A Capability Approach to Intergenerational Justice? Examining the Potential of Amartya Sen's Ethics with Regard to Intergenerational Issues

Abstract

The idea of intergenerational justice has practical consequences, not least because it is linked to the politically influential, wide-ranging concept of sustainable development. It also bears on several philosophical puzzles arising in the context of intergenerational justice. They need to be solved in order to establish a case for intergenerational obligations of justice. In this paper we shall examine Amartya Sen's capability approach in the light of these questions. In developing an account of human development, Sen's capability approach suggests a conception of some aspects of intragenerational justice, but not of intergenerational justice itself. This paper aims to close this gap in two steps: first, it identifies necessary elements of a theory of justice; second, and subsequently, it examines how successful the capability approach is in providing these elements.

Keywords:

• Capability approach
• Well-being
• Human development
• Economic Development
• Sustainability
• Environment

About the Authors

Rebecca Gutwald is a research assistant at the Ludwig-Maximilans-University, Munich, Germany. Having studied law and philosophy, her areas of research include the ethics of the capabilities approach, political philosophy and applied ethics. After working in a research project on intergenerational justice and the capability approach, she is currently continuing this line of research in an interdisciplinary project focusing on resilience and capabilities.

Ortrud Leßmann is a senior researcher at the Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg, Germany. An economist by training, her research interest lies in the overlap of economics, philosophy, philosophy of education and sociology. After conducting a research project on the conception of justice and sustainability on the basis of the capability approach, she is now part of a project on socio-economic reporting and looks specifically at inequality in connection with sustainable consumption.

Torsten Masson is a researcher at the Helmholtz-Centre for Environmental Research, Leipzig and the Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg, Germany. An economist by training, his research is focused on sustainability indicators and sustainable consumption. He is currently part of a project on socio-economic reporting and looks specifically at inequality in connection with sustainable consumption.

Felix Rauschmayer leads the research field of sustainability transitions at the Department for Environmental Politics at the Helmholtz-Centre for Environmental Research, Leipzig, Germany. An ecological economist by training, his research interest lies in the construction of interdisciplinary models for transdisciplinary sustainability research. Recently, he coordinated a research project on the conception of justice and sustainability on the basis of the capability approach, and is now involved in two projects on linking sustainable lifestyles and energy cooperatives.

Notes

1. Since in our characterization of a theory of justice we largely follow Rawls’ account, the concept of “theory” is used in the sense defined by Rawls. Sen would call this kind of a theory “transcendental” (Sen 2010a); that is, a theory that states necessary and sufficient conditions for a just society. Sen endorses what he calls a “comparative” approach. Whether Sen's interpretation of Rawls’ account is fully plausible cannot be discussed here, but we think it is at least debatable. We therefore stick to Rawls’ account, which has shaped the discussion about justice in political philosophy.

2. It has to be conceded, however, that not all theories of justice that exhibit the structure set out above can be constructed in a fully universal way; that is, such that they include principles applying to all human beings. Hence, as we shall discuss below, we will seek an account of justice that fulfills our requirement of true universality.

3. In this context, “universal” refers to human beings. Although this position is often criticized as “anthropocentric”, we prefer it. The reasons for this we can only sketch, since a more detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

4. There are several works in the philosophical literature that are devoted to specific intergenerational questions. Axel Gosseries’ work in the field provides an extensive treatment of the subject—see, for example, “Introduction—Intergenerational Justice and Its Challenges” in Gosseries and Meyer (2009). Tim Mulgan (2008) also provides a good overview in his development of a moderate consequentialist account. We cannot go into all of these complex questions here, mainly for reasons of space. In what follows we concentrate on questions that are relevant to our project of introducing the CA into the discussion.

5. This description of the non-identity problem relies on Meyer and Roser (2009).

6. This certainly was a reason why the Brundtland Commission referred to rather essential needs such as food, clothing, shelter and jobs, even though the universality of the latter, in particular, can be disputed, since it pertains to specific socio-economic forms.

7. Actually, we also find some minor forms of asymmetries within generations; for example, between children and adults or between older, deprived people and young, active ones.

8. There are two reasons for this: considerable differences between Nussbaum's and Sen's theoretical accounts (Leßmann 2007) render it difficult to lump them together; and as yet Sen's approach is not as well examined as Nussbaum's. Thus, henceforth, we refer to Sen's account whenever we speak of “the CA”.

9. Even though highly relevant, the problem of paternalism is not very well discussed in the literature on Sen's CA. Martha Nussbaum discusses whether the CA may be called paternalist in promoting well-being of people regardless of their own views on this matter (Nussbaum 2001). Also, Séverine Deneulin has examined the topic critically (Deneulin 2002).

10. Like many other theories, the CA may be deemed to have consequentialist elements; for example, in testing whether a policy is right when its consequences promote justice or freedom in the right ways. But this is different from classic consequentialist accounts such as utilitarianism that rely on consequences as their main basis of evaluating policies/actions.

11. As mentioned, the Brundtland focus on essential needs can be understood as a form of a basic threshold.

12. This is not to say that a sufficientarian account is the only possible way to counter the non-identity problem in a CA-based theory. Another route that suggests itself is to tie intergenerational obligations to institutions instead of focusing on the individual good. In this way, one may refer to “collective capabilities” or “group capabilities’ (see, for example, Wolff and De-Shalit 2007; Robeyns 2005a). We believe this to be a very promising route to counter the non-identity-problem, since it shifts the focus away from individual well-being and thus from particular identity. There is also the possibility of combining the two ideas. Nevertheless, for the present concern of justice and SD, we think the notion of a threshold to be better suited. The main reason is that the construction of collective capabilities is quite complex and its prospects of success are still quite unclear. The focus on individual well-being, however, is fundamental to the CA.

13. For a similar idea in a more Senian framework, see Peeters, Dirix, and Sterckx (2013).

14. We discuss the link to SD in more depth in a different paper (Rauschmayer et al. forthcoming).