Power consolidation and its impact on the decline of democracy in Indonesia under President Jokowi

Abstract

This article explains the decline of democracy currently happening in Indonesia that is related to the failure of democratic consolidation. After the democratic transition has been going on for two decades, the Indonesian nation has been held hostage by the political interests of those in power who have been able to infiltrate every arena of democratic consolidation. Among five aspects of democratic consolidation, the most dominant aspect causing the decline of democracy during the Jokowi regime is the aspect of civil and political society as the Jokowi regime acted to intimidate and arrest anyone dangerous to criticise the government. To counter opposition from civil society groups, Jokowi used social media and pro-government civil society figures to praise the successes and achievements of his government. The law was repressively implemented for the sake of maintaining political stability so that the development agenda could be implemented following his will. The national bureaucracy also failed to act professionally since it was tightly controlled by the Jokowi regime, thus contributing to the decline of democracy. This article presents the existence of systematic government interference through the creation of legal rules, which has an impact on the arena of democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

Keywords:

• consolidation
• decline of democracy
• political system
• elite
• society

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The decline in democracy that has taken place in many countries in the last decade has also occurred in Indonesia. Whether we realize it or not, the decline of democracy in Indonesia is the impact of the dysfunctional arena of democratic consolidation, which affects the functioning of the elements in the arena of democratic consolidation. This article describes from the perspective of the arena of democratic consolidation that rarely gets public attention. It can be said that every element in the five arenas of democratic consolidation has experienced a systematic decline in its function. This condition occurred because the Jokowi government intervened too profoundly in the elements that should have consolidated democracy in this arena. For the government, this intervention is carried out for the desired purpose, namely, how to control democracy following the political interests of the ruling government.

1. Introduction

The policy used by President Joko Widodo (often referred to as Jokowi) to implement his development agenda has received a lot of criticism from his people since he prioritised the development of infrastructure rather than that which improves the well-being of the people and eradicates poverty (Warburton, 2016). Apart from that, Jokowi also listened to the views of his cronies in formulating government policies rather than the views of political opponents. By consolidating the power of political party elites who won the election, Jokowi could control the arena of consolidation of democracy to strengthen his political position.

This article discusses how President Jokowi’s consolidation of power during his two terms of leadership with the political party elite led to the decline of democracy in Indonesia. Interventions carried out by President Jokowi through policies affected the political activities of democratic actors in each of the existing consolidation arenas. The legal rules made during President Jokowi’s time were to fulfil the ruling regime’s interests. During Jokowi’s reign, there were at least eight government regulations instead of law (Perppu), showing how the government ignored the people’s representative institutions that became its partners in discussing any policies related to the public interest. The Perppu include Perppu No. 2/2017 concerning community organisations, Perppu No. 2/2020 concerning Pilkada, Perppu No. 1/2022 concerning Elections, as well as Perppu No. 2/2022 concerning Job Creation. The question is, how did President Jokowi’s intervention impact the decline of democracy?

Power and Warburton (2020) explained the condition of democracy in Indonesia in the past decade. They observed that the law was no longer a tool of justice as it has been utilised by the political elites. Law enforcement officials tend to be tools of power, repression and free rulers making laws in the name of democracy to eliminate groups opposing them. Other indications can also be seen from the findings of researchers who no longer see the checks and balances of state institutions in carrying out their functions (Mujani & Liddle, 2021). Apart from blocking civil liberties, military involvement in civilian envoys, strengthening political oligarchy and election intervention by political elites, political flow also illustrates the increased backwardness of democracy in Indonesia (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Fossati, 2019; Schäfer, 2019).

Although many researchers have examined the ups and downs of democracy in Indonesia, the reality is different from what they previously described. This article explains how the democratic decline is seen from the failure of democratic consolidation that the government had to carry out after the democratic transition took place more than two decades after the fall of the New Order. However, the Indonesian nation was being held hostage by the political interests of those in power who can infiltrate every arena of democratic consolidation. To analyse the reason behind this intervention, this article examined several cases in each of these arenas of democratic consolidation by observing the decline of democracy in Indonesia during the Jokowi era focusing on the aspects of democratic consolidation introduced by Linz and Stepan (1996). The article described the statement by Linz and Stepan about the progress of democracy stemmed from the consolidation process in the five existing democratic arenas. Unfortunately, these five arenas of democratic consolidation suffered setbacks under President Jokowi. This article argued that although the purpose of the Jokowi government’s intervention is to control the government’s policy to run democratically, the reality displayed otherwise, since President Jokowi was caught up in his strategy to control the process of democratic consolidation but ended up stuck with autocratic behaviour.

2. The decline of democracy and its explanatory aspects

There are no standard parameters for explaining the decline in democracy. Some scholars attribute this decline to how democracy is organised as a parameter. For example, Tilly (2007) described democracy into four types; substantive democracy, constitutional democracy, procedural democracy and process-oriented democracy. Looking at these types of democracy would allow one to understand how a country applies democracy in its society. If one of these forms of democracy is absent, a government can be assumed undemocratic. Indeed, understanding the application of this form of democracy requires other political variables such as political parties, civil society, freedom of opinion, elections and community participation (Dahl, 1998; Held, 2006; Touraine, 2018).

Haynes (2001, pp. 3–5) realised that the emergence of democratic government relies heavily on many variables. He added that the existence of the middle class is an essential part of influencing those in power to enlarge the faucet of democracy. In addition, democracy can also be associated with free and fair elections held on regular periods; those who obtain the most votes or seats are the ones who win the election. He also said that democracy requires a culture of mutual trust, tolerance and compromise so that democratic institutions can correctly develop.

Another factor in the decline of democracy is the low commitment of the government to implement the principles of democracy. In America, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) criticised the behaviour of politicians who threatened media freedom, turned their political rivals into enemies and rejected election results as the democratic institutions they had long defended. Bermeo (2016, p. 15) also supported this statement by stating that the backwardness of democracy is also common when political elites commit fraud in elections by manipulating the rules and process of the election. Furthermore, when they managed to win elections, the ruling elites used their prerogative rights to leverage the law, thus weakening their political opponents.

The experience of many countries suggested that the factor causing the decline of democracy is the weakening of the role of civil society. Taking the examples of Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines, Lorch (2020) saw that civil society in the three countries does not play its role well since they supported the ruling elites after being rewarded. This situation causes civil society not to be critical of the government for failing to play a check and balance role after being co-opted by the government. There is no doubt that this is a paradox with an established democracy placing civil society as an important organisation in a democratic system (Alagappa, 2004).

The decline of democracy in a country can also be identified from the freedom of the press, even though the government has guaranteed it. The more freely the press reports public information, the more it encourages people to participate because the information provided can build public awareness. The community’s political efficacy increases so that the urge to participate in policymaking is easy for them to follow. Thus, the government will also respond to the people’s aspirations as the basis for making these public policies. However, a free press must also be responsible for avoiding misleading information, especially if the news is manipulative. For example, Ukraine, known for its “high quality” mass media, does not escape the spread of manipulative news in the interests of particular policy agendas (Zakharchenko et al., 2021). Therefore, the freedom of the press responsible by existing legal regulations must also be realized to prevent a decline in democracy.

Not only that, but the decline of democracy can also be seen from the ability of the state to provide social, economic, legal, and cultural guarantees to its citizens when the democratic system is implemented. The Government does not only carry out the democratic system procedurally but substantially; that is, the positive effects felt by citizens are also an inevitable part of the democratic system. Suppose the Government fails to implement a social, economic, cultural, and legal security system. In that case, this is also an early indication that the decline of democracy is also known at a practical level. How is the Chinese Government trying to improve the public pension security system to produce a competitive worker economic system to improve the quality of life of workers in the country (Čajková & Čajka, 2021) From the legal aspect, for example, the integration of the legal system in European Union countries is also a threat in implementing the national justice system in upholding a just law. Of course, ideally, the national governments of European Union member countries should be able to provide this legal guarantee so that people in European Union countries accuse democratic setbacks from the aspect of law enforcement (Funta & Králikova, 2022).

The decline of democracy in Indonesia is often associated with many aspects of democracy. However, the emergence of democratically elected leaders has received the most attention, but their attitudes changed to anti-democracy when exercising their power (Aspinall et al., 2020; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). This style of leadership can be seen from the policies made, which tend to be illiberal (Hadiz, 2017) as they made the law for their interests to maintain political and even economic power (Muhtadi & Hidayatullah, 2019) while putting pressure on civil society groups that oppose those policies (Mietzner, 2021). Utilising the power of the state apparatus including the military and the bureaucracy to carry out specific political goals has faced criticism from political opponents. They used certain powers to control public opinion by spreading information troubling the community as part of seeing the community’s response regarding the government’s agenda (Primandari, 2021).

For example, the polemic regarding the presidency for three periods contains a particular political agenda (Shafira, 2023). As a result, the previously created climate of openness in democracy has changed into an arrangement prohibiting the public from criticising the government. This condition was clearly faced in Indonesia during President Jokowi’s leadership. Political forces that benefit from President Jokowi play a significant role as opinion makers who utilise several mainstream media and social media for their interests (Tapsell, 2015).

Nevertheless, questions remain on the existence of any serious debate among political scientists on the exact picture representing the decline of democracy, whether it was due to failures in governance or mistakes in identifying countries undergoing democratic transitions with the weakness of authoritarian regimes and not the political policies of governments that want to build democracy in the country. The decline of democracy can be easily understood when a country has undergone a democratic transition but cannot follow the trajectory of the next democracy. For example, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 5) affirmed the importance of consolidating democracy as a marker of democratic progress in a country. Progress requires behaviours, attitudes and constitutions that restrict individuals and institutions from acting outside existing rules to achieve consolidation. This awareness makes democracy consolidated so that it becomes “the only game in town.”

The decline of democracy in Indonesia is not only viewed from aspects of much concern to researchers. It rarely gets attention since President Jokowi is systematic with the intervention of the government and its agencies in the consolidation of democracy. This condition unknowingly affected the elements of attitudes, behaviour, institutions, and constitution both at the individual level, as well as political institutions such as parties, executive bodies and the political economy environment that influence the development of the political system. The transition to democracy has been on track, especially in the early decades of reform. However, the entry of old political forces that “hijacked” democracy diverted the direction of reform (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 244–245).

The old political forces that were cronies of the New Order began to play their role in the second half of the reforms implemented. They control essential elements of democratic consolidation like political parties, influence the DPR institution in policy-making, as well as finance candidates in political contests. Tragically, basic things in the consolidation of democracy, such as elements of individual attitudes and behaviour, can be influenced to make the public a priori with democracy. This anti-democratic behaviour received support from state institutions such as political parties, legislatures, and the government. Even today, the desire to change the 1945 Constitution continues to emerge, an agenda that they continue to strive for to return to the state before the reform took place (cf. Mietzner, 2023). These old political forces managed to join forces with the new political forces resulting from the reforms in entering the arena of democratic consolidation.

Linz and Stepan (1996) explained that the consolidation of democracy requires five main arenas. First, the existence of civil society for playing a check and balance role to monitor government actions. They explained, “A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and monitor government and state, can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate and help deepen democracy (1996:9).” Unfortunately, not all countries have a strong civil society, including Indonesia. The weakness of civil society is also related to the absence of financial freedom to finance their activities. In addition, the ideological polarisation and interests of civil society involved in community activities made dealing with the government unstable.

Second, the existence of the political society as the main actor in the success of democratisation process in a country. This political society refers to the existence of space for competition besides free and fair elections to allow the growth and development of democracy. On the other hand, the people need to be provided with political education to produce a quality political society. Democracy cannot work well if political parties do not apply the principles of democracy. This is because political parties are the most responsible institutions in shaping the governing power and carrying out the functions of a state. If political parties do not implement democracy, autocratic regimes will be triggered for running the government.

Third, the consolidation of democracy also emphasises the principle of rule of law as a way for actors to gain power. This means that the tools for gaining power must refer to mutually agreed laws and regulations. Not only that, but the interpretation of the law also needs to be fair as it is the only rule in a democratic political game. Through the law, civil and political societies can go hand in hand to strengthen the process of democratic unification.

The fourth important aspect of democratic consolidation is the state apparatus. The institution of the state as the manager of the government power needs to understand its duties and jurisdiction so that democracy can run smoothly to provide services to the people. If political parties often use state institutions for political gain, it will result in the decline of democracy.

The fifth is the existence of an economic society. An economic society is a group of individuals with economic power to influence government policy. In industrialised countries, the economic community is an important actor in determining the appropriate national economic policies and systems. Therefore, to protect these economic interests, the economic community needs to unite to face the government if its policies threaten the national interest.

