Reasoning strategy moderates the transition between slow and fast reasoning

References

• Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017). Fast logic? Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 158, 90–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bors, D. A., & Stokes, T. L. (1998). Raven's advanced progressive matrices: Norms for first-year university students and the development of a short form. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 58(3), 382–398. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164498058003002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brisson, J., & Markovits, H. (2020). Reasoning strategies and semantic memory effects in deductive reasoning. Memory & Cognition. 48, 920–930.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 28–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611429354
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Neys, W., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Logic, fast and slow: Advances in dual-process theorizing. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28(5), 503–509. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721419855658
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, J. S. B., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 295–306. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196976
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, J. S. B., & Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005). Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11(4), 382–389. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780542000005
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, J. S. B., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612460685
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gagnon-St-Pierre, É, Doucerain, M. M., & Markovits, H. (2020). Reasoning strategies explain individual differences in social reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(2), 340–353..
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gratton, C., & Markovits, H. (2021). Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims. Memory & Cognition, 49(8), 1505–1525..
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haran, U., Ritov, I., & Mellers, B. A. (2013). The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 188–201.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Markovits, H. (2019). Reasoning strategy modulates gender differences in performance on a spatial rotation task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72(12), 2870–2876. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021819867203
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., Brisson, J., & de Chantal, P. (2016). Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(1), 72.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., Brisson, J., & de Chantal, P.-L. (2015). Deductive updating is not Bayesian. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(4), 949.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., Brisson, J., de Chantal, P.-L., & Thompson, V. A. (2017). Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias. Memory & Cognition, 45(7), 1182–1192.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., Brunet, M.-L., Thompson, V., & Brisson, J. (2013). Direct evidence for a dual process model of deductive inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(6), 1213–1222. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030906
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Markovits, H., Lortie Forgues, H., & Brunet, M.-L. (2012). More evidence for a dual-process model of conditional reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 40(50), 736–747. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-012-0186-4
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Markovits, H., & Thompson, V. A. (2024). Can we change how people reason? Effects of instructions to reason differently and reasoning strategy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., Trémolière, B., & Blanchette, I. (2018). Reasoning strategies modulate gender differences in emotion processing. Cognition, 170, 76–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.09.012
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morsanyi, K., & Handley, S. J. (2012). Logic feels so good—I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(3), 596. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026099
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2003). Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Mind & Language, 18(4), 359–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00232
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raoelison, M. T., Thompson, V. A., & De Neys, W. (2020). The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking. Cognition, 204, Article 104381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104381
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: The interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning, 24(4), 423–444. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5), 645–665. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00003435
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thompson, V. A., & Markovits, H. (2021). Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance. Cognition, 217, Article 104866. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104866
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63(3), 107–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thompson, V. A., Striemer, C. L., Reikoff, R., Gunter, R. W., & Campbell, J. I. (2003). Syllogistic reasoning time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10(1), 184–189. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196483
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thomson, K. S., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2016). Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection test. Judgment and Decision Making, 11(1), 99–113. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500007622
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Trippas, D., Thompson, V. A., & Handley, S. J. (2017). When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias. Memory & Cognition, 45(4), 539–552. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0680-1
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar