The four dimensions of power: conflict and democracy

ABSTRACT

This article theorizes the four dimensions of power, which builds upon the work of Dahl, Lukes, Foucault, Bourdieu, and Giddens, among others. The four dimensions correspond to four aspects of social interaction. The first dimension refers to the agency-energy aspect of interaction. The second concerns the structural components. The third concerns the epistemic element of interaction. The fourth relates to the social ontological elements of social subjects. The theory has implications for both normative and empirical research. Normatively the theory provides a pragmatist power-oriented way of building democratic theory. Empirically the theory provides a power-oriented conceptual map of everyday interaction.

KEYWORDS:

• Power
• social structure
• agency
• authority
• democracy

1. The concept of power

Bertrand Russell once wrote ‘that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.’ (Russell 1938, p. 10). At its most general level power is energy, or a capacity for action, which is fundamental to agency. When an agent makes a difference in the social world, they have power.

In everyday speech there is a tendency to conceptualize power in a normatively negative manner. However, from a social science perspective, a world without power would be a world without the agency to do things.

Following Allen (1998: 21–40), we should distinguish between power-to, power-over and power-with. Power-to is the capacity for action, or ‘ableness’ to do something (Morriss 2002, p. 81–4) – the energy, above. Power-over refers to situations when A makes B do something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). Power-over is often dominating, but not necessarily so. Power-over is a subset of power-to, as power-over presupposes power-to capacity for action (Pansardi 2012). Power-with denotes wider collaboration between actors that facilitates joint power-to.

This language of power should not be interpreted as some absolute foundational insight into essences or ‘correct usage’ (Haugaard 2010, 2020, p. 1–18). Rather, following Wittgenstein (1967), words are conceptual tools within a theoretical language game.

2. The four dimensions of power

Lukes (1974) characterized power as having three dimensions. Since then, under the influence of Foucault (1982) and following Digeser (1992), I have argued there are four dimensions of power (Haugaard 1997; 2012, 2020). These dimensions exist conjointly, yet can be analysed singly, for the purposes of understanding. This is analogous to an architect’s drawings for a house, consisting of plan, elevation and two end-elevations. None of these aspects exists singly in the actual house. However, we need this breakdown as an analytic device to understand the structure of the house. Unlike a house plan, these dimensions are ideal types (Weber 2011), or theoretical constructions that get to the essence of social phenomena, while they are rarely found in their pure form.

In broad outline, the four dimensions correspond to four aspects of social interaction. The first dimension refers to the agency-energy aspect of an interaction. The second concerns the structural components. The third concerns the epistemic element of the interaction. The fourth relates to the social ontological elements of social subjects. As readers who are already familiar with the work of Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), Lukes (1974, 2005)) and Foucault (1979, 1982)) will see, this four dimensional model is inspired by these authors, yet is significantly different from their work.

3. The first dimension of power

The first dimension of power, 1-D from now on, concerns the fundamentals of agency. As argued by Dahl (1957, 1968)), we must distinguish between the exercise of power and power resources. The exercise of power takes place the moment agents make a difference. Resources are potential power, which are activated through the exercise of power.

There is an exception to the clear distinction between resources and the exercise of power. When the less powerful are aware of the power resources of the more powerful, they may respond as they think the more powerful desire them to, without the more powerful having to do anything (Dowding 2003). Hence, the less powerful respond to resources without the presence of any exercise of power.

In everyday life, the three most significant power resources are violence-cum-coercion, authority and material-cum-economic resources. These resources are theoretically separable as ideal types. Yet, like most sociological concepts, in reality exist in mixed form.

3.1. Violence and coercion

Arendt once wrote that ‘it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites … ’ (Arendt 1970, p. 56), which is an observation that is critiqued (Breen 2007), yet has support from theorists as disparate as Parsons (1963) and Foucault (1982). As theorized here, the contrast highlights the difference between violence and authority (Haugaard 2018).

In its pure form violence is physical action upon the body of another as a physical, non-cognitive, object. When the other is shot or physically forced to do something, the social agency of the less powerful is ignored. However, the more common use of violence is as a threat to ensure compliance, which is coercion. As coercion presupposes interactive communication, it is social in the Weberian sense (Weber 1978, p. 4–24), while unmediated violence is not.

Exercises of power based upon coercion accord with Weber’s definition: ‘Power [macht] is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance … ’ (Weber 1978, p. 53). As argued by Parsons (1963), coercion is analogous to a primitive currency, such as gold, relative to the economy. Coercion is an ultimate backup resource. However, a political system based upon coercion is unstable. The moment that the less powerful have sufficient opposing violence to overthrow the coercive state, they have every reason to do so. Coercion begets resistance and, potentially, revolution.

While more unstable, violence and coercion are resources with wide scope. Violence can destroy anyone, and coercion can be used to gain domination of any kind – rape, plunder, fawning obedience etc. Violence and coercion are the most fungible and flexible of power resources, which is why they are often favoured by totalitarian regimes and are ideal for slavery (see Haugaard 2020, p. 172–185).

3.2. Authority

On a scale of sociability, authority lies at the opposite end of the scale from violence, with coercion in-between the two. As observed by Weber, authority depends upon belief (Weber 1978, p. 213), which is cognitive and meaning related. As argued by Searle (1996), authority follows the formula X counts as Y in circumstances C. The X (a person – Obama), counts as Y (authority – the President of the USA), in the circumstances C (Obama’s inauguration, 20 January 2009).

As a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim 1982), authority is inextricably linked to the performance of it (Austin 1975). As long as we perform the election of presidents there exists the social facticity of presidents but the moment we cease to perform the election of presidents, they cease to exist. In contrast, if we forget to call Mount Everest by its name, there will still be some physical thing, which continues to exist, although the concept ceases.

The scope of power that President Obama had was inextricably tied to what people believed, at that time, concerning the characteristics of the signifier ‘President of the USA’. In contrast, violence has a physical existence irrespective of meaning. Because positions of authority are inextricably tied to meaning, this limits the scope of authority. Hence, authority is significantly less fungible than coercion. When an individual performs the Y function of university professor, the felicitous performance includes, for instance, the scope of power to command that students write essays. Similarly, the performance of traffic police includes the authority to direct traffic, or issue parking tickets. Such commands are felicitous, thus consonant with the scope of authority of their respective positions. However, if professors were to attempt to direct traffic, or traffic police demanded essays, such actions would be entirely infelicitous, therefore outside their respective scope of authority. In contrast, a gunman, or dictator backed by an army, can coerce in any way they like, as long as they have more violence at their disposal than those whom they coerce.

