Beyond Structure and Contingency: Toward an Interactionist and Sequential Approach to the 2011 Uprisings

Abstract

Taking as its starting point the mental earthquake produced by the 2011 uprisings, this article tackles the epistemological questions of causality and contingency in an effort to foster dialogue between comparative political regime studies, the sociology of revolutions and social movement literature. Based on a comparative analysis of three ‘positive cases’ (Egypt, Syria and Tunisia), and a ‘negative case’ (Morocco), it follows an interactionist and sequential approach to revolutionary situations. Its main objective is to expand the scope of the attempts aimed at reconciling structure and contingency, by focusing on the formation of large coalitions and the spread of mobilization on division or defection from within the repressive apparatus, and on the impact of crisis management by the incumbents. More specifically, the article highlights the fact that uncertainty affects not only the ‘actors from below,’ but also all the actors present: the challengers as much as the incumbents and their international allies, the ordinary citizens as well as the officers and the recruits.

Key Words:

• Arab uprisings
• Army
• Causality
• Coalition formation
• Contingency
• Crisis management
• Defection
• Egypt
• Morocco
• Repressive apparatus
• Revolutions
• Syria
• Tunisia

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dietmar Braun, Youssef El Chazli, Olivier Fillieule, Bernard Voutat and the anonymous reviewers for their stimulating comments on an early version of this article. I would also like to thank Joanne Deller for her translation of the first version of this article from French, Youssef El Chazli for his attentive reading of this translation, and Ann Humphry-Baker for her reading of the revised version.

Notes

¹ E. Burke III (1988) Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections, in: E. Burke III & I. Lapidus (eds) Islam, Politics, and Social Movements (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press), p. 17.

² The proceedings of the first conference are published in: Theory and Society, 23(2), 1993; proceedings of the second are in: American Journal of Sociology, 100(6), 1995.

³ F. G. Gause III (2011) Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability, Foreign Affairs, 90(4), pp. 81–90.

⁴ See, e.g., C. Tilly (1995) European Revolutions: 1492–1992 (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing).

⁵ T. Kuran (1995) The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises, American Journal of Sociology, pp. 1528–1551.

⁶ W. H. Sewell, Jr. (1996) Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology, in: T. J. McDonald (ed.) The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, 98 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press), p. 264; also see C. Kurzman (2004) The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge and Harvard: Harvard University Press).

⁷ For a critical review, see, e.g., M. Valbjørn (2015) Reflections on Self-Reflections: On Framing the Analytical Implications of the Arab Uprisings for the Study of Arab Politics, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 218–238.

⁸ Following in the footsteps of M. Bennani-Chraïbi & O. Fillieule (2012) Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations: Reflections on the Arab Uprisings, Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 62(5–6), pp. 1–29.

⁹ In the same vein, see, e.g., A. Allal & T. Pierret (eds) (2013) Au cœur des révoltes arabes [Inside the Arab Revolts] (Paris: Colin); J. Beinin & F. Vairel (eds) (2013) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press); M. Camau & F. Vairel (eds) (2014) Soulèvements et recompositions politiques dans le monde arabe [Political Uprisings and Recompositions in the Arab World] (Montréal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal); R. Hinnebusch (2015) Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 358–374. For the use of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas to understand these processes through their historicity, see, e.g., J. Chalcraft (2016) Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

¹⁰ C. Tilly (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley), pp. 189–222.

¹¹ For a discussion about monarchical exceptionalism and for a critical view of institutionalist explanations see,

e.g., D. Bischof & S. Fink (2015) Repression as a Double-Edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs,

Repression and Revolution in the Arab World, Swiss Political Science Review, 21(3), pp. 377–395.

¹² R. Aya (1990) Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis).

¹³ A. Abbott (2001) Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).

¹⁴ L. Dakhli (2013) Tunisia and Syria: Comparing Two Years of Revolution, Middle East Critique, 22(3), p. 300.

¹⁵ See, for example, M. Pace & F. Cavatorta (2012) The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective – An Introduction, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), pp. 125-138. See also the following special issues: The Arab Uprisings of 2011, Middle East Critique (2013), 22(3); From Arab Spring to Arab Winter: Explaining the Limits of Post-uprising Democratisation, Democratization (2015), 22(2); Révolutions arabes: un événement pour les sciences sociales ? [Arab Revolutions: An Event for the Social Sciences?], Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée [Review of the Muslim Worlds and of the Mediterranean] (2015), 138.

