Nato’s Anglo-American identity and the Ukrainian crisis from an ontological security perspective – can a realist international system give diplomacy a chance?

Abstract

International military organizations derive their identity from the objectives they are set to perform thus acquiring ontological security. Organizations like NATO—adhering to a realist approach to International Relations (IR) and Security Studies (SS) – have historically reconfigured their identity depending on the ontological threat du jour by prioritizing Anglo-American interest at the expense of Russian and Franco-German socio-economic security. By adopting an ontological security perspective critically approaching a realist lens to IR and SS, the following sections highlights that NATO has in the past, and continues in the present, to acquire ontological security by constructing imaginaries founded on an ontological double-requirement emphasizing that Anglo-American Self-security is based on demanding a threatening Other-identity. That is, while most studies on NATO focus on the question “why does NATO still exist?”, the sections seek to highlight “how” did the process of ontological security seeking unfold, and what were the driving naturalized assumptions that enabled such process. The introductory section familiarizes the reader with the Anglo-American camp known as Atlanticism perceiving Continentalism interest as trivial. The second section defines the perspective of ontological security and its inter-related concepts of “critical situation”, “environmental stability”, “routine”, “socialization” and “narratives”. The third section highlights Atlanticist’s protracting the war in Ukraine for ontological security purposes by fabricating narratives relating to Russia seeking “past glory”, Ukraine becoming a possible NATO member, and finally, by undermining Franco-German sovereignty. The final section reveals the importance of considering diplomacy as the primary solution remedying the ontological insecurity accenting world politics.

Keywords:

• Ontological Security
• NATO
• Russia
• Diplomacy
• Ukraine
• Self-Other Nexus
• International Relations
• Security Studies
• Routine
• Narratives
• Environmental Stability
• Realism
• International Law
• Socialization
• Continentalism
• Atlanticism

NATO has been transforming from its Cold War, and then regional incarnation of the 1990s, into a transatlantic institution with global missions, global reach, and global partners. This transformation is most evident in Afghanistan and Iraq where NATO is at work, but the line we’ve crossed is that that “in area/out of area” debate that cost so much time to debate in the 1990s is effectively over. There is no “in area/out of area.” Everything is NATO’s area, potentially. That doesn’t mean it’s a global organization. It’s a transatlantic organization, but Article 5 now has global implications. NATO is in the process of developing the capabilities and the political horizons to deal with problems and contingencies around the world. That is a huge change. - Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (2007)

The danger to global equilibrium is a growing NATO being expanded further by American and British ambitions into a monster military force of world proportions, way beyond any Atlantic or European alliance. NATO expansion, intrusive military hardware is threatening North-South peace. NATO as it expands today is absolutely not what the world of struggling economies and deprived populations require. It is nothing, but a negative force. NATO must be abolished! - Denis J. Halliday, Former UN secretary general (2012)

1. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – also known as the Washington Treaty of 1949 – is the largest international military organization. The organization was a product of its environment; its ideological identity recognized the Soviet Union as a threat—and NATO members from both sides of the Atlantic—huddled under the protective umbrella of the US for collective security. Since NATO’s inception, the organization has included mostly EU polities and has witnessed nine rounds of expansion during and after the Cold War. NATO has admitted 15 members after the collapse of the Berlin wall, and at the time of writing, it currently includes 31 members with Finland being the latest member to join the organization in April 2023 . NATO as an organization has the power to arouse either hatred or anger from its proponents, to nostalgia and pride from its advocates. Its critics affirm that the Atlantic alliance has overstepped its geographic mandate by operating “out of area” and assert that NATO is a genuine threat to global peace and security (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Cupac, 2012; Nazemroaya, 2012). Also, they argue that the international organization is a destabilizing factor in world relations and is a military-arm utilized by the Anglo-American (i.e., Atlanticist) camp to impose objectives on nations outside of the Atlanticist orbit thereby developing underdevelopment (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019). Supporters of NATO state that it is an essential and indispensable foundation for the multi-layered security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic zone that includes North America, Europe, and the North Atlantic as a geo-political core (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019; Nazemroaya, 2012). However, whether you are a critic or a supporter, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, advocates and opponents had to answer the question: why does NATO still exist, and more importantly, how did it re-acquire ontological security—therefore purpose—by reformulating its identity since its raison d’être was obsolete (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019). Analyst James Chace of the Council on Foreign Relations stated that “NATO is an institutional dinosaur and a dead organization”, while other critics such as Ronald D. Asmus and the late Zbigniew Brzezinski mentioned that NATO had to enact an “expansionist policy” and go “beyond its boundaries” or become “outdated and wither away like a dried-up plant” (as cited in Nazemroaya, 2012, p. 17).

Even though NATO witnessed an identity crisis after the Cold War, the symptoms of an earlier identity crisis between the Anglo-American and the Franco-German (Continentalist/Europeanist) camp is pertinent to keep in mind thereby understanding current unfolding events identified in mainstream communication centres as the “Russian-Ukrainian crisis”. The two opposing camps have historically been the centres of gravity for NATO within its Euro-Atlantic zone (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019; Cupac, 2012; Nazemroaya, 2012). The Franco-German camp has a history of strong pan-European/Continental tradition along its Eurasian tendencies, including strategic concepts such as the axis of Paris, Berlin, and Moscow. Historically, before Russia and the US became highly influential in international political affairs following WWII, it was a rivalry between the forerunner of Atlanticism—the British Empire—and the precursor of continentalism Napoleonic France and the Imperial German Realm. The British Empire continuously adopted a policy preventing the continentals from uniting (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019). Furthermore, Continentalism is best identified when we analyze the Brussels Treaty which was replaced by the EU and NATO and currently prioritizes Atlanticist ideals. The authentic European Union or continental integration France and Western Germany yearned for was codified in the amended Brussels Treaty of 1954. A European Defence Community (EDC) was established that had at its essence a pan-European aspiration to protect the continent (Carpenter, 2019; Nazemroaya, 2012). Furthermore, Franco-German relationship developed and evolved after WWII when President De Gaulle demanded that France’s foreign policy be independent of the influence of the US and demanded that a tripartite directorate be created between France, Britain, and the United States to manage West-Germany. However, such appeal was rejected by Washington and London. Therefore, “the current geo-political composure of the EU is a dichotomy; the EU is a pan-Europeanist project under Atlanticist contours within the euro-Atlantic zone. NATO is also a representation of this pan-Europeanism within the contours of an overarching Atlanticist architecture” (Nazemroaya, 2012 See also, Carpenter, 2019).

Atlanticism denotes a specific configuration of security-policy identity and orientation emphasizing geopolitical calculations prioritizing historical ties with the “United States and Britain” anxious about a European integration led by France and Germany (Demetriou & Benney, 2016; Græger & Haugevik, 2009, p. 11). Because of historical—therefore epistemological—differences, Britain has consistently been identified as the primary representative of Atlanticism in NATO, whereas France has been the “foremost advocate of continentalism” (Græger & Haugevik, 2009, p. 21). It is particularly important to note that Britain’s historical clash with “Europeanism” has been marked by foreign policy decisions being at odds with France and Germany especially when considering common threats to the continent, and finally, negotiating an optimal method to address threats (i.e., diplomacy instead of military actions). This is by no means a hyperbole, Britain’s island position being located “outside the European continent constitutes an important part of British exceptionalism” identifying its “history, geography, culture and national identity” as being “different from the rest of Europe” (Græger & Haugevik, 2009, p. 22). Churchill famously voiced this when he declared that “Britain was with Europe, but not of it, linked but not combined, and interested and associated, but not absorbed” (as cited in Græger & Haugevik, 2009, pp. 22–23). Therefore, Atlanticism being sceptical of a continentalist identity unsurprisingly defines the latter as the “cautious Europeanist dimension of Atlanticism” or the “Other” according to the discourses adopted by foreign policy circles adhering to an Anglo-American identity constructing security threats (Græger & Haugevik, 2009, p. 21). With the rivalry between Atlanticism and continentalism evident during and after the Cold War, it should be noted that European powers choosing to flirt with an Atlanticist orientation to EU foreign policy argue that such “Atlantic cooperation” is a “political balancing, based on the wish to prevent marginalization of influence, rather than threat of balancing” (Græger & Haugevik, 2009, p. 21).