While political and organisational authority are hierarchical, as in the above examples, there is a form of everyday authority that is significantly more part of the fabric of everyday life of democracies than people are generally aware of. Inspired by Pettit (2014), I call this citizen’s authority. Because it is ubiquitous, thus hiding in plain sight, citizen’s authority is best made visible by exploring its absence.

Primo Levi was, by his own definition, ‘an Italian citizen of Jewish race’ (Levi 1991: 4 – italics added). By profession Levi was a laboratory chemist. In early 1944 he was captured and deported to Auschwitz, where he worked as Jewish slave labour in a chemistry laboratory attached to the camp. In that laboratory, there were other prisoners, including non-Jewish political prisoners, and German, Aryan, cleaners who lived outside the camp. In terms of hierarchy, even though Levi was doing the professional technical work of the laboratory, because of his Jewish identity, Levi was the bottom of the authority hierarchy. When the cleaners swept the laboratory they would sweep over his feet, and never looked Levi in the eye. One day Levi addressed one of them, but she ignored him, turning to one of the political prisoners, who had higher status than the Jews, to complain of the presence of a ‘stinkjude’ (Levi 1991, p. 168). To theorize this: in Italy Levi had the Y status authority of citizen, which is a form of everyday authority that people in liberal democratic societies take for granted. However, once in the camp, Levi had lost the everyday status function of citizen, thus the authority to speak for himself. He had experienced, what Patterson (1982) describes as social death. The paradigm instance of social death is slavery, where the person lacks the authority to do anything on her own behalf: she exists for-the-sake of another. Slaves cannot author their actions; therefore, lack authority to speak for themselves.

Social death is as close as it is possible to come to the ideal type of the total absence of authority. In contrast, liberal democracy entails the idea that ‘ordinary life’ has value (Taylor 1989). Citizen’s authority means that every person has the authority to author their own life, as an end in themselves (Korsgaard 1996). This authority is not the foundation of all moral systems (as suggested by Kant 2012), rather a social construction that is the achievement of a modern democratic struggle for recognition (Honneth 1995). The current #MeToo movement and Black Lives Matter are a continuation of this struggle.

Beyond citizen’s authority, certain forms of everyday authority are associated with common social roles. The social roles of ‘parent’, ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘customer’ and so on, all have authority expectations associated with them. Authority does not simply concern formal hierarchies but is the stuff of everyday social integration, whereby individuals are social actors performing certain social roles.

For social actors, a felicitous performance leads to successful social integration. In that sense, social integration entails resources that define their scope of authority. Because social actors have a psychic predisposition toward social integration, they have, what Butler (1997) describes as, a psychic attachment to relationships of authority. This attachment adds stability to the social system, even when authority is unevenly distributed – the less powerful also have psychic attachment to their authority roles.

3.3. Organizations and political systems

Organisations are deliberately created social systems that are created for the purposes of power-with collaboration for their members. Individual actors wish to come together to augment their individual agency, with social power-to derived from organisational collaboration. In order for an organisation to achieve any goals there has to be division of labour, which necessitates the creation of positions of authority. Because authority is confined in scope, it is possible to combine power-over with power-to for the less powerful. Those in authority have power-over others, which, when used for the purposes intended, empowers all members of the organisation, including those who are compliant.

There is a short-term incentive for those who occupy positions of authority to abuse that authority, using their power-over to disproportionally advantage themselves. However, when the less powerful perceive that power-over is no longer in the collective interest, a process of power deflation takes place, as the less powerful become unwilling to confer authority upon the more powerful. Conversely, when those in authority use their power as intended, for collective power-with, the less powerful are willing to increase their trust in the more powerful, which increases the legitimacy of the more powerful and, thus, increases their authority. So, self-restraint in the use of power increases this power resource, thus it is in the long-term advantage of both the more and less powerful. This creates a long-term incentive to use authority as intended.

In the case of power deflation, where trust is withdrawn due to the perceived abuse of authority, the more powerful replace authority with coercion, in order to maintain power-over others. However, once coercion is used, this is a de facto admission of the absence of authority, thus what authority is left is further undermined. Consequently, there is a long-term disincentive to the use of coercion.

I would argue that this is what Arendt meant when she argued that obedience, but not power (actually authority) never comes out of the barrel of a gun (Arendt 1970, p. 53). However, there is a notable exception to this rule, which is when the less powerful confer those in authority with coercive resources to overcome the problem of free-riders within the system. When a democratic state uses coercion to enforce laws that have legitimacy, then authority is re-enforced by the barrel of a gun.

3.4. Democracy

Democracy constitutes an assembled set of structural constraints that renders conflict positive-sum. From the perspective of historical sociology, democracy is the slow evolution of politics from coercion to a situation in which power-over is based upon authority. European feudalism was largely a system of kleptocracy, where wealth and power were extracted by coercion. Power was largely zero-sum and compliance was the product of overcoming resistance. It was a highly unstable system because the powerful were constantly threatened by revolution, where coercion meets coercion.

From the 18^th C. onwards, the bourgeoisie emerge as the dominant social class. By establishing parliaments the bourgeoisie gained political authority. Political rights slowly moved down the social scale. The bourgeoisie learned that giving up power resources actually increased the total amount of power resources in the system. As greater numbers of the population were included in the political process, they became socially integrated within the system. As authority replaced coercion, the system became more stable.

Liberal democracy is a system for structuring conflict, which is the outcome of the concessions given under the threat of revolution. The aggregate unintended effect is a political system where the exercise of power-over is positive-sum. What makes this possible is a set of social structures that constrain conflict in such a manner that those who lose democratic power conflicts, do not lose absolutely. Key is the distinction between episodic power and dispositional power (Clegg 1989). Episodic power is the momentary exercise of power, while dispositional powers are the latent power resources that an actor has A exercises power-over B episodically in an election, while dispositionally the authoritative power resources of both actors are reproduced. The moment the structures of the democratic system are reproduced, the social structures of democracy constitute resources that enable the Bs to prevail over the As at a future date. Democracy is essentially an iterative, or repeat, game of power-over in which defeat still means the retention of sufficient dispositional empowerment to play again. Human rights are sets of constraints upon the victor, which ensures that the losers in the democratic game have the power-to play again. So, for instance, freedom of speech is a right that enables the less powerful to critique the more powerful, thus giving the less powerful a means of winning the next democratic contest (see Haugaard 2020, p. 184–218).

Is authority always normatively desirable?

The above suggests that authority is always benign, which is not the case. What is sociologically legitimate is not necessarily normatively legitimate. The sociological foundation of authority lies, as observed by Weber, in the beliefs of the compliant actors. The less powerful may sincerely believe that the more powerful are acting in their interests, thus grant them authority, but this may not necessarily be the case. The less powerful may be compliant because they have been cognitively manipulated – the third dimension of power.

