Social work and Pierre Bourdieu: relevance for and in a Norwegian welfare state context

ABSTRACT

A significant body of the literature argues for the relevance of Bourdieu in social work and other welfare professions due to his focus on social stratification, inequality, and marginalization. Despite this relevance, Bourdieu remains a peripheral figure in social work research and teaching. Thus, the literature poses that Bourdieu is relevant, but largely missing. This paper discusses the relationship between the relevance for and application of Bourdieu in a Norwegian context, with a particular focus on the welfare state. We argue that Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus can shed light on important social issues and developments in a contemporary context, and thus, also has potential both for social work research and praxis, including research on practices. We pay particular attention to Bourdieu’s notions of ‘doxa’ and ‘symbolic violence’, as well as theories on the modern welfare state, through the concepts of ‘the left and right hand of the state’. We suggest an unfulfilled potential in the application of Bourdieu in the analysis and understanding of the very role and function of social work in a modern welfare state and for themes integral for social work, most notably social inequality and mobility.

KEYWORDS:

• Bourdieu
• social work
• doxa
• Nordic welfare state

Introduction

In an uncharacteristically explicit speech to social workers, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that social workers are in an almost impossible squeeze, due to having to fight on two fronts at the same time: on the one hand, against those they try to help and who find themselves powerless and demoralized, and on the other hand, against the slow and complex bureaucracy (P. Bourdieu 1999, 189–191). In this paper, we approach this theme in a somewhat circuitous way. Contrary to Bourdieu’s speech, we are not explicitly concerned with the challenges of social work (and social workers), but rather of how Bourdieu’s thinking can contribute to illuminate these in the context of the Nordic welfare state. Our primary focus is on the context in which social work operates, that is, the potential relevance of Bourdieu for social issues and themes central to social work, while also addressing implications for professional practices.

Indeed, in an international context, the literature argues for the relevance of Bourdieu in social work, both regarding a general relevance for professional practice and for academic efforts connected to it (see, for instance, Emirbayer and Williams 2005; Fram 2004; Garrett 2007a, 2007b; Houston 2019; Smith et al. 2017; Wiegmann 2017). In this literature, it is argued that Bourdieu’s perspectives and theories are particularly relevant for social work, because of conjoined thematical interests and due to his prominent focus on social stratification, inequality, and marginalization. It is further argued that, despite this relevance, Bourdieu is often missing in academic social work endeavours. The mentioned literature poses two main arguments, in other words: Bourdieu is relevant, and Bourdieu is largely missing.

We will discuss this relationship – between relevance and application – in the context of the Norwegian welfare state. We take the second argument as stated above – that Bourdieu is largely missing in social work – as our starting point and ask the following questions: is Bourdieu relevant for social work in a Norwegian/Nordic context, and if so how? We will pay particular attention to theories/concepts connected to habitus, doxa and symbolic violence, in addition to his thoughts on the left and right hand of the state. Our discussion on the potential relevance of Bourdieu for social work in a Norwegian/Nordic welfare state context is conjoined with a discussion on implications for social work as an academic discipline and in professional endeavours.

Bourdieu and social work: a relationship in progress

Bourdieu’s potential is not realized within social work, according to the mentioned literature (Emirbayer and Williams 2005; Fram 2004; Garrett 2007a, 2007b; Wiegmann 2017). Transferred to a Norwegian context, which, naturally, comprises a much smaller scholarly area, this seems to hold true, at least to some extent. In central social work teaching material, Bourdieu is seldom mentioned and/or mentioned in passing (see, for instance, Askeland 2011; Askheim 2012; Hutchinson and Oltedal 2017; Oltedal 2005; Skjeldal 2021), albeit with some notable exceptions. Here, Bourdieu is varyingly presented as a central theoretical figure within so-called ‘conflict theoretical perspectives’, together with Marx, Freire, and Foucault, or simply left out of the picture, (in contrast to Freire, Foucault and Habermas, for instance). Also, in social work research in Norway, other theories or ‘theory builders’ seem to have a stronger position as compared to Bourdieu, although we find noticeable exceptions (see for instance Ågotnes 2021; Marthinsen 2003, 2010, 2011; Nysæther 2004; Stray and Thomassen 2023), concerning, among others, child welfare services, social work and neoliberalism, social capital and work activation. The relative peripheral role of Bourdieu in social work in Norway is somewhat in contrast to Denmark, or at least some academic environments within it, in which Bourdieu is highlighted as a central academic figure, while also being applied in analyses geared towards understanding and explaining conditions and practices within a Nordic welfare state context (see for instance, Järvinen and Mik-Meyer 2003; Mik-Meyer 2017; Mik-Meyer and Villadsen 2007).

