Foreign aid in the post-colonial Africa: Means for building democracy or ensuring Western domination?

Abstract

Even though colonialism ended in the 1960s because of changes in the global political economy, imperialists’ influence and exploitation have been persisting in the post-colonial period. Securing flag independence without economic autonomy, Africa has been keen-jerked by lack of finance, capital, and technical know-how which forced it to rely on Western donors and its former colonial masters for development and democracy assistance. Accordingly, Africa has received sizable industrialization, poverty reduction, good governance and democracy, and MDGs aid packages since its independence. However, despite the huge foreign aid it has been receiving, Africa has achieved neither sustainable economic development nor consolidated democracy. This paper is thus intended to appraise whether foreign aid is the means for democracy or tool of domination in the post-colonial Africa. Claiming that the foreign aid Africa has been receiving is systematic aid with repressive political conditionalities designed to instill liberal values in an illiberal continent that celebrates social wholeness, this article concluded that foreign aid becomes a neocolonial instrument of Western politico-economic and ideological domination that trades off the continent’s sovereignty for aid and loan.

Keywords:

• Africa
• democratization
• domination
• foreign aid
• post-colonialism

1. Introduction

The scramble for Africa started following British and French exploration (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016) of resources, marketplace, and labor in the mask of civilization. Europeans not only scrambled Africa but also exploited its resources and spoiled socioeconomic and cultural foundations. At the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), Europeans partitioned Africa into colonies that laid the rule to avoid potential hostilities. Consequently, imperialists set artificial boundaries, divided and merged people of different ethnic groups (Athow & Blanton, 2002), and ruled Africa almost for a century. By redrawing the continent’s political geography (Bereket, 2003), colonizers divided and merged ethnic groups and reshaped socioeconomic structures in line with Western philosophy. These and other colonial legacies put Africa in a vicious circle of problems. The artificial border induced conflicts; ethnic partitioning sowed the seed for later irredentist and secessionist movements; and the mono-crop legacy yielded agricultural fluctuation. Many of the economic, social, and political problems facing Africa are rooted in colonial legacies and neocolonialism conspiracies.

By imposing alien values, colonizers impede continent’s economic, social, political, and cultural fabrics. However, following WWII, Europeans faced insurmountable challenges when internal and external conditions that had sustained colonial rule unraveled. Externally, the war shattered their capacity; USA and USSR allied with Africa to overthrow the shackle of colonialism (Babou, 2010; Ndulu & O’Connell, 1999). Internally, political and economic changes before, during, and after the war had caused strong pressure. Growing acquiesces of colonial subjects, local rulers’ awareness of the immorality of colonial commitment, and colonies global recognition (Babou, 2010) posed challenges to colonial rule in the 1960s. Africa finally achieved independence in the 1960s after protracted battles costing many lives. Africa is trapped by deadly spiral of socioeconomic and political peril due to the spilling effects of arbitrary boundary, ethnic division, and mono-crop agriculture, however.

Africa’s independence surged socioeconomic and political optimism: nationalists envisioned democracy, industrialization, and economic boom (Adejumobi, 1996; Ndulu & O’Connell, 1999). Nonetheless, winning only flag independence, Africa has stretched its hand to the West to overcome financial, technological, and leadership constraints. Since the 1960s, it has received huge foreign aid for poverty reduction, stabilization, and democratization (Kalu, 2018; Moyo, 2009), but neither sustained development nor workable democracies have been realized. Because of the huge debt burden and aid dependence, Africa vehemently opened its door and succumbed to Western diktats. Using political conditionalities, Westerners imposed incompatible and decontextualized values, and Africa entered into endless crises. Even so, alleviating poverty, promoting growth, and improving human conditions (Kalu, 2018; Radelet, 2006) are official goals of foreign aid, the West perpetuate their long-standing aspiration of keeping Africa as a dependable source of raw material and marketplace for dumping goods.

The hoped independence brought only change of leadership from Europeans to Africans. Ushering liberal democracy, new wave of liberalization swept across Africa during 1990s. Donors imposed conditionalties that facilitate Africa’s transition. Yet, reforms are either façade to stay in power or poorly instituted. Not only recession of democracy but also mismatch between official reports and real settings marks post-colonial Africa (Zeleza, 2019). Despite massive democracy and development assistance, real changes are still elusive. Considering the abundance of literature on foreign aid and democratization (Boone, 1996; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Carnegie & Marinov, 2017; Dietrich & Wright, 2015; Dunning, 2004; Knack, 2004, Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010; Resnick, 2018; Scott & Steele, 2011; Wright, 2009), reviewing some major themes and debates has been current scholars overdue.

