration even diminished the responsibility of the United Nations for the cholera contamination, instead of pressuring the organisation for an effective response to the crisis, as Haitian civil society did (Seitenfus 2014, pos. 5408).

18. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2350, 13 April 2017.

19. Reports from the field research also attested such improvement of the PNH and the positive role of Minustah.

20. Interview with military personnel of Minustah.

21. Some of my interviewees, mainly Haitians from civil society organisations and belonging to the middle class, expressed this dissatisfaction with the initial DDR programme.

22. This opinion has been expressed by several of my local informants.

23. Two Years Later, Haitian Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute, Maura R. O’Connor, Columbia Journalism Review, January 12, 2012. https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php Accessed August 31, 2018.

24. Final Report – Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti, January 13, 2011, OAS, http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2011/CP25512E.pdf Accessed May 14, 2018.

25. Final Report – Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti, January 13, 2011, OAS, http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2011/CP25512E.pdf Accessed May 14, 2018.

26. ‘Elections in Haiti: 2015 Legislative Elections.’ International Foundation for Electoral Systems, August 6, 2015. http://www.ifes.org/faqs/elections-haiti-2015-legislative-elections Accessed May 14, 2018.

27. Recent reports on elections in Haiti inform that intimidation and violence in polling stations is still common. See, for instance: OAS, Final Report – Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti, January 13, 2011; OAS, Report to the Permanent Council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, General Elections, September 12, 2017 (http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Final-Haiti-CP-2017-ENG.pdf). This view was also expressed by several of my interviewees, Haitians and foreigners alike.

28. OAS, Report to the permanent council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, General Elections, 29 January 2017. http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Final-Haiti-CP-2017-ENG.pdf Accessed September 7, 2018.

29. Reported during the field research by local informants and foreigners alike. I also had reports of politically motivated violence perpetrated by gang members during this period.

30. ‘Improprieties of UN’s Sandra Honoré condemned by Haitian-American org.’ Haiti Sentinel, November 16, 2015. http://sentinel.ht/2015/11/16/improprieties-of-uns-sandra-honore-condemned-by-haitian-american-org/; ‘Lettre ouverte à Madame Sandra Honoré.’ Le Nouvelliste, November 16, 2015. https://lenouvelliste.com/article/152544/lettre-ouverte-a-madame-sandra-honore Accessed March 16, 2018. Several of my local informants mentioned these declarations and that they represented a violation of Haitian’s sovereignty.

31. The reported turnout in 2006 was of 60 per cent, 22 per cent in 2010 and 18 per cent in 2016 (Inter-Parliament Union, Haiti – Elections held in 2006, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2138_06.htm; OAS, Final Report Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, January 13, 2011; OAS, Report to the Permanent Council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, January 29, 2017). In my interviews with Haitians, the waning trust in the elections and political system was also predominant.

32. See also: ‘Leaked UN report faults sanitation at Haiti bases at time of cholera outbreak.’ The Guardian, April 5, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/leaked-un-report-sanitation-haiti-bases-cholera-outbreak?CMP=share_btn_fb.

33. ‘UN’s Ban apologizes to people of Haiti, outlines new plan to fight cholera epidemic and help communities,’ UN News Centre, December 1, 2016. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55694#.WSgoQGjyjIV; ‘U.N. Apologizes for Role in Haiti’s 2010 Cholera Outbreak,’ The New York Times, December 1, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/world/americas/united-nations-apology-haiti-cholera.html.

34. See: ‘UN could have prevented Haiti cholera epidemic with $2,000 health kit – study,’ The Guardian, April 14, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/haiti-cholera-epidemic-un-prevention?CMP=share_btn_fb Accessed September 7, 2018.

35. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2272 on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 11 March 2016.

36. L’Expert indépendant de l’ONU présente ses conclusions au terme de sa mission en Haïti, OHCHR, March 13, 2017. www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21352&LangID=F#sthash.K0lRxSK2.dpuf Accessed September 7, 2018.

37. See, for instance: ‘Mass funeral held for inmates who died in ‘cruel, inhuman’ Haitian prison,’ CBS News, February 21, 2017. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/families-mourn-after-20-haitians-die-in-dismal-prison/.

38. See, for instance: OHCHR, Report: ‘Se faire justice soi-même ou le règne de l’impunité en Haïti’, January 2017. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/170117Rapport_Se_faire_justice_soimeme_FR.pdf Accessed September 7, 2018.

39. Interview with civil society representative.