Re-examining the explanations of convert radicalization in Salafi-Jihadist terrorism with evidence from Canada

ABSTRACT

Evidence from multiple sources suggests converts to Islam are significantly overrepresented in the ranks of Salafi-jihadist terrorists. Researchers have been speculating for some time why this might be the case. This paper identifies, and critically examines, four hypothetical explanations commonly found in the literature: (1) some explanations focus on the significance of prior personal characteristics of the converts; (2) some explanations emphasize the rapidity of the movement from conversion to radicalization; (3) some explanations highlight the lack of religious knowledge on the part of radicalized converts; and (4) some explanations point to the role of the zealotry of converts. Examining each explanation, we find the causal mechanisms hypothesized are inadequate and the hypotheses are incongruent with the data we have collected on radicalized Canadian converts. In the end, we offer an alternative hypothesis, based on the analysis of the response of radicalized converts to an experience of disappointment that is common in the post-conversion period.

KEYWORDS:

• Radicalization
• religious conversion
• terrorism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The nine referenced studies and their respective calculation of convert representation are: 40% – Vidino & Hughes (2015); 6% – Bakker & de Bont (2016); 20% – Hellmuth (2016); 18.2% – Boncio (2017); 12.9% – Bergema & Van San (2019); 25% – Dawson & Amarasingam (2017); 23% – Reynolds & Hafez (2019); 11.2% – Marone & Vidino (2019); 15% – Weenink (2019).

2 Of course, the incidence rate of women being involved in violent extremist groups is much larger than this sample suggests (see, e.g. Davis 2017).

3 The phrases including ‘foreign fighters’, ‘ISIS’, ‘high risk travelers’, ‘extremist travelers’, ‘Canadian convert’ and ‘homegrown violent extremism.’

4 For an overview of the Canadian situation see Dawson and Amarasingam (2020).

5 As is obvious, even in cases with ample public reporting, it was still difficult to gather enough information to fill out the columns.

6 The paradigmatic manifestation of this inclination is St. Augustine in Confessions, a text that set the model for Christian conversion narratives. See, e.g. Dong Young Kim (2012).

7 Note, for this analysis, all religious converts included in the data file were included and the motivating ideology was not constrained to Salafi-Jihadism. Of the 185 converts, 139 were involved in Salafi-Jihadist plots, 19 were involved in far-right plots, 9 were involved in far-left plots and 18 were involved in single-issue plots. Most of the single-issue converts were individuals who converted to Christianity and were later involved in anti-abortion plots targeting health care practitioners or human service agencies that provided abortion services.

8 The PIRUS codebook defines exposure as the ‘time of incident or arrest, or earliest mention of individual in sources, so long as these are related to the plot/radicalization of the individual’. This could include, for example, the earliest date in an indictment where an individual is mentioned as having come to the attention of law enforcement or intelligence agencies, which would likely pre-date by some time the date of arrest. But, nevertheless, we contend the significant time between conversion and involvement cannot be fully explained away by these issues with the data.

9 This finding aligns with John Horgan’s (2014) argument for differentiating between how persons become involved in extremist movements and groups and how a few of those who join later agree to commit acts of violence for the cause.

10 In making this statement, however, he misstates the facts, in a way that exaggerates the significance of his claim. On the questionnaires in question ISIS recruits were asked to rate their knowledge of Shariah law, and not Islam, as he states. There is a significant difference, and as Andrew Lebovich (2016, p. 2) comments, ‘[t]he relative weakness of someone’s knowledge of the Shariah does not necessarily say much about how religious they are or want to be. For one thing, a depth of knowledge of Shariah is not particularly common for observant Muslims, and it is in many ways a construct of outsiders to think it should be’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David A. Jones

David Jones is a graduate of the University of Alberta and presently works as the Manager of Applied Research at the Organization for the Prevention of Violence.

Lorne L. Dawson

Dr. Lorne Dawson is a Full Professor in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies and the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Waterloo. In 2012 he co-founded the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). He is the current Project Director (see www.tsas.ca) of this partnership.