Since its independence, Africa has been receiving huge aid for poverty reduction, democracy promotion, etc., that sustained North–South relations beyond the politico-economic constellations. There are debates, however, on the official goal and outcome of aid. This paper thus reviews those debates and appraises whether Western aid promoted democracy in post-colonial Africa’ or not. Subsequently, qualitative approach with social constructivist paradigm is employed to appraise the issues more thoroughly. Furthermore, the effect is evaluated from the perspective of the colonized South using post-colonial theory as an analytical lens to voice Africa. Since the paper is basically a review essay, it thematically analyzed data collected from wide range of secondary sources.

This paper is organized into six parts. Following this introduction, part 2 presents conceptual issues related to foreign aid, major donors, and recipients. This is followed by a theoretical framework (modernization and post-colonial theory) to examine liberal democracy and development models Westerners advocated. Part 4 highlights the “foreign aid-democracy” debate, and part 5 reviews the history and purpose of aid in post-colonial Africa. Part 6 appraises whether Western aid promoted Africa’s democracy as proponents had advocated or ensured domination using empirical literature. This is followed by some tentative conclusions on the impact of Western foreign aid on post-colonial Africa’s democratization.

2. Conceptual issues

Foreign aid indicates physical goods, skill and technical know-how, financial grants, and loans transferred from donors to recipients (Kalu, 2018; Riddell, 2007). According to Radelet (2006), foreign aid is about financial flows (1) to promote economic development and (2) provided either as grants or subsidized loans. Though loans are given to both developed and underdeveloped states with future repayment, according to Development Assistance Committee, “a loan counts as aid if it has a grant element of 25 percent or more, meaning that the present value of the loan must be at least 25 percent below the present value of a comparable loan at market interest rates” (Radelet, 2006, p. 4). Historically, most aid has been given as bilateral assistance from one country to another (Radelet, 2006; Riddell, 2007). However, organized and multilateral aid began post-WWII development. Whereas institutionalized aid began with Marshall Plan, OECD is formed to coordinate and promote aid across developing countries (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Riddell, 2007). The establishment of Bretton Wood Institutions shifted bilateral aid into multilateral aid, and donors started to provide aid directly via multilateral institutions.

Depending on time and context, foreign aid takes different forms. Moyo (2009, p. 22) classified foreign aid into three categories: humanitarian aid (mobilized and dispensed in response to catastrophes); charity-based aid (disbursed by charitable organizations); and systematic aid (directly given to governments bilaterally or multilaterally). The classical realist scholar Morgenthau (1962) classified aid into six categories: humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribe, prestige, and economic development. Development Assistance Committee also classified foreign aid into three general categories: Official Development Assistance (aid given to low- and middle-income countries); Official Assistance (aid given to rich countries like Israel, Taiwan, etc.); and private voluntary assistance (grants from NGOs, charities, foundations, private companies) (Radelet, 2006). For this paper, foreign aid refers to Western grants and loans provided to Africa. The paper excludes humanitarian and private aid and focuses on “systematic” aid to appraise whether it is a means to build democracy or ensure domination in post-colonial Africa.

Who gives aid, for whom, and why? The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the African, Asian, and Inter-American Development Banks, and UN agencies are the major donors. The main donor nations include those in North America, Western Europe, Scandinavian, and the Middle East (Lancaster, 2007; Radelet, 2006). Since 1970s, several countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Korea, India, China, Turkey, and Thailand have entered the “club of OECD as emerging donors” (Chaponnière, 2009, p. 56). On the other hand, Latin America, Asia, and Africa are recipients of bilateral and multilateral aid. Though aid is a foreign policy instrument (Morgenthau, 1962) between donors and recipients, it serves different purposes. The most common rationale is to alleviate poverty, promote economic growth, and improve human conditions (Heinrich, 2013; Lancaster, 2007; Qian, 2015). The classification of aid for industrialization in 1960s, poverty reduction in the 1970s, stabilization in 1980s, and buttress of democracy in 1990s justifies similar benevolent purposes. Also, aid carries implicit and explicit objectives. In this respect, Morgenthau (1962, p. 301) noted that even so only humanitarian aid is non-political, “it can indeed perform political function when it operates with political context.” My argument is also that aids are not free gifts, but rather deliberate instruments of donors to advance vested interests.