For instance, De Gaulle in 1959 made his famous speech in Strasbourg about a unified Europe which would break away from the Atlanticist contours of the Anglo-American alliance. He would also look at West Germany for aid in countering the Anglo-American influence in Europe, and most importantly, he would remove France from the Atlantic alliance in 1966 and discharge French troops and military units from the command of NATO (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019).¹ Also, France recognized the Republic of China in 1964 - eight years before President Nixon—and it also pursued its own nuclear program under Euratom to break the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly (Al-Kassimi, 2015). By 1966, NATO headquarters was transferred from Paris to Brussels in Belgium, signifying the clash between Continentalism and Atlanticism. Another more recent clash between NATO’s Atlanticist and Continentalist ideals post-Cold War occurred in 2003 when Germany and France refused NATO involvement in the war on Iraq. This persuaded US Senator Carl Levinto to state that institutional reform needs to occur in the EU to hold accountable France and Germany in obstructing US plans seeking to export “democratic liberal values” which are part of “NATO’s identity” (Nazemroaya, 2012, p. 35). Germany and France believed that force, rather than diplomacy, eliminated any possible political solution to the situation in Baghdad and held that the war would destabilize continental “ontological security” and aggravate an already “critical situation”.

It is true that the election of former French president Nicholas Sarkozy in 2007 and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2005 resulted in Franco-German relations flirting with Atlanticist ideals. In 2009, Sarkozy reintegrated France into the NATO command and on April 30^th, 2007, Merkel signed the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) at the White House which was described by Jean-Luc Mélenchon as a transfer of German sovereignty from the people to American national corporations (Al-Kassimi, 2015). Commenting on France assuming full NATO membership, Martine Aubry stated “nothing today justifies returning to NATO’s military command, there’s no hurry, no fundamental need, except this Atlanticism that’s becoming an ideology” (Erlanger, 2009). One may ask how can France and Germany exercise Continentalist ideals in one period and Atlanticist in another? That is because Anglo-American geo-strategists recognize the importance of France and Germany in projecting Atlanticist influence over Europe and in conducting their enlargement program. Brzezinski mentions that the relation between France and Germany is vital for the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic zone. He mentions that “a wider EU and an enlarged NATO will serve the short term and long-term interest of American policy. A large EU will expand the range of American influence without simultaneously creating an EU so politically integrated that it could challenge the United States on matters of strategic importance” (Brzezinski, 1997). Furthermore, Theodore Draper claims that “without France, Western Europe is a political and geographic amputee” (Nazemroaya, 2012, p. 38).

NATO’s intervention in Iraq in 2003 has been labelled as “World’s Clashing”; that is the Franco-German clashing with the Anglo-American camp. The war in Iraq proved that NATO did develop a new identity during the Cold War and did master its environment as shown in the Yugoslav intervention, however, it did so at the expense of mutual socialization with vital founding members of NATO, precisely Germany and France. Daniel Braun states that the dispute over Iraq was not just a dispute over one conflict rather, “it involved a deep crisis that reflected if not an unravelling, then at least great problems with the processes that enabled and fostered mutual socializing within the alliance during the cold war and played a pivotal role in creating a type of density of shared experience that helped create and sustain NATO’s collective identity” (Braun, 2007, p. 2). The US was furious with the late French President Jacque Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder because they opposed the US placing Patriot anti-missile systems in Turkey in January of 2003 (Al-Kassimi, 2015). Furthermore, Russia, Germany and France assumed a leadership role to work against American efforts gathering support for the war in Iraq by utilizing the United Nations Security Council because NATO was simply advancing Anglo-American interest at the expense of refusing to socialize and cooperate with other countries considering the consequences of the Iraq war on Eurasian socio-economic development.² Christopher Hill was correct in stating that the United States was conducting “autistic power politics”; that is, a foreign policy that is self-regarding and without concern for its impact on other polities such as Russia and the EU (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019). President George Bush went as far as to state that “if other governments do not act, America will” (Braun, 2007, p. 11). The Iraq war coincided with NATO’s second enlargement process in 2004. Seven more Eastern European members were admitted into the North Atlantic Organisation following the Iraq war. However, this round is especially important because all seven members supported the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and proved themselves to be ardent supporters of the Anglo-American identity. Donald Rumsfeld noted that the newly admitted Eastern European NATO members are on the side of Washington and not on the side of Berlin and France. Subsequently, Rumsfeld would go on to state that NATO’s orbit is shifting Eastward away from “Old Europe” towards “New Europe” (Braun, 2007, p. 9). Thus, it is safe to say that just like NATO’s intervention in Iraq brought to the forefront the intra-rivalry dispute between Atlanticism and Continentalism, similarly, the current Russian-Ukraine war is further accentuating such historical rivalry.

The introductory section sought to familiarize the reader with the Anglo-American camp known as Atlanticism—during and after the Cold War—perceiving Europeanist interest as trivial. The second section will define the perspective of ontological security and its inter-related concepts of “critical situation”, “environmental stability”, “routine”, and “narratives” by connecting it to how NATO reconfigured its identity by identifying an external threat to fulfil its purpose and assume its role in the international system. It will be highlighted that ontological security is a condition where a polity or organization can provide unequivocal answers to fundamental questions relating to their identity (i.e., self-existence) thereby making it environmentally stable. On the other hand, being ontologically insecure is characterized by an identity crisis manifested because of a critical situation destabilizes a “familiar environment” thus rupturing routines and bringing up fundamental questions relating to self-existence into inter-national discourse. The third section highlights Atlanticists protracting the war in Ukraine for ontological security purposes and not because they would like to see Ukraine as member of NATO per se or because Russia is actually seeking “past glory”. The final section reveals the importance of diplomacy as the only solution remedying ontological insecurity accenting the European Union and Russia but cautions about Washington and London geopolitical interest since they naturalize a (realist) militarized approach claiming that interests take precedent over ethics, and more importantly, that diplomacy from a Hobbesian worldview is a sign of “state weakness”.

2. Methodology

2.1. An international system dominated by a realist approach: The importance of a (threatening) “other” identity for achieving ontological security

Following WWII, the Anglo-American discipline of International Relations—including its sub-discipline International Security Studies—came to be characterized by the Great Divide Discourse with (realist) IR scholars emphasizing that the concept of survival and security are the paramount aspirations of states adhering to a Hobbesian ontology of global relations characterized by anarchy (Schmidt, 1998; Al-Kassimi, 2022; Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Kenneth Waltz’s argued that “survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have” and Hedley Bull, similarly, asserted that “unless men enjoy some measure of security against the threat of death or injury at the hands of others, they are not able to devote energy or attention enough to other objects to be able to accomplish them”. Brent J. Steele—the author of the influential work entitled Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State – underlines how such realist requisite prioritizes the physical rather than ontological survival of the state. This illustrates that the survival notion of security is a major tenant in realist IR thinking which has come to reify security as being inclusively attained through quantitative material facts such as favourable geographies, weapons stockpiles, large competent militaries, high-tech SMART weapons, military alliances such as NATO, and strategic resources (Herrington, 2013). In contrast, the structuralist and constructivist widening (what is the threat?) and deepening (what is threatened?) turn of IR—especially through the perspective of ontological security seeking—appends the naturalized assumptions adopted by a realist approach to IR by emphasizing identity rather than material social constructs as the drivers for security and survival (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Campbell, 1992; Huysmans, 1998; Mitzen, 2006; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2021; Steele, 2008).

Steele operationalizes ontological security as a perceptive to deconstruct realpolitik assumptions by stressing the ideational cause/reason for states deciding on particular “security policies” rather than explaining the material outcomes/effect of particular foreign policy decisions. Steele notes that for a state “to be ontologically secure” it must “possess answers to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses” (Steele, 2008). This allows ontologically secure states to turn actions into “routines which contribute to their sense of continuity and order that is so important to their sense of self.” (Steele, 2008, p. 2,12, emphases added). Ontological security—according to constructivist thinker Alexander Wendt—is therefore described as “predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities” since it “motivates actors to hang onto existing” ontological rather than material conceptions of the self which are socially constructed (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). In other words, “anarchy” is what identity makes of it and not what the material demands of it (Al-Kassimi, 2022; Wendt, 1992, 1994). While physical/material security is vital for a state’s continuity and order, their need for ontological security is even more so since the later results in the materialization of the former. Put differently, states—and I argue international organizations in the third section—seek ontological security because its “fulfilment affirms a state’s self-identity” which then allows the state to “maintain consistent self-concepts” because the self “is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions” (Steele, 2008). If a routine—which guaranteed ontological security—is disrupted because of internal or external political changes, then this puts into question the “routinized narrative” and results in ontological insecurity (i.e., anxiety) thus directly forcing the state to establish new routines to maintain its sense of self and identity (i.e., survival) (Herrington, 2013; Steele, 2008). An ontological security perspective to IR reveals how a “critical situation” undermining a state’s identity is what ultimately motivates a state to “securitize” a particular development by moving it from the realm of “normal” to “emergency” politics which in turn allows the state to adopt actions that can, and in most cases will, violate International Law (Buzan, Waever, De Wilde, 1998; Al-Kassimi, 2017, 2022; Steele, 2008). An ontological security approach can be further explained by considering “securitization theory” developed by the Copenhagen School which seeks to deconstruct the consequences of realist assumptions on foreign policy and the construction of security threats by widening and deepening security studies. The process of “securitizing” takes place when an issue moves from being discursively addressed using “normal politics” to “emergency politics” with speech actors persuading the international community and their national audience that the “threat in question” needs to be dealt with in an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2021; Waever, 2000). Since a speech act is the discursive component which initiates the process of securitization, then, a speech act is a securitization move articulated by speech actors when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat (threatening a referent object) begins being spoken of as a security issue by an official with high political capital (Al-Kassimi, 2017; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2021). It is important to note that a speech act has the power to construct an issue as being a “critical situation” destabilizing a “familiar routine and environment” when in reality the issue may not innately possess any threatening qualities or would rather benefit from being “de-securitized” (Al-Kassimi, 2017; Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In any case, a successful process of securitization would require national constituents (i.e., audience at home) to internalize the threat as being existential and have confidence in those speaking security (i.e., speech actors). This means that a speech act is not a sufficient component to successfully securitize an issue, rather, it additionally requires what Waever calls “felicity conditions” which stipulates that an issue has a higher chance of becoming “securitized” if it historically connotes threats, danger, harm, and anarchy according to the subject uttering such discourse (Al-Kassimi, 2017; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2021; Waever, 2000).

David Campbell explicitly foregrounded the importance of a realist IR approach requiring a threatening other for ontological security by arguing that while state identity could in principle be constituted through relations of difference, in reality the pressure to turn difference into radical, threatening Otherness was overwhelming (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Campbell, 1992, p. 55). State survival—therefore – according to a realist approach to International Relations can be said to be conditioned on an ontological double requirement which stipulates that for a state to be “secure … it also need[s] the threatening Other to define its identity, thereby giving it ontological security” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 218). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the differences between how Mitzen and Steele conceptualize ontological security, their work is indispensable in highlighting how international organizations (i.e., NATO) like states require a stable cognitive environment that provides behavioural certainty and predictability thus guaranteeing the survival of their self-identity or idea of being (i.e., ontology). Mitzen and Steele both widen the level of analysis from individuals to states (i.e., referent object) by arguing that states’ behaviour is not motivated—as assumed by realists—only by the need to survive physically but also by the need to serve their self-identity. Thus, for both Steel and Mitzen, ontological security signifies “security of the self, not of the body” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344) since “states are people too” (Wendt, 1999, p. 215). Steele uses the concept of ontological security to deliberate three forms of state behaviour: moral, humanitarian, and honour driven (Steele, 2008, p. 2). He notes that realist IR scholars have largely ignored the possibility that these kinds of normative concerns of states are internally generated. In other words, states do not embark on “humanitarian or moral behaviour because this kind of behaviour is intersubjectively constructed or universally moral, but because it serves states’ self-identity needs and in turn provides them with ontological security” (Cupac, 2012; Steele, 2008, p.25, 48;). In other words, a state claiming altruism “is not an altruist because of a strong feeling of empathy, but because that particular person, identity-wise, wants to be seen as an altruist” (Cupac, 2012, p. 23). Consistent self-conceptions sustained through narratives are thus central to Steele’s notion of ontological security. By using NATO’s “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo as a case study, Steel claims that the United States operation in Kosovo provided it ontological security since their self-identity—as made evident in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda—made them experience “shame”.

Mitzen, on the other hand, puts greater emphasis on social interaction as the catalysing power behind states and organizations seeking ontological security. She strongly opposes realpolitik assumptions naturalizing the idea that a state identity is self-organized and “given by nature” rather than constituted through “social interaction” (Cupac, 2012; Mitzen, 2006). Mitzen posits that this “realist identity” are just “possible selves”; cognitive conceptions of what the state would like to be if the conditions were perfect (Mitzen, 2006, p. 355). But since conditions are never perfect since we live in a Hobbesian world accented by distrust, anarchy, and war, state identities become dependent on social interaction, presumably with other states, and on the type of roles state perform within those social relationships (Mitzen, 2006, pp. 354–357). State identities are thus intersubjective, both on the level of knowledge and on the level of practice. While Steele’s conceptual framework informing an ontological security perspective emphasizes concepts such as “narratives”, “shame”, and “honour” as drivers for ontological security, Mitzen on the other hand adopts “routinization”, “attachment”, “socializing”, and “stable cognitive environment” – amongst others. Therefore, relationships with a significant threatening Other lead to a “routinized” relationship and it is this “familiar routine” that provides states ontological security since such “attachment” develops a stable self-identity. A stable-familiar cognitive environment provides behavioural certainty by ensuring that things will unfold tomorrow as they did today since “states [are] invested in socially recognized identities” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 359).