3.5. Economic resources

Material resources have a dual aspect to them, mirroring the distinction between violence/coercion and authority. In a crude form, the threat of deprivation, or inducement of material rewards, functions in analogous manner to coercion. A social actor who is desperate for material resources will be amenable to disadvantageous compliance. However, in an advanced economy money functions analogously to authority – a social construction that facilitates complex chains of interactions. Money is a symbolic medium, like authority, which follows the formula X (bits of paper or electric pulses) counts as Y (dollars or euros) in circumstances C (when ratified by the centrals banks of USA or Europe).

As suggested by Parsons (1963), both wealth and authority are variable-sum. As an economy expands, there is more wealth to go around. A primitive economy is a kleptocracy. As complex economic exchanges increase wealth and workers create trade unions, this creates possibilities for buyer/seller and employer/employee to enter into economic relationships that are mutually beneficial, even if not always equally so.

The distribution of economic resources defines positions within the economic system. The most obvious is the difference in strategic advantage between the owners of the means of production, and those who have solely their labour power to sell. Again, over centuries, the sellers of labour power have learnt that the value of labour power is increased through scarcity. Essentially, education is a way to give labour power distinction, thus added value. In parallel to the democratic process, unions, labour law and so on, are structural constraints for managing conflicts between the sellers of labour power and the owners of the means of production.

Economic resources have a specific scope, analogous to authority. Whether prostitution is legal or not is, in part, a debate concerning whether or not the scope of economic resource should include sex-work as a legitimate category of economic activity. Central to the process of democratization is the attempt to make the purchase of political authority outside the scope of economic resources. In feudalism, political power and economic power were fused. As an ideal type, democracy is a system where there should be a separation between economic and political power. In theory, the purchase of political authority should lie outside the scope of economic resources. In practice, a democracy like Sweden, where, for instance, the Deputy Prime Minister Mona Shalin resigned, in 1996, for using public funds to purchase a chocolate bar, is closest to the ideal type. In contrast, in the US political system the separation between the scope of economic resources and political authority is currently incomplete, thus far from the ideal type of democracy.

4. The second dimension of power

When Bachrach and Baratz (1962) developed the second face (now dimension) of power, they drew attention to the structural aspect of power. Social structures preclude certain types of decisions: some issues are organised into politics, while others are organized out. Bachrach and Baratz wanted to draw attention to the fact that what is excluded from an agenda can often be as important as what is included. In the model of 2-D developed here, structural aspects are developed further, including the enabling aspects of structure, and the phenomenon of conflict over social structures.

In Bachrach and Baratz’s theorization, and in everyday speech, it is generally assumed that structural constraint is a negative phenomenon, which social actors would be better off without. This is analogous to the assumption that power equates to domination; therefore, power is undesirable. In contrast, Giddens (1984) theory of structuration shows us that the constraining aspect of social structures is inextricably linked to an enabling aspect and social structures.

The enabling and constraining aspects of social structures exist as a duality. In a democratic contest, it is the constraints of the electoral process that enables one actor to prevail over the other. Similarly, language constitutes a set of rules of practice, which are structural constraints that make communication possible. In general, constraints are the precondition of enablement, or power-to. Furthermore, as freedom is always the freedom to do something, thus an exercise of power-to, structural constraint is a condition of possibility for freedom (Haugaard 2016).

While enabling, it is equally true that structural constraint may impede forms of action, so in that sense is the enemy of freedom. To determine whether a constraint is freedom-enhancing or restricting (domination), we must observe the distribution of the enablement, or power-to. What makes democratic contests stable, and normatively desirable, is the fact that the structural constraints deliver power-to the less powerful, not only the powerful.

In itself, structural bias is a normatively neutral phenomenon: it is the nature of the bias that determines whether a structural bias is normatively desirable or reprehensible. A liberal democracy and a racist system, such as apartheid South Africa, each have certain structural constraints that render certain actions within the conditions of possibility, while others are organized outside. To simplify, what makes democracy normatively desirable is that a significant number of the structural exclusions are there to empower the less powerful. In contrast, in the racist system the constraints are there to ensure that the less powerful remain disempowered.

Structural constraint means the inclusion of certain exercises of power within the conditions of possibility, and the exclusion of others. Given a plurality of interests all social structures are contested to some extent. However, the more social structures are consonant with the collective interests the less they will be contested. For this reason, more egalitarian structures will be more stable than less egalitarian social structures. Hence, there is a direct correlation between normative desirability and stability, which is why despotic systems are more prone to revolutions than democracies. It is because of this correlation that, over the last two hundred years, there has been selection in favour of democracy.

The interactive reproduction of social structure:

In the theory of structuration Giddens (1984) draws our attention to the fluid or plastic nature of social structures. They are entirely the product of social construction, thus exist only through continual replication, which he terms structuration. What is missing from the model is that not all acts of structuration are felicitous or are accepted as legitimate. This is where conflict over structures comes into the picture. Following Wittgenstein’s (1967) private language argument, social structures only really exist systemically when they receive validation from others as felicitous. If someone believes they have the authority of Napoleon, and structures accordingly, but no-one else recognises this as felicitous, the political authority structures of Napoleon are not reproduced.

Garfinkel’s breaching experiments revealed the extent to which all interactions, including trivial everyday greeting behaviour (Hello, how are you?), have a felicitous (correct) and infelicitous (incorrect) response (Garfinkel 1984, p. 44). When the responding actors validate an initial act of structuration, only at that moment is the structure reproduced. Successful structuration requires the collaboration of others, who are willing to confirm-structure. Conversely, responding social actors exclude what they consider deviant acts of structuration through de-structuration.

As we saw in the case of Primo Levi, if socialised in a liberal democracy, we take for granted that others are willing to confirm-structure structuration of everyday citizen’s authority. However, when Levi addressed the Aryan cleaners and found they were not willing to speak to him, they were de-structuring his citizen’s authority. As theorized by Honneth (1995), the politics of recognition involves creating a community of people willing to confirm-structure the citizen’s authority validity of a particular identity. It is for this reason that, for instance, gay rights or black rights require mass demonstrations as a way of proving the existence of a large community of confirm-structuring others. The political structures of democracy are ways of enrolling such consensus felicity building by social groups.

The need for confirm-structuration applies not only to the authority of individuals but also to collective authority positions. For a collective of people to achieve the status of a nation-state, it is not simply sufficient for them to declare themselves as such – an act of structuration – but they also require the collaboration of others to confirm-structure this Y status authority. The majority of Catalans, Kurds, Tibetans and Palestinians consider themselves members of sovereign nation-states (Y status) but they do not have that form of political authority because insufficient numbers of other nation-states are currently willing to confirm-structure their structuration as felicitous.

4.1. Conflict over social structures

With respect to social structures, two types of conflict occur. There are conflicts that reproduce social structures in a routine way, which are 1-D structured power conflicts. The democratic process and negotiations between employers and trade unions are instances of structured conflicts. These are relatively shallow conflicts as there is underlying consensus around the reproduction of the social structures. In contrast, in 2-D conflict over structures, the rules of interaction are contested because the social structures that underpin ordered interaction are in dispute. In such conflict over structures acts of structuration are met with de-structuration by relevant others.

2-D conflict over structures has different quality to it than 1-D structured conflict. In the latter, social actors may disagree about goals, such as who should govern the country or what a fair wage is, but they fundamentally agree about what is a reasonable order-of-things. They accept that those whom they oppose retain the authority to speak, and therefore are engaged with them. The structures of democracy are built around the idea that those who are part of the democratic process are reasonable others, which is why democracy presupposes freedom of speech. In contrast, in conflict over structure, there is fundamental disagreement over the social order and, frequently, the status authority status of the other is seen as unreasonable.

The right to speak and to be heard relates to two aspects of the speech act. It relates to the authority of the speaker. As observed by Foucault (1989, p. 51), medical statements cannot come from just anybody, such statements come from doctors, who have the authority to speak on this subject. This extends not only to specialist fields of knowledge, with their institutionalized representatives, but to everyday interaction, where the world is divided into reasonable others, with whom one should engage (even if they may be wrong or have different interests) and unreasonable others whose opinions can be ignored because they are, well, ‘just so unreasonable’. In the case of democracy, it is considered unreasonable not accept the outcome of an election. While public protest is reasonable, it is outside the conditions of the reasonable to get supporters to occupy parliamentary/government buildings.

Being deemed worthy of interaction (as a reasonable other) constitutes an authority status position. Part of the strategy of two-dimensional power conflicts is to socially construct the other as unreasonable, thus unworthy of engagement.

The Israel–Palestine conflict is an exemplar of the differences between 1-D conflict within structures and 2-D conflict over structures, as it contains elements of both. The Oslo peace process was an attempt to turn a 2-D conflict over structures, where neither side recognised the other as a legitimate interlocutor, into a constrained 1-D structured conflict, where each recognised the other as reasonable. Prior to the process, the Palestinians did not recognise Israel as a legitimate nation-state and Israel socially constructed the PLO as ‘terrorists’, thus unreasonable. In contrast, the famous handshake between Arafat and Rabin, in front of US President Bill Clinton, on 13 September 1993, represented a mutual recognition of the other as having the authority to speak and be listened to as reasonable. In the 1-D structured Oslo narrative, the Israel–Palestine conflict became socially constructed as a struggle of two conflicting nationalisms, which were of equal moral worth.

Since Oslo the Palestinians have been divided on whether to recognise Israel as a reasonable other, or to continue with 2-D conflict. The followers of Hamas and the BDS movement continue a 2-D conflict over structures approach. Rather than conflicting nationalisms, they socially construct the Israelis as ‘colonisers’. In a contemporary liberal democratic system of practical knowledge, the signifier coloniser has a negative status function as unreasonable. As argued by De Jong, from a BDS Palestinian perspective (De Jong 2018, p. 377), once the Israelis are seen as colonisers ‘the notion of binary conflict functions as an ideological distraction.’ (De Jong 2018, p. 376). In other words, the social construction of other as ‘coloniser’ entails that there are no longer two reasonable, yet conflicting, points of view, only one.

The peace process in Northern Ireland has a similar quality. Part of the strategy of moving from a deep conflict two-dimensional conflict over structure to a peace process, which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement 1998, was persuading both sides to agree to ‘parity of esteem’. The moment parity of esteem was recognized, the other became a reasonable other, through the social construction of the conflict as a struggle between two conflicting nationalisms. Thus, the conflict moved from two-dimensional conflict over structure to one-dimensional structured conflict.

Peace processes entail moving from 2-D conflict over the structure to 1-D structurally constrained conflict. However, in cases of large imbalances of power, it often makes strategic sense for the less powerful to persist with 2-D conflict over structures. Gene Sharp is the author of the best-known how-to manual for non-violent resistance. From Dictatorship to Democracy: a conceptual framework for liberation (Sharp 2010) opens with the distinction between conflicts that are resolvable through negotiation and deep conflicts, which are not (Sharp 2010, p. 10). The contrast is typified by the difference between democracy, where institutional structures are a means for resolving conflicts, and dictatorship, where justice requires structural change.

In the deep conflict, the key to resistance is the fact that all authority presupposes validation through the beliefs of the people that obey (Sharp 2010, p. 18). Once these beliefs are undermined the foundations of the dictator’s power rest solely upon coercion and violence, which, in a complex society, are insufficient as power resources. Essentially, Sharp is distinguishing between 1-D conflicts and 2-D conflicts. Non-violent conflict is a method of deconstructing the authority structure of domination through continual de-structuration. Sharp advocates a process of micro-resistance whereby the social structures that underpin the authority of the dictator are essentially de-structured. As observed by Johansson and Vinthagen (2015) with regard to the Palestinian sumud, often such acts of resistance may be largely symbolic, but they still have the cumulative effect of undermining the authority of the dominant.

In analysing whether a conflict is one-dimensional or two-dimensional, the language of self-sacrifice is a typical indicator of 2-D conflict over structures. This is because by refusing to confirm-structure the social order the less powerful sacrifices short-term everyday power-to that she would obtain from confirm-structuring the social system. Only in extreme cases of domination, such as slavery, is there no significant power-to gain from reproducing the social system. Typically, the less powerful gain some power-to from the system, which is why, even when they are aware that they are dominated, they will often reproduce and confirm-structure the structures of the more powerful. To take gender as an example, in a patriarchal system, which is unequal, there is still power-to for individual women to be gained by reproducing the gender-norms of femininity. As argued by Hayward (2013, p. 2), if you take tango dancing as a metaphor for a patriarchal set of social structures, for the individual female dancer dancing according the rules means following the male lead, which delivers status authority for the female as a ‘good dancer’. In contrast, resisting those social structures would make her a ‘poor dancer’, thus with lower authority status. As argued by Scott (1990), in everyday life each actor acts singly and so structural change does not appear a realistic option. In everyday interaction it makes strategic sense for the less powerful to use existing structures as best they can to realize the episodic power-to that they require to get by, with the consequence that they confirm-structure the social structures that are part of the system of domination.

As argued by Scott (1990), this pragmatic strategy should not be confused with ideological endorsement of the system, as in the third dimension of power.

5. Third dimension of power:

In the original formulation, Lukes (1974) suggested that the third dimension of power involved actors not knowing their real interests (1974, p. 24), or what Marxists refer to as ‘false consciousness’. In the second edition, Lukes dissociates from this as it suggests there is such a thing as real interests or true consciousness (Lukes 2005: 145; see also Haugaard 1997: 18–19, 2020, p. 70). Below, the third dimension of power is theorized differently, and includes aspects of Foucault on power/knowledge, while integrating this with a social constructivist account of social structure, influenced by Giddens and Bourdieu. There are five aspects of 3-D that I will discuss, as follows: practical knowledge, natural attitude, reasonable versus unreasonable, reification, and truth versus Truth.

5.1. Practical knowledge

The term habitus has been popularised by Bourdieu (1977, 1990)), while Giddens (1984) refers to practical consciousness knowledge. I will follow an adapted version of Giddens, dropping the word ‘consciousness’, referring simply to practical knowledge. In everyday life, social actors order their actions using a combination of practical and discursive knowledge. At this moment, at a discursive level, I am writing an article. However, to do so I am using my practical knowledge of the English language, which is largely a tacit knowledge that is used to ‘go on’ in everyday interaction. Bourdieu states that habitus is unconscious (Bourdieu 1977: 77, 1990, p. 56), and describes it as ‘immanent law’, or ‘lex insita’ (Bourdieu 1990, p. 59). Following Giddens (1984), I would argue that while it is true that much of the time social actors do not question practical knowledge, it is not unconscious in the deep sense of not being penetrable by discursive consciousness, nor are social actors cognitive/cultural dupes (as suggested by ‘immanent law’). Social actors can discursively reflect upon practical knowledge and, in so doing, critique that knowledge, which is an important aspect of resisting 3-D power.

When writing The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir’s original intention was to write an autobiography focusing upon her early life (Moi 2010). She decided to begin with the simple observation that she was born a woman. At Jean Paul Sartre’s urging, de Beauvoir decided to interrogate what precisely it means to be a woman and discovered, to her astonishment, that describing what is involved in performing female gender would fill the entirety of her book. In other words, the practical knowledge of the performance of femininity was vast and complex. Moving practical into discursive knowledge made the implicit unequal power relations of such performances manifest, thus was a feminist critique of prevailing social structures.

This corresponds to what in everyday speech is called ‘consciousness-raising’. What makes such discursive articulations convincing is not that they represent the Truth, in any absolute sense. Rather, such discursive articulations of practical knowledge are effective social critiques when they resonate with the practical knowledge of readers. The reader is convinced of the veracity of the discursive text because it resonates with what they already know at the level of practical knowledge.

5.2. Practical knowledge and the natural attitude

An integral part of practical knowledge is meaning. Humans are interpretative beings who constantly impose concepts upon data that enter the brain. In everyday social action it appears as if the meaning of the world is external to us but in reality, it is we who impose meaning upon the world. In everyday action, social actors have what the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1967) called the natural attitude, whereby they take their practical knowledge as given and external to them.

The natural attitude assumes there is a self-evident order-of-things. We have already observed that those who wish to contest the status quo are often characterized as unreasonable. From the perspective of the natural attitude those who do not accept the natural order-of-things are characterized as unreasonable because they appear to deny self-evident reality. Through misrecognition (Bourdieu 1990, p. 68), the natural attitude suggests that meaning is external, rather than socially constructed. Those with significantly different practical consciousness appear unreasonable, as they are denying objective external reality. The shared practical knowledge of a community defines what is reasonable and what is not: what is felicitous and what is infelicitous. Obviously, actors can say infelicitous things (they are not dupes), but the response of others will be to dismiss such utterances as unworthy of engagement, infelicitous or unreasonable. The realm of the reasonable is what policy experts refer to as the Overton window.

The tendency for practical knowledge to endorse the status quo leads to normatively undesirable exclusions, including 2-D structural bias against minorities. However, it also has desirable consequences, which are easily overlooked. When an actor interprets the electoral system with a natural attitude, it appears reasonable to accept the outcome of an election. When a political party finds themselves with fewer votes than the party they oppose, the natural attitude informs them they should accept defeat. Once a democratic system is well established, over many years, it gains stability from the natural attitude.

5.3. Reification

While the natural attitude creates a bias in favour of the status quo, there are always actors who critique the existing conditions of possibility and, in so doing, contest practical knowledge. If this were not the case, social change would never occur. This is 3-D epistemic conflict, which corresponds to 2-D conflict over structures.

When the natural attitude is suspended, and practical knowledge is made discursive, the social constructedness of everyday life becomes manifest. Then, social actors realize that (to paraphrase Foucault 1988, p. 36), social reality is made, therefore it can be unmade. This is deeply destabilizing to social order. Social actors who wish to maintain the status quo employ reification to resist this process. Simultaneously, those who desire change, while they attempt to demonstrate the constructedness of the present order-of-things, will build their own reifications to obscure their own acts of social construction.

Reification is the process, whereby the social constructedness of structures is denied. If the existing social order, or the future order of things, are not socially constructed but represent some transcendent-order-of-things, then it is unreasonable to question that order-of-things.

Sacred versus profane and other techniques of reification:

In traditional societies the most common form of reification is religion. As argued by Durkheim (2008), the essence of religion is the distinction between the sacred and the profane. The sacred embodies the collective norms that should not be questioned, simply accepted. An effective way to foreclose critique is to instill in people that social structures are sacred, thus not social constructions that can be unmade.

The construction of the sacred typically involves charismatic, or sacred, authority. For instance, Moses was a charismatic leader who embodied the sacred. When Moses presented the Ten Commandments to the Jews, he did not argue that, ‘thou shalt not kill’ or other moral precept made pragmatic sense, which he could have done, as many of the commandments are justifiable on consequentialist grounds (social construction does not preclude normative justifiability, as is often assumed). Instead, to foreclose argument, a stage was set, with a sacred mountain, thunder, and lightning and so on, all props for Moses’ charismatic authority, followed by the explicit claim that the tablets were handed down from God. Moving forward in time, all the rituals found in the Abrahamic monotheistic faiths are a kind of institutionalized charismatic authority, used to instill in the faithful the idea that the teachings of their respective faiths are not social constructions, which were made and therefore can be unmade.

As has been convincingly argued by Alexander (2011), even in modern secular social systems, the everyday fabric of modern society is still significantly structured along with the sacred versus profane distinction. The elaborate ceremonies that are observed in presidential inaugurations or openings of parliament are an attempt to give politics the aura of the sacred. Furthermore, political contests are typically framed around familiar sacred versus profane themes, with political leaders casting themselves in quasi-sacred roles of leading the people into a new era of greatness, while political opponents are cast as representing a profane past of corruption. The metaphors of nationalism and populism would be typical variants of this secular use of the sacred versus profane reifying imagery. The ‘will of people’, ‘moral majority’ or ‘nation’ are the sacred, while the ‘elites’ or ‘deep state’ are the profane.

Moving beyond the sacred, essentialism is another technique of reification. Certain people have characteristics attributed to them based upon essential features. When the differences between men and women are attributed to biology, then gender inequality is not socially constructed. Similarly, in colonial discourse indigenous peoples were given essential characteristics that made them (supposedly) incapable of governing themselves (see Said 2003, p. 32–3). It is noteworthy that these essential characteristics are often framed in apparently positive ways. The 19^th C. women’s magazine, The Ladies Monthly Museum, described these essential differences between the sexes as follows.

Man is strong – woman beautiful. Man is daring and confident – woman is diffident and unassuming. … Man has a rugged heart – woman a soft and tender one. … Man is a being of justice – woman of mercy.

(Quoted in Alexander 2006, p. 238)

The objective is to have the less powerful, in this case women, buy into the essentialism.

Another technique of reification is for a group to represent themselves as agents of the laws of history. Historicism is a way for a social group to claim that their advocated order-of-things is not just another social construction but, rather, a manifestation of a transcendental order. Hegelian Marxism and Darwin-inspired social theory would be typical of these techniques of reification.

In critique of reification, it should be observed that the social construction of norms does not mean that they are arbitrary, as is often assumed, even by some social theorists, including Bourdieu (1990, p. 67). Roman and Arabic numbers are both social constructions. Arabic numerals are better than Roman numerals for the purposes of multiplication, as they are less complex. Hence, there is nothing arbitrary about Arabic numerals: they are justified by their usefulness relative to their competitor socially constructed numeral systems. So, reification is not a necessary condition for the justification of social constructions and leads attention away from the pertinent normative grounds of critical justification. With regard to political structures, the structures of democracy are by convention only. Yet, we would argue that they are far from arbitrary. Their purpose is to manage conflict in an egalitarian way, so their normative desirability is assessed relative to their capacity to deliver political equality. If, for instance, a set of political institutions has an intrinsic bias in favor of one group over another, that is normatively undesirable relative to the use function of democratic political structures. While democratic rituals often reproduce the sacred, the foundation of democracy is not reification.

5.4. Truth versus truth

When Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God (Nietzsche 2006, p. 125), he bemoaned the fact that science seemed to have slotted seamlessly into the space previously occupied by God. As observed by Foucault (1988, p. 107), Nietzsche was not interested in Descartes’ philosophical question, which was to find a foundation of truth claims. Rather, Nietzsche was interested in the use that is made of truth. From a sociological perspective, Truth is used as a form of reification. Relative to everyday understanding, Truth is not a social construction, rather a claim that transcends culture and society, analogous to the sacred.

At this point, we should distinguish between truth with a small t and Truth with a capital T, which Foucault (1980) fails to do. Small t truth refers to truth claims that do, indeed, recognize that truth claims are socially constructed. Most philosophers of science, including mainstream ones, such as Popper, fully accept that science is made up of ‘conventions’, which constitute ‘the game of science’ (Popper 2002: 32; italics added). Scientists start from general hypotheses, which constitute an ‘irrational creative intuition’ that is never verifiable but should be open to falsification (Popper 2002: 8; italics added). Kuhn (1970) argues that scientists construct their theories relative to paradigms, which are systems of thought and meaning young scientists are socialized into. Without going into too much detail (see Haugaard 2020, p. 114–42), these kinds of perceptions of scientific truth claim are not reifying, as they openly acknowledge that truth claims are grounded in socially constructed conventions. As argued by James (1981, p. 37), the word truth is simply a term of recommendation, used for any socially constructed concept or hypothesis that proves itself more useful than its competitors.

In contrast, the reifying use of Truth constitutes a transcendental claim, denying social construction. Sociologically, Truth claims have the same function as God claims. Claiming Truth is way of foreclosing argumentation. No reasonable person argues with the Truth, in much the same way no reasonable person (in a theocracy) argues with God.

Policy-makers routinely use expert committees to reify their policies, making them incontestable. When they do so, they are making use of an everyday perception of Truth as transcendental, in much the same way that the word of God is. This use of Truth to reify claims should not blind us to the fact that conscientious scientists make more modest use of truth, recognizing that what they say is entirely fallible, revisable and socially constructed.

For the purposes of buttressing authority, Truth claims confer more strategic advantage than truth claims. When researching Discipline and Punish, Foucault came across the case of Pierre Riviére, who ran out into the street, wielding a bloodstained axe and loudly proclaiming that he had killed most of his family (Foucault 1975). What fascinated Foucault was the fact that medical experts wrote endlessly about the case. Their work was superfluous for the purpose of the conviction of Riviére. However, it was essential for the social construction of the categories of beings that populated early criminal psychiatry. When these 19^th C. pioneering scientists were constructing their field of knowledge, they populated it with figures, such as the ‘psychopath’. When constructing this category of meaning it makes strategic sense to build upon the natural attitude, suggesting that the ‘psychopath’ exists in the world-out-there, in much the same way that geographers might claim that Mount Everest exists. These objects are discovered (Truth), rather than socially constructed (truth). As the natural attitude already suggests that meaning is external to our being-in-the-world, it makes strategic sense to claim expertise on something-in-the-world-out-there which you have ‘discovered’, rather than socially constructed. So, there exists a natural attitude bias in favour of making Truth claims, rather than socially constructivist pragmatist truth conjectures, even if the latter are better scientific practice.

In the social sciences the social constructions that social scientists create include certain categories of persons. Part of treating the perceived ‘problems’ of these categories of persons is to convince them to recognize the validity of their categorization. A person becomes cured of mental illness or addiction through a process that includes admitting that they constitute a certain category of person. Again, convincing someone to accept the categorization appears more convincing if presented in a reified way, as a Truth claim. Although, it should be possible to use truth instead, explaining the usefulness of socially constructed identities.

6. Fourth dimension of power

The fourth dimension concerns the social construction of social subjects, with particular predispositions. As observed by Erikson, no society can afford too many characters who behave arbitrarily (Erikson 1995, p. 168). Every society is a complex order of interdependence that requires certain conformity of subject predispositions. This process can take place intentionally, through education and surveillance, as described by Foucault (1979), or more subtly through competition for status, as described by Erikson (1995), Elias (1995) and Bourdieu (1989).