Different academic traditions can perhaps explain this relative absence if we return to the international literature. Here, differences in philosophy of science between social work and Bourdieu’s sociology are pointed out (Garrett 2007a, 2007b; Wiegmann 2017). This argument contains both practical and ontological elements. Regarding the former, Bourdieu’s texts are relatively inaccessible, it is pointed out, both regarding the complexity of literary form and the large volume of his authorship, and requires a considerable effort by the teacher/researcher aiming at familiarizing themselves with this universe (Garrett 2007a). Relatedly, and largely due to Bourdieu’s style of writing, approaching his theoretical universe, at least in a substantial way, implies some knowledge of more or less peculiar French academic traditions (Wiegmann 2017), pointing to how implicit references and allusions may not be accessible for the uninitiated reader. Third, and on an ontological level, the social agent is, as seen through Bourdieu, imprinted with a degree of inertia (Garrett 2007b), leading to a critique related to social determinism (Jenkins 1992). Consequently, an ontological divide can be seen, between Bourdieu’s position and a professional area which, on a fundamental level, seeks to contribute to or enhance social mobility for the agent (Ågotnes 2021; Garrett 2007a; Wiegmann 2017). To simplify, Bourdieu’s stance does not offer promise for a discipline looking to promote social change. Relatedly, Bourdieu was, despite a focus on social stratification, not explicitly concerned with questions of multiculturalism and diversity central to academic endeavours within social work (Garrett 2007a, 363).

In addition to this alleged underutilization, it is argued that the ways in which Bourdieu is applied within social work are problematic. It is pointed out that Bourdieu is often used in texts in superficial ways, by removing and using smaller parts of a larger machinery, without alluding to the wider theoretical context the specific theory or concept is intended to be a part of (see also Everett 2002, 69). For instance, terms such as ‘cultural capital’ or ‘habitus’ can be used in ways which represent a simplified understanding of Bourdieu’s toolbox, according to Emirbayer and Williams (2005).

According to Garrett (2007a, 356), the argument that Bourdieu is underutilized within social work can be illustrated by the fact that he is not indexed in Lena Dominelli’s central Sociology for Social Work (Dominelli 1997). Still, the argument can be nuanced. Bourdieu was read more widely, especially in France, after his publication of The Weight of the World published in 1999 (Bjørnhaug 2002; Garrett 2007b, 356). This is also a period where Bourdieu gained increased prominence in the public limelight, as a spokesperson for the ‘castaways’, and against processes of neoliberalism.

Returning to Norway, as possible explanations to the relative absence of Bourdieu, it is tempting to look at the peculiarities of the social democratic welfare state. Perhaps this context and the egalitarianism and universal access to welfare services that supposedly characterizes it, renders Bourdieu less relevant? On the other hand, as seen from the Danish context, this does not seem as an ample explanation. Perhaps, Bourdieu’s relative absence is a simple question of other scholars and perspectives being preferred, most notably Foucault, Habermas, Freire, but also Goffman and others. The preference for others might be explained by the fact that the academic milieu centred around Bourdieu has not been established in a Norwegian context to the same extent, as for instance, in Denmark. Somewhat contrarily, the absence of Bourdieu can perhaps be connected to a general absence of ‘critical theory’ in Norwegian social work. As Marthinsen (2011) has argued, social work in Norway has not developed a unique ‘academic identity’ or a place within or in the outer regions of the social sciences in Norway, a characteristic shared with Finland and Denmark, in contrast to Sweden (see also Uggerhøj 2011, 59). In Bourdieu’s own terms, social work as an academic discipline has not reached a state of becoming an autonomous sub-field within the social sciences. This can again be explained by the complex relationship between research and practice or between theory and experience, characterizing social work historically and contemporarily. In recent times, this schism has contributed to a divide between a critical or reflexive academic praxis and an evidence-based tradition, as well as, most importantly, a gradual strengthening of the latter, according to Marthinsen (2011, 24, see also Warming 2011, 124). This does not, however, explain why other scholars, and particularly the ‘critical’ Foucault, is somewhat preferred, leaving us, again, with only a partial answer.