2.2. NATO as the referent object being secured – military organizations seek ontological security

Most scholarship on NATO has been interested in asking about the endurance of the international organization following the disintegration of the Soviet Union rather than asking questions relating to “how” did the process of identity reformulation and environmental stabilization play a role in this unfolding and what were the driving forces that made it achieve ontological security. As mentioned in earlier sections, ontological security as an approach makes such an inquiry by focussing on the processual side of the behaviour of international organizations when conditions in the international environment fluctuate. The behaviour of organizations is therefore driven by identity needs (Cupac, 2012). As noted by Steele, one of the three ways that identity is formed—especially through a realist approach—is through the adoption of “Self-Other nexus” where the self is shaped with regards to the oppositional threatening Other (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Cupac, 2012; Steele, 2008, p. 26). The self-other nexus works in tandem with the geo-political environment du jour in the formation and behaviour of an international organization. In other words, an international organization is formed with the purpose to serve the needs of international environments since it is “called into existence by the nurturing environment” (as cited in Cupac, 2012, p. 26). The global environment is critical for the formation and stability of an “identity” because it creates challenges and opportunities to which an organization—like NATO—justifies its existence and self-identity. Therefore, ontological security is the security of the Self caused by environmental (in)stability with the objective of defending values and norms (i.e., identity). It is this uninterrupted routinized relationship between international organization and international environment that renders an organization ontologically secure.

Critical changes in the global socio-economic and political environment causes identity crisis and therefore directly renders an international organization ontologically insecure (i.e., anxious). The concept of “critical situation” and “anxiety” linked with the perspective of ontological security further elaborate the causes of how an international organization proceeds in seeking ontological security. A “critical situation” represents a change in the external environment within which international organization performs its functions (Steele, 2008, pp. 10–12). In ontological security terms, this kind of situation will render an international organization unable to continue as its “old self” because routines and “biographical narratives” that were once part of its “routine” no longer conform with the external conditions of the international environment (Cupac, 2012). This new (unfamiliar) environment is most likely to appear as a “chaotic condition” since there are no certainties anymore and “uncertainty itself has become the primary threat” (as cited in Cupac, 2012, p. 27). For instance, two policy experts by the name Derek Chollet and Amanda Sloat—who are currently advisors in the Biden administration—wrote in Foreign Policy magazine in 2018 that NATO summits were “just not worth it” and simply “too risky when Trump was in office…he denigrated the alliance on the world stage”. (Guyer, 2022). This narrative highlight ontological insecurity and in order to restore the stability of the identity and eliminate anxiety, the organization is likely to start exhibiting a new and different kind of behaviour by seeking new threats. With anxiety or ontological insecurity being the state that precedes ontological security, then anxiety is the experience that actualizes itself when an agent is overwhelmed by the uncertainty of external conditions and has yet to master the environment in a way that would allow routinization and guarantee the survival of self-identity through predictability.

Motivated thus, ontological security seeking is a processual mechanism with an objective to eliminate anxiety (i.e., identity crisis) when an agent (international organization) is expected to invest energy in order to move from an anxious situation and reach a non-critical situation accented by environmental stability. Accordingly, anxious behaviour equals process of ontological security seeking and directly answers the question of how NATO has continued to persist since the end of the Cold War. In a struggle to order things in a way that re-establishes “routine” and eliminates a “critical situation”, enemies and threats—from a realist approach—need to be discursively addressed with a “common voice” thereby confidently instituting the “new” identity of the international organization. The following section seeks to reveal how different articulated narratives of members within NATO—especially in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis before and after 2014 – highlights that not all members are aligned in how ontological security is sought thereby accentuating that while NATO has a common declared identity, states that are members of NATO—especially France and Germany—are weary in compromising their (internal) identity at the expense of (external) Anglo-American interests.

3. Results

3.1. NATO and Ukraine in 2014 – an overview

The reaction of France and Germany to NATO in relation to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 is similar to the stance they adopted towards NATO when it intervened in Iraq in 2003. The Atlanticist camp wished to admit Ukraine to NATO; however, France and Germany were explicitly against such membership (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019). In the months before the September 2014 NATO summit in Wales, a debate occurred between EU members suggesting NATO deploying permanent troops in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States or what was defined by the Anglo-American camp as “New Europe” (Nazemroaya, 2012). Former German Chancellor Merkel explicitly ruled out such deployment and suggested a rapid-response force to operate at short notice to counter threats against NATO members (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019; Guyer, 2022; Nazemroaya, 2012). “New Europe(an)” NATO members mentioned that a rapid-response force is not a strong deterrent and demanded that NATO troops be stationed permanently in their country (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Nazemroaya, 2012). Even with Germany and France pushing for a diplomatic solution, the Anglo-American alliance—similar to the Ukrainian crisis which unfolded in 2022 – preferred a military solution reifying a realist approach to International Relations which prioritized interests over morality (Jonsson & Hall, 2005). In November 2014, Franco-German differences with the US began to emerge once again when former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama announced that the Pentagon was going to send arms into Ukraine—and even compared President Putin to “Hitler” as they did in 2022 (Al-Kassimi, 2015; Carpenter, 2019; Herman, 2022;Huggler, 2015). Patrick Smith from the Fiscal Times at the time mentioned that “Washington treated Russia and the [Continental] Europeans to a one-two punch when it revealed its thinking about arming Ukraine” (as cited in Nazemroaya, 2012). This primed Germany and France to attend Russia in an emergency meeting to meet with President Putin to collectively discuss a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis based on diplomacy and collective security fearing a spill over to other European regions. While former US Secretary of State John Kerry reassured the media and the public that there was no rift between Washington and the Franco-German side, it was widely reported that the late Senator John McCain called the Franco-German peace initiative “Moscow bullshit” (Huggler, 2015).

3.2. NATO and the war in Ukraine in 2022 through clashing narratives: Anglo-American ontological security at the expense of continental insecurity?

When Speaker Nancy Pelosi was asked during a Ukrainian lawmaker visit to Capitol Hill whether the US would endorse a request made by Ukraine for an “accelerated accession” to NATO, she declined to explicitly endorse such bid but rather claimed that she supports a “security guarantee for Kyiv” (Desiderio et al., 2022). She continued by stating that “we are very committed to democracy in Ukraine … let us win this war.I would be for them having a security guarantee” (Desiderio et al., 2022). A similar “narrative” accenting the Ukrainian crisis providing NATO ontological security—therefore environmental stability and identity assurance—was articulated by democratic congressional representative Mike Quigley from Illinois who stated “Ukraine’s fight is the reason we formed NATO in the first place … After the Second World War, we recognized that an authoritarian regime cannot be allowed to wipe out a democratic country. I think we need to support this [NATO membership].” Following the annexation of four Ukrainian regions by Russia in October 2022, the President of Ukraine announced a surprise “fast-tracked” bid to join the North Atlantic military alliance. While existing members of the alliance backed the bid such as: Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Macedonia, and North Macedonia, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg was reluctant in his speech act—including US security adviser Jake Sullivan—who explicitly mentioned that the bid should be “postponed” (Askew, 2022).

While there are several reasons that the Anglo-American camp would refuse to “fast-track” Ukraine’s bid at becoming a member of NATO, three narrated reasons are considered across all camps. First, Ukraine joining NATO would enlarge the geography of the battlefield since Article 5 of NATO’s collective defence agreement states that if one sovereign member is attacked all other members must consider this an attack on themselves and come to the aid of the victim. This would not only legally require the US including all other NATO members to militarily defend Ukraine but would further complicate environmental stability and exacerbate ontological insecurity. According to John Williams—a professor at Durham University specializing in International Politics—Ukraine joining NATO would be a “nightmare scenario” since there are “escalatory risks in making Ukraine a member…NATO would [be] pitched more clearly into the war in a much more direct way” with countries bordering Russia becoming a “frontline” (Askew, 2022). Secondly, any new member seeking to join NATO requires the unanimous approval of all 30 members of NATO. Sweden and Finland have encountered this difficulty with their own NATO membership requests since Turkey raised initial objections. In the same way, Hungary could prove to be a problem for Ukraine’s membership bid. Ukraine and Hungary share a land border including a long-running dispute about the rights of Ukraine’s Hungarian-speaking minority. For instance, in 2017, when the Ukrainian government made the Ukrainian language the primary language in primary schools, Hungary took that as a reason to block Ukraine’s attempt to integrate with both NATO and the EU. As a matter of fact, PM Viktor Orban has repeatedly criticised the dominant Western strategy toward Russia and positioned himself as an ally of President Putin by “slamming the use of sanctions and striking gas deals with Moscow” (Askew, 2022; Desiderio et al., 2022). Significant for our discussion is the position of continentalists such as France and Germany who have raised issues concerning Ukraine’s bid in joining the alliance. According to William Alberque—director of strategy, technology, and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank—the big question is “whether France and Germany, what you may call the wets of the [NATO] alliance, would agree…would they be willing to go that far?” (Askew, 2022; Desiderio et al., 2022). It should be noted that in the year 2008 Paris and Berlin blocked attempts by Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance, while in February 2022 – only a week before the invasion—German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Ukraine’s membership was not on the table.

Thirdly, Ukraine joining NATO would be a “propaganda victory” for President Putin—according to the Anglo-American camp—and would explicitly reveal that a Western realpolitik approach to International Relations is conditioned on the identification of a threatening Other for ontological security. According to Professor John Mearsheimer and Professor Ivan Katchanovski, not only has President Putin—especially since his renowned 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, and more recently at the 25^th St. Petersburg IEF—continuously expressed that NATO is an external threat to Russian ontological security, but also, has justified the operation in Ukraine by mentioning Ukraine’s bid in wanting to join NATO. According to Jamie Shea—a former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General—not only would Ukraine joining NATO involve putting western troops and military bases on Ukrainian soil, but more importantly, it would give Putin “a massive propaganda boost … Putin is trying to convince the Russians that there is an external existential threat from NATO […] bringing in Ukraine now would just play to the hands of that narrative…who wants to give Putin an olive branch?”. Shea mentions that NATO membership is not necessary for Ukraine since NATO is already committed to Ukraine with some members extending “tens of billions of euros in military and financial aid … the alliance itself provides huge support to Ukraine, coordinating this bilateral assistance and the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid” (Askew, 2022). According to Shea, it is “ironic” that the Ukrainian government is pushing for membership since “all of these weapons flowing [into Ukraine] mean that, in a way, Ukraine already has a NATO security guarantee […] without membership”, he continues by adding that “sometimes you can get a lot of benefits of NATO membership without actually joining” (Askew, 2022).

These narratives—some more successful than others—reveal states advocating an “individualistic” (Steele, 2008, p. 10) approach to identity construction with an objective attempting to figure out what issues, enemies, and threats need addressing in order to be (re)constituted in the new purpose of NATO thereby providing behavioural certainty and solving a “critical situation” (Carpenter, 2019; Cupac, 2012). An individualistic approach emphasizing self-identity are called “biographical narratives” which are simply “stories by which self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the individual concerns and by others” (Giddens, 1991, p.243). These narratives are expressions of states’ internally generated self-identity needs from which social action proceeds thereby giving “life to routinized foreign policy action” (Cupac, 2012, p. 28; Steele, 2008, p. 3). From this “biographical” representation through clashing narratives we notice that NATO’s dominant (Anglo-American) identity has remained the overarching value-system accenting the alliance especially since the Anglo-American camp is not interested in Ukraine becoming a NATO member per se but is simply using such narrative to acquire ontological security. However, what is striking is that for the alliance to achieve ontological security in the post-Cold war period it has unambiguously adopted an identity that is committed to being an offensive rather than a defensive alliance (Cupac, 2012, p. 34). For instance, Samuel Charap—a Russia expert at the RAND Corporation—mentioned that “NATO was first sort of given a new mission, or a new lease on life, by the events of 2014”, however, since the events in Ukraine began in 2022 there “is a unity of purpose now that there wasn’t before.” (Guyer, 2022, emphases added).

Regardless of the reasons extended, Europe’s reliance on Washington and London is no longer sustainable as highlighted by the Spanish think tank called Real Instituto Elcano which deliberated 4 scenarios by different foreign policy analysts (Lookman, 2022). Since it is geopolitically clear that a Russian-Chinese partnership gaining sufficient geoeconomic power will directly result in Europe integrating with Asia into a Eurasian supercontinent, this would inevitably lead to the EU diversifying its partners and no longer excessively depending on one player or region (Lookman, 2022). The policy paper produced by Elcano in December 2017 – following the UK exiting the EU—specifically discussed the future relationship of the EU with great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. The underlying question was whether “Europe will remain a geopolitical subordinate” to the Anglo-American camp or develop “into an independent player among great powers”. The first scenario depicts “Europe as prey to external actors and internal competition. The special relationship with the U.S. is history, NATO passé, and the EU irrelevant”. Another scenario by Professor Alexander Mattelaer envisions “a European Union that will rule Europe and have a significant hand in determining world events”. In the third scenario, “the West is experiencing a rebirth. The transatlantic framework led by the U.S. and the UK determines the course of events in Europe and how Europe positions itself in the world”. And the final scenario, highlights how the “Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has brought Europe closer together economically, politically and militarily-strategically” (Lookman, 2022). It is probably apt to remember the words of geo-strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski who stated that “Paris and Berlin should never be alienated from the US…without the strategic cooperation of France and Germany the task of expanding US influence into Eurasia would be drastically crippled”.³

The process of attaining ontological security—therefore – assumes that it is not possible to develop “behavioural routines and thus behavioural certainty in conditions that appear to be constantly changing” (Cupac, 2012, p. 33). A critical situation destabilizing a “familiar environment” undermines the ability of NATO to continue with the old-self-identity because “tomorrow may not correspond with what [the] ‘self’ was made for” (Cupac, 2012, p. 33). In other words, with the “old identity” witnessing ontological insecurity, then it logically follows—from a realist perspective—that NATO has to find a “new self [identity] in the new world” (Cupac, 2012) by fabricating narratives stating the Russia is threatening the international system. However, since a realist approach to IR is based on an ontological double requirement consistently demanding a threatening Other for the ontological security of the Self, and more importantly, since the current crisis Ukrainian crisis appears to be fluid, uncertain and constantly changing, realist imperatives demand that NATO comes up with ways of existing as an organization “yesterday”. This is because the identity of any international organization is highly dependent on the purpose it fulfils in the international environment and time-lapse risks members of NATO losing confidence in the purpose of the organization. Here, countries revert to their historical internal “intrinsic identity” for ontological security by scaling-down from an organizational level to a state level. This has occurred during the Cold War as highlighted with the Franco-German camp, and this is becoming evidently clear in the current Ukrainian crisis in 2022. Several countries in NATO are being forced to answer to their “internal audience” (i.e., citizens) who are demanding diplomatic negotiations with Russia, the halt of financial aid to Ukraine including weapon exports, by citing internal socio-economic underdevelopment. It seems that the current Ukrainian crisis has unclothed the “NATO emperor” by revealing perhaps that NATO was never just a military alliance “held together by a sense of a common external threat…but first and foremost, a community of liberal and democratic values” (Cupac, 2012, p. 34). The discourse of “liberal-democratic” values—especially when considering the opposition of France, Germany, and Russia—has been adopted for several NATO missions that have flagrantly violated International Law such as the intervention in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and now, in Ukraine. However, from an ontological security perspective these missions were vital for NATO’s (Anglo-American) identity thus allowing it to reflect on itself as “whole continuous person in time” (Cupac, 2012, p. 34). This is clear with Huysmans’s stating that NATO transformed its Atlantic civilization from a “ritualistic confirmation of values into a key aspect of the security strategy of NATO” at the expense of other particular cultural-identities (as cited in Cupac, 2012, p. 34)

3.3. France, Germany, and Russia—is diplomacy a possible conduit for ontological security in a realist world?

The Istanbul Peace talks—which took place from March to April 2022 and included top diplomatic officials and ministers from Russia and Ukraine—was hailed in some corners as “the quickest way to end the war in Ukraine” (Bharadwaj, 2022; Echols, 2022). Former official at the US National Security Council Fiona Hill co-authored a lengthy essay in Foreign Affairs recounting key moments of the talks. She states that Russia and Ukraine agreed to “end the war in April … Russian and Ukrainian negotiators appeared to have tentatively agreed on the outlines of a negotiated interim settlement … Russia would withdraw to its position on February 23, when it controlled part of the Donbas region and all of Crimea, and in exchange, Ukraine would promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries. But as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in a July interview … this compromise is no longer an option” (Hill & Stent, 2022). The failed settlement highlights the impact of former British PM Boris Johnson’s efforts to stop negotiations. The decision to “kill the deal” coincided with his visit in April 2022 to Kyiv, during which he reportedly urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to break off talks with Russia (Bharadwaj, 2022; Echols, 2022). Ukrainska Pravda—a media communication centre close to President Zelensky—stated “the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Boris Johnson … appeared in the capital almost without warning, brought two simple messages. The first is that Putin is a war criminal, he should be pressured, not negotiated with. And the second is that even if Ukraine is ready to sign some agreements on guarantees with Putin, they [the UK and US] are not”. Three days following PM Johnson’s departure from Kiev, President Putin publicly stated that talks with Ukraine “had turned into a dead end” (Bharadwaj, 2022; Echols, 2022). Here we notice that the Anglo-American camp including President Zelensky reify a realist approach to IR since they assume that attaining ontological security is possible by undermining the physical security of Ukraine. In addition, we notice Washington and London refusing to socialize and cooperate with other members of the international community by assuming their interest as priority, and the interest of other sovereign countries as trivial. In other words, Washington and London attaining ontological security is dependent on fostering instability and anxiety (i.e., ontological insecurity) in other polities by prioritizing militarized in place of diplomatic solutions.

President Macron’s most recent deliberations remind us of the lacunae between Continentalism and Atlanticism in that he defended his continued diplomatic efforts with President Putin following the invasion of Ukraine which according to him is the only conduit for achieving “environmental stability”. He reminded countries who are approaching politics from simply a realpolitik lens reifying interest over morality that overlooking diplomacy is a “mistaken morality” that further aggravates a “critical situation”. This reaffirms Jonsson and Hall’s argument in their renown book entitled Essence of Diplomacy (2005) which emphasizes that diplomacy is undertheorized in Anglo-American foreign policy because it assumes diplomacy as a means instead of an end in itself for the reason that it adopts a realist approach to International Relations. While speaking to French ambassadors gathered at the Elysée Palace in September 2022, President Macron questioned the decision of western capitals closing the lines of communication with Russia (Caulcutt, 2022). During his yearly address on foreign policy, he mentions that “the job of a diplomat is to talk to everybody and particularly to the people we disagree with…we must not give in to any form of mistaken morality that would seek to weaken us.” Macron argued that is vital to maintain French and European “independence” especially on regional issues. He mentioned that “[Independence] doesn’t mean equal treatment. The U.S. are our allies. But we don’t want to depend on them”. Macron cautioned against continental cleavages emerging among EU members in the face of the Russian intervention and amid warnings relating to the energy crisis and rising inflation by saying, “we must not let Europe be divided by this war. European unity is key” (Caulcutt, 2022). In response to President Macron’s emphases on diplomacy, former NATO secretary—Anders Fogh Rasmussen—stated that his words were “deeply harmful” and continued by stating that “Macron astonished us at the beginning of the crisis with his, to say the least, unique and critical statement that Putin should not be humiliated and offered an exit ramp. Such statements were disastrous … ” (Reuters, 2022). However, more recently at the 75^th UNGA, President Macron sought to appease the Atlanticist camp by stating that Russia’s actions amount to “modern day imperialism”, however, he reiterated his belief that world leaders needed to keep the ethos of cooperation and negotiation with Russia. While Macron mentioned that Russia “must now understand that it cannot impose its will by military means”, Rasmussen unconvinced replied by stating “He [Macron] has weakened international cohesion, and I think he is now regretting this and trying to regain the initiative” (Reuters, 2022). These empirical speech acts highlight that while the Anglo-American camp perceives Russia as an “Evil Empire” that cannot be negotiated with, France on the other hand believes that such unfounded perception of Russia not only undermines reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis but has cascading effects that are destabilizing the socio-economic development of the European continent.

On October 12^th, 2022 – during a France 2 interview—President Macron faced criticism from members within the NATO alliance for stating that France would not respond with nuclear weapons if Russia used its own atomic arsenal “against Ukraine” or “the region” (Abboud & Foy, 2022). This broke with the standard policy of “strategic ambiguity” characterizing a realist approach to IR generally, and deterrence specifically. President Macron reverted to France’s “intrinsic identity” by stating that its nuclear doctrine rested on the “fundamental interests of the nation”, which “would not be directly affected if, for example, there was a ballistic nuclear attack on Ukraine, or in the region…We have a framework of what concerns us” (Abboud & Foy, 2022, emphases added). NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said, “we will not go into how exactly we will respond…It will have severe consequences if Russia uses any kind of nuclear weapon against Ukraine”. Here, we notice NATO leapfrogging over European sovereignty by assuming that any internal identity that conflicts with NATO’s (external) identity is a threat to its ontological security or more specifically, Anglo-American identity. This is evident when Macron highlighted a different path to ontological security-seeking that is at odds with the Anglo-American identity accenting NATO since France does not participate in NATO’s formal nuclear weapons mechanisms and is not taking part in the alliance’s annual nuclear exercises (Abboud & Foy, 2022). Therefore, France does not find nuclear “narratives”, “exercises”, and “mechanisms” as conducive for environmental stability but rather perceives it as gestures that would aggravate an already “critical situation” and catalyse European ontological insecurity. The Franco-German camp and other countries in NATO prioritizing the security of their “internal self-identity” rather than scaling security from an international organization to the state evidently developed an unstable environment for the Anglo-American camp. This is clear with Harvard professor Nicholas Burns—now serving as Biden’s ambassador to China—paper in 2019 arguing that “that Trump’s NATO bashing, increasingly undemocratic leaders under the NATO umbrella (among them Turkey and Hungary), and NATO’s failure to confront Putin have hurtled the Alliance into its most worrisome crisis in memory” (Guyer, 2022; emphases added).