Using a non-European example of subject formation, Erikson compares two Native American tribes, with very different characteristics: the Sioux and Yurok. The Sioux inhabited the plains, roaming widely, while the Yurok lived in a narrow mountainous valley, with a river running through it. The Sioux hunted by following roaming herds of buffalo, while the Yurok fished. The Sioux valued generosity, openness to strangers and a comparatively high level of spontaneity. In contrast, the Yurok thought anyone who wished to venture beyond the limited space of the valley to be ‘crazy’ or of ‘ignoble birth’ (Erikson 1995, p. 150), or unreasonable. Because the Sioux were outwardly mobile, by the time Erikson became acquainted with them, they were in contact with mainstream US society, therefore had absorbed many of their norms. In contrast, the Yurok predisposition for isolation protected their culture. In Yurok society self-restraint, autonomy and cleanliness were highly esteemed. The internalization of discipline and self-restraint began in utero. The pregnant mother ate little and continued doing hard physical labour, which was thought to prevent the foetus from being too comfortable. Women rubbed their abdomen to keep the foetus awake. After birth, the baby was seldom allowed to rest and early weaning was encouraged (Erikson 1995, p. 159). The Yurok meal was ‘a veritable ceremony of self-restraint. The child was admonished never to grab food in haste, never to take it without asking for it, always to eat slowly, and never to ask for second helpings … ’ (Erikson 1995, p. 160). Children’s fables emphasized the terrible consequences of lack of self-restraint – for instance, the buzzard’s baldness is the effect of the bird being impatient and greedy, therefore putting its whole head into a dish of too hot soup (Erikson 1995, p. 160). Yurok society created self-restrained social subjects, with temperaments functional to their society of fishing, Spartan lifestyle and lack of physical mobility.

Combining Erikson with Bourdieu, imagine the socialization of a male Yurok child. At first, the child would have found the constraints external to him, as external admonitions from his parents. However, as he became good at heaping his spoon ‘just right’, or knowing just ‘how much to eat’, he would start to take pride in self-discipline. The child would learn that the more perfectly he performed, relative to the norms of the society, the greater approval and status he would have. Soon he would compete with his peers, gaining distinction (Bourdieu 1989) for his abilities. When learning to fish, he would be more self-controlled than his peers, which would translate into high status authority as a fisherman. At this stage, his self-restraint would no longer be external imposition: it would be internal self-subjectification, as part of his identity.

Elias’ (1995) account of the ‘civilizing process’ is essentially an account of how, over time, status authority became attached to certain forms of self-restraint. The account is often criticized for being Euro-centric, consequently, I began with a non-European example, to make the point that this is not solely a European phenomenon. Rather, it characterizes all societies. I now add to this that the term civilization is a social construction, which is used by actors strategically to create authority. Civilization is part of a strategic will to power, not something that I am normatively endorsing.

Elias researched books of etiquette from the feudal period up to the early 20^th C. The early books were written for the upper-class members of the feudal order, when visiting court. Relative to modern norms, the advice is extraordinarily crude, for instance: ‘A man who clears his throat when he eats and one who blows his nose in the tablecloth are both ill-bred, I assure you.’ (Elias 1995, p. 69). That the elite of society need to be told not to blow their nose in the tablecloth suggests doing so would have been normal.

By the early modern period (17^th C.), such crude advice is no longer necessary. Early modern books were often directed at the bourgeoisie, who wished to attend court. By the 19^th C there are similar books of etiquette for the working class. In broad outline, in the feudal period the elite were trying to create distinction (Bourdieu 1989) for themselves. In the early modern period there was a move toward court society, which both the Feudal aristocracy and members of the bourgeoisie attended. As merchants and manufacturers gained wealth comparable to, or exceeding, the feudal class there arose massive competition for status authority between the two classes. The feudal class developed increasingly complex manners and ways of behavior to set themselves apart form the bourgeoisie. The strategic suggestion was that the bourgeoisie had wealth but were ‘uncivilized’. However, the bourgeoisie did not accept that they were ‘uncivilized’ and adopted the self-restraints of (so-called) ‘civilization’. As the bourgeoisie became dominant, the race for self-restraint moved down the social scale. The petit bourgeoisie aped their (so-called) ‘betters’ and over time some of the working class sought distinction through self-restraint.

As described by Bourdieu (1989), this competition for self-restraint occurs not only between classes, also within and between different status groups. Artists, those in finance, fans of rock music, and every social group imaginable have dispositions that they consider of high status, or distinction, thus setting themselves apart from their ‘less civilized’ competitors.

Just as the self-discipline of the Yurok was functional to their social order, similarly the social dispositions of the typical self-restrained European social subject is/was functional to modernity. Elias provides a graphic description by contrasting a typical feudal road with a modern highway (1995, p. 446). As a thought experiment, imagine travelling on 12^th C. road through a forest, the light is fading and peering into the distance, you perceive another figure. What do you do? You make sure your weapon is ready and/or you prepare to disappear into the woods at a moment’s notice. The appropriate social ontology includes a predisposition for fight or flight: a capacity for rapid reaction in response to contingent, unforeseen situations. In contrast, imagine driving on an eight-lane highway, approaching an intersection, at 100 km-h. When the driver needs to change lanes in preparation for the next intersection, is a fight-or-flight temperament appropriate to this situation? Certainly not! Self-restraint linked to foresight is the order of the day. As argued by Elias, modern society, especially modern bureaucracy requires self-disciplined foresight, which contrasts with the code of a feudal knight.

Unlike Elias, I would not interpret any civilizing process as necessarily a net increase in self-restraint, rather as a shift in its nature. There is no doubt that feudalism demanded self-restraint, associated with codes of honor.

Moving beyond Elias, as we saw with respect to authority, the increase in organizational authority is based upon trust. If those in authority positions use their authority for organizational goals, they increase trust in authority. Conversely, if they use authority for personal gain, authority deflation takes place. Hence, the authority required for modern complex organizations is premised upon social subjects with high levels of internalized self-restraint, willing to forgo short-term gains for longer-term positive-sum authority.

In politics, the democratic process involves massive internalized self-discipline. Democracy is essentially an iterative game where power is circulated as a consequence of elections, with associated rights. Those who lose an election must have the self-restraint to concede defeat. It is never easy to campaign to win, and then to accept defeat. Once in power, there is a continual temptation for the victors to despoil the losers, which is resisted through ontological self-discipline, in addition to the usual checks and balances. This has the normatively desirable effect of moving power away from coercion and towards authority.

In contrast, a Presidential candidate who resolutely refuses to accept defeat, even after all the constitutional processes have been applied to confirm that the process is fair, is directly undermining democracy. Taken to an extreme, this results in a reversion from authority power to coercive contest of power, or cycles of protest, riot and state repression.