Success in the five arenas above depends on a consistent commitment from all democratic actors in their implementation. Every interaction between the arenas in the consolidation is within the framework of strengthening democracy. It will be a setback if one of the actors in this consolidation arena is not serious about implementing democracy. In most previous literature, these five arenas are used as a guide in observing how democracy is implemented. This article dives further into these five aspects of consolidation to assess the consolidation of Indonesian democracy in the era of Jokowi’s government.

3. The development of democracy in Indonesia before the Jokowi Era

After the fall of Suharto’s New Order in May 1998, Indonesia entered an era of reformation. Among the reformation agenda implemented was to amend the 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, especially regarding the democracy of state institutions to avoid the recurrence of authoritarianism. However, when Indonesia had the opportunity to conduct the consolidation of democracy, the power of anti-democratic groups came from the old power during the New Order period (Hadiz, 2003) comprising oligarchs who previously supported the New Order by re-engaging in the political process through funding the elections of central legislative and Pilkada. Mietzner (2019) saw the involvement of these oligarchs as limiting the space for open competition since financial aid from these oligarchs could not be matched by other parties.

The reforms in Indonesia succeeded in changing the political conditions that were closed and dominated by certain elites during the New Order period to inhibit the practice of democracy. At the beginning of the reform, Indonesian society welcomed the democratic transition process characterised by improvements in the political system. President Habibie, who replaced Suharto, began to make fundamental improvements, especially in political policy. For example, Habibie revised Law No.5 of 1974 on Regional Government, which according to him was too centralistic and hindered development in the region. Habibie also lifted the ban on establishing political parties to encourage citizen participation in politics. Indonesian people were then allowed to form political parties to participate in the elections (Haris, 2014). During the New Order organised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, elections were transferred to an independent body to ensure that elections follow the principle of being free, honest and fair. In addition to improving the Election Law, President Habibie also released political prisoners arrested by the New Order regime who had been critical of President Suharto without going through a legitimate court.

Political reforms also took place in the legislature, especially the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which decided to remove the 75-seat military from the institution. This military seat was deliberately given due to the application of the Dual Function concept, which integrates the military into civilian government activities. However, unfortunately, the New Order regime used MPR members from the military as a political tool to support its power (Said, 1998). The elimination of the army in the MPR changed the institutional form of the MPR to a bicameral consisting of the DPR and the Regional Representative Council (DPD). This change was also a reform commitment from the political elites who agreed to amend the 1945 Constitution following the reform agenda.

However, the progress of democracy in this period of reform did not last long. The economic elites who became cronies of the New Order and were “exiled” at the beginning of the reforms began to return to the political arena to play their part. They re-organised themselves into a force that influenced the course of the political system. In the last few years, the reforms in Indonesia resulted in liberalisation, which became an essential arena for the re-emergence of this economic society (Robison & Hadiz, 2004). The economic elite group with excellent capital power became part of an essential supporter of the ruling political elite by compensating to gain direct access to state resources (Fukuoka, 2004).

The transformation of the economic and political power of the New Order cronies during the reform period also influenced the decline of democracy. Their success in forming cartels and strengthening political positions by placing themselves as oligarchs worsened the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia (Slater, 2004). In addition, they were involved in politics by helping to finance party activities or establish political parties for maintaining their existence in the political system of the reform period. The group grew more robust in the political system, further determining how democracy is implemented in the following times.

The phenomenon of the decline of democracy in Indonesia had already begun when the old political forces that were part of the cronies of the New Order regime succeeded in establishing cooperation with new political forces that were born during the reform process. They slowly began to control the political power in the political system. The economic power of the supporters of the New Order regime was able to finance political parties and, as part of them, also helped form political parties to strengthen their position further in economic and political policy making (Chua, 2009).

Since these political forces have merged, it is difficult to distinguish them from new political forces, which continue to strengthen into political oligarchy groups that determine policies in the government and the legislature through the political parties they control. The dominance of this group is not only in government and legislative institutions but also in controlling civil society as an extension of their arm to put pressure on the government and society if their political will is not fulfilled. This group has also succeeded in influencing how the rule of law that is made to strengthen their power in the political system.

4. Methodology

This article aims to explain the interference made by the Jokowi administration in every arena of democratic consolidation that has impacted the decline of democracy in the last two decades. This goal is motivated by the condition of democracy in Indonesia, which is experiencing a very significant setback. However, it is rare to see that this setback can be understood from the failure to consolidate democracy in every arena due to government interference.

This study used literature reviews from journals, books and mass media pages related to democratic practices and their decline during President Jokowi’s administration. The literature involved journals, books and mass media pages about democratic practices and their decline. Meanwhile, the data used were secondary data from various relevant sources, both print and online, using several keywords such as power consolidation, the decline of democracy, as well as Indonesian politics and policies. From the literature review results, synthesis and evaluation were done according to the research questions, main themes and the thesis proposed. The analysis in this literature review was carried out thematically but also emphasised chronology in certain aspects according to the issues discussed (Cantero, 2019). The analysis in this article employed content analysis to conclude the existing symptoms according to the central questions in this article. Moreover, the themes from relevant data of the existing literature formed the basis of analysis according to reality.

5. Regime intervention in the arena of democracy

This section examines the Jokowi regime’s intervention to limit democracy and the interaction of political, economic, bureaucratic and civil society actors during his era. This article discusses Jokowi’s government’s strategies and argues that Jokowi’s intervention strategy to consolidate democracy has in turn led to the decline of Indonesian democracy.

5.1. Weakening of civil society

In a democratic country, civil society organisation has been gaining a place in the social activities of the society and beginning to set aside the role of political representation in parliament (Lang, 2013). This is because society has lost faith in the legislature causing them to turn to civil society to voice their aspirations. The people also see civil society as more sincere in the struggle, which in turn built their trust to work side by side with the civil society in controlling the government (Rico, 2007).

Civil society in Indonesia also has various forms, as known in the concept of civil society that exists in many kinds of literature. Even so, civil society was not highly influential in terms of political and government policies. The power source for civil society in Indonesia in influencing political and government policies depends on how many solid supporters are involved in their activities and the type of power networks they have in political and government institutions. With it, it is easier for civil society in Indonesia to play its role in the policy-making process. Therefore, only a few civil society groups in Indonesia were involved in political activities, let alone in influencing government policies, since their position was threatened under President Jokowi (Mujani & Liddle, 2021, pp. 76–77).