Regardless of explanation, Bourdieu’s place in Norwegian social work seems to be in accordance with international literature pointing to a potential unfulfilled potential. Bourdieu does not represent a substantial academic sub-field within social work, in contrast to his role in sociology, pedagogy and health and nursing sciences in Norway and other Nordic countries. But does that matter? Should Bourdieu be more present? We suggest that while Bourdieu at first glance seems an ill fit within a professional sphere seeking to promote social mobility, he remains relevant in explaining the very processes of social mobility as well as the contextual factors that might impede it. Finally, Bourdieu might also be applied to understand the contextual features that shape social work itself.

Some selected perspectives from Bourdieu: getting to know each other

Here, we will present a condensed review of a selection of Bourdieu’s theoretical perspectives, while being cognizant that we might contribute to the aforementioned pitfall: to simplify a complex and interwoven theoretical universe. It is also important to point out that different interpretations, adaptations, and understandings of Bourdieu exist, within and between disciplines, not only regarding which of Bourdieu’s many tools are highlighted in any given case but also on what, in a more epistemological sense, is considered ‘the essence of Bourdieu’. Consequently, different schools of thought have emerged, often profoundly disagreeing on what methodological and/or thematical areas are ‘correct’. We also, in our text, make some choices, related to what we see as particularly central in a social work context: habitus, field, doxa and symbolic violence/power, supplemented by Bourdieu’s thoughts on the role of the state in relation to neoliberalism.

Habitus and field: battle of positions

According to Bourdieu, the social agent acts based on a set of internalized habitual dispositions, coined as ‘habitus’: ‘A system of durable, transportable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (P. Bourdieu (1977) 2012, 72). The habitus of a person is created, or perhaps more to the point, is moulded, through social conditionings with one’s surroundings. Habitus therefore consists of one’s past (contributing to its moulding) and present (affecting how one construes and responds to the social world), that is, both as structure and as structuring (P. Bourdieu 1990, (1977) 2012). A field can be described as a structure containing a set of recognized ‘rules’ that are largely adhered to, that exists within a recognized social space. In a field, the agent has (and takes) a position relative to that of other fields. The field is, meanwhile, itself ‘placed’, in that it is relational to others. In this sense, battles ensue both within and between fields: the former through positionings within a field, related, among others, to the accumulation of capital (the availability of which would differ depending on the field); the latter through the attempt to become and remain autonomous against external forces. Furthermore, Bourdieu distinguishes between three main forms of capital: economic (material), cultural (symbolic goods and abilities) and social (resources attained through relationships and/or membership in groups and networks) (P. Bourdieu 1986). A fourth form, symbolic capital, exists within and between the other three forms, in the sense of being the way in which any form of capital, and its compositions are conceived as legitimate, or not, and therefore can create ‘profit’.

Doxa and symbolic violence: inhibitors for change

The relationship between a person’s habitus and the surrounding field (in addition to one’s positioning within it) is, according to P. Bourdieu ((1977) 2012), both dialectic and somehow ‘logical’. The field contributes to comprehensible and apparently coherent conditions for existence and practice, that are mutually relational to one’s set of habitual dispositions. This compliance makes the surroundings understandable, manageable, and navigable (but also peculiar: another set of habitual dispositions in another field would lead to a different compliance, equally ‘logical’, albeit in a different way) for the social agent. Habitus, as we interpret it, contributes to making sense of and in the world. However, the compliance between habitus and field creates the perception of one’s social world as more rather than less fixed, which again creates limitations or barriers to what, in a given context, appear as possibilities. It creates, in other words, repertoires of ‘natural states of being’. This is, according to Bourdieu, captured by the term ‘doxa’: the taken-for-granted perception of ‘the way things are’, where the social order appears not as ‘ … one possible among others, but as self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unanswered’ (P. Bourdieu [1977] 2012, 166). Doxa pertains, in other words, to the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life, or the accepted and unproblematized truths that can exist, as we will return to, both for social workers and their beneficiaries.

Outside the sphere of the doxa, we find the heterodoxa: that which does not fit in, or that which challenges the taken for granted and the established. Heterodoxa emerges by the breaking down of doxa, or when it is disturbed or shaken: the status quo is challenged and no longer appears as the true, natural state of being. Heterodoxa represents the lifting of the social veil, which according to Bourdieu, can contribute to fundamental change, through a rupture of the very premises or rules of the game, for social life. Resultantly, this forms the very foundation for active political awareness. If activated, heterodoxa will, at the same time, also be resisted, by the prevailing orthodoxa, again illustrating how social life is seen as a battle.

