Ethiopian political crisis after reform: Causes of Tigray conflict

Abstract

Ethiopian politics usually faces conflicts either to bring change or after the change. A 2018 Ethiopian political reform aimed to sustain peace among Ethiopians. Nonetheless, the conflict has escalated in different regions. Military confrontations campaigned between the central government and the Tigray region frequently. Finally, it occurred between the central government and Tigray People’s Liberation Front in late 2020. Scholars debated the root causes of it. Hence, there is no agreement among scholars regarding the cause of the Tigray conflict. This research explores the Ethiopian political crisis after the 2018 reform focusing on the Tigray conflict causes. The researcher employed a qualitative method and ethnographic research design to study the causes of conflict. The research finding reveals that though the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Party’s demise, the constitutional crisis, election delay, and the Amhara region’s ambition to annex Tigray Region land to regain the lost territories are the causes of conflict, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front attack on the Ethiopian northern military base was the immediate cause of the conflict. It recommends further research needs to conduct on the consequences of the conflict.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• political crisis
• reform
• causes
• Tigray conflict

Public interest statement

The coming of Abiy Ahmed into power aimed to last peace in Ethiopia because the power transferred peacefully for the first time. Nonetheless, conflicts have escalated in different parts of the country. Until November 2020, all regions were under tension except the Tigray region. Alleging the TPLF to the northern military base attack, Abiy commanded his army to the Tigray region. Yet, there is an argument among political scientists concerning the causes of the conflict. This research explores the Tigray conflict causes. Both primary and secondary data were used to conduct research. The ethnographic research design is used to scrutinize the conflict causes. The research finding reveals factors that caused the Tigray conflict are rivals for power, the expulsion of TPLF members from the central government, Eritrea’s intention to retaliate against TPLF, the EPRDF demise, and Amhara region's ambition to annex Tigray lands.

1. Introduction

Historically, Ethiopia has faced different political challenges. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its coalition came to power by overthrowing the Derg government in 1991 (Lyons, 2019). Though power shifted after the downfall of the Derg, the Ethiopian political process is rigid. The antagonistic parties aspire to the new political reform that promotes mutual political agreement, but it witnessed little improvement. The post-1991 reform agenda was promising initially—party formation and elections, more press freedom, programs for economic development, fiscal reform, decentralization, and judicial reform. But TPLF has dominated gradually. TPLF removed the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Force (COEDF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) after a disagreement (Abbink, 2009). If transitional process failed to use amity and steadiness as an orienting strategy for all government works, it would lose focus and miss opportunities for fostering community participation (Berhe, 2017).

Slowly but surely, the challenges are more likely to emerge within the party. That means whether in the form of further accepted political unrest or disagreements within the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) government (Lie & Mesfin, 2018). Following the 2016 Addis Ababa integrated master plan with the surrounding areas, Oromo youths began to protest the EPRDF. Then, both the Oromo and Amhara movements articulated grievances against TPLF domination, declining economic conditions, corruption, and federal and state security services brutality (Jima & Meissner, 2021; Opalo & Smith, 2021). Lastly, though it has ruled the state for three decades, the Oromo youths’ high protest compelled the party to make political reform (Jima & Meissner, 2021).

Subsequently, EPRDF elected Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister (PM) in March 2018 (Jima & Meissner, 2021; Strategic Comments, 2020). The transition from Hailemariam to Abiy was the most significant change in Ethiopia’s political history (Strategic Comments, 2020). The coming of the Abiy brought the “The released political prisoners, returned of exiled political opponents, Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, and empowerment of women” (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Nonetheless, the reforms faced different challenges because of misunderstandings between the incumbent and opposition political parties. When Abiy came to power as the new PM as the first Oromo politician entering the former imperial palace, many believed it was the Oromo’s turn to rule. However, he has brought little for the Oromo so far. Further, the premature internal divisions have resurfaced, old alliances and allegiances have been remade, and where the inherently fragmented nature of Oromo politics seems to have prevailed (Ostebo & Tronvoll, 2020).

On the other hand, Abiy’s appointment resembled solving the ethnic conflict in different parts of the country. Still, it made worse in some areas. The conflict quickly erupted in Oromia, where the aggressors were perhaps emboldened by the appointment of an Oromo PM, reviving old claims over disputed territories (Strategic Comments, 2020). Under his administration, the security forces executed 39 people publically in Oromia regional state, Guji zone (Goro Dola) and West Guji zone (Dugda Dawa) in 2019. Although the initial points seem the human rights improvement, the old style in which the security forces violate fundamental rights is restored slowly but surely. Besides, security forces discharged severe fundamental rights violations in the Amhara region following the assassination of the region’s leaders in the same year (Amnesty International, 2020). The central government claimed the TPLF for the atrocity because they dominated the military and security sectors. The unrestrained political circumstance of the current regime has created dissension and violence among the public and thus led to escalating political, economic, and security crises in Ethiopia (Addis et al., 2020).