On December 1^st, 2022, president Emmanuel Macron held a visit with US president Joe Biden in Washington. The discussion revolved around European security guarantees in general, and the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in particular. In an interview with French television channel TF1, President Macron said “the two leaders had talked about the need for the US and Europe to prepare a security architecture for tomorrow…This means that one of the essential points we must address—as [Russian] president [Vladimir] Putin has always said—is the fear that NATO comes right up to its doors, and the deployment of weapons that could threaten Russia” (Abboud et al., 2022). His interview faced strong criticism from Kyiv, Finland, and other “New Europe” NATO members from Baltic nations after he suggested Russia would need to be given security guarantees as part of future negotiations to end the war in Ukraine (Abboud et al., 2022). Macron continued by saying “That topic [security guarantees] will be part of the topics for peace, so we need to prepare what we are ready to do, how we protect our allies and member states, and how to give guarantees to Russia the day it returns to the negotiating table” (Abboud et al., 2022). Macron’s comments appear to give credence to Putin’s allegation that NATO had “expanded” towards Russia’s borders by admitting former Soviet states, and that this was a legitimate reason for the invasion (Abboud et al., 2022). Regrettably, President Biden in response to Macron mentioned that “he would be willing to speak to Putin if the Russian leader was serious about seeking an end to the war”, which he said is “not the case at present” (Abboud et al., 2022). Put differently, and from an ontological security perspective, France highlighted that with Russia being part of the European continent, its anxiety is justified and for Russia to feel once again ontologically secure by transforming a critical situation into a stable familiar environment, Atlanticists (i.e., President Biden) and (New European) NATO members would need to extend guarantees that would socialize Russian disconcertment.

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April 2022 came under severe criticism for stating that she stands firm by her decision to block Ukraine’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) for joining NATO in the 2008 Bucharest summit. Mykhailo Podolyak—advisor to Zelensky—slammed Merkel’s statement by saying that it “indicates that Western elites are still under dangerous delusions” (Ankel, 2022). Furthermore, President Zelensky mentioned that the decision taken in 2008 Romania was a clear “miscalculation that resulted in war atrocities” thereby directly blaming Germany and France for what has occurred in Ukraine, and more specifically, undermining their “internal identity” (Ankel, 2022). On January 23^rd, 2022, Vice-admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach—who had led Germany’s naval force since March 2020 – made comments that according to Andriy Melnyk from the Die Welt newspaper “put the entire Ukrainian public in deep shock” and “massively called into question Germany’s trustworthiness and reliability, not just from a Ukrainian point of view.” According to Admiral Kay-Achim, President Putin wants “respect”. He mentioned that “On eye level, he wants respect. And my God, giving him respect is low cost, even no cost. It is easy to give him the respect he demands, and probably deserves” (Oltermann, 2022). The comments came at a time when Germany’s stance in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was under increased scrutiny especially since Germany is Europe’s second largest economy and was increasingly isolated in its refusal to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons and alter its gas trading deals with Russia. The admiral proceeded to resign following his statements citing that he wants to “avoid further damage to the German navy, the German military, but especially the Federal Republic of Germany” (Oltermann, 2022).

Christine Lambrecht—German defence minister—made clear that Ukraine’s battlefield gains would not alter Berlin’s refusal to provide the country with much-needed battle tanks. German politicians and political scientists echo the statement of Admiral Kay-Achmin who emphasized that it is unrealistic—and quite suicidal—to assume that Kyiv can retake its occupied territories, much less win the war. Johannes Varwick, a German political scientist mentioned that while it is an “unpopular opinion…the reports of Ukrainian military success don’t change the big picture: Russia … has escalation dominance and in the medium-term higher stamina. There is no alternative to a political reconciliation of interests.” The former Ukrainian ambassador to Germany Andrij Melnyk offered his own frank assessment by replying “Unpopular opinion: Fuck off”. The position of France and Germany remains a continentalist position and this is clear with German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock mentioning that Germany will do everything to avoid NATO becoming a direct party in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Her remarks came after Kiev requested to become an official member of the US-led military bloc. She mentioned that “We have made it clear from day one that we have a responsibility to ensure that the war does not spread to other countries, that NATO does not itself become a party in the war. And that remains true today. We are doing everything we can to ensure that other countries and NATO are not drawn into this war” (Karnitschnig, 2022; RT, 2022).

4. Conclusion

An international system naturalizing a Hobbesian worldview that reifies interest over morality and military action over diplomacy will invariably produce a war every few decades that will not only create en-masse carnage and displacement but will place countries around the world in a “critical situation” demanding ontological security guarantees. As mentioned in earlier sections, there is nothing inherently immoral or threatening about wanting to be ontologically secure, however, the issue with NATO’s dominant Atlanticist identity is that it is conditioned on a realist approach to IR which is not only inherently founded on an inclusive-exclusion, but also on Self-Other nexus that necessitates constructing a threatening-Other for its values/identity to be (ontologically) secured (Al-Kassimi, 2022). According to Demetriou, the most important issue for American leadership “is whether European pursuits and aims are in harmony with those of the United States and not whether Europeans possess or not an identity…one easily can realise that the American aim has been for the US to make the decisions and for Europeans to support it. It is likely that some EU member-states would like to change this mode of cooperation into a more collective one, in which decisions will be made multilaterally instead of unilaterally” (Demetriou & Benney, 2016, p. 4).⁴ Motivated thus, and as argued in previous sections, an Atlanticist identity never accepts being an equal partner in a coalition, rather it seeks to generalize its identity even if the cost is NATO partners feeling ontologically insecure. This is obvious in President Joe Biden’s most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) affirming an objective to export “democratic values” using a discourse of unilateralism. Even when a NSS emphasizes the importance of “alliances”, these statements are qualified by making it clear that the US “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary” (Demetriou & Benney, 2016, p. 4). It is apt to remember the words of the first Secretary General of NATO in 1952 – Lord Hastings Ismay (d.1965) – who is remembered to have said that the objective and dynamic of NATO is “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

The recent Russian-Ukrainian crises has revitalized the words of Lord Hasting’s especially since it has explicitly revealed the “values gap” accenting NATO and the estrangement between Russia, France, Germany, Britain, and the US. The process in which Atlanticists sought ontological security was argued to be at the expense of Franco-German sovereignty and identity. As elaborated above, the EU has continuously persuaded its partners to use military force grudgingly, and only after all other non-military methods of conflict prevention have been exhausted. According to Demetriou, “the EU prefers full-scope conflict prevention, rather than threat prevention” (Demetriou & Benney, 2016, p. 4). That is to say, the continentalist would like to see diplomatic, political, and economic measures take precedent over military action. Atlanticists perceive the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an obstacle to Anglo-American expansion of power and cultural values especially since the EU are not unanimously aligned with the hawkish position adopted by the US and UK in relation to the war in Ukraine. Instead, the EU’s preference for multilateral cooperation, compromise, and diplomacy, and its reluctance to use force, has been viewed by the Anglo-American camp as an “evident sign of weakness” (Demetriou & Benney, 2016, p. 5).