¹⁶ S. Heydemann (2015) Explaining the Arab Uprisings: Transformations in Comparative Perspective, Mediterranean Politics, 21(1), pp. 1–13.

¹⁷ A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Issaev, S. Y. Malkov & A. P. Shishkina (2014) The Arab Spring: A Quantitative Analysis, Arab Studies Quarterly, 36(2), pp. 149–169.

¹⁸ Sewell, Three Temporalities, p. 263.

¹⁹ R. Aya (2001) The Third Man; or, Agency in History; or, Rationality in Revolution, History and Theory, 40(4), pp. 143–152.

²⁰ E. Bellin (2012) Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2), p. 127.

²¹ Ibid, p. 135.

²² P. Balsiger (2015) Corporations as Players and Arenas, in: M. J. Jasper & J. W. Duyvendak (eds) Players and Arenas (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) p. 119.

²³ Following in the footsteps of Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, see, e.g., Jasper & Duyvendak, (eds) Players and Arenas.

²⁴ D. McAdam, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (2001) Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

²⁵ Ibid, p. 37.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 308.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 15.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 26.

²⁹ C. Tilly (2008) Contentious Performances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 4–5.

³⁰ McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p. 311.

³¹ Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, p. 13. For an implementation of this concept of multi-level analysis and causation inspired by symbolic interactionism, see, e.g., O. Fillieule (2015) Disengagement from Radical Organizations: A Process and Multilevel Model of Analysis, in: B. Klandermans & C. van Stralen (eds) Movements in Times of Democratic Transition, pp. 34–63 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

³² Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, Towards a Sociology of Revolutionary Situations, p. 14.

³³ Abbott, Time Matters, p. 51.

³⁴ I. Ermakoff (2015) The Structure of Contingency, American Journal of Sociology, 121(1), p. 114.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ G. Steinmetz (1998) Critical Realism and Historical Sociology. A Review Article, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1), p. 173 quoted by Ermakoff, The Structure of Contingency, p. 70.

³⁷ Ermakoff, The Structure of Contingency, p. 110.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 100.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 66.

⁴⁰ J. Goodwin, J. Jasper & F. A. Polletta (eds) (2001) Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), p. 16.

⁴¹ S. Latté (2015) Des « mouvements émotionnels » à la mobilisation des émotions [From ‘Emotional Movements’ to the Mobilization of Emotions], Terrains/Théories [Fieldworks/Theories], (2). Available at https://teth.revues.org/244.

⁴² M. R. Beissinger (2011) Mechanisms of Maidan: The Structure of Contingency in the Making of the Orange Revolution, Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), p. 27.

⁴³ Abbott, Time Matters, p. 51.

⁴⁴ R. Chartier (1991) The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham & London: Duke University Press), p. 169.

⁴⁵ J. W. Duyvendak & O. Fillieule (2015) Conclusion: Patterned Fluidity: An Interactionist Perspective as a Tool for Exploring Contentious Politics, in: J. Jasper & J. W. Duyvendak (eds) Players and Arenas (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), p. 298.

⁴⁶ L. J. Rupp & V. Taylor (1987) Survival in the Doldrums (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press).

⁴⁷ S. Tarrow (1993) Modular Collective Action and the Rise of the Social Movement: Why the French Revolution Was Not Enough, Politics & Society, 21(1), pp. 69–90.

⁴⁸ McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention, p. 275.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., M. Parsa (2000) States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

⁵⁰ Hinnebusch, Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes.

⁵¹ M. R. Beissinger, A. A. Jamal & K. Mazur (2015) Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions, Comparative Politics, 48(1), pp. 1–24.

⁵² Ibid, p. 19.

⁵³ C. Hmed (2015) Répression d’État et situation révolutionnaire en Tunisie (2010–2011) [State Repression and Revolutionary Situation in Tunisia (2010–2011)], Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire [Twentieth Century: History Review], 128(4), p. 80.

⁵⁴ J. Allinson (2015) Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 294–314.