3. Theoretical framework

As “no one sees the world as it is, but through the veil of theories” (Heywood, 2011, p. 53), theories shape our view of social phenomena. However, since a single theory cannot explain all facets of politics (Huntington, 1991; Peters, 2019), students of politics use ranges of theories. Being an interdisciplinary field that celebrates diversity (Marsh & Stoker, 2010), political science promotes eclectic use of theories to see issues through different lens. In this regard, Peters (2019, p. 3) underscores the importance eclecticism of theories as “eclecticism pays greater intellectual dividends for political science than strict adherence to a single approach.” Yet, critical selection and innovative contextualization are the tasks of students of politics. Against this backdrop, this article uses modernization and post-colonial theory to review the role of foreign aid in post-colonial Africa’s democracy.

Modernization theory assumes that modernization brings specialization, urbanization, and economic growth which are the basis to transform economic and political institutions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). Even if modernization theory is used in development studies, it is also used in comparative politics to assess the development–democracy correlation. The underlying premise is economic development is the prerequisite for democracy (development and democracy are independent and dependent variables with a cause–effect relationship). By promoting secularism, urbanization bureaucratization, and individualism, which are ethics of liberal democracy (Adejumobi, 2000), development brings democracy. Once more, not only the fruits of development but also the social structures of capitalism reinforce democratic values (Adejumobi, 2000). However, the “development model” modernization theorists maintained as a precondition for democracy is Western development model.

Vented from the premise of “Westerners should install modern values and build backward nations through economic assistance” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 35), Westerners initiated aid packages to uproot Africa’s economic and democracy challenges. Adejumobi (2000) noted that unless democracy is linked with socioeconomic empowerment, poor economies undermine peoples’ confidence in democracy. Though aid packages are planned to improve development and democratization, modernization is used to legitimize Westerners’ aid policies (So, 1990). Once more, though the positive correlation is discarded, the claim that liberal values are pillars of democracy is alive. Westerners present their development and governance models as “best experience” to establish and sustain democracy. Principles of liberal democracy (pluralism, civil rights, individualism, etc.) and liberalization, deregulation, and privatization are modernization facets in which Westerners promote as necessary for development and democracy. Yet, as it justifies Western development and governance models as “best model” regardless of radically different contexts, modernization perspective as an analytical frame to appraise the role of aid for post-independent Africa is flawed. This makes the use of post-colonial theory as a framework to evaluate the foreign aid–democracy nexus in post-colonial Africa sound.

Post-colonial theory on the other hand is developed as a reaction to the embedded west-centric orientation and exclusive nature of mainstream theories (Abrahamsen, 2007; Sylvester, 2014) and their paucity to address post-colonial issues. Born out of experiences of oppression and struggle for freedom (Young, 2001), it challenges neocolonialism and its agents that are enforced through political, economic, and social exploitation (Rukundwa & Aarde, 2007). Post-colonialism exposes Western assertions and overturns cultural and psychological dimensions of colonialism by legitimatizing non-western ideas, norms, and traditions (Heywood, 2011). Unmasking West-centric orientation of mainstream theories on the one hand and the cultural biases that subdued the South and exploitative practices of the West on the other hand (Abrahamsen, 2007; Rukundwa & Aarde, 2007; Sylvester, 2014), post-colonial theory makes the global south audible and visible in the analysis of politics.

Foreign aid is an issues continued in the post-colonial period as one facet of North–South relation and exploitation. Contrary to conventional theories which place focus on nation-state, post-colonial helps to look at foreign aid taking the South as main unit of analysis. Since foreign aid is one aspect of North–South relations, post-colonialism is used to appraise the role of aid on Africa’s democratization. Vented from the rationale of exposing imperialism, exploitative practices, and unbalanced relationships, post-colonial theory appraises Westerner’s attempt of re-colonization and domination via conditional and systematic aid. Arguing that foreign aid is the extension of imperialism, post-colonialism as an analytical frame to appraise the exploitation, politico-economic intervention, imbalanced North–South relations, and domination attempts outweighs the normative implicit and explicit reliance on modernization.

4. Foreign aid and democratization: the debate

Moyo in her seminal work Dead Aid stated that trillion of aid has been spent over the last five decades. Till recently, donors preferred economic growth to democracy (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). For example, aid programs began during the WWII-orchestrated economic growth. From 1950s to 1980s, economic aid was the main agenda because democracy was seen as the second option for poor states (Adejumobi, 2000). So, authoritarians used “dictatorship of development” than “democratization of development” as a justifying factor (Adejumobi, 2000, p. 4). Knack (2004) argued that aid promotes democracy indirectly by modernizing societies because attributes of modern society engender principles of liberal democracy. Of course, development assistance has always been political (Crawford, 2001): consists implicit and explicit political goals. Donors give aid not randomly but after critical calculation of its political ramifications. Thus, even if large sum of aid has been packed as “economic assistance,” it equally carries a gamut of political objectives.

Before and during the Cold War, donors prioritized strategic issues (Dunning, 2004) as criteria for they compete for geostrategic location, alliance, and ideological domination. When the Marshall Plan reconstructed Europe, the Soviet Union supported socialist states as a counter strategy. As such, not democratic orientation but geopolitics was an important factor to receive foreign assistance. For example, Egypt received huge economic, military, and political assistance from both blocks (Khawaja, 2013). The end of the Cold War reduced the significance of geopolitics (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004) and democracy took center stage. Whatever the case, donors provide aid even for authoritarians as long as it brings vital returns. In fact, foreign aid and its allocation criteria are dynamic with changes in the global political economy. Its evolution as the Marshall Plan in 1950s, industrial aid in 1960s, poverty aid in 1970s, stabilization and adjustment aid in 1980s, democratization aid in 1990s, and MDGs aid in 2000s witnessed this.

In 1990s, the international community reached a consensus that democracy is a key component of development (Dietrich & Wright, 2015). The “democracy dependent and economic development independent” debate is discarded in favor of democracy as a basic need (Adejumobi, 2000). Democratic sponsors like US and Western Europe committed themselves to expand democracy (Scott & Steele, 2011). Donors made policy departures from development assistance to human rights and democracy. And, democracy firmly entered into the aid business in the early 1990s (Hackenesch, 2019; Hearn, 2000; Resnick, 2018; Mkandawire, 2010) as a new commitment. International financial institutions used human rights as a political cover to reduce aid to countries that disrespect rights (Wright, 2009). Thereupon, spreading values of democracy, respect for civil liberties, and good governance become part of foreign aid (Dietrich & Wright, 2015; Szent-Inanyi, 2015). USAID, for example, emphasized on rule of law and human rights, elections and political process, civil society, and accountable governance (Scott & Steele, 2011).

Being lofty aspirations of donors, democracy and good governance are attached to development interventions. Aid policies have been revised in manner that could promote political rights, democracy, and accountability (Crawford, 2001). Promoting democracy, civil rights, human freedom and multi-partyism are emphasized as basic values of foreign assistance. Foreign aid becomes conditional because “significant amount of aid is directed toward promoting democracy through conditionality aimed at forcing authoritarian regimes” (Mkandawire 2011:1153). Donors firmly used conditionalities to fund projects that improve democracy (Hackenesch, 2019; Szent-Inanyi, 2015). Grants, loans, and assistance become conditional because donors (1) attach political reforms to economic aid, and (2) directly invest in democratic promotion through activities aimed at strengthening institutions and civil societies (Dietrich & Wright, 2015). Specifically, attaching conditions with external assistance, loans, aids, and grants has become common since 1990s.

Western donors used twofold conditionalities. Positively, they back projects that uphold democracy, human rights, and civil societies. For instance, the United States forgave the debt of Benin for democratic transition (Gazibo, 2005); Canada gave Mali $17 million to improve the effectiveness and accountability of the country’s justice system (Dietrich & Wright, 2015); and Sweden supported Tanzania’s auditing system (Knack, 2004). In addition to supporting elections, and bolstering the judiciary, parliaments, and political parties, USAID spends $700 million yearly on democratization (Knack, 2004); the EU devotes much aid for promoting democracy, human rights, and accountable institutions (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017; Szent-Inanyi, 2015). Negatively, donors imposed restrictions for human rights violations and failures to transform democracy. The 1990s decrease in aid disbursement for anti-democratic behaviors (Wright, 2009) and US’s and European Union’s cut of all non-humanitarian aid for Madagascar following the 2009 coup (Resnick, 2018, p. 410) are some example of negative conditionalities.

