Dilemmas of “going legit”: why should violent groups engage in or avoid electoral politics?

Abstract

Much of the recent literature on the violent groups that turn to electoral politics centers on the conditions under which these groups undertake these transitions, the types of groups that are likely to do so, and the moderating implications these transitions have on the groups involved. While the literature offers insights into the costs and benefits associated with a transition to nonviolent forms of politics, there is an apparent gap when it comes to delineating the variety of costs and benefits associated with these transitions, especially from the perspectives of the violent groups that may or may not undertake them. This paper begins to fill this gap in the literature through an investigation of the benefits violent groups may gain from a transition to electoral politics, as well as the costs these transitions may impose. Implications of turning to electoral politics for group legitimacy, popular support, bargaining position, group objectives, and group survival figure prominently among the costs and benefits. Looking at these transitions from the point of view of violent groups, it becomes apparent that even though groups may expect to benefit from this transition, there are many ways in which they do not.

Keywords:

• electoral politics
• terrorist groups
• political parties
• adaptation
• political violence

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Ami Pedahzur, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression for helpful comments.

Notes on contributor

Susanne Martin is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Irvin (1999) and Weinberg et al. (2009) for an elaboration of the conditions under which groups are more or less likely to shift between violent and nonviolent tactics.

2. See Weinberg (1991) for a typology of the various types of transitions from terrorism to party politics.

3. For further discussion of tactics and strategies and the distinctions between them, see Weinberg et al. (2009) and Eccarius-Kelly (2011).

4. See Deane (2008) for a description of how Hamas' lack of recognition as a legitimate political actor following its 2006 parliamentary victory may have an effect on the party's operations.

5. See Crenshaw (2008) for a discussion of the lack of information that armed groups have regarding their levels of popular support.

6. See Guelke and Smyth (1992) for further discussion of Bobby Sands' campaign and election and the effect this had on IRA strategy.

7. Refer to Scham and Abu-Irshaid (2009) for a detailed discussion of Hamas and political competition in the Palestinian context.

8. Kydd and Walter (2006) make a similar suggestion with regard to some Palestinians' preference for Hamas over Fatah: “Palestinians might therefore prefer Hamas as a negotiating agent with Israel because it has a reputation for resolve and will reject inferior deals” (p. 77).