Hailemariam, the former PM, had a wholesome relationship with TPLF. On the other hand, the coming of Abiy reduced TPLF supremacy (Opalo & Smith, 2021). He tried to discuss with people of all regional states in the country regarding his future government. But he undermined strong opposition political parties such as OLF and TPLF. Also, the postponed election exacerbates the difference between Abiy and TPLF (Strategic Comments, 2020). Abiy’s appointment got worse for the Tigrayans when he acted promptly against the once-dominant TPLF within the EPRDF by removing officials from government posts, which further reduced the influence of the Tigrayan minority in governance. The prominent leader of 2018 political reform, Lemma Megersa aspired to political stability and continuity. Yet, Abiy got rid of TPLF leaders belligerently from the central government. He also eliminated them from the armed forces and national intelligence service while seeking to have some arrested. What else, the incumbent administration has repeatedly blamed the TPLF for stirring unrest without providing evidence for the allegation (Strategic Comments, 2020).

In the same vein, the relationship between the central government and the TPLF is paradoxical. The central government deteriorated the Tigray regional state people and TPLF. Many political parties stated that Abiy inflicted the Tigray tensions with neighboring states. Accordingly, the Tigray region conflicted with Amhara and Afar regions. The opened road which connects Eritrea and Tigray regional state closed. To control the Media that broadcast from the Tigray region, he banned the Regional Media. He further cut the Tigray budget to weaken it and cautioned and kidnapped foreigners not to go to Tigray, especially journalists and investors. But the TPLF held the Regional election on Nine September 2020 without the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) recognitions that accelerated the conflict between the central government and TPLF’s region, Tigray (Jima & Meissner, 2021). In fact, regional states cannot conduct an election without the NEBE’s permission, mediation, and recognition in the country. Nonetheless, the TPLF sponsored diverse rebellions in the country to fight against the central government and make it busy.

Lastly, the orchestrated and campaigned military brought a conflict between the central government and the Tigray region (Opalo & Smith, 2021). PM Abiy commanded the forces to fight the TPLF when it attacked a northern military base on Four November 2020 (International Crisis Group, 2020). That was the immediate cause of the war that resulted in the death, eviction, and migration of many people in the country (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Even though the central government announced the war ended in late November 2020, the conflict continued with many human casualties (International Crisis Group, 2020). As it intensified, different actors like federal defense forces, Eritrean troops, and Amhara police participated in the war (Ibid). However, there is little consensus among scholars concerning the causes of the Ethiopian Tigray conflict. This research explores the Ethiopian political crises after the 2018 reform focusing on the cause of the Tigray conflict.

Albeit different factors are responsible for the conflict, this paper does not discuss all issues due to the absence of data. Also, the author could not go to the study areas and observed the situation, collected data from the victims, and triangulated their views because of security issues. As a result, the study delimited to cause of the conflict like military competition between the central government and TPLF, the demise of the EPRDF Party and the TPLF’s refusal to join the new part (Prosperity Party), the attempt of the central government to control TPLF, the expulsion of TPLF members from the central government positions, Amhara region’s intention to annex the Tigray land, and the TPLF attack of the Northern military base of the country.

2. Theoretical framework

Based on the nature and issues they address, political scientists employ different theories in politics. The normative political theory, contemplative political theory, political party theory, game theory, and power transition theory are widely used in political science.

Normative political theory was an ancient theory that emerged in Greek. It served as a benchmark for political science research (Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2017). It attempts to practice moral elements in politics. The realists apply it by presenting political philosophy needs to acclimatize real politics (Rossi & Sleat, 2014). The normative political theory plays a pivotal role to legitimatize power (Weale, 2010). However, most scholars encounter that it is difficult to apply normative political theory at this time due to the selfishness of politicians. Thus, it is non-practicable. On the other hand, speculative political theory relates to religious points of view. Thus, the relationship between the ruled and the ruling is a spiritual concept (Komjathy, 2017). The radical democratic theory attempts to speculate the incarnate democracy practice in every exercise of life (Mariotti, 2020). That form of political theory is exercised in a country where people believe that power is given to the ruling one by divine power. It deals with the psycho-spiritual development of the ruling and the ruled.

The other theory is the political party theory. It is used in political science for several years (Wolkenstein, 2019). It refers to a process where people come together, form a party, set game rules, and attempt to control power (Bawn et al., 2012; West, 2014). Party plays a pivotal role in political reason out. If a party exercises its rights and announces its objectives to the public, there will be an opportunity to be elected. That is possible in democratic states (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2020). Further, activists and interest groups are prominent actors in a political party. And loyal candidates are nominated for party and election (Bawn et al., 2012). Nonetheless, it is arguable that the existence of a political party does not necessarily ensure democratization and lasting peace. It depends on the degree of exercising democratic culture, the prevalence of the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the independence of the judiciary to adjudicate the case when a disagreement happens among or between parties.