On the contrary, the government controls how civil society carries out activities together with the government. Civil society in Indonesia is also under threat. Despite strengthening the political function of civil society during the reform era, for example, under President Megawati and President Yudhoyono, this function has declined over time. This fact can be seen during President Jokowi’s time due to the restrictions imposed on civil society, which resulted in the decline of democracy. This reality is contrary to the character of civil society, namely “…a self-regulating universe of associations committed to the same ideals that needed, at all costs, to be protected from the state to preserve its role in resisting despotism” (Edwards, 2014, p. 7).

In Indonesia, the struggle of civil society is supported by the people owing to the work done by the civil society organisations that is more effective than the government (Lang, 2013, p. 2). Despite the efforts put by the government to weaken civil society organisations by accusing them of being disobedient, not aspirational and inconsistent with the public interest, the people still strongly defended civil society organisations, which was driven by the trust they put on civil society organisations to replace the weakening and deteriorating role of legislative institutions. This is quite significant since the majority of legislators in the House of Representatives (DPR) became part of Jokowi’s group. This political coalition formed a very strong oligarchy eliminating the DPR’s critical attitude towards Jokowi’s government. The strength of this oligarchy can also be seen in Jokowi’s intervention against civil society groups that opposed him by co-opting them. As a result, the politics of co-optation affected the freedom of civil society in facing government policy (Nyman, 2009). One of Jokowi’s strategies was to fund the activities of civil society organisations for creating a bond between the groups and the government. For example, the government involved various civil society groups to provide clean water to the rural population. By Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2018, the government would provide access to funding for these civil society groups as long as they assist government programs for the community.

According to Mietzner (2020), civil society in Indonesia is politically and ideologically polarised to ensure that no common democratic agenda will arise to balance the government’s agenda. As a result, the government became increasingly daring to restrict civil society protests that opposed its policies. For example, the DPR approved Jokowi’s action to issue Government Regulation Substituting for Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 to dissolve the existing mass organisation. The publication of Perppu was one of Jokowi’s strategies to control mass organisations. Although on the one hand, the government said it was targeting certain radical and hard-line mass organisations such as Hizbur Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Liberation Front (FPI), on the other hand, the government also managed to formalise the position of leaders of these civil society organisations in line with it by providing allocations for these groups to fund their activities. Indirectly, this strategy transformed civil society organisations from the field of activism into an aspect of formalism (Lay & Netra, 2020).

In addition, the ruling government also utilised the support of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) to convince Muslim voters to support the ruling government. Several cases in Indonesia demonstrated that the role of religious figures also influenced the decline of democracy. Schäfer (2019) stated that the presence of members of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) developed voter support through religious conviction to the point of eliminating debate on strategic issues in the campaign that should be the basis for making choices in voting. The strengthening of religious politics in Indonesia deserves attention owing to its very dominant influence, especially in every national and local election.

The fact is that the civil society movement is not only criticised through protests but also through discussions on the policies of Jokowi’s government. For example, a forum to discuss the question of impeachment and the constitutional system organised by the Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada on 29 May 2020, was cancelled due to strong threats against the organising committee and panellists (Taher, 2020). Academic freedom was closely monitored by security forces, especially those that touch on sensitive issues related to Jokowi’s regime. The Freedom in the World 2021 — Indonesia report published by the Freedom Institute (2021) asserted that this was a threat to academic freedom in Indonesia.

Academics have been charged with defamation and removed from their posts for criticism of public officials. Throughout 2020, academics, students and researchers received threats including death threats and experienced hacking of their online accounts, physical intimidation and violence for organising discussions on topics perceived as critical of the government. Moreover, academic discussions on Papua and West Papua have been cancelled with organisers surveilled and threatened. Four students from Khairun University in North Maluku were expelled in December 2019 for their involvement in peaceful protests over human rights abuses that month in Papua and West Papua; one of the students was charged with treason in July 2020 (Fealy, 2020). Students, student union leaders and others involved in campus protests against anti-Papuan racism continued to face intimidation, arrest and treason charges, with authorities linking the antiracism protests to secessionist movements.

The discussion above revealed civil liberties as a problem when the government feels that its development agenda is disrupted. Jokowi blocked news portals and social media so as not to be a public concern. Not only that, but Jokowi also used the army, police and intelligence agency to quell criticism of his rule (Fealy, 2020). The loss of the freedom of speech of civil society to express their ideas, let alone to express criticism of the ruling regime, was a real setback in Indonesian democracy.

5.2. Political society conflict

Another fact that becomes a parameter in seeing the decline of democracy in Indonesia is the increasing number of co-opted political parties in the government. Political parties as a representation of the political community in Indonesia did not develop well despite gaining the freedom to participate in the political process after the collapse of the New Order regime. The formation of a political party in every election cannot be a measure that public participation has increased. Every time there is an election, there will be a fluctuation in the number of voter participation. In the 2004 legislative election, the voter participation rate was 84.07% but decreased to 70% in the 2009 election. In 2014, this participation figure rose again to 75.11% and increased again in the 2019 election to 81% (Purbolaksono, 2019).

The increase in participation in the last election was related to the legislative election and the presidential election held simultaneously. The political party of the coalition supporting president Jokowi managed to mobilise the people to vote for Jokowi when facing Prabowo Subianto and asked the people to choose their party in the simultaneous election. The implementation of these simultaneous elections has created tensions between political parties in supporting the presidential candidate as well as competition for seats in the DPR. To gain public sympathy as voters, various scams containing slander and false news circulated during the campaign (Hui, 2020).

Apart from that, the problem of personalisation of political parties was also dominant. Fionna (2016) saw political parties in Indonesia as highly dependent on the charisma and figure of a person to gain public sympathy in an election. Political party elites were more prominent in the leadership of certain figures since they were linked to the background and history of their political party journey than demonstrating the ideology of the party. This symptom can be seen in parties such as PDI-Perjuangan, Gerindra, Hanura and Democrat. For example, Megawati Soekarnoputri from PDI-Perjuangan still has support from the lower classes. The same goes for Prabowo Subianto of the Gerindra Party who projected a strong nationalist image. In addition, the Democratic Party still used the name of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the former President of Indonesia to gain the support of voters (Firmanzah, 2010). Since the image of the old elites was still liked by the public, many parties used this figure in their campaigns.

Not only that, but the oligarchs also made political parties undemocratic in decision-making since they control their political cadres in the DPR (Asrinaldi Yusoff et al., 2022). Even during Jokowi’s presidency for the 2014–2019 period, almost all political party leaders supporting his rule held important positions in the cabinet. As a result, there was almost no oversight and critical attitude of the DPR to control the policies made by the government. The attitude of these DPR members stemmed from their worries about being fired should they oppose the interests of this oligarchy group.

