Decrypting Sri Lanka’s ‘black box’ amidst an Indo–China ‘great game’

ABSTRACT

Competition is a natural byproduct of major powers navigating an anarchic world. Small states operating in such a milieu however, face a dilemma when strategizing their foreign policy. At present, two regional behemoths – India and China – remain locked in a Realpolitik affray as they vie for influence by enticing and attracting South Asian states through economic, security and diplomatic initiatives. How do these structural dynamics impact Sri Lanka’s policymaking process? Moreover, has the island been able to mount a timely and appropriate response to structural dictates? In what way has domestic variables influenced and channeled policy preferences in Sri Lanka since 2015? By adopting a Neoclassical Realist frame of analysis, this paper appraises the impact made by the external environment and domestic intervening variables on the island’s foreign policy trajectory. It concludes that domestic intervening variables drew the island away from optimal choices in its relations with India and China.

KEYWORDS:

• Sri Lanka
• India
• China
• foreign policy

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Former Ambassador Mr H. M. G. S. Palihakkara, Dr Dinusha Panditaratne, Dr Jayanath Colombage, Dr Neil DeVotta, Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Dr Sree Padma Holt, Mr Shiran Fernando, Mr Vijaya Dissanayake and Ms Bhagya Senaratne, for their valuable insights and time. Acknowledgments are also due to two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their constructive comments which helped improve this manuscript. Any mistakes are mine alone.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Shakthi De Silva is an Assistant Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Colombo (Sri Lanka). He also serves as a Visiting Lecturer at the Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute. He has published widely including in the South Asian Survey, Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences, South Asia Journal, Global –E journal of the University of California, Synergy: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies hosted by the University of Toronto, The Diplomat Magazine and the London School of Economics South Asia Blog.

Notes

1 The National Unity Government faced a significant political crisis in October 2018. On 26th October 2018, President Sirisena removed Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and swore in former President Rajapakse as the new Prime Minister. The President’s party also withdrew from the ruling coalition that had been in existence since 2015. On 13th December 2018 Rajapakse resigned from the position of Prime Minister and on 16th December Ranil Wickremasinghe was sworn in as Prime Minister ending a 51 day political turmoil. These developments displayed the political unpredictability and the mounting economic challenges in Sri Lanka, resulting in a worsened perception of the country’s risk profile. The country was also downgraded by three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P. In order to avoid delving too deeply into this crisis the author examined Sri Lanka’s foreign policy before the said crisis, i.e. from the inception of the National Unity Government in 2015 until October 2018.

2 Satisficing is a term found mostly in literature related to decision making and psychology. The term is best understood as the antithesis of an objective and utilitarian strategy. While a utilitarian strategy involves a fastidious evaluation of all options on offer and the selection of the best, a satisficing one settles on an option which is inadequate to further a country’s national interest, particularly in the long run. This is because satisficing leads to suboptimal decisions which are not objectively and adequately thought through.

3 For more detailed explanations on the 13th Amendment and the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka refer Bhasin (2004), Dixit (2001), and Ghosh (1999).

4 For example, it was expected through the ETCA, that Sri Lankan exports could more easily penetrate the Indian market ‘of over 1.2 billion.’ Vasantha Senanayake, Parliamentary Debates Hanzard (25 November 2017) Vol. 257 - No. 8, Column 1683.

5 Prior to the 2015 elections, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), from which both Sirisena and Rajapakse hail was part of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The SLFP however, was the vanguard of the UPFA.

6 June 2017 saw a military standoff in a strategically important territory claimed by both China and Bhutan - a close ally of India. Reports suggest that China’s incursions into Dokhlam prompted the arrival of Indian troops who blocked Chinese road building efforts. By the end of August both countries accepted an ‘expeditious disengagement’ of troops from the region.

7 The India-China bilateral trade reached $84.44 billion in 2017. According to Ministry of Commerce of China, Chinese investments in India between January-December 2017 were to the tune of US$289.98 million and cumulative Chinese investment in India till the end of December 2017 amount to US$4.747 billion. Cumulative Indian investment in China till September 2017 is US$ 851.91 million (Embassy of India in China, 2019).

8 A Gallup World Poll reflects an upsurge in Sri Lanka’s approval of China’s leadership from 24% in 2013 to 41% in 2018. ‘Approval of China’s Leadership.’ Gallup Analytics retrieved from https://analyticscampus.gallup.com/Charts?linkid=17282.

9 These include the bilateral ‘Sri Lanka and India Naval Exercises (SLINEX)’ as well as the ‘DOSTI Exercises’ (which includes the Coast Guard of India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives).