Decision making and mental imagery: A conceptual synthesis and new research directions

ABSTRACT

This paper introduces a conceptual synthesis of theoretical ideas investigating the relationship between decision making and mental imagery. We claim that the generation of mental images may play a pivotal role in decision making because imaginative foresight allows an event to be pre-experienced and consequences of different choice alternatives to be “tried out.” Moreover, we provide evidence that mental imagery can be considered a source of emotions that regulate decision making and risk perception. We also propose principles describing the mutual relationships between mental imagery and decision making that allow for formulating testable hypotheses. Finally, we discuss open issues that arise in the context of the idea that mental imagery informs decision making. They concern the relationship between mental imagery and emotions, functional and dysfunctional consequences of mental imagery, spontaneous vs. enforced generation of mental imagery, and the role of imagery-based approach/withdrawal motivation in terminating the decision-making process.

KEYWORDS:

• Mental imagery
• mental simulation
• episodic foresight
• decision making
• risk perception
• emotions

Data availability statement

Data sharing not applicable – no new data generated.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In the present paper, we mainly use the term “decision making under risk” but we argue that on the conceptual level, the ideas we discuss can explain decision making under both risk and uncertainty (De Groot & Thurik, 2018; Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012). We assume that people might create mental images and engage in future-oriented mental simulations irrespective of whether quantitative risk parameters are provided or not, even if some authors argue that mental time travel happens first of all in decision making under strict uncertainty (Tuckett & Nikolic, 2017). It should also be noted that models proposed in the field of judgement and decision making often adopt the term “risk” in a broad context covering different types of situations that do or do not provide information about probabilities (Blais & Weber, 2006; Lejuez et al., 2002). Moreover, as probabilities are seldom known in everyday situations, people typically exploit the word “risk” even if they act under uncertainty (De Groot & Thurik, 2018).

2 Even if such models as regret theory, disappointment theory, and decision affect theory refer to emotions in general, they assume that these emotions (e.g. regret, disappointment) are by-products of counterfactual thinking about the decision problem or appraisal processes. In contrast, we argue that they can shape decision making and predict choices under risk and uncertainty.

3 Generating vivid and affect-laden mental images may also be maladaptive for good decision making, and we will discuss this issue in more detail later in the paper.

4 It should be noted that the authors provided evidence indicating that people are more prone to use mental simulations when making choices with closed eyes. However, they have not directly documented that working with closed eyes is associated with generating mental imagery.

5 See also research showing that mental imagery and visual perception share overlapping neural bases (Farah, 1988; Ganis et al., 2004; Ishai & Sagi, 1995; Kosslyn et al., 1997; Kreiman et al., 2000) and that producing mental images is associated with specific neural activity in the visual cortex (Amedi et al., 2005; Ganis et al., 2004; Kosslyn et al., 1995, 1997; Mellet et al., 1995).

Additional information

Funding

This paper has been financed from Narodowe Centrum Nauki (grant number 2019/33/B/HS6/01920).