Interestingly, they formed the coalition, not on consideration of the party’s manifesto and program, but intending to safeguard the interests of a handful of elites. One of them is the agreement to enact election laws following the interests of the ruling political party along with its supporting party, which can be seen in the decision of President Jokowi supported by the political party elites to reject the revision of Law No.7 of 2017. This decision was considered crucial to be improved by many parties, especially civil society. Hence, civil society demanded a revision of this law as several problems occurred such as the presidential threshold, the workload of the General Election Commission (KPU) in conducting simultaneous elections, the problem of constituencies and the nomination system. As is known, Law No. 7 of 2017 on the election has helped President Jokowi and his coalition party to win the 2019 election. Although civil society objected to Jokowi’s decision to reject the revision of the election law, he has the support of all ruling coalition parties (Rizky, 2021).

The full support of political parties benefitted President Jokowi in implementing his development agenda. With this support, President Jokowi managed to ignore criticism from opposition groups such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party. The number of these two parties in the DPR was insignificant with SMEs having only 50 seats (8.70%) and the Democratic Party only winning 54 (9.39%) out of 575 seats in the DPR. Political parties that supported Jokowi have 427 seats in the DPR representing 74.26%. Meanwhile, Parti Amanat Nasional (PAN) with 44 seats (7.65%) was in the middle and ready to join the government if offered the ministerial post (Aditya, 2021). PAN’s pragmatic attitude was certainly related to the benefits they get should they support the government. This pragmatism was one of the strategies of the party elites to defend their existence and at the same time carry out the function of the party through ministry programs to reach out to the community. Such strategies are often used by ministers to meet with their cadres in the district or fund activities for political party cadres (CNN Indonesia, 2019).

Another problem with political parties in Indonesia is the frequent internal party conflicts. An example was the “coup” against the leadership of Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono as the leader of the Democratic Party carried out by senior elites who have been fired from the party. The dissatisfaction of Democratic Party cadres who were fired by the son of former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) caused the party to split (Tempo, 2021b). The Extraordinary Congress held on 5 March 2021, in Deli Serdang, North Sumatra Province elected General (Retired) Moeldoko as the general chairman of the Democratic Party. This election further exacerbated the internal conflict of the Democratic Party as Moeldoko was then the Chief of Staff of the Presidency in Jokowi’s Cabinet (Ramadhan, 2021). The people questioned the attitude of President Jokowi who did not respond to Moeldoko’s election as many suspected that his election as the general leader of the Democratic Party must be related to the permission given by Jokowi. The results of a survey conducted by Tempo Magazine online regarding this allegation found that 77.54% of Indonesians believed that Moeldoko’s doings were approved by Jokowi (Tempo, 2021a).

Internal conflicts of political parties during Jokowi’s leadership can be prevented if the government is neutral about the presence of internal party conflicts since political party laws allow the government to verify and certify a political party. For example, during President Jokowi’s time, there were several internal conflicts among political parties such as the Development Association Party (PPP), the Hanura Party and the Golkar Party. Nevertheless, the party’s internal conflict was successfully resolved following Article 3 of Law No. 2 of 2011 on political parties, which requires that political parties must be registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Usually, government intervention occurs when a political party registers with this legal entity. Thus, Golkar, PPP and Hanura supported the government, making it easy for them to obtain the status as a political party that can join the election. Indirectly, this intervention led to the decline of democracy as political parties were highly dependent on the government.

In addition, the practice of electoral democracy is yet to be free and fair due to the presence of DPR intervention through the Election Oversight Body (Bawaslu) and the Election Commission (KPU). If a rule is not in the interest of the DPR, then the rule is revoked. An example is Regulation Article 7 (1) (h) of KPU No. 20 in 2018 on the nomination of members of the DPR, DPRD Provinsi and DPRD Kabupaten/Kota, which prohibits former corruption offenders, drug traffickers and child sex offenders to nominate themselves as members of the legislature (Pratama, 2018). Nonetheless, members of the DPR demanded that the Election Commission cancel the article as it was deemed irrelevant and not under its jurisdiction to make the order.

Another problem with elections in Indonesia is the aspect of regulations that violate the principles of freedom and justice. A fatal rule is the threshold of presidential candidacy requirements in the 2019 election, which must meet the requirement of 20% of seats or 25% of votes in the House based on the results of the 2014 election. This rule benefitted Jokowi’s pro-political parties as it is “manipulative” in nature. Many small political parties rejected the implementation of this threshold since it does not do justice to political parties that do not have seats in the DPR to nominate their presidential candidates. Although the civil society filed a lawsuit against Article 222 of Law No. 7 of 2017, the Constitutional Court considered that the process of making the law is under the constitution as it has been approved by the DPR. The enactment of this Election Law was Jokowi’s strategy to give him the advantage to contest again for a second term in the 2019 election and be easily nominated by political parties to face Prabowo Subianto as president. Closing the space for others to run through fraud has been done systematically to the point of impacting the decline of democracy (cf. Bermeo, 2016, p. 13).

During the previous presidential term, the position of the DPR was very strong when dealing with the government. The DPR distanced itself from the power of President SBY, often even against the policies of his government. Some of SBY’s principles have been critically debated by the DPR to allow the DPR’s oversight function to run smoothly. For example, the DPR showed its critical attitude towards the government over the publication of Perppu Number 4 of 2008 on the safety net of the financial system leading to the Century Gate scandal. Century Gate is related to the government’s efforts to save the troubled Century Bank by providing Rp6.7 trillion in capital, which ultimately caused losses to the country (Detiknews, 2010).

The existence of political parties as a political community in Indonesia is getting more robust since they joined the DPR. The DPR is a forum for political parties to gather to bargain with the government in formulating policies to be made. To facilitate the policy-making process in the DPR, the president aimed to control the DPR through political cooperation with the chairs of political parties, which began by involving them in building a government through a coalition. Political history in Indonesia recorded that almost all presidents during the reform era built coalitions with elite political parties that controlled seats in the DPR. The goal is that the stability of the government that it organises can be realised, while the policies made are supported by political parties.

However, a striking condition occurred during President Jokowi’s time: he involved the heads of the election-winning political parties by making them ministers in his cabinet. For example, Prabowo Subianto became the Minister of Defense and General Chair of the Gerindra Party. Besides, Airlangga Hartarto became the Coordinating Minister for the Economy and the general chairman of the Golkar Party. There was also Zulkifli Hasan, who became the minister of trade and the chairman of PAN. Meanwhile, parties supporting Jokowi’s government that joined the coalition, such as PPP and PKB, also won ministerial seats in Jokowi’s cabinet.