Game theory has become an eloquent instrument to describe politics (McCarty & Meirowitz, 2007). It shows that human interaction consists of conflict, cooperation, and competition (Rosenmuller & Trockel, 2014). The authors present that the main paradigms of game theory are strategic behavior, incomplete information, the anticipation of actions, bargaining power, mutual, fairness, and equity. It modeled the mutual rely of the opponent’s strategic behavior, the opponent’s knowledge, the recursive influence of consideration on the state of knowledge, and the resulting strategic consequences (Rosenmuller & Trockel, 2014). In Ethiopia, the strategic behavior the central government and TPLF used against each other caused conflict.

The power transition theory is a flexible and core element to describe global politics. It predicts harmony and conflict at international, regional, and national levels (Tammen et al., 2017). It can be a challenge between the incumbent and the opposition party unless it is managed and exercised wisely (Feng, 2013). In the Ethiopian context, it describes how the power was transferred from the former Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Ethiopia entered into conflict then after though the power was transferred peacefully. The power parity is unsafe in power transition because two parties cannot take a single position. As a result, the power struggle between the dominant power and the emerging power is inevitable (Pop & Brînză, 2017). “The power transition theory also claims that the challenger tends to declare war on the hegemonic power before reaching power parity with the hegemonic power” (Ibid, p. 61).

In this study, the researcher used game theory and power transition theory to scrutinize the cause of conflict in Ethiopia. The game theory is applicable to illustrate how the ruling party and TPLF decision are responsible for it because it helped the researcher to deal with the overlapping areas of fair division, political economy, public choice, and war bargaining. On the other hand, power transition theory is used to investigate how power transition was the conflict causes as stated above.

3. Methodology of study

The researcher employed a qualitative method to conduct this research. In qualitative research, the researcher is central. He is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. The researcher plays a pivotal role in constructing concepts, theories, and principles out of detailed discussion, interviews, and observations (Creswell, 2009). Moreover, the qualitative strategy is a detailed description of situations, events, people interactions, observed behaviors, and direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts (Crain-Dorough, 2009; Dawson, 2002). And data are collected through focus group discussions and depth interviews in qualitative research (Kothari, 2004). The author employed the ethnographic research design in this research because it is suitable to study conflict and flexible in choosing data collection methods.

Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews online because of COVID-19 and the continuity of the war during data collection. The researcher selected six dominant parties’ representatives—Prosperity Party (PP), Oromo Federal Conference (OFC), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ethiopia Social Justice (EZEMA), Amhara National Movement (NAMA), and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) since they have played a pivotal role in Ethiopian politics and have many supporters. The researcher selected two participants—one male and a female—from each party purposively. The researcher attempted to balance the gender because the females are the most vulnerable during the conflict. Besides, the researcher reviewed secondary data sources such as books, book sections, journal articles, magazines, newspaper articles, the Ethiopian Constitution, encyclopedias, proclamations, working papers, reports, and minutes. Additionally, frequent notices of parties’ are used. Secondary data is triangulated with primary data. Game theory and Power transition theory were used to analyze how the central government and TPLF used a strategy to get supporters before and during the conflict. And lastly, the researcher employed thematic and content data analysis to explore the conflict causes. Finally, the author triangulated primary data with secondary data.

4. Findings and discussion

4.1. The confrontation between the central government and the Tigray region

After securing his position, Abiy undermined opposition political parties such as TPLF. His tenure went downhill to public security. And his politics has been full of turbulence (Strategic Comments, 2020). Opposition political parties, OFC, and OLF representatives argued that the Abiy government showed military parades repeatedly to frustrate TPLF. They also stated that the Tigray region ruling party, TPLF, did the same things. That showed a rivalry for power between Abiy’s government and the Tigray Region’s ruling party. The military campaign has brought a humanitarian catastrophe. Also, it has brought apprehensions of regional randomness (Gavin, 2021).

After the TPLF has cast out from the central government, its members returned to the Mekele and influenced the Tigrayans under the ethnic federalism umbrella. It continued to dominate the Tigray Region state’s politics, economy, and security (Opalo & Smith, 2021). The federal government and the TPLF were in confrontation for months (International Crisis Group, 2020). However, in November, long-rising competition between Abiy’s administration and the leadership of the TPLF turned into military hostility (Gavin, 2021). The outbreak of hostilities reflects a power struggle between the federal government and the TPLF. The PP alleged the TPLF exacerbated conflicts in Ethiopia during his tenure (Blanchard, 2020). Nevertheless, both sides were preparing for confrontation at the same time, the interview results with OLF and OFC representatives. The war between the federal government and the Tigray regional state demolished the country (International Crisis Group, 2020). Interview results with all parties revealed that many civilians died, migrated, women were raped, inflation raised and the economy collapsed.