Still, the starting point is that doxa obscures this battle, by representing an order that is not understood as arbitrary or one of the many possibilities (P. Bourdieu (1977) 2012). A given social order’s legitimacy is not problematized (see also, Everett 2002, 66). Importantly, when this doxic order leads to uneven distribution of capital and resources – and at the same time is perceived as legitimate and not challenged by the heterodoxa – the assertion of symbolic violence occurs (Bourdieu, in Eagleton 1992; Everett 2002; Wiegmann 2017), understood as an implicit and unrecognized exertion of a relationship of dominance from one entity to the other. This can, for example, transpire through the educational system, that appears (and presents itself) as distinctly egalitarian, but that contributes to reproducing existing differences and stratifications (Garrett 2007a, 228), or, as we will return to, in the area of poverty, and understandings of blame connected to it. With such an understanding of symbolic violence, we can put forth the idea of how the starting point of social agents differs: both the premise and the space of possibilities, in part created through the premise, are different, despite apparent (and claimed) similarity. Furthermore, Everett (2002) argues that this symbolic application of power can be as efficient or even more efficient compared to more explicit uses of violence, precisely because it is not experienced as violence, and is therefore not communicated or problematized as such. As a consequence, it remains largely unchallenged.

On the (welfare) state

Bourdieu’s authorship spans, as mentioned, decades, covering many thematic and empirical areas disseminated in many forms, some translated, some translated only in parts, some transformed and re-assembled in a different volume in a different language, and so on. This makes syntheses, such as ours above, both difficult and complex. This also holds true about theorizing and conceptualizing around Bourdieu’s notions of ‘the state’ and its function that sometimes are addressed explicitly, sometimes implicitly in his works (for the more explicit and in-depth examples, see P. Bourdieu 1996, 2014). In an interview with Bourdieu from 1992, some of these elements appear in a clearer light, elements that we believe are of particular importance for the topic of this paper.

The main point here is that the state contributes and is a part of the above-mentioned mechanisms, in general, by being a central agent in the construction and reproduction of social categories, and specifically related to social work, by how it prioritizes certain areas over others (P. Bourdieu 2011). Bourdieu suggests separating the state into two parts: the right and the left hand. The right consists of the economic-technocratic pole (the bureaucracy, the statesmen, and so on) while the left consists of what Bourdieu interestingly describes as ‘social workers’, or the executive hand of the state (connected both to welfare and education, thus implying a wider understanding of ‘social work’). Here, we also find battles or struggles: the right hand is dominant and exercises a form of symbolic violence over the left. The right hand of the state does not recognize the legitimacy of the left hand and does not wish to pay for its excesses (P. Bourdieu [1992] 2011, 167). One implication of this (in part realized in contemporary France, according to Bourdieu) is a degree of withdrawal of the state’s executive branch: the state should be run in a more efficient manner, and cuts should be made in its provisioning rather than its administration. The state appears, ultimately, no longer as the protector of the commons, according to Bourdieu.

From a more theorized vantage point, Bourdieu places the above developments as part of the ‘return of individualism’. ‘A return to individualism’ stands, of course, in contrast to the idea of collective responsibility: the role of the state changes from a form of security net for all, to being a facilitator for the individual citizen, and, in the process, becoming a servant of its own technocratic branch. For Bourdieu, this development occurs to the disservice of the oppressed: it lays the foundation for the doxic notion of victim-blaming, in which the victim is ‘given the whole and full responsibility for his own deprivations, and to communicate the message of self-help’ ([1992] 2011, 171, authors’ translation). As such, Bourdieu offers a trenchant criticism of neoliberal policies and ideologies, while also addressing the role of social workers and their ‘space of possibilities’, that we will return to, to effectively support socio-economically marginalized groups (Garrett 2007a). This illustrates, according to Garrett, Bourdieu’s general preoccupation of defending the public sector(s) that are under attack (Garrett 2007a).

Bourdieu’s presentation of the two poles of the state and its present or future withdrawal, has been criticized, among others, by Garrett (2007a). He argues that Bourdieu simplifies, first and foremost, by dividing the state into two clearly separated and unintegrated parts. Relatedly, it is argued that the left hand of the state cannot be seen as exclusively benign: this hand too contains tensions and bureaucracy and can punish (p. 371). Still, we argue that a conceptualization of the state into two poles – as representing two, concurrent and interacting spheres of interest, as opposed to two separate areas – can be of relevance to understand the role and function of social work in the contemporary Norwegian context.