The discussion above indicates that the weak functioning of the DPR as a political community during Jokowi’s rule led to the decline of democracy through its inability to inspect and control Jokowi’s rule due to the politics of co-optation carried out by the oligarchs in his rule. Indeed, the DPR was able to oversee the executive institution at the beginning of the first term of Jokowi’s government, but after the joining of the opposition party into Jokowi’s cabinet, almost no more criticism and corrections were made to the policies of his government.

5.3. Weak law enforcement

Law enforcement is a fundamental principle in the implementation of democracy. In a democratic country, the state is not merely a law enforcer but places the law in the highest position to exercise the power of state institutions. Law enforcement can be weak when the law no longer acts as the main basis for a government and guarantees the human rights of its citizens. In Indonesia, law enforcement is a problem for those opposing the regime in power. To legitimise the regime’s actions to control the opposition groups, Jokowi published Perppu No. 2 of 2017 for dissolving existing civil society organisations to guard against critical attitudes and opposition from these civil society groups. For instance, the dissolution of Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) on 19 July 2017, was a follow-up to Perppu No. 2 of 2017. So far, HTI has been very critical in criticising the Jokowi regime, which is considered not pro-Muslim, and its government’s policies that are considered detrimental to Islam (CNN Indonesia, 2020b).

In addition to HTI, Jokowi also dissolved the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) for opposing his government. Jokowi’s reason was that FPI’s activities are contrary to Law No.16 of 2017 on community organisations (CNN Indonesia, 2020a). FPI was one of the major demonstrations on 2 December 2016. Together with the Indonesian Ulema Council Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF-MUI) and other Muslims, the movement managed to gather millions of people demanding Jokowi to prosecute Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or Ahok who at the time was the governor of the Special Capital Region (DKI) of Jakarta. Ahok who quoted the Qur’an Surah Al-Maidah, verse 51 when in dialogue with the people in the Thousand Islands, mistakenly explained the meaning of the verse so that it was considered insulting to Muslims (Kresna, 2017). However, many parties claimed that the FPI’s action has something to do with the political movement to remove Ahok as a candidate in the DKI Jakarta governor election held in 2017 (Bonasir, 2017).

Weak law enforcement in dealing with political issues during Jokowi’s rule received strong opposition from supporters of democracy in Indonesia. One of them is the weak enforcement of human rights. For example, the death case of a student due to a police shooting in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi for rejecting the review of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Criminal Code (KUHP) (Wijaya, 2019). This was also similar to the murder case of four FPI members suspected of being abused by the police (CNN Indonesia, 2021). Jokowi’s failure in the aspect of law enforcement became among the indicators of the decline of democracy in his era. This failure can be seen in two aspects. First, the laws were made in the interests of Jokowi’s regime, particularly in protecting political policies opposed by community organisations. The publication of Perppu was an easy way for the government to make laws without having approval from the DPR. Second, the use of the laws was not for the sake of strengthening the democratic process, but rather to weaken political opponents who are critical of the government policy. As a result, the government denied the people freedom of opinion and assembly that do not suit their interests.

5.4. State bureaucrats that are not exempted

In a democratic country, the bureaucracy performs state functions such as collecting taxes for state financing needs, providing services to the people and enforcing rules and laws to create a social order in society. The existence of this bureaucracy is always used by the government to maintain its power. In Indonesia, during the New Order, a collaboration between the bureaucracy, Golkar and the Armed Forces had become an effective tool for the Suharto regime to control opposition groups. Suharto understood the power of infrastructure owned by the bureaucracy from the centre to the village level. The hierarchy of power in the bureaucracy was ultimately used to mobilise public support to win Golkar in elections during the New Order in power (Tomsa, 2008). As a result, the Indonesian bureaucracy became an institution that no longer reflected its independence in exercising power, regulation and providing services to the people.

Nevertheless, questions arise about how to make the bureaucracy or Civil State Officer (PNS) professional as the number is large, reaching 4,168,118 people with the largest number of PNS in districts with 3,209,199 people or 77% of the total PNS in Indonesia (Badan Kepegawaian Negara, 2020). This shows that although the New Order regime is no longer in power, the behaviour of the bureaucracy has not changed and even openly became a tool of the regime’s power. In Jokowi’s candidacy as president for a second term, the bureaucracy backed him to run government programs, especially those of a populist nature. It is difficult to distinguish whether bureaucratic involvement is part of his obligation to make government programs successful or a part of his efforts to support existing candidates. The involvement of bureaucracy in the political process was indeed vaguely done in the implementation of government programs, either in the form of socialisation or other technical activities. The interaction of government officials with the community when conducting socialisation programs or other technical activities allowed them to conduct secret campaigns for presidential candidates or district head candidates (Barenschot, 2019).

Jokowi’s way of governing was also different from the previous president. During the era of SBY’s rule, he worked hard to eradicate corruption and the practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). However, the reality is that KKN had involved greater bureaucracy like the corruption in the Home Ministry’s big project, namely the electronic identity card project (KTP-el) with a national loss of Rp2.3 trillion rupiah (Agus, 2017). In addition, there was also an athlete house project in Hambalang involving the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which cost the country Rp706 billion rupiah (Kusumawati, 2016). Thus, during his rule, Jokowi implemented several bureaucratic reform agendas to reduce corruption and bureaucracy so that the government’s development plan could be implemented quickly and effectively.

One of them was related to the ease of investing in Indonesia. To that end, Jokowi reduced the bureaucratic licensing procedure when starting a business from 13 to 7, reducing the average processing time from 47 days to 10 days. Similarly, construction permits that must meet 17 procedures were reduced to 14 (Ward, 2021). However, this bureaucratic reform was unable to create a reliable and professional bureaucracy and eliminate KKN since some of the bureaucratic elites who enjoy great power did not want to change.

Another obstacle faced by Jokowi was the strength of government intervention to safeguard political interests. This can be seen in the corruption case in the Ministry of Youth and Sports involving minister Imam Nahrawi from the National Awakening Party amounting to Rp265 billion, as well as the corruption case in the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries involving Minister Edhy Prabowo of the Gerindra Party amounting to Rp9.8 billion (Flora, 2019; Syaifudin, 2020). This was followed by the corruption in the Ministry of Social Affairs involving Minister Juliari P. Batubara from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) who received Rp17 billion (Septiasputri, 2020). Jokowi took serious note of corruption cases involving his cabinet ministers by asking the KPK to take action following the law but yielded insignificant results.