4.2. Separatism against TPLF

On coming to power in 1991, the TPLF faced the immediate problem of any guerrilla movement that seizes control of a national government—of taking over the state apparatus against which it had been fighting for the previous decade and a half (Clapham, 2009). The TPLF politics depends on the Tigray people. The interview results with the TPLF representative posited that the party, TPLF, is organized by the people. Hence, it is similar to the Tigray people. TPLF and Tigray people are two sides of one coin. However, the PP representative countered that the party and people are different. People are beyond party. TPLF traded by the Tigray people throughout its power. But, it has done nothing for the Tigray people. The people remained poor. In fact, it is not easy to defeat TPLF unless the central government separates it from the people. Hence, the central government produced different documentary films against TPLF (Jima & Meissner, 2021). EZEMA and NAMA favored the central government in an attempt to separate TPLF from the people. But OFC and OLF took a neutral position. The parties warned the central government that imposing war on Tigray could cause civilian casualties. “The swift moves against the TPLF have encountered stiff resistance” (Ylönen, 2019, p. 344). The TPLF also appears to enjoy significant support from Tigrayans (International Crisis Group, 2020).

TPLF representative explained:

The central government did not be fond of the relationship between the TPLF and Tigrayans. The PM tries to restore the Derg system of administration. Thus, he opened the war on the Tigray people alleged to North military base attack. The TPLF queued with its people because it is the party of Tigrayans. He allotted 72 hours for TPLF members to surrender. Nonetheless, TPLF discussed with people and left Mekele. Then they returned to guerrilla fighters. The Tigrayans intensely supported TPLF in Abiy’s military defeat. Finally, both Tigrayans and TPLF recaptured Mekele in June 2021. Albeit Abiy formed his puppet government as an interim administration, the Tigrayans could not cooperate with them. They support TPLF in to fight against the defense of Ethiopia. That shows there is a strong relationship between TPLF and Tigray people.

Unlike the central government’s miscalculation to separate people from TPLF, the Tigray people supported the TPLF to recapture Mekele, the capital city of the Tigray region June 2021. The TPLF, under Alula Abba Nega’s military force, defeated many regimes of the central government’s military forces. Yet, the central government did not accept the defeat. The military retreated because the Tigray farmers want to plow lands. Indeed, that was not a convincing argument. UAE, which affords drones to the central government refused to cooperate due to the U.S. warnings. Actually, the central government also got weapons from Turkey and Iran. In conclusion, the central government’s tactics to separate Tigrayans and TPLF strengthen the bondage between them instead. However, it provoked the Tigray conflict.

4.3. The demise of the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front Coalition

The Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) emerged from North peripheries of Ethiopia. The TPLF, the heart of EPRDF, struggled for many years until it controlled power in 1991. Initially, the TPLF had the idea to form an independent Tigray Empire. But gradually, it reframed into a national state and mobilized other groups to induce power (Clapham, 2009). The TPLF began to take military insurrection against the Derg regime in 1975. Step by step, it formed the EPRDF that led to power in 1991. Before EPRDF, Ethiopia was ruled by a unitary state. However, it restructured the state into a federal one based on ethnolinguistics and the people’s willingness in 1990. Finally, the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution adopted a federal state that grants regional states the right to self-rule and self-determination (Blanchard, 2020). The TPLF was the dominant party in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition for three decades (Gavin, 2021), and it was the center of gravity in the country’s ruling EPRDF coalition (Woldemariam, 2018). Under the umbrella of EPRDF, Tigrayans dominated the protection equipment, National Defense Force (NDF) officer corps and federal administration, physical exertion near-exclusive management over economic aid, international loans, and the leasing of public land to amass billions of greenbacks (Jones, 2020).

However, TPLF’s position among EPRDF grew weaker as the Oromo and Amhara element parties pushed back against what they perceived as TPLF dominance within the coalition (Ostebo & Tronvoll, 2020). The EPRDF’s internal power struggle and its inability to deal with the protests brought a political transition in 2018 (Ibid). In December 2019, PM Abiy allied the EPRDF coalition parties into a single party, PP. The TPLF objected and refused to affix (Gavin, 2021). Further, many Oromo did not join the party claiming that it aimed to reduce their status of self-administration and self-rule (Strategic Comments, 2020). One of Abiy’s most prominent critics, Oromo opposition politician Jawar Mohammed, represented the PP’s formation as a shift removed from transitional ideology to a centralized state, alleging that the PM was steering the country back toward authoritarian rule. The government, in remission, arrested Jawar in July 2020 through protests following the death of a preferred Oromo singer, Hachalu Hundessa, inciting ethnic violence and terrorist act (Gavin, 2021).