⁵⁵ C. Hmed (2012) Abeyance Networks, Contingency and Structures. History and Origins of the Tunisian Revolution, Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 62(5–6), pp. 797–820.

⁵⁶ A. Allal (2012) ‘Revolutionary’ Trajectories in Tunisia: Processes of Political Radicalization 2007–2011, Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 62(5–6), pp. 821–841.

⁵⁷ Hinnebusch, Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes.

⁵⁸ M. Duboc & J. Beinin (2013) A Workers’ Social Movement on the Margin of the Global Neoliberal Order, Egypt 2004–2012, in: Beinin & Vairel (eds) Social Movements, Mobilization and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, pp. 205–227.

⁵⁹ M. Vannetzel (2012) La clandestinité ouverte: Réseaux et registres de la mobilisation des frères musulmans en Égypte (2005–2010) [Openly Clandestine: Networks and Registers for the Mobilization of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt], PhD dissertation, Institut d’études Politiques de Paris.

⁶⁰ M. Abdelrahman (2011) The Transnational and the Local: Egyptian Activists and Transnational Protest Networks, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 38(3), p. 407.

⁶¹ V. Collombier (2011) Gamal Moubarak et le Parti National Démocratique ou la stratégie du désastre [Gamal Mubarak and the National Democratic Party or the disaster strategy], Outre-Terre [Other World], 29(3), p. 343.

⁶² A. Baczko, G. Dorronsoro & A. Quesnay (2013) Mobilisations as a Result of Deliberation and Polarising Crisis. The Peaceful Protests in Syria (2011), Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 63(5), p. 17.

⁶³ See, e.g., M. Rey (2013) La révolte des quartiers: territorialisation plutôt que confessionalisation [The Revolt of the Districts: Regional Autonomy rather than Confessionalism], in: F. Burgat & B. Paoli (eds) Pas de printemps pour la Syrie [No Spring for Syria] (Paris: La Découverte), p. 90; R. Leenders & S. Heydemann (2012) Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), pp. 139–159.

⁶⁴ E. Picard (2008) Armée et sécurité au cœur de l’autoritarisme [Army and Security at the Heart of Authoritarianism], in: O. Dabène, V. Geisser, & G. Massardier (eds) Autoritarismes démocratiques et démocraties autoritaires au XXIe siècle [Democratic Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Democracies in the 21st century], pp. 303–329 (Paris: La Découverte).

⁶⁵ B. Haddad (2012) Business Networks in Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).

⁶⁶ L. Anderson (2000) Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive, in: J. Kostiner (ed.) Middle East Monarchies. The Challenge of Modernity, pp. 53–69 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

⁶⁷ F. Vairel (2014) Politique et mouvements sociaux au Maroc [Politics and Social Movements in Morocco] (Paris: Sciences Po Les presses).

⁶⁸ M. Bennani-Chraïbi & M. Jeghllaly (2012) The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement, Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 62(5–6), pp. 103–130.

⁶⁹ D. Strang & J. W. Meyer (1993) Institutional Conditions for Diffusion, Theory and Society, 22(4), pp. 487–511.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Y. El Chazli (2012) On the Road to Revolution. How Did ‘Depoliticised’ Egyptians Become Revolutionaries? Revue Française de Science Politique [English], 5–6 (62), pp. 843–865.

⁷² K. Clarke (2014) Unexpected Brokers of Mobilization: Contingency and Networks in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising, Comparative Politics, 46 (4), pp. 379–397.

⁷³ Baczko, Dorronsoro & Quesnay, Mobilisations As a Result of Deliberation, p. 6, 13.

⁷⁴ E. Burke III (2014) The Ethnographic State (Oakland: University of California Press).

⁷⁵ M. Bennani-Chraïbi & M. Jeghllaly, The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement; and S. Smaoui & M. Wazif (2013) Étendard de lutte ou pavillon de complaisance? [Fighting Symbol or Flag of Convenience?], in: Allal & Pierret (eds) Au cœur des révoltes arabes, pp. 55–79.

⁷⁶ W. Pearlman (2013) Emotions and the Micro-foundations of the Arab Uprisings, Perspectives on Politics, 11(2), p. 387.

⁷⁷ R. Leenders (2012) Collective Action and Mobilization in Dar’a: An Anatomy of the Onset of Syria’s Popular Uprising, Mobilization, 17(4), pp. 419–434.

⁷⁸ Baczko & al., Mobilisations as a Result of Deliberation, p. 6.

⁷⁹ Y. El Chazli (2017) Four Scenes of the Egyptian Revolution in Alexandria: A Microhistory of January 25. How a Series of Contingencies Walked Us to the Revolution. Available online at: https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/01/25/feature/politics/four-scenes-of-the-egyptian-revolution-in-alexandria-a-microhistory-of-january-25/, accessed July 26, 2017.

⁸⁰ McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention, p. 46.

⁸¹ Fillieule, Disengagement from Radical Organizations.

⁸² See, e.g., Bellin, Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East, p. 143; and R. Springborg (2014) Arab Militaries, in: M. Lynch (ed.) The Arab Uprisings Explained, pp. 142–159 (Columbia: Columbia University Press).

⁸³ Picard, Armée et sécurité au cœur de l’autoritarisme, p. 322.

⁸⁴ H. Albrecht (2015) Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political – Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings, Mediterranean Politics, 20(1), pp. 36–54.

⁸⁵ Springborg, Arab Militaries, p. 149.

⁸⁶ N. Ketchley (2014) ‘The Army and the People Are One Hand!’ Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 56(1), pp. 155–186.

⁸⁷ El Chazli, Four Scenes of the Egyptian Revolution in Alexandria.

⁸⁸ S. E. Nepstad (2013) Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain and Syria, Journal of Peace Research, 50(3), p. 341.

⁸⁹ M. Camau (2014) Le soulèvement populaire tunisien: retour sur images [Tunisian Uprising: Back to the Images], in: Soulèvements et recompositions politiques dans le monde arabe [Political Uprisings and Recompositions in the Arab World] (Montréal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal), p. 61.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 68.

⁹¹ T. Aclimandos (2015) De l’armée égyptienne. Éléments d’interprétation du ‘grand récit’ d’un acteur-clé du paysage national [The Egyptian Army: Some Elements to Interpret the ‘Great Narrative’ of a Key Player on the National Stage], Revue Tiers Monde [Third World Review], 222(2), p. 89.

⁹² A. Holmes (2012) There Are Weeks When Decades Happen: Structure and Strategy in the Egyptian Revolution, Mobilization, 17(4), p. 397.

⁹³ V. Geisser & A. Krefa (2011) L’uniforme ne fait plus le régime, les militaires arabes face aux ‘révolutions’ [The Uniform does not make the Regime any more, the Arab Military faces the ‘Revolutions’], Revue internationale et stratégique [International and Strategic Review], 3(83), p. 94.

⁹⁴ Ermakoff, The Structure of Contingency, p. 66.

⁹⁵ Parsa, States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions.

⁹⁶ L. Anderson (2013) ‘Early-Adopters’ and ‘Neighborhood Effects,’ in: C. Henry & J. Ji-Hyang (eds) The Arab Spring: Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions?, pp. 27–32 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

⁹⁷ S. Heydemann & R. Leenders (2011) Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening,’ Globalizations, 8(5), p. 649.

⁹⁸ Camau, Le soulèvement populaire tunisien, p. 50.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 51.

¹⁰⁰ N. Jebnoun (2014) In the Shadow of Power: Civil–Military Relations and the Tunisian Popular Uprising, The Journal of North African Studies, 19(3), pp. 296–316.

¹⁰¹ Collombier, Gamal Moubarak et le Parti National Démocratique, pp. 339–340.

¹⁰² Baczko et al., Mobilisations As a Result of Deliberation, p. 20.

¹⁰³ F. Burgat (2013) La stratégie Al-Assad: Diviser pour survivre, in: F. Burgat & B. Paoli (eds) Pas de Printemps pour la Syrie.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 25.

¹⁰⁵ L. Vignal (2014) La révolution ‘par le bas’ en Syrie [Revolution ‘from below’ in Syria], in: Camau & Vairel (eds) Soulèvements et recompositions politiques dans le monde arabe.

¹⁰⁶ Burgat, La stratégie Al-Assad, p. 19.

¹⁰⁷ Bennani-Chraïbi & Jeghllaly, The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement, pp. 129–130.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 130.