Bureaucratic reforms carried out in the first period of his leadership only obtained changing Bureaucratic Reform Index (IRB) scores. For example, the IRB, which is an index for the progress of bureaucratic reforms carried out by ministries and government agencies at the national level each year in 2017, was 74.42 points and decreased to 72.21 points in 2018. In 2019, it slightly increased to 73.66 points. In addition, the average IRB of the entire province was still below the national average, which only reached 63.70 points while the district/city IRB was only 55.49 points (Kementerian PANRB, 2021). Among the causes were the low bureaucratic thinking and work culture as well as the widespread symptoms of corruption.

Every president in power has initiated the bureaucratic reform agenda to become professional, including President Jokowi. However, the dynamics of bureaucratic reform also depend on the political will of the political elites to carry it out. Even in practice in the regions, this bureaucracy was deeply involved in the Pilkada process. Not a few bureaucrats, also known as the State Civil Apparatus (ASN), were split as they became supporters of regional head candidate pairs competing in the Pilkada (cf. Pierskalla, 2022). ASN was no longer professional and impartial in carrying out its duties. Pilkada impacted the emergence of bureaucratic support for regional head candidates. This situation has worsened, especially in the last decade, due to the increasingly strong position of regional heads as ASN superiors who were political officials in determining bureaucratic careers in the regions. Cases of buying and selling positions in the bureaucracy, such as the case of the Kudus Regent of Central Java Province in 2019, are some of the proofs (Aji, 2019).

Meanwhile, at the central level, appointing officials at the director general level and those at the equivalent level was laden with political interests. The appointment of bureaucratic officials at the echelon 1 level also violated Law Number 5 of 2014 concerning the State Civil Apparatus. For example, it relates to the position that must be occupied through the tour of duty concept passed by officials who will occupy positions in Echelon 1. However, with political intervention, these requirements can be abolished according to the interests of the political elite. On the other hand, the bureaucratic reform carried out by the Jokowi government by eliminating Echelon 3, and four positions in the bureaucracy have created chaos, especially in terms of bureaucratic career paths since all of them were transferred to available positions. It is no longer clear how government affairs should be carried out, especially in the regions, due to the unclear implementation of government functions at Echelon 3 and Echelon 4 levels that were removed.

This situation is exacerbated by the action of Jokowi to limit this relationship by applying the principles of good governance, but to no avail, since almost this partisan bureaucracy benefited all the oligarchs in Jokowi’s rule from General Elections to the Election of Regional Heads. Thus, it is not surprising that efforts to make the bureaucracy neutral in politics are merely rhetorical.

5.5. The dependence of economic society on the government

Jokowi’s economic policy prioritises infrastructure development but relies on external debt sources in terms of implementation, causing Indonesia’s foreign debt to increase rapidly under his government. The Bank Indonesia report stated that up to the fourth quarter of 2020, Indonesia’s external debt reached USD413.4 billion from only USD400.6 billion at the end of October 2019. At the end of November 2021, Indonesia’s external debt increased further to USD416.4 billion, which of course will continue to increase as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Bank Indonesia, 2022). The policy of increasing the country’s debt worries public figures. For example, SBY criticised Jokowi’s policy of increasing foreign debt by 3 times or 180.4% to finance several developments (Putri, 2021). Former finance minister Rizal Ramli also criticised the accumulation of foreign debt that could endanger the country’s finances (Tribun News, 2020). Thus, they attacked Jokowi by comparing the foreign debt policy during President SBY’s time, which only amounted to USD209.7 billion at the end of his reign in 2014 (Ariyanti, 2017).

In the context of Jokowi’s rule, the fact is that the existence of this economic society is also related to the political society since many businessmen are not only involved in determining party policy but also government policy. Therefore, it is not surprising that businessmen are affiliating with political parties to support the government in determining the economic policy of a country. One of them is Law Number 11 of 2020 on job creation, which benefits employers more than employees. The publication of the Copyright Law is indeed beneficial for the ease of investment into Indonesia to create employment opportunities for the community but puts workers in a weak position, especially those working with agreements and uncontrolled time limits (Maharani, 2020).

Although debates have been held in connection with the provisions of this Copyright Law, the influence of the oligarchs dominated this law showing that the transition to democracy in 1998 does not guarantee that the principles of democracy could work well in Indonesia. The relationship of political parties with oligarchy groups affected the decline of democracy as Jokowi continued the character of a government focusing on oligarchs as practised by the New Order regime. During the New Order, Suharto concentrated his power only on the military and technocratic groups known as the “Berkeley mafia” (Abdulgani-Knapp, 2007, p. 82).

Meanwhile, during the Jokowi regime, the focus of his power was much more numerous and diverse involving the coalition party elites, former army generals, businessmen affiliated with certain political parties and civil society activists. Warburton (2016) explained that the consolidation of power by President Jokowi was to develop a patronage relationship between personal interests and the cronies who supported him in the 2014 presidential election for putting him in a better bargaining position to support his power. Besides, Jokowi chose to mobilise state institutions to succeed in his economic development policies since he was aware that the strength of national institutions is important in achieving his economic agenda (Hill & Negara, 2019). By strengthening state institutions, Jokowi indirectly gained the people’s confidence that his policies were not autocratic. As a result, he managed to develop the people’s belief that his government was democratically implementing the development agenda.

Jokowi’s strategy has succeeded in setting the agenda of economic development, despite having to deal with oligarchic cronies in his circle of power. Several businessmen supporting President Jokowi included Harry Tanoesudibjo, the owner of MNC Corporation and the Head of the Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo) as well as Surya Paloh, the owner of Media Group and the Head of Nasdem Party. Apart from that, there were Garibaldi Thohir who is the President Director of Adaro Energy, Alim Markus who is the President Director of Maspion Group, Arifin Panigoro, the owner of Medco Group, Hariyadi Sumadani, Rosan P Roeslani, Adi S Lukman, Head of Food and Beverage Association, as well as Ade Sudrajat, the Chairman of the Indonesian Textile Association (Warta Ekonomi, 2019).

The high-speed rail project was included as one of the National Strategic Projects (PSN), which incurred a cost of USD5 billion. Bappenas, the one studying the project’s plans since 2012, failed to receive political support from President Yudhoyono’s government at the time (Deny, 2016). However, in line with President Jokowi’s agenda to develop an economy focusing on infrastructure development, the project was successfully included by his cronies as part of a strategic development project whose funding involved cooperation between State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and China Railway International. The high-speed rail project, whose implementation began in 2016, has received criticism from the people since it was only concentrated in Java, leading to the problem of foreign labour and development sourced from foreign debt (Riyandi, 2016). Unfortunately, this criticism did not get Jokowi’s attention who even allowed the continuance of the project.

