The identity politics of India–US nuclear engagement: problematising India as part of the Anglosphere

Abstract

Although its precise definition is contested, the concept of the ‘Anglosphere’ has grown in political discourse in the past decade. Anglospherist authors have defined it as a group of states tied together on the basis of shared tradition, laws, liberty and language. And yet they do not discuss India substantively, placing it firmly on the outside of its hierarchy. Others have argued the concept is based in a racialised, Anglo-Saxon identity. In 2005, Manmohan Singh surprised some domestic observers by emphasising India's positive connections to the ‘English-speaking world’ while speaking at Oxford University. Shortly after, India announced negotiations on a civil nuclear agreement with the US, leading to similar agreements with Canada, the UK and Australia. This article uses the contemporary India–US nuclear engagement to investigate India's position in relation to the ideational space of the Anglosphere and how this shapes India–Anglosphere relations. It is argued that India's postcolonial scepticism towards this space combined with the inherent anglocentrism in Anglosphere identity discourse limits India–Anglosphere relations while simultaneously animating nuclear engagement.

Keywords:

• Indian foreign policy
• Anglosphere
• postcolonialism in international relations (IR)
• India–US civil nuclear agreement

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Priya Chacko, Kanishka Jayasuriya, Carol Johnson, Petra Mosmann, Peter Davis, Adela Alfonsi, Vineet Thakur and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughts and criticisms on this article. Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the author.

Notes

1. In this article, I frequently refer to the US, the UK, Canada and Australia as ‘the Anglosphere’ and India-Anglosphere relations. I do so for the ease and simplicity of language, rather than a judgement on India's position inside and/or outside of this group.

2. Joe Biden complained about India's unwillingness to open itself to US corporations during a visit to India in July 2013 (Harris, 2013).

3. India–Canada bilateral trade between Canada and India rose by 72% between 2004 and 2011 – including a 152% increase in Canadian exports to India (Canada DFAT, 2012). Trade between Australia and India grew from $3.3 billion in 2000 to over $20 billion in 2011 (Australia DFAT, 2013).

4. Although I do not aim to comment on the validity of one economic policy over another, I say this partly due to the relative failure of India's GDP growth to assist people out of poverty. See, for example, Krishna (2013).

5. Most work on India–Canada relations focuses on the destruction of a close relationship post-1974. For example, see Delvoie (1998).

6. A similar argument was made by former BJP external affairs minister Jaswant Singh (1998).

7. Bruce Grant (1974) summarised the feeling within the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia on India's actions, stating: ‘Not untypically for India, what she has done does not fit in to generally accepted categories. There is a feeling of annoyance with India for being so tiresome. “Why doesn't she simply say she's built a bomb?!”’.

8. For a full list of documents see US State Department (2005).

9. This is a common term in strategic discourse on India–China relations in the US and Australia. For an example, see Rubinoff (2006, p. 43).