ABSTRACT
In an effort to contextualise the concept of intelligence liaison within the framework of International Relations theories, the paper argues that the genesis of liaison arrangements is driven by necessity and convenience – key tenets of realism. Specifically, the paper investigates U.S.–Pakistan intelligence liaison spanning over a period of three decades, from early 1980s – a time when religious terrorism spread its tentacles in the Indian subcontinent under the aegis of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence and occasionally, indirect support from the Central Intelligence Agency – till the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. The question that is attempted to answer is: under what conditions do intelligence liaisons sustain? What drives cooperation or confrontation among intelligence services? The case study serves as an illustration of the realpolitik character of intelligence liaisons where interests and practicality-driven actions dominate moral and ethical considerations. Finally, using Randall Shweller’s model of analysis of international alliances, the paper concludes that, more than honouring the purpose of the liaison arrangement, the complex adversarial liaison between the two intelligence agencies served as a medium for each other to balance their interests.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.