![Sample our Law journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5942/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Law.jpg"})
Abstract
Religion and ethnicity is widely associated with the unrelenting Taliban-led violence in Pakistan. Their shari'a rhetoric coupled with a sympathetic politico-religious constituency compounds the terrorism landscape for the general audience. Besides, less academic treatment of the phenomenon entailing analysis of its wholesome dimensions further constrains its understanding. Conceding the fact that religion pervades all aspects of contemporary conflict, this article argues that the present setting is neither rooted in the ethnicity nor in the religion literally as the conflict formation variables; it is instead governed since its inception by dynamics germinating from Pakhtunwali (a social code of conduct of tribal Pashtun), mainly its retributive imperative. It specifically investigates the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's rent seeking, greed and hypocritical behavior, which, it contends, lies in the selective perversion of Pakhtunwali permeated also by the nuanced influence of foreign fighters. The peace advocates’ claim for potential success in dialog with Taliban is therefore considered as misleading. Drawing upon an adapted theoretical framework, the article attempts to empirically demonstrate the viability of these assertions.
Notes on contributor
Muhammad Feyyaz holds M.phil. degree in peace and conflict studies from National Defence University, Islamabad, and a master's in war studies from Quaid-e- Azam University, Islamabad. As a former soldier, he has served in the tribal areas of Pakistan for nearly two years. Has studied mediating disputes from Harvard Law School, management of group conflict from USIP, Washington, DC and terrorism studies course from NATO-Centre for Excellence-defence against terrorism, Turkey. Feyyaz is also the country coordinator for Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) for Pakistan. He teaches at the School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology, Lahore Pakistan.
Notes
1 This research work is primarily based on empirical sources; the inspiration for this undertaking stems from the writer's extensive experience of interaction with the tribes during nearly two years stay in North Waziristan Agency from 2006–2008.
1. See Chapter 2– Al-Baqara, verse 178, Al-Quran.
2. This writer is of the opinion that generally tribes are conscious of the salient contradictions between rawaj and Islam. The more moderate and informed tribal families in FATA and especially those settled in urban areas however renounce these traditions. For further details, read Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, CAMP 2011; The Economist (Citation2006 ) Special report, Pushtunwali: Honour among them; Muhammad Ali Baba Khel, SWARA: Women as Property, Peshawar: Aurat Foundation, 2003.
3. A civil war is defined by Bosker and Ree as an armed conflict between an internationally recognized state and (mainly) domestic challengers able to mount an organized military opposition to the state. A war must have caused more than 1000 deaths in total and within at least a three-year period.
4. Baituallah was the first chief of the TTP hailing from Meshud tribe of South Waziristan. He retained that position until his death during August 2009. Maulvi Nazir who belonged to Ahmed Zai Waziri tribe of South Waziristan succeeded Nek Muhammad in June 2004, to lead Waziri Taliban. All three were killed by drone attacks.
5. Fakir of Ipi who was born and also died in North Waziristan, belonged to the Tori Khel sub-tribe of Wazirs. He is buried in the Gorvek area situated close to Dwa Toi, a small hamlet along the Pakistan–Afghan border.
6. Gul Bahadur is the dominant Taliban leader from Uthman Zai tribe of North Waziristan. He is generally known for his pro-government stance. There have been unconfirmed reports of his killing by drone attack during January 2015.