Relevance for social work: a closer relationship?

As mentioned, the literature argues that Bourdieu is rarely applied within social work and that this should be rectified, especially given the mutual thematic interests (Emirbayer and Williams 2005; Fram 2004; Garrett 2007a, 2007b; Houston 2019; Smith et al. 2017; Wiegmann 2017). It is further argued that the theory universe of Bourdieu is of particular relevance because of the complexity embedded in social work issues. But what, in the sphere of social work and other welfare professions, can this universe of theories promote understandings of? And is this relevant for a Nordic and a Norwegian welfare context? We suggest two main areas of relevance. We begin with the larger picture, discussing developments of the welfare state and possible consequences for social work. We continue by addressing the potential relevance of Bourdieu in understandings of poverty and exclusion. Within and across both areas, implications for social work practice will be drawn out.

Neoliberalism, the Nordic welfare state and social work

Traces of the philosophical and socio-cultural underpinnings of neoliberalism, as theorized by Bourdieu, can also be found in the contemporary Norwegian welfare state. In short, over the recent decades, neoliberalism has influenced core ideas about social policies and the ethos of the welfare state, according to Kildal (2018). With the adoption of the ‘new welfare contract’ in Norway since the 1980s, citizens were expected to enact certain duties and obligations to meet the eligibility for receiving public benefits (Ervik and Kildal 2016). Notions such as individualization and the duty of the individual to take care of themselves, described by Bourdieu as connected to a shift in the role of state institutions, have also entered the Norwegian public discourse, according to scholars (Botten, Elvebakken, and Kildal 2003; Ervik and Kildal 2016). With this backdrop, two important changes have been identified which holds significance for social work and perhaps also Bourdieu’s relevance: firstly, a shift towards ‘welfare consumerism’ where what had hitherto been thought of as a collective system of security came to be seen more as a system of individual rights; and, the ‘freedom revolution’ wherein the old ideas that infused the welfare system in Norway such as equality and unity came to be replaced with ideas about freedom and individualism (Sejersted 2004; Sønneland 2021). This kind of re-configuration of the Norwegian, in particular, and Nordic, in general, welfare state, has served to challenge the hitherto well-entrenched reputation of the Nordic countries as being ‘bastions of equality, equity and social cohesion’, according to Kamali and Jonsson (2018, 8). At the same time, social work is predominantly mediated by the state in the Nordic context. Here, scholars have argued that as a result of the recent transformations in social policy and implementation, the practice of social work has also become more individualized and depoliticized. Consequently, research suggests that social workers working for the public sector have had to increasingly conform to market values and goals (Røysum 2009), and adapting to becoming more managerial, technocratic, professionalized and evidence-based in their practice (Ervik and Kildal 2016).

Applying Bourdieu to such a context, social workers as state agents can be seen as representing the prevailing doxa, ultimately, following Bourdieu, running the risk of perpetuating rather than combatting symbolic violence, despite well-meaning intentions. In Bourdieu’s terms, the socio-cultural context of social work in the Nordic countries, may limit the space for heterodoxic impulses (in theory and in praxis), thus also limiting the strength of the left hand of the state. Following Bourdieu, neoliberalism has in the last decades contributed to not only the dominance of the right hand but also to the infiltration of the left, where central figures increasingly ‘have become its advocates, deploying arguments of realpolitik, economic necessity, and material instrumentality to justify their policies and actions’ (Horton 2018, 1504). This is, as we read it, not a critique of the intrinsic need for or role of social work, but rather of the limitations imposed from outside and above.

In short, recent developments in the trajectory of the Norwegian welfare state has resonance with Bourdieu’s reflections on the role of the state, in which individual needs and rights are expected to be met by individuals themselves and the state retreats from its role of providing social and welfare responsibilities (P. Bourdieu 2011). Given this resonance, we argue that Bourdieu has relevance for contemporary Norwegian social work, in the sense of providing a theoretical and analytical vantage point to analyse the position, role, and function of the very profession (as well as knowledge about it). This potential appears, for us, particularly relevant regarding the dangers associated with ‘the withdrawal of the welfare state’.