Jones (2020) posits the PM launched a series of systematic reforms to reduce TPLF influence and stabilize the country by merging Ethiopia’s ethnic coalition with a single, nationally oriented PP. “The TPLF felt threatened by the new government’s personnel and policy choices, and it declined to join the successor party to the old ruling coalition” (Gavin, 2021, p. 2). The TPLF refused to affix PP, partly because the unitary party gain-said the ideals of ethnic federalism (Opalo & Smith, 2021). Offscouring invitations of the PP, the TPLF consequently laid off Abiy’s reforms as an extra-constitutional, reactionary power grab that vulnerable Mekelle’s authority and regional autonomy (Jones, 2020). The central government and TPLF moved to war lastly, which caused the death and migration of many civilians.

4.4. TPLF members’ expulsion from the central government

The popular politics incorporation into the EPRDF regime magnified the contradictions within the coalition. The continuous supremacy of TPLF in the EPRDF was illegitimate. Finally, the situation forced TPLF to return to Mekele (Opalo & Smith, 2021). The EZEMA, NAMA, OFC, OLF, and PP representatives explained that TPLF dominated Ethiopian politics albeit their number is the least. Jones (2020) states that under the umbrella of EPRDF, Tigrayans dominated the security apparatus, NDF officer corps, and federal administration, exercising near-exclusive control over foreign aid, international loans, and the leasing of public land to amass billions of dollars. But the TPLF supremacy weathered following the coming of Abiy into power in 2018. The TPLF leaders returned to their origin, Mekele, and began to challenge Abiy’s administration. Interview results with the TPLF representative showed that the Abiy administration demolished the TPLF roles at the federal level. Abiy removed most figurative TPLF members from the central government. Following the constitutional crisis and the postponed election, the TPLF parliament members pulled out and returned to Mekele vowing to maintain the Constitution. Finally, the TPLF representative and House of the Federation speaker, Keria Ibrahim, resigned and returned to Mekele (Jima & Meissner, 2021).

Contrarily, interview results with the PP representative exhibited that Abiy’s administration attempted to maintain an equilibrium position among Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peoples. The TPLF members dominated Ethiopian politics irrespective of their population. Rather than accepting the facts, TPLF members orchestrated propaganda to distance the Tigray people and elongate their powers. After all, confrontation and quarrel were responsible for the Tigray war. Yet, “the bloody offensive war aims to eliminate TPLF” (Burke, 2020, p. 2). The transposition between the central government and TPLF caused the Tigray conflict.

4.5. Election delay and constitutional crisis

The Ethiopian government decided to postpone the scheduled elections for an unlimited period alleging COVID-19 caused a constitutional crisis (Jima & Meissner, 2021). They further states:

The ruling party presented four possible scenarios to circumvent the constitutional crisis. Those are dissolving the parliaments, declaring a state of emergency, amending the Constitution, and seeking a constitutional interpretation. Then, the Parliament endorsed a constitutional interpretation on 5 May 2020.

And they have asked the House of Federation to issue an interpretation within a month without arriving at a political consensus with opposition political parties (The Economist, 2020 in Jima, 2021). For this reason, most opposition parties have rejected the decision (Mulugeta, 2020). “The ruling party was partial to constitutional interpretation since all the House of People Representatives and the House of Federation are members of the ruling party” (Jima & Meissner, 2021, p. 11).

However, the Tigray regional government, led by the TPLF, went ahead with its regional council elections, despite the federal government warning that the vote would be illegal. TPLF won most of the seats (Blanchard, 2020). The TPLF argued that they made the democratic election in the Tigray Region. But the central government defied that the Tigray election is illegal and unacceptable. The EZEMA and NAMA representatives shared the views of the PP and stated that the central government needs to take action against TPLF for an unlawful election. Blanchard (2020) contemplates:

The brewing tensions between Abiy’s government and the TPLF came to a standoff with the Tigray government, quarreling, that the federal government’s term expired in October. The federal government termed the regional government unlawful and moved to cut federal funds to Tigray similarly.

Consistent culture of biased decisions and favoritism to the ruling party is the most critical to the democratization process in Ethiopia (Jima & Meissner, 2021). The OLF and OFC representatives explained that a constitutional crisis caused a conflict, which was supported by a military campaign on both sides. The research finding showed that the postponed election and constitutional crisis caused the Tigray conflict. In its turn, the central government conducted in June 2021, where no Tigray region representative was available. And in the Oromia Region, OLF and OFC parties, which have many supporters, boycotted the election. Thus, the PP presented for election without competitors in the Oromia region. During the eve of the election, TPLF regained Mekele, the capital city of Tigray which forced the central government military to withdraw. The International Crisis Group (2020) states a constitutional dispute over delayed national elections that brought the spat between the federal and TPLF gradually resulted in the northern military base attack.

