Metropolitan democracy from below: participation and rescaling in Delhi

ABSTRACT

The concept of ‘metropolitan democracy’ is crucial to understanding the political dimension of cities. But while this concept has strong normative value, its ability to describe a reality is less obvious. This paper argues that metropolitan democracy is defined by a multiplicity of scales, legitimacies and actors, and that the development of participatory practices offers a privileged standpoint to analyse the competition (and sometimes the cooperation) between them. Observing metropolitan democracy ‘from below’ indeed reveals two heuristic features of this concept: it sheds a light on rescaling processes and their implications in terms of distribution of resources; and it questions the tension between the different types of legitimacy that are at stake in such processes. The argument is based on an empirical study of four participatory experiments implemented in the Indian city–state of Delhi in the past two decades. The paper shows that the development of such participatory practices increases the competition between multiple scales, legitimacies and actors, and that it results in a new, partly unpredictable, dispersion of power through the redistribution of two power resources, namely: voice and visibility. However, the Delhi case also makes clear that such dispersion of power is not necessarily synonymous with democratization.

KEYWORDS:

• metropolitan democracy
• urban governance
• Delhi
• Bhagidari
• public hearings
• neighbourhood assemblies

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 However, the working definition of democracy used in this paper is largely congruent with that of Fung and Wright (2003), insofar as a major indicator of the democratic character of political processes is the quality of participation that they involve, a quality that itself depends on the proportion of citizens who participate, the diversity of socioeconomic groups among participants, and the nature of participation (from information to consultation and co-decision). Pace Purcell (2007), however, the focus on democratic processes is not necessarily disconnected from a concern with democratic outcomes: the assumption is that the practicability of avenues of participation is crucial for making it possible for different social groups to defend their respective interests.

2 Forty-six women were elected that year, since one major feature of the 74th CAA is that it makes it mandatory to reserve at least one-third of all elective positions at the local level to women (in addition to the seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes).

3 On the reluctant, incomplete nature of decentralization in urban India, see Ruet and Tawa Lama-Rewal (2009) and Baud and De Wit (2009). On civil society actors, see Harriss (2006), Mehra (2013) and Harindranath and Khorana (2014).

4 This was done between 2005 and 2007, that is, before the trifurcation of the MCD.

5 Bhagidari is a Hindi word meaning ‘participation’ or ‘partnership’.

6 In 2012 two new districts were added, so the NCTD has today 11 revenue districts.

7 There are at least two reasons for this lapse. First, by 2008, many RWAS, including one of the largest RWA federations, were clearly supporting the Bharatiya Janata Party, thus lessening the incentive for the Congress government (which had already been in power for 10 years) to devote many resources to the scheme. Second, in 2008, the scheme, which had been hitherto limited to Delhi’s planned or ‘regularized’ colonies – two types of settlements that together are home for about 40% of the population of the city state – opened itself to unauthorized colonies, whose population is more heterogeneous and includes a substantial section of the lower middle classes (Lemanski & Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2013). This extension of the Bhagidari scheme to poorer neighbourhoods made it more difficult to use it as a springboard for collective action, since RWAs from authorized and unauthorized colonies had different concerns.

8 On the beginnings of the AAP in Delhi, see Roy (2014).

9 This was the justification given by the AAP; however, one can think that another reason was the ambition to contest national elections that were to take place three months later.

10 Assembly segments are the electoral constituencies of the Legislative assembly of Delhi.

11 According to the Constitution, indeed in case of a conflict between the government of the NCTD and the central government, the latter prevails through the role of the Lieutenant Governor in the affairs of the city-state. This was illustrated, from 2016 onwards, by the institutional tussle that developed between the AAP-dominated NCTD government and the BJP-dominated central government – a struggle that provided new fuel to the debate on the limits of federalism in India.

12 On the Orientalist origins of such vision, see Dumont (2002).

13 This campaign, led by the MKSS, led to the adoption, in different states and finally at the all-India level, of the Right to Information Act 2005.

14 For instance, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 or the National Food Security Act 2013.

15 However, two small areas escape the jurisdiction of the MCD, even after the adoption of the 74th CAA: (1) the central area that includes the Diplomatic Enclave and the residences and offices of the Union government and which is managed by the New Delhi Municipal Council, whose members are not elected but appointed; and (2) the Delhi Cantonment, a small enclave historically occupied by army personnel, and managed by the Delhi Cantonment Board, whose members are partly elected and partly appointed.

16 Thus, a Congress MLA accused the scheme of being elitist:

69% of Delhi population is presently residing in slums and unauthorised colonies. This large chunk of the population does not have any representation in [the Bhagidari] scheme [which] has become elitist in nature and needs a total overhauling with the aim of involving the common man and not a few elite. (The Hindu, 10 March 2006)

17 This was mentioned in many interviews with organizers or jury members of public hearings.