Emeritus Professor of International Law—Richard A. Falk—mentions in relation to the Ukraine War and NATO’s response that it was “mainly articulated and materially implemented by the U.S. by pouring vast quantities of oil on the flames of conflict, taunting Russia and its leader, increasing the scale of violence, the magnitude of human suffering, and dangerously increasing the risk of a disastrous outcome” (Falk, 2022). Falk continues by mentioning the immoral stance of the US adopting a “militarist identity” to attain ontological security which ignored the fact that Russia and other EU countries from “day one of the attack strongly supported the wisdom of making an all-out effort to achieve an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiations aiming at durable political compromises not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also between NATO/U.S. and Russia”. However, as mentioned throughout this manuscript—by adopting an ontological security approach—NATO’s dominant Anglo-American identity has yet to “publicly manifest any such interest [in diplomacy], much less setting forth a commitment to stopping the killing and devastation by encouraging diplomacy… [this] should be shocking to the conscience of peace-minded persons and patriots of humanity everywhere (Falk, 2022). Realism as a mainstream approach adhered to by the Anglo-American camp and some member states in NATO risks protracting conflict since diplomacy and negotiation are simply identified as gestures of a “weak identity”. A realist lens deducing foreign policy during the 20^th and 21^st century seeks cultural homogeneity thereby “suppressing identity-difference in favour of sameness” even though “culture is about difference” (Al-Kassimi, 2022; Mingst & Warkentin, 1996). Some member states in NATO valorising a foreign policy based on an “identity security dilemma” by conceptualizing relations as exclusively constitutive of a Self-Other binary risk simply recognizing the Other as embodying a threatening “Other-identity” or an “underdeveloped version of the Self” (Al-Kassimi, 2022; Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 220;). The moral issue with a realist foreign policy is that it is constitutive and productive of a Self-Other nexus, and this is salient with opposing “biographical narratives” extended by states seeking different paths to achieving ontological security and managing a critical situation. A widening and deepening approach to IR and ISS—especially through an ontological security perspective—cautions of ethical dangers induced by a realpolitik foreign policy since it highlights that a realist foreign policy is bound by an oppositional binary where the Other is constructed as a threatening depoliticized object in need of “identity-change” with the Self appearing to be “doing something” without fundamentally acknowledging “responsibility” for mismanagement and the promotion of ontological insecurity (Al-Kassimi, 2022).

The President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, visited President Vladimir Putin on October 11^th, 2022, in St. Petersburg and called for dialogue, negotiation, and diplomacy among all parties to end the war in Ukraine. He mentioned that “we discussed several issues of mutual concern, including the Ukraine crisis, and the importance of engaging in dialogue to reduce tensions and arrive at a diplomatic solution” (Arab News, 2022; Falk, 2022).⁵ It is important to note that the US responded to such diplomatic gesture by claiming that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are on the wrong side of history and proceeded to claim that both countries should be sanctioned especially because they decided to reduce oil output in OPEC+ – a decision narrated in Western mainstream media as seeking to appease President Putin (Falk, 2022; Maini, 2022). The importance of such false propaganda claims made by the US and the UK is that it accentuates how a realist approach to International Relations perceives diplomacy as linked to an identity that is “weak”. In addition, the narratives perpetuated by the US seem to remind the international community that cultural/identity homogeneity is what provides the Anglo-American camp ontological security, and this is manifest in how the US constructed the diplomatic mission and decision of OPEC+ as a “critical situation” conducted by an Other-identity seeking to destabilize the global environment. Janine Jackson—a media critic from Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) – has noted that “the current crisis with the US and Russia about Ukraine is a test of many things, not least news media’s ability and willingness to disengage themselves from these frozen narratives … and from the devastating idea that diplomacy is weakness, and massive violence, or threats of massive violence, are the best way to address conflict” (Rumi, 2022). It is fitting to recall the words of the great Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky who is remembered to have said “to live without hope is to cease to live”. Now is the time to transform “hope” into “reality” and demand that diplomacy be given a chance.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Correction

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Acknowledgments

I wanted to thank Professor Richard Meissner for his valuable feedback. Also, the two anonymous peer-reviewers who aided me in sharpening my arguments. Needless to add, I alone am responsible for the errors and infelicities of this manuscript.

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Notes on contributors

Khaled Al-Kassimi

Khaled Al-Kassimi is an Assistant Professor of Political Philosophy, International Relations, and International Law at the American University in the Emirates. His academic research is particularly interested in Arab-Islamic and Latin-European epistemological differences pertaining to their different jurisprudent and philosophical sources (i.e., revealed Law and rationalized law). Such eclectic disciplinary navigation has permitted Khaled Al-Kassimi to publish peer-reviewed articles in a variety of journals interested in law and philosophy, history and political science with an eye appreciating the civilizational heritage accentuating the cultural reconnaissance between the Orient and Occident. His most recent monograph published by Routledge entitled ”International Law, Necropolitics, and Arab Lives - The Legalization of Creative Chaos in Arabia” argues that International Relations and International Law continue to be accented by epistemic violence by naturalizing a separation between law and morality

Notes

1. French economist Pierre de Gaulle—the grandson of General Charles de Gaulle—rightly stated in July 2022 that “Our people [Russia and France] are linked by many years of friendship and the blood shed against Nazis,” he said at a reception marking Russia’s Day at the Russian Embassy in Paris (TASS, 2022). He continued by saying, “I came here to assert once again loud and clear that it is in France’s interests to maintain good relations with Russia as well as to say that we should work together for the sake of the unification and security of our continent, for the sake of maintaining balance, progress and peace in the entire world”. He continued by saying “He [Charles De Gaulle] loved Russia. My family and I love Russia and its people. The Russian people whose property rights are being so unfairly violated worldwide” (TASS, 2022).

2. In February 2003, President Putin travelled to Berlin and Paris and joined French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder in a joint declaration stating that there was still an alternative to war and that Russia, France, and Germany were determined to work together to complete disarmament in Iraq peacefully (CRS, 2003).

3. This is also attested in that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Chinese President Xi in November 2022, and more recently, President Macron of France met with President Xi in April 2023. Both visits discussed trade, security, and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

4. On November 24^th, 2022, several EU top officials and diplomats complained about Anglo-American policies protracting the war in Ukraine and alienating their national constituents by sanctioning trade. Senior officials of the EU mentioned that “the fact is, if you look at it soberly, the country that is most profiting from this war is the U.S. because they are selling more gas and at higher prices, and because they are selling more weapons”. The official continues by saying, “we are really at a historic juncture” arguing that the “double hit of trade disruption from U.S. subsidies and high energy prices risks turning public opinion against both the war effort and the transatlantic alliance”. He concludes by saying, “America needs to realize that public opinion is shifting in many EU countries”. The EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell, called on Washington to respond to European concerns by stating that “Americans—our friends—take decisions which have an economic impact on us”. President Emmanuel Macron also mentioned, “high U.S. gas prices were not friendly”, and Germany’s economy minister—Robert Habeck—has called on Washington to show more “solidarity” and help “reduce energy costs”. The US rejected the EU’s complaint by stating that, “the rise in gas prices in Europe is caused by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s energy war against Europe, period” (Moens, Velva, and Barigazzi, 2022). The aforementioned recent deliberation by the EU and the response of the US being “discursively unilateral” clearly accentuates that US ontological security seeking disregards EU internal identity and the fact that it is ontological insecure. Or put differently, the EU seeks to de-securitize trade with Russia and cooperate, while the Anglo-American camp demands its securitization and military action.

5. At the time of writing, Italy is also requesting prioritizing diplomacy and negotiations with Russia since it is the West who has violated the Minsk Agreements. In fact, former PM Silvio Berlusconi defended President Putin by accusing Ukraine’s president in provoking Russia (Tondo, 2022).