4.6. Amhara’s ambition to annex Tigray lands

Amhara and Tigrayans are Semitic language-speaking people (Negash, 2016). Both regions share large areas of territories. Withal, there is a debate regarding the ownership of western parts of Tigray such as Wolkait. The Amhara region claiming the areas following the new structural administration formed after 1991. The EPRDF, mainly dominated by TPLF, established a federal structure for the first time in Ethiopian history following the Derg regime’s defeat (Afesha, 2016). Before 1991, Ethiopia ruled under a unitary state structure (Sherr, 1990). Still, the coming of EPRDF, a coalition of four parties, structured the state into fourteen regional states during the transitional government. Later on, it was reframed to nine regional states (Constitution, 1995). According to FDRE constitution article 46 (2), regional states are formed based on the settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned.

Furthermore, Tronvoll (2021)depicts:

Administrative borders of provinces have been altered during all regime changes in Ethiopia. And they are often used as a means for the central government to divide and rule by maintaining political control over local nobility and political elites aspiring for central power.

For the last 27 years, based on the FDRE constitution, the Tigray Region bordered the Amhara region’s north Wollo, Agaw, and Gonder. Notwithstanding, following the 2018 political change and demise of TPLF, the Amhara Region began to claim that areas in the Tigray region such as Rayya (Maichew, Mohoni, Korem, Alemata, and Waj), Wolkait, Tselemti, Tsegede, Adi Remet, and Humera are parts of former Amhara. NAMA representative alleged that the TPLF incorporated areas into the Tigray Region forcefully. Thus, Amhara needs to regain them. To realize the mission, Identity Reconstitution Committee (Raya Identity Reconstitution Committee and Tegede Identity Reconstitution Committee) was formed. Contrarily, the TPLF representative quoted the FDRE constitution and stated that all regions were reframed based on the consent and settlement patterns of the people. The TPLF did not include any parts of Amhara lands without the people’s consent. The TPLF representative also challenged why the Amhara Region kept silent so far if their lands were taken forcefully. In fact, according to FDRE constitution article 48 (1), the House of Federation settle border disputes based on settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned if regions, where concern are raised, are unable to solve them.

Surprisingly, Amhara elites argued that the FDRE Constitution does not represent them for two reasons. Firstly, they claimed that Amhara had no representative during the promulgation of the Constitution. Secondly, the TPLF designed the Constitution in its best interest without considering the Amhara people. They argued that TPLF demised Ethiopia and reframed regions based on ethnic lines. They presumed Amhara is the Ethiopian guard. The TPLF killed, evicted Amhara, and replaced Tigre, Amhara elites alleged. Howbeit, OFC and OLF representatives encountered that the FDRE Constitution is not the mere TPLF document. It answered the Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peoples’ questions to administer themselves, learn, and judge by their languages. They also argued that Amhara elites are two sides of one sword. They attempt to implement the Amharization policy (one language, identity, religion, and people). On the other hand, they hide under the Amhara people when they face a challenge. The NAMA, for instance, depends on Amhara nationalism. “Amhara elites’ territorial ambitions are creating trouble for Abiy both domestically and internationally” (Tronvoll, 2021, p. 1).

Generally, the Amhara region vowed to annex Tigray lands and incorporated them into its Region. Consequently, they aggravated the conflict between the central government and the Tigray Region. The OFC and OLF representative contemplated that Amhara partitioned Tigray’s lands under the curtain of the central government military operation. The Amhara Region kept silent when Sudan annexed the Amhara Region lands, Al Fashaga. But, they began to control Tigray’s land and resettle Amhara in the areas where Tigrayans were evicted. Tronvoll (2021) concludes the Amhara ethnic political elites used Ethiopia’s Tigray war as a mean to recapture the lost territories in 1991. In a nutshell, they hit the war drum between the central government and TPLF to accelerate the war. The author argues that territorial ownership claims between the Amhara and Tigray regions need to be solved constitutionally.

4.7. Eritrea’s intention to retaliate against TPLF

The Ethio-Eritrea relationship was interrupted in 1998 with the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war. During the period of the war, both political and economic confidence was traumatized due to a combination of circumstances (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003). Eritrea’s prosecution of the war and Ethiopia’s intransigent response were driven not by considerations of national security nor national interest but by the relentless logic of the domestic politics of political transition (Steves, 2003). The conflict held from May 1998 to June 2000 and resulted in an estimated 70,000–100,000 deaths. The disputed border has been a cause of the war of the peace treaty in Algiers that brought the war to an end importantly, established a border commission to resolve the issue (Ylönen, 2019). The Eritrea president, Isaias, was operating in bad faith. The Eritrea issue had been historically contentious within Ethiopia and key political terrain upon which Ethiopia’s political class sought to compete (Woldemariam, 2018). “Eritrea is a hot potato for Ethiopian policymakers. Damned if they hold it; damned if they do not” (Ibid, p. 411).