On social mobility and the difficulties associated with it

On a related, yet different level, we argue that Bourdieu can be significant in an area of vital importance for social work: understanding and working with social inequality. As alluded to earlier, Bourdieu is, on a fundamental level, concerned with the inhibitors to social change. Social change is, through Bourdieu’s glasses, difficult to achieve: there are few if any quick fixes. As such, Bourdieu provides a contribution to the almost universal academic debate on the relationship between agency and structure. This – the dialectic between subjectivisms’ emphasis on the rational actions of individuals and objectivism’s emphasis on social structure – has been described as being at the very core of Bourdieu’s intellectual project (P. Bourdieu (1977) 2012). By taking the form of a middle ground position in this dialectic, a central contribution from Bourdieu is, in our opinion, how different spheres or spaces of possibility exist for social agents. Differences (whatever they might be) are somehow based on different starting points or different conditions: some have a head start, some have better equipment, some have to jump over hurdles along the way, some use performance enhancing drugs. Or more covertly: some know how to get the drugs and how to mask their effects, while others do not, and so on. Varied starting points contribute to varying limitations in what we can call ‘social potentialities’: what, at a given time, is possible to achieve for a social agent. On a basic level, this can be illustrated by applying Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and habitus to the case of inequality and mobility. Not only economic but cultural and social capital is fundamental for ‘potentialities’, while how these are composed and how they are applied (both what ‘we have’ and ‘what we can get’) connect to dispositions largely embedded in individuals and small groups. Simply adding resources will not suffice, in other words. To illustrate this in a social work context, Hindhede (2016) applied these concepts to an analysis of the characteristics and strength of social ties in a state-led renewal programme for community participation in a deprived neighbourhood in Denmark, and found some unintended exclusionary dynamics. Here, while attempting to include participants from various social segments, ‘the least powerful’ (535) opted out of the process, potentially leading to a situation where differences were reproduced or even increased, contrary to the initial aim of the initiators.

We believe that Bourdieu’s perspectives on social inequality and mobility have relevance and significance for social work issues, both in the sense of ‘working with’ and ‘analyses of’ inequality and mobility, particularly when it comes to ‘the bigger picture’. As Wiegmann argues, Bourdieu contributes to an understanding of poverty in relation to other conditions: ‘due to the interrelationship of poverty, individual well-being, and behavior, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework also makes it clear that social work with clients must involve efforts to diminish the effects of poverty, both material and embodied, in order to achieve meaningful change’ (Wiegmann 2017, 108). Poverty may be understood and (in part) explained by the positions of social agents within a social space, while such spaces can set limits when it comes to mobility within them. Furthermore, within Bourdieu’s universe of theories, we find an omnipotent yet invisible toughness regarding the pursuit of social advancement, to be regarded not as a social law and not a rule without its exceptions (Bourdieu was himself one). Social mobility is, contrary to doxic representations, neither a simple question of effort where persistence will suffice, nor a game of chance, where anyone, at any given time, can draw the winning lottery number (P. Bourdieu 1986). As such, Bourdieu’s toolbox can strengthen the goals of social work practice to address not only individual but also structural factors that shape the life circumstances of clients (see for instance Garrett 2007a; Houston 2019), and, we will add, the dialectic between them. Bourdieu’s theorizations can, in other words, help social workers to understand the complexity of the lived experiences of their clients, the range of capitals accessible to them and the doxic ideas or norms that influence and shape their situations. The people social workers work with are not necessarily entirely free in their choices and actions, as these are intrinsically linked to relations of power and hierarchy within which they are embedded (Wolniak and Houston 2023, 12). Thus, by ‘contextualizing a person’s thinking, affect and behaviour from a sociological angle’, it is possible to arrive at a more incisive understanding of the specific biography of a person, their worldviews, expressions, actions and the range of resources or capital available (Houston and Swords 2022, 1943), or, in Bourdieu’s terms, the interplay between habitus, field, capital and symbolic power. This understanding finds resonance in one of the most influential theoretical and organizing frameworks in social work knowledge and practice, based on various systems’ perspectives and ecosystems or ecological frameworks: the ‘person in environment’ perspective. This approach views the individual and his or her multiple environments (social, cultural, economic, physical, political and so on) as being part of a complex, dynamic and interactive system, in which each component of the system simultaneously affects and is affected by the other (Hare 2004). As for Bourdieu, within this ecosystem, ‘individuals are influenced by and influence their environments through their actions’ (Weiss-Gal 2008, 65; see also Johnson and Yanca 2001; Kondrat 2002). Given such a shared emphasis on mutuality of influence between the individual and his or her environments, perhaps one can view Bourdieu’s perspectives as potentially supplementary as opposed too contrary to dominant theoretical frameworks in social work.

