Reasoning strategy moderates the transition between slow and fast reasoning

ABSTRACT

Reasoning faster is often assumed to be less “logical” than slow reasoning. The Dual strategy model of reasoning, which distinguishes between Counterexample and Statistical strategies, suggests a more nuanced way of understanding the effects of time constraints. Previous studies suggest that Statistical reasoners are using a broad form of intuitive processing, while Counterexample reasoners use more working-memory intensive processes, suggesting that time constraint should have less of an effect on the former. In the following study, participants were initially given a set of belief-biased inferences with unlimited time, followed by another version of the same inferences with a 4 s limit, along with the Strategy diagnostic and measures of IQ, CRT and AOT. Consistent with predictions, results show that having less time produced less logical responding in Counterexample reasoners but had no effect on Statistical reasoners. Results also show the existence of reasoners using mostly belief or validity that were directly related to reasoning strategy.

KEYWORDS:

• Dual strategy
• belief-bias
• fast reasoning

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

All data are available online (https://osf.io/qtw9x). This study received ethical approval by the IRB of the Université du Québec à Montréal (1068_2020).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada: [Grant Number 2016-04865].