Nonetheless, almost all ruling regimes in Indonesia involve oligarchs in their political power. This tendency began to emerge when running in presidential elections or regional head elections. Strong oligarchic intervention into government political policy affected the quality of Indonesian democracy as many businessmen set up political parties to be part of this oligarch. Examples included Surya Paloh who founded the Nasdem Party and Hary Tanoesoedibjo who founded the Indonesian Association Party (Perindo). In addition, the tendency of society as voters to receive political money for the choices they make further added to the political costs that the party elite has to spend in every election (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). The results of a study by the Kompas newspaper found that the average politician who wants to be a member of the DPR spent around Rp2–5 billion rupiah on campaign costs (Jatmiko, 2018).

The above scenario has made the oligarchs influential and powerful. Through available financial capabilities, they reached out to the ruling elites by financing party activities in elections to keep their business safe and free from government interference. President Jokowi’s position has also become stronger with supportive oligarchs. For instance, to ensure the growth of the economy after Covid-19, the COVID-19 Management and National Economic Recovery Committee (KPC-PEN) were formed comprising ministers in his cabinet with businessmen among his supporters under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) (Khadafi, 2020). This way, the government can direct economic projects to Kadin for influencing the independence of Kadin as a group of the economic society in overseeing the government’s economic policy.

Regime interference in all arenas of democratic consolidation resulted in the decline of democracy in Indonesia; one of the most important was the arena of civil and political society as civil society became afraid to criticise and oppose the regime in power due to the dominance of the state power. The government intimidated and arrested civilians who were considered dangerous. As a result, the power of civil society began to weaken and no longer became an autonomous and independent force in overseeing the implementation of democracy in Indonesia.

Another group tightly controlled by the Jokowi regime was the political community. Through coalitions with political parties, President Jokowi undertook corporate strategy and co-optation by offering key positions to political elites to support him, causing political parties to lose their check and balance role in the DPR. Other democratic consolidation arenas including state bureaucracy, laws and regulations as well as economic society were not given special attention by Jokowi as they are part of the government. Through a policy based on the law influencing the implementation of democracy, the Jokowi government controlled all the consolidation of democracy causing the decline of democracy after the second term of his rule. Table 1 summarises the forms of intervention undertaken by the Jokowi regime during his leadership.

Table 1. Forms of regime intervention and the phenomenon of democratic consolidation failure

Arena of Democracy	Forms of Regime Intervention	Elements Involved
Civil society	Using the rule of law by restricting freedom of opinion and freedom of association	MenkoPolhukam, Polri and BIN, pro-government civil society figures (e.g. influencers, buzzers)
Political society	Strengthening coalitions with elites of political parties, corporations and co-optations, application of autocratic leadership, strengthening of positions through election laws	Elite political parties, coalition parties in parliament, non-party figures
State bureaucracy	Politicisation of Bureaucracy	Government officials at central and regional levels, political party elites at central and regional levels
Law and Legislation	The formation of the Perppu and the Law, the application of the Law to opposition groups	Elite coalition of political parties, DPR
Economic society	Integrating the role and dominance of policy in the economic field by the government. Involvement of entrepreneurs in economic committees formed by the government	Pro-government entrepreneurs

Sources: Adapted from various sources.

6. Conclusion

The process of consolidating democracy in Indonesia has its ups and downs depending on the agenda of the ruling regime. This article has shown how Indonesia still faces problems with the consolidation of democracy after two decades of power transition. Taking several empirical cases during Jokowi’s rule, it is clear that Indonesia’s decline in democracy is caused by the failure of its consolidation, which allowed the political elites who enjoyed comfort with the Jokowi government to maintain the situation for their benefit.

This article has emphasised that the decline of democracy in Indonesia stemmed from the failure of democratic consolidation caused by the strong involvement of the ruling regime that affected the ongoing consolidation process. Despite efforts to accelerate the consolidation of democracy, the government has allowed the entry of anti-democratic political elites to influence the government’s agenda. Meanwhile, it was difficult for civil society to escape threats against their activities to fight for the democratic agenda since they also depend on the government. Additionally, discussions have shown that they participated in defending the regime’s intervention in the democratic process by being influential and carrying out government-funded activities. The effect was that freedom of speech and unity became so limited that it went against the principles of democracy. Besides, the Jokowi regime’s intervention in the political community was aimed at strengthening the coalition network to salvage the economic and political interests of the oligarchs in the government, which was evidenced by the coalition formed to perpetuate the regime’s policy in determining the democratic agenda following the interests of the political and economic elites in Jokowi’s government. Not many parties dare to question government policies for fear of law enforcement could ensnare them on the pretext of breaking the law.

The decline of democracy in Indonesia occurred due to the Jokowi administration that has gone too far to control the arena of democratic consolidation involving the public. This article also discovered restrictions on the role of actors in political society, civil society and the co-optation that took place against economic society accompanied by legal arrangements made under the ruling regime’s interests. The bureaucracy has become a tool of power for political elites at the local and national levels, which began with substantial elite interference in determining bureaucratic officials and using bureaucratic positions to gain economic benefits for elites in the regions. One thing that needs to be explored and continued from these findings is to prove that the level of maturity of the Indonesian people in democracy also influences the decline of democracy in Indonesia. Suppose the maturity of a democratic society can be realised, the efforts of the political elite to intervene in every arena of democratic consolidation will be challenging to carry out.

Acknowledgments

This research is sponsored by Universitas Andalas Research Grant Number 01/PL/SPK/PNP/FISIP-UNAND/2021 and UKM Research Grants Code SK-2020-005 and SK-2020-015. The authors would like to thank the FISIP Universitas Andalas and the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for these research grants.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the FISIP Universitas Andalas Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Notes on contributors

  Asrinaldi

Asrinaldi is a professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) Universitas Andalas, West Sumatra, Indonesia. His interest and study are on Democracy and Politics in Indonesia and Local Political Dynamics, which have been carried out for the last few years. Asrinaldi is the Head of the Political Science Masters Program at FISIP Universitas Andalas.

Mohammad Agus Yusoff

Mohammad Agus Yusoff is a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. His research interests and concerns have been Democracy and Politics in Southeast Asia and Federalism in Malaysia.