Despite the increasing attention to democracy, the outcome is contestable. On the one hand, proponents argue that aid is essential to promote democracy (Dietrich & Wright, 2015; Knack, 2004; Kono et al., 2015; Resnick, 2012; Scott & Steele, 2011). Being the interplay of internal and external actors, “foreign aid plays non-negligible role in developing countries political trajectory” (Resnick, 2018, p. 421) as a key tool of democracy promotion. Consequently, foreign aid advances democracy directly through technical assistance and conditionality and indirectly by promoting education and income. Since democracy is one part of development efforts (Dietrich & Wright, 2015), development assistance and poverty reduction programs promote democracy (Diamond, 2008; Knack, 2004) because poverty reduction and economic empowerment requires democratic [governance] improvement. Yet, as Scott and Steele (2011) claimed, direct democratic assistance has greater role for democracy than general economic aid.

Donors implement explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing direct assistance to governments, political parties, and other groups via various channels (Scott & Steele, 2011). USAID, for example, works on democracy-related programs: supporting elections, strengthening parliament and judiciary to check the executives, and fostering political parties (Knack, 2004). By reducing electoral misconduct (Dietrich & Wright, 2015), and silencing the elite and the public through benefit packages, aid initiates liberalization by empowering political parties and civic societies. In Ghana, for example, donors support administrative, fiscal, and governance decentralization by giving advice, technical support, and organizational development (Picard et al., 2008). In addition, donors often used aid as leverage to diktat poor countries to introduce economic and political reforms (Brown, 2005). In such a milieu, if not for full transition, it increases the likelihood of democracy by facilitating authoritarian collapse.

Aid basically provides legitimacy in the early stage of democratization by building confidence, creating social peace, and avoiding instability (Gazibo, 2005; Resnick, 2012). The claim is that aid furthers democracy by reducing backslide, financial, and legitimacy challenges. The impact of conditionalities in promoting democracy and discouraging authoritarianism is another point proponents are raising. For example, the World Bank and International Development Association lend about $65 billion annually to poor states for democracy and human rights (Knack, 2001, p. 312). The justification here is technical assistance, conditionalities, and modernization initiatives of aid promotes democracy (Knack, 2004; Szent-Inanyi, 2015). Here, Hackenesch (2019) also concluded that despite skepticism regarding its effectiveness, democracy aid and associated political conditionalities have positive contribution to African democracy. In short, proponents claim that foreign aid furthers democracy by providing alternative finance, strengthening institutions, initiating reforms, and securing socio-economic bases that have cascading effects for democratization.

On the other hand, aid is criticized for negative and unnecessary conditionalities. Opponents claim that foreign aid is used as a source of funds for authoritarian leaders to repress and co-opt public demand (Dunning, 2004). According to Lynch and Crawford (2011), aid props up electoral authoritarianism and creates neo-patrimonialism and personalization of power as demonstrated in Museveni of Uganda and Biya of Cameroon. It impacts democracy by rising elites’ rent and excluding others from power to reduce representation (Wright, 2009). Putting clearly, aid degrades institutional quality and accountability by favoring corruption and patronage (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Wright, 2009) in several ways. First, as Knack stated,

Aid dependence can potentially undermine governance quality and public institutions by weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, foment conflict to control aid funds, siphoning scarce talent from bureaucracy and alleviating pressure to reform inefficient policies and institutions (2001: 310).

Second, it increases instability and coup d’états by making aid control more valuable (Knack, 2004; Wright, 2009). The competition to control food aid in the Somalia civil war among various actors as an example is worth mentioning here. Likewise, in Tanzania, most of the 1970s and 1980s foreign aid was diverted to subsidize state-owned enterprises and parastatals (Knack, 2001). Third, although foreign aid might trigger democratic transitions, viable democracies are still lacking. Aid is not successful as expected in creating a solid foundation for consolidated democracy (Resnick, 2012). Since democratization is largely a matter of domestic effort, sanctions are less successful in ensuring democracy. According to Resnick (2018), sanctions are likely if recipients lack close ties with donors or their action affects donors directly or indirectly. Thus, opponents of foreign aid firmly claimed that it creates the culture of dependence, siphon talent, and deepens patron-client relationships.