Foucault’s (1979) account of subject creation through discipline, as exemplified by the Panopticon, is commensurable with Elias’s theory and, integrates well with Gellner’s (1983) account of nationalism. Essentially, from the 19^th C. onwards the state not only assumed a monopoly on violence and taxation, but also education (Gellner 1983). Consequently, everyday socialization moved from the contingencies of the home to institutionalized education. This involved socialization into a shared culture, which was rendered sacred (3-D power) through nationalism (Gellner 1983). Simultaneously, schooling involved massive internalization of self-restraint in terms of bodily movements and attention to detail, as documented by Foucault (1979). Added to that, as modern society values meritocracy over inherited privilege as sources of advancement, social subjects compete for educational credentials. So overt external panoptical discipline becomes augmented through competition for social advancement within the system. Thus, what starts in early socialization as external discipline becomes internal competitive disposition. For those who do not internalize 4-D power willingly, coercive disciplinary institutions remain.

While modern self-discipline is functional to modernity, it has a dark side. As emphasized by Weber (1978), the modern ‘civilized’ social subjects are ideal for running bureaucracy, as an iron cage. These self-disciplined social subjects have the capacity to split their obedience to the system from their personal morality. Such self-restraint, or ‘civilization’, gives the modern social subject the capacity to commit mass atrocities, including killing on an industrial scale (see Bauman 1989). Feudal knights have subject predispositions that allow them to feel at ease with being covered in blood and gore. In contrast, modern social subjects typically have revulsion at being covered in blood, but have subject predispositions for killing at a distance, ‘rationally’, in a ‘dispassionate way’, by lining up targets on a computer screen.

7. Democracy and the four dimensions of power:

Democracy is a process for managing conflict in such a manner that social actors are willing to accept authority power-over as legitimate. The democratic process is a way of structuring social conflict in so that the outcomes are acceptable even to the losers. Within the democratic process power is positive-sum. When a political party fields candidates, campaigns for more votes and so on, they enter into a epistemic field, at the level of three-dimensional power, where it would be unreasonable not to accept defeat if they have fewer votes at the end of the process. The moment they accept defeat they reproduce the political structures of the democratic process, which exists as structured conditions of possibility for them to fight another electoral campaign. So, while they lose episodically, they gain power at the dispositional level. However, for it to be reasonable for a party to consent to their own defeat two conditions have to be fulfilled.

The first condition is that the power of those who have won must be strictly limited in such a manner that they cannot deprive those who lost of the resources necessary to fight in the next round of the election. Constitutional checks and human rights are a way to limit the powers of the victors, those in government, so that they can't disempower the losers in a number of fundamental respects (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to join unions, the right to form a political party, separation of powers, a supreme court that is not politically stacked and so on) necessary for them be able to participate in the next election on an equal footing to everyone else.

The second condition is that the democratic process is actually democratic in practice, not just in principle. If the losers are permanent losers in practice, they will cease to continue to play the democratic game, and resort to coercion. In permanently divided societies, such as Northern Ireland, first-past – the-post majority systems, where the winner takes all, mean continual defeat for the minority. In such societies, a combination of proportional representation and consociational democracy ensures that the minority is not a permanent loser. In general, first-past-the-post systems have the potential to permanently exclude minorities, and thus are less democratic than proportional systems. This is especially the case where gerrymandering of constituencies and so on is used by one group, when in power, to bias the system in their favour.

By conceptualizing democracy as a repeat, or iterative, power authority game, normative theory is fused with empirical theory. In purely normative theories, such as Rawls (1993, p. 147) modus vivendi is considered ‘altogether inferior’ to consensus. In this model normative desirability is measured by stability. Essentially democracy is a modus vivendi arrangement whereby everyone consents to manage conflict in a structured manner. Stability is inseparable from normative desirability. This is a pragmatist view where democracy is a tool for managing conflict in such a manner that everyone considers it reasonable to abide by the results of the democratic process.

The importance of reasonableness points to the third dimensions of power. For democracy to work social actors must share an overlapping practical knowledge. Democracy is dialogic; whereby people hold opinions within the public sphere that respect the right of others to hold different opinions. Democracy is way of controlling conflict, while not repressing disagreement – the objective is not consensus. If a given group of social actors hold reified beliefs, beyond contestation, which they insist on imposing upon others through the democratic process that is inimical to the democratic process. In this respect, social actors must be aware that they are perfectly entitled to hold reified beliefs in the private sphere, but these do not belong in the public sphere. This liberal distinction between private and public emerged out of modus vivendi arising from the inability of either Catholic or Protestants to prevail over each other in the Thirty Years War in Europe, culminating in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Similarly, freedom of religion was enshrined in the US constitution because of the realization that without it such a melting pot would boil over into civil war. The public-private distinction is a modus vivendi that has become a normative principle over time. The public-private distinction is a protection for minorities who lose in elections, whereby their private beliefs will be respected. Without the shared knowledge that respects the private sphere, it is not reasonable to expect the losers to consent to defeat. Of course, the trade-off for that assurance is that social actors recognize that certain of their views do not belong in the public sphere.

Consenting to defeat has a social ontological level – the fourth dimension of power. It is always tempting for the winners to wish to despoil the losers. Furthermore, it is always tempting for the losers not to consent to defeat and resort to coercion. Not consenting to defeat is especially tempting after being in power and then suffering an unexpected electoral defeat. The capacity not to give in to either of these temptations presupposes a high level of self-restraint. In Foucault’s model of self-subjectification through discipline (Foucault 1982, 1979), there is a tendency to view discipline and the ability to view the self as an object entirely normatively negatively. While it is true that too much self-discipline can result in docile disciplined bodies incapable of critique and is often used in torture leading to social death (see Haugaard 2020: 172–168 on social death), it is also the case that being able to see the self from the perspective of others and having the self-restraint to be able to act upon that, are conditions of possibility for turn-taking in democratic politics. Interpreting the work of Elias (1995) in a Bourdieusian manner, class competition for status created social subjects capable of the self-restraint necessary for the democratic process. Status competition became part of mass competition for educational qualifications (which entails massive deferral of gratification) that created a mass population which internalized the self-restraint necessary for turn taking in the democratic process. In contrast, extreme narcissistic personality types, who cannot see the world from the perspective of others, and who cannot restrain themselves to consent to defeat, are a fundamental threat to the democratic process. In that regard, while the spirit of early capitalism, as described by Weber (1976), contributed to democratic social ontology, some of the ontological implications of unrestrained late capitalism, characterized by rampant consumerism, which inclines the person towards instant gratification, are a fundamental threat to the social ontology necessary for the democratic process.

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Mark Haugaard

Mark Haugaard is Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the National University of Ireland Galway, Ireland. He is the founder editor of the Journal of Political Power, published by Routledge, and the book series, Social and Political Power, with Manchester University Press. He has published extensively upon power, and his most recent publication is The Four Dimensions of Power: understanding domination, empowerment and democracy, 2020, Manchester University Press.