Nevertheless, the Nobel Peace Committee awarded Abiy Ahmed in 2019 because he reconciled Eritrea and Ethiopia after two decades without any arbitration (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Different politicians and opposition parties argued that the two countries did not yet sign a peace agreement. The bargain is between the leaders—Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afworki. They further accused that there is no agreement between the two states, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unlocked road has been closed that connects the Tigray Region and Eritrea (Temin & Badwaza, 2019). Burke (2020) explains Abiy’s rapport with Eritrea isolated the TPLF. Consequently, the TPLF accused Abiy’s rapport with Isaias is to weakening the Tigray people. The close of Zela Anbessa road that connects the same people was the manifestation. Hence, the interview results with TPLF, OLF, and OFC representatives indicated that the reconciliation of Addis Ababa and Asmara is a tactical agreement between Abiy and Isaias to intimidate, control, and weaken TPLF.

Particularly, the representatives of TPLF claimed that Isaias wanted to retaliate against TPLF because the late PM, Meles Zenawi, smashed him both at the battle and diplomatic areas. Hence, Eritrea was under the sanction of the UN and the West for decades. Generally, Abiy and Isaias were working hard to capture TPLF and revenge them under pseudo reconciliation, interview with TPLF representatives. Also, interview results with OFC, OLF, and EZEMA representatives showed that Abiy destroyed the base site of strong opponent political leaders such as OLF and Ginbot-7 in Eritrea by reconciliation name. Lastly, the participants argued that lasting peace between the two countries is unthinkable by excluding the Tigray region since the Region shares many border areas with Eritrea, and both people speak the same language and geopolitics.

The TPLF, OLF, and OFC representatives further claimed that Abiy’s government rapport with Eritrea to retaliate against TPLF. The Eritrean leader had a longstanding ambition to cut the TPLF down to size. “Isaias views Tigray leaders as ungrateful junior partners who turned Ethiopia’s military against his regime in 1998 despite Eritrean support for the TPLF’s rebellion against the Derg military dictatorship” (International Crisis Group, 2021, p. 8).

During conflicts between the Ethiopian central government and the Tigray Region, different world media reported that Eritrean troops were involved in the Tigray war. Also, the international institutions, including the UN, urged the central government to withdraw Eritrea troops and Amhara police and militia from Tigray. But Abiy and his allies denied it several times. The Amnesty International (2021) states that the Ethiopian and Eritrean authorities have made contradictory statements regarding the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray conflict. Inconsistent news produced by the central government. The PP, NAMA, and EZEMA representatives argued that Eritrea did not involve in the war. Interview results with OFC, OLF, and TPLF demonstrated that the PM announced the parliament members as Eritrean troops helped the Ethiopian armies allegedly attacked by TPLF. Accordingly, the Eritrean troops were involved in the Tigray war because TPLF hit Asmara with rockets.

Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2021) explains:

Eritrean troops’ looting of Tigray could be seen as payback for the destruction Eritrea suffered in the 1998–2000 war, said a close observer, who dismissed the idea the Eritreans would pull out: Isaias will not sleep until the TPLF is destroyed. The Eritrean troops were operating in the Ethiopian cities of Axum and Shire, Tigray, committed a series of human rights and humanitarian law violations, including killing hundreds of civilians.

By the same token, Abiy has planned to withdraw heavy military weapons and a northern military base from Tigray. EZEMA, NAMA, and PP representatives argued that most of the country’s military weapons were in Tigray. Ethiopia invested in them after the Ethio-Tigray war. The representatives also stated that the PM has restored peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Accordingly, the heavy military needs to be pulled out from Tigray. The PP representative thrashed out that TPLF inflicted conflicts among various ethnicities. They also vowed to attack the central government by using stored weapons. The TPLF representative countered that Abiy tolerated Isaias to retaliate Tigray people. OFC and OLF representatives added that the PM made a historical mistake when allied with a foreign enemy to open war on his country’s people. Smith (2007) has forecasted that the global community needs to work hard to avoid the Ethio-Eritrea conflict in the future. This paper argued that Isaias used the opportunity of the TPLF to attack the North military base to retaliate against it.

4.8. Northern federal force attack in Tigray

Relations between Tigray regional state and the central government turned to beset following the coming of Abiy into power. Abiy downgraded the TPLF as soon as he took office (Marks, 2020). Blanchard (2020) indicates:

The federal government has accused the TPLF of escalating conflicts along ethnic and religious lines across the country to make it ungovernable. But the TPLF denies initiating the conflict on November Four, accusing Abiy of starting a war to consolidate his power.