The effect of aid on democratization is mixed, however. And it could be misleading to argue that aid is unnecessary as it leads to political degeneration because the contexts, motives, and donors’ objectives determine its effectiveness. Instead, it is safe to argue that if aid is well managed and well directed to the needs of domestic politics, it helps to institutionalize changes and facilitate progress by reducing financial and legitimacy bottlenecks. But, if it is imposed, it is likely to end either in crisis or superficial reforms as experienced in many African countries. Of course, aid cannot be out of political motives; it is the natural extension of donors’ implicit interest. For instance, Cold War and early post-Cold War Western aid were driven to replace socialism with liberalism as the best economic and political model. As such, aid conditionalities were impositions with rare consideration of recipients’ socioeconomic, political, and cultural settings. This is perhaps the reason for Africa to wallow in poverty and persistent authoritarianism albeit billions of development and democracy aid since the early 1960s.

5. Foreign aid in the post-colonial Africa

The 1960s were years of aspiration and excitement as they have dignity, self-respect, and better future (Moyo, 2009). Development plans anticipated rapid growth fuelled by industrial expansion, export diversification, and agricultural modernization (Ndulu & O’Connell, 1999). Indeed, Africa achieved socio-economic expansion and industrialization in the early 1960s (Adejumobi, 1996; Heidhues & Obare, 2011; Ndulu & O’Connell, 1999). These, however, did not last long; striding attempts came up with a trap of challenges. First, independent states were bottlenecked by lack of skilled manpower, capital, and leadership. Africans relied on colonizers for policy advice, finance, and technical support. Second, as it got only “flag independence,” Africa pleaded for foreign finance, personnel, and expertise. Since the 1970s growth has slowdown, investment and export declined (Heidhues & Obare, 2011) and economic progress returned to grim prospects. This forced Africa to stretch its hand for aid to deal with poverty, dearth of infrastructure, and debilitated social capital which pushed it into economic colonialism, which had replaced political colonialism.

Since the 1970s, Westerners have been giving massive aid to Africa. “In 1980s sub-Sahara Africa received net aid of 10% of its GDP. By 1990 about thirty-one countries received 10% of their GDP, and in 1998 twenty-one countries received this amount, whereas Malawi, Ghana, and Zambia funded 40% of their GDP” (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, p. 257). Except for a few, most states depend on foreign fund to perform basic tasks of government (Goldsmith, 2001). In spite of the long-term debilitating impact, Africa became aid dependent as a main part of its GDP and government expenditure. Aid dependence increased over time till the continent fell under debt servicing difficulty and balance of payment deficit. For instance, “from 1975 to 1979 seventeen countries received 10 percent of their GDP; from 1980 to 1989 countries increased to 25 and from 1990 to 1997 the countries reached 31” (Goldsmith, 2001, p. 125). Africa became the largest receiver of aid; however, the economy became more stagnant with rising poverty and expanding corruption.

During 1970s and 1980s inflation, unemployment and poverty ravaged the continent (Ball & Johnson, 1996; Moyo, 2009). The oil embargo associated with the Arab-Israel war and America’s tight monetary policies resulted in economic turmoil that set off stiff crisis. Rapid population growth, small economy, limited industrialization, and political instability caused catastrophic conditions calling for reform. Because of the economic hardship that ailed skyrocketing inflation, in Sierra Leone and Ghana, governments were unable to pay salaries (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). The mono-crop agriculture was subjected to wide fluctuation; trade investment and production dropped. Economic unrests feed social turmoil and political upheavals. Moreover, recurrent coups, civil wars, and political instabilities disrupted domestic revenue and consumed scarce resources. Africa stretched its hand and donors vehemently intervened to decide on the continent’s macro-economy and policymaking under the aegis of aid and loan.

The World Bank promoted state-led development for Africa, but after the crises, the bank disavowed its stance and blamed Africa (Carmody, 1998). The WB, IMF, and donors concluded that Africa’s crisis is governance and policy failure associated with corruption, ineffective bureaucracy, resource mismanagement, faulty exchange rate, and extensive state intervention (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Heidhues & Obare, 2011; Kalu, 2018). Hence, the continents’ sluggish economy came across two aid-based programs: stabilization and structural adjustment, but the WB and IMF recommended structural adjustment. Citing the degeneration of foreign aid into crises in the 1980s, WB and IMF pushed Africa aggressively to carry out extensive reforms (Brent, 1990; Kalu, 2018). Consequently, with no critical problem analysis and context understanding, Strucural Adjustment Program has been adopted as a response to economic hardship.

