![Sample our Law journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5942/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Law.jpg"})
Abstract
This article offers a revisionary re‐description of the central characteristics of terrorism in an attempt to put forward a persuasive definition under which scholars could converge. It accepts that there are valid reasons for rejecting the term, not least because it is a socially constructed label that has been misused in public discourse. Nonetheless, it argues that, based on a ‘minimal foundationalist’ ontological position, it is possible to define and describe the key characteristics of terrorist violence. The article then attempts to re‐describe the characteristics of terrorism by dealing with a number of common misconceptions, such as the notion that terrorism is violence directed at civilians or non‐combatants by non‐state actors, before offering a contingent definition of terrorism relevant to the present historical moment. The article concludes by outlining a range of additional pragmatic and normative reasons for retaining the term as a research concept.
Acknowledgements
Parts of this article were originally presented as a paper entitled ‘Critical terrorism studies: an explanation, a defence and a way forward’ at the 3rd Annual CICA‐STR International Conference: ‘Political Violence and Collective Aggression: Considering the Past, Imagining the Future’, University of Ulster, Jordanstown Campus, Northern Ireland, 2–5 September, 2009. I am grateful for valuable feedback received from participants and journal reviewers. Thanks also to Justin Sinclair for encouragement to submit the article in the first place.
Notes
1. This section is adapted from Jackson, Pontying and Murphy (Citation2009). See also, Blakeley (Citation2009). A great many empirical examples of acts of state terrorism can be found in these sources.