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Abstract
In mid-September 2011, a Russian naval task force headed by the Udaloy-class destroyer, Admiral Panteleev, sailed across the Indian Ocean and commenced counter-piracy operations near the Bay of Aden. The sixth Russian Pacific Fleet task group had replaced a three-month deployment of the sister destroyer Severomorsk dispatched to the area from the Northern Fleet (Gavrilenko 2011, p. 1). The resumption of regular deployments of the Russian Navy to the area and Russia's active participation in counter-piracy operations is one of many examples of the country's current push to restore its fallen image and reputation in the Indian Ocean Region. In the past six years, Russia has intensified contacts with the region. However, questions remain as to the extent to which Russia will be involved in regional affairs. A majority of commentators remain sceptical of the country's interest and its capacity to play any significant future role in the Indian Ocean Region.
Notes
1. In particular, the eastern (south-eastern and southern direction) via the Volga River and Astrakhan’ trade route to Iran and China were gaining strategic prominence (Pashuto et al. Citation1980, p. 53).
2. Russia's growing power competition with the British Empire, which accelerated after the unsuccessful the Crimean War, extended into Asia and the Pacific. Russia's strategic penetration of Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century brought the state's sphere of influence to the borders of contemporary Afghanistan (Gromyko et al. Citation1986, p. 481).
3. The contributing factors included the pursuit of the great strategic agenda of the global transformation, thus warranting the need to engage the Third World (South Asia and Africa); the growing strategic confrontation with China in the 1960s and the need to create an anti-Chinese regional security architecture; growing threat of the United States’ sea-based strategic assets deployed in the Indian Ocean (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and carrier battle groups; logistical support of the Soviet space programme and other.
4. For the benefit on maintaining focus on the IOR the paper will not cover aspects of Russia's relations with Iran and key Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia or Malaysia. The other merit behind it is that Moscow considers its relations with Iran in the context of its Middle Eastern/Caspian Sea sub-regional policy; likewise, relations with Indonesia and Malaysia are being viewed primarily as part of the state's Southeast Asian agenda.
5. Even the Commonwealth of Independent States vector, which was officially declared to be Russia's number one priority, was effectively sacrificed in favour of building intimate relations with Western partners.
6. It was only after September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that the West began to change its attitude towards Russia's actions in Chechnya.
7. By 2015 India and Russia aim to increase the annual level of bilateral trade to US$ 20 billion (Kuzmichev Citation2010, p. 6).
8. Israel's annual turnover of India's defence orders has now reached US$ 2 billion; lately, the United States has secured defence agreements worth of US$ 5 billion (Dasgupta and Cohen Citation2011, pp. 22, 24).
9. China–Pakistani political and security dialogue has intensified in the 1960s and 1970s, paralleling with the dramatic deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations to the point of escalation in an open conflict.
10. Besides support of operational activity in the IOR, Russian nominal military presence in Cam Ranh symbolised the state's direct interest and involvement in Southeast Asian strategic affairs.
11. During his visit to Mumbai in early 2001 then Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Kuroyedov ruled out the possibility of the re-establishment of a permanent Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean since ‘there is no necessity for it’ (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie Citation2001, p. 1).
12. LRA deployed a force of six strategic aircraft (four Tu-95MS and two Tu-160), which reached the area by flying over Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was the largest deployment of Russia's strategic power to the IOR since Soviet worldwide naval manoeuvres Okean–70 and Okean–75.
13. In particular, the reconstruction of the runway and upgrades to other elements of support ground infrastructure would enable the Russian Federation Air Force to operate all types of combat aircraft from the Kant base, including Tu-95MSs and Tu-160s.
14. In his latest memoirs Primakov noted that his concept of the Grand Triangular relationship is working under a trilateral dialogue as well as part of the BRICS framework (Primakov Citation2011, p. 159).