ABSTRACT
Cooperation between intelligence services is primary when tackling transnational threats. Yet, often, cooperation is limited by the capabilities that states can deploy. Understanding the constraints and structure of services – and their origins – should make it clear how much leverage an intelligence apparatus has and accordingly, where remaining intelligence gaps lie. The article focuses on one state with a small intelligence service, Switzerland, and shows the complexity that understanding such constraints can have. The country went through many scandals which shaped its structure as well as what it was allowed to do. The article posits notably that the current structure of the Swiss intelligence apparatus, with only one civilian organisation, is best explained as the result of political and bureaucratic factors, and not, as often contended, because of changes in the landscape of violence. Considering these two other factors leads to a new but comforting conclusion: the structure of its intelligence apparatus does not need be completely overhauled whenever the political elite perceives a change in priorities for intelligence analysis. For international partners, this should mean certain stability, as the service builds up its institutional memory, learns from its mistakes, and thus becomes more professional and efficient.
Disclosure statement
The author is a former analyst at the Department of Defence, Switzerland.