The potential ‘added value’ – or supplement – of Bourdieu to this framework, lies, in our opinion, in how social mobility is conceptualized. Applying Bourdieu’s thoughts on the complexity connected to social change, based on the aforementioned understanding of the interrelatedness in various (material and embodied) conditions, can contribute to a more advanced understanding of the mechanisms of difference and inequality. While rightly considered affluent, this is also relevant in a Nordic context. In Norway, for example, research has established how, with the emergence of new pockets of inequality and exclusion in society, more people face risks and uncertainties today than before, and substantial gaps at the socio-economic, political and cultural levels, have emerged between different groups in society (Kamali and Jonsson 2018; Sønneland 2021). A report by Statistics Norway (With 2023) indicates that 20% of the population (above 16 years old) lives in household that will not be able to pay unforeseen expenses, particularly so among immigrant populations. So while poverty and rates of inequality in Norway are still considered low in comparison with other European countries, on the basis of these figures, it is clear that issues of widening gaps and inequality have been creeping into Norwegian society.

Bourdieu’s perspectives can, we believe, be fruitful for analyses of such an alarming development, particularly with regard to how it can take a ‘naturalized’ form. Bourdieu’s theorization implies that exclusion and poverty, though wrapped in a thick doxic veil, are not pre-determined or deterministic. Rather, exclusion and poverty can be regarded to be a construct, influenced by both contextual features and by a form of appropriation and embodiment. To clarify, exclusion is both ‘structural’ and ‘lived’: it has to, by its very nature, be reproduced (Everett 2002, 60). This mode of dominance also leads to a form of ‘learned ignorance’, that is an appropriation by the oppressed or, to return to Bourdieu’s toolbox, as an appropriation of doxa. Through the appropriation of doxa, the social order is accepted and re-enforced, even by individuals and groups who do not benefit from its acceptance, as in a paradox of the misfortunate. By accepting the dominant social order, one also accepts the phenomena of exclusion and marginality as belonging to ‘the natural order of things’. This further implies that exclusion can be presented and perceived as self-inflicted (Wiegmann 2017), that is as both ‘the natural order of things’ and as ‘rightly so’. Social inequality becomes naturalized and experienced as being based on a predetermined social order that is justified. Even the oppressed contribute to a form of reproduction of the social order, and thereby, commit an act of treason upon themselves (Everett 2002, 67).

While seemingly dystopian, this point is important, we believe, in explaining, partly at least, how inequality and suffering can emerge and be reproduced. With this, Bourdieu also becomes an entry point to understand under-communicated aspects of inequality and exclusion, or, in his words, ‘mis-recognized’, and therefore more rather than less relevant for ‘privileged’ countries, where inequality and poverty tend to be under-communicated. Within a ‘privileged context’, to return to another of Bourdieu’s ideas, those who do not reap the benefits of privilege can in particular be construed (also by themselves) as the source of their own misfortune. Here, in the land of plenty, those who do not feast can only blame themselves for their hunger. Those who have all the opportunities, but still miss out, can, in other words, be particularly vulnerable to symbolic violence, in which their misfortunes are naturalized and internalized. As such, and within this context, Bourdieu may contribute to nuancing forms of the ‘blame game’, as well as providing social workers with alternative glasses to view the social world with, in which the self-evident and the internalized can be nudged at, if not completely ‘un-veiled’.

Conclusions

We argue that Bourdieu’s theories and perspectives are of significance, particularly in understanding ‘limitations of spaces of possibility’, not only in working with social work ‘subjects’ (related to poverty, for instance), but for the very profession itself, having its own limitations and possibilities. Garrett argues, in a continuation of this, if not for a Bourdieusian social work, than for a Bourdieu informed social work (2007b, 238). We support this sentiment and believe that it is also true in a Nordic context. By way of conclusion, we argue that in spite of the marginal position that Bourdieu seems to occupy in social work in the Norwegian context, his conceptual apparatus has, in fact, immense potential to bolster both social work knowledge and practice in contemporary Norway.

Acknowledgments

A version of this article was presented at the research group “Community Work”, at the Western Norway University of Applied Sciences. We are grateful for the constructive feedback following this presentation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).