The tension entered into war in early November with an alleged raid by TPLF units on federal military bases in Tigray (Burke, 2020; Gebremedhin, 2020). Abiy ordered his troops instantly to control Tigray and capture TPLF leaders (Burke, 2020). Following that, TPLF attempted to internationalize the war. For this reason, it fired rockets into the airports of the Amhara region’s towns, Gondar and Bahir Dar. It also hit Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, with rockets (O’Grady, 2020; Schipani & Pilling, 2020). Then, Ethiopia’s government ordered the army into the Tigray Region and declared a six-month state of emergency (Marks, 2020). In addition to the federal forces, the Amhara region’s Special Forces and militias joined the army and controlled the Tigray. Externally, Eritrean troops supported the central government’s forces (Amnesty International, 2021). The finding of this research confirms Gavin (2021) that reported TPLF attack on the north military base in the Region was an immediate conflict. The TPLF representative denied their atrocities to begin the war. The Tigray people fought to liberate themselves from Abiy and Isaias’ political atrocity and maliciousness. Abiy vows to kneel to the Tigray people and TPLF, according to interview results with TPLF representatives. Nonetheless, both of them united more and defended themselves. Finally, TPLF freed Mekele, the capital city of Tigray, and recaptured it after eight months in June 2021. But that did not last more since the central government defeated the TPLF in late 2022 which forced them to surrender to the central government.

On the other hand, interview results with PP representatives demonstrated that the TPLF attacked the northern military base to control the heavy weapons of the military, fight the central government, demise it, and come to power easily. In fact, the TPLF leaders accepted the allegations made against them. They presumed that Eritrea forces had never participated. And the central government could not use the air force. Their calculation was to control the weapons, fought the central government, and returned to power, but they failed. The conflict was responsible for many civilians' death, eviction, wound, and famine. A lot of soldiers were dead and wounded on both sides. Military equipment damaged. It also caused women rape, abduction, and unwanted pregnancy in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions. The author argues that the TPLF attack on the northern military base was the immediate cause of the conflict even though different factors contributed.

5. Conclusion

Following the Oromo youths’ protest, Abiy Ahmed came into power in 2018, which brought peaceful political reform in Ethiopian history (Jima & Meissner, 2021). Initially, the reform has gotten the world to applaud. Meanwhile, Abiy’s administration faced opposition. The Oromo people, an agent of reform, began to revolt as the reform was hijacked. The conflict erupted in all regional states, except the Tigray region from 2018 to November 2020. The central government alleged TPLF was provocative of the conflict. However, opposition political parties claimed that Abiy alleged TPLF to cover his weakness concerning the escalated conflict. Both the central government and the Tigray region campaigned for military parades frequently. Some politicians argued Eritrea attempted to intimidate TPLF via the invisible hand. That was why Eritrea’s rapport with Ethiopia sans any arbitrators. Constitutional crisis and election postpone aggravating the tension between the two. Tigray region held a regional election when the central government postponed scapegoating the COVID-19 pandemic without the permission of the NEBE.

This research explores the causes of the Tigray conflict after peaceful political reform that caused the Ethiopian political crisis. The research finding shows that the rivalry between the central government and the Tigray region caused the conflict. Eritrea’s intention to retaliate against TPLF intensifies it. The EPRDF demise, TPLF members’ expulsion from the central government, constitutional crisis and election delay, and Amhara Region’s ambition to invade and annex Tigray lands are the causes of conflict. Abiy neglected engagement with opposition parties, including the ousted Tigrayan elite. He removed TPLF leaders from federal institutions, including the armed forces and the national intelligence service (Strategic Comments, 2020). Yet, the Ethiopian northern military base attack was the immediate cause of the conflict. Addis et al. (2020) conclude that the unrestrained political circumstance of the current regime has created dissidence and violence among the public and thus led to escalating political, economic, and security crises in Ethiopia. The research recommends further research needs to be done on the consequence of the conflict and the way to lasting peace.

Acknowledgments

The researcher thanks the participants of the research. My heartfelt thanks go to the unanimous reviewers of this manuscript for their constructive and genuine comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

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Abdisa Olkeba Jima

Abdisa Olkeba Jima is an assistant professor and researcher at the Department of Governance and Development Studies, Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. He received a BA degree in Civics and Ethics from Madawalabu University, Ethiopia, and an MA in Development Management from Jimma University, Ethiopia. Now, he is attending his Ph.D. at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, in Development Studies. His research areas include the FDI and local communities, gold mining and local community, the impact of human trafficking, teaching the Gadaa system in higher education, Ethiopian politics, indigenous knowledge vs western education, water governance, mutual benefits between the investors and the local communities, rural transformation, and schooling and rural unemployment. Mr. Abdisa has served as department head of Civics and Ethical Studies, and department head of Governance and Development Studies. Further, he served as director of the Internationalization Office and the Postgraduate School director at Bule Hora University.