Initially, Africans denied that bad policies were contributing factors, rather they blamed terms of international trade and refused to accept SAP (Brent, 1990). But for poor African countries ravaged by poverty, accepting SAP with its repressive conditionality was the only option to access aid from bilateral and multilateral donors. In essence, SAP was based on two premises: (1) without adjustment new resources would drain away, and (2) African leaders do not make appropriate changes unless pressurized (Callaghy, 1988). Finally, its fragile economy forced Africa to accept oppressive concessions and conditions put forward by SAPs. With scarce hard currency, declined aid, and market access, the need for adjustment has caused increasing reliance on the IMF and WB. The structural adjustment called for trade liberalization; exchange rate and financial reform; and privatization to promote competition, market orientation, openness, and macroeconomic balance of payment (Crisp & Kelly, 1999).

The impact of SAP is a point of debate among scholars and policymakers. Proponents argued that SAP was a solution for Africa’s crisis, whereas opponents blamed it as decontextualized. My argument is that it impacted Africa’s political economy and adjusted for extended intervention. As Crisp and Kelly (1999) noted, SAP imposed a neoliberal political economy to curtail Africa from socialist orientation. It was supposed to lessen poverty by fostering growth (Heidhues & Obare, 2011), but it generated significant debt. In this regard, Carmody (1998) said that SAP has not facilitated economic recovery, but rather sped up economic decline because of misreading of Africa’s reality. In principle, macroeconomic adjustment, liberalization, and privatization (Adejumobi, 1996) were expected to yield better returns, but the adjustment resulted in budget deficit, rising debt, and infrastructural deterioration. Not surprisingly, the burdens of SAPs fall under the shoulder of the poor: exchange rate decline, removal of subsidies, diminished government spending, and loss of employment drastically affected the poor.

SAP gave up Africa’s economy to the West: its conditionalities degenerate domestic industries and turned Africa into dumping of goods. Trade liberalization, exchange rate devaluation, and financial reforms (Crisp & Kelly, 1999) ruined the basis of the economy. Moreover, the deregulation, liberalization, and openness concessions affected infant and less competitive local industries and resulted in deindustrialization and immiseration (Carmody, 1998). Onimode claimed that SAP’s hard conditionalities imposed by WB and IMF led to complete reintegration of Africa’s economy into the global market along colonial lines by destroying local manufacturing industries and promoting export of primary commodities (in Carmody, 1998). It did not request permission or considered socio-economic settings, but imposed liberal values and economic interests under the auspice of poverty reduction and crisis management. Besides, the debt burden and conditionalities with politico-economic motives created circle of structural dependence and debt servicing.

Despite the huge aid it has received, Africa remained poor and undemocratic. In fact, aid is not totally bad; I rather contend that the way it is provided and the motive determine its success. However, it cannot be a dependable way out of political and economic problems. If aid would be a reliable guarantee for development and democracy, we would have a better Africa than today. Africa is washed-out with massive aid, but the socioeconomic and political outlook is still bleak. This is why Gatune (2010) noted that Africa’s development should not rest on aid but should focus on knowledge, entrepreneurship, and governance to be effective. Reflecting donors’ dynamic interest, aid continued in different modalities, but Africa achieved neither development nor democracy. Most aids are systematic extensions of pre-colonial and colonial aspirations for raw material and marketplace with the narcissistic interest of domination. Last, aid itself, its conditionalities, and sequence (industrialization, poverty reduction, and democracy) sermon Western development and democracy, the tenet of modernization theory.

6. Foreign aid as tool to democratize post-colonial Africa: an appraisal

The foreign aid-democracy correlation is fluid: some have argued for a positive correlation, whereas others have claimed either no or negative effect. Yet, democracy aid has been the agenda of both bilateral and multilateral donors especially since the 1990s. My claim here is that donors provide aid often for tit-for-tat than for democratization and development. According to Hagmann et al. (2016), self-interest, as opposed to the rhetorical “support for democracy” is the implicit rationale of Western donors to justify aid. Indeed, national interest, cultural similarity, colonial past, economic potential, and ideological proximity are major considerations of donors concerning aid allocation. Hence, be it democratic or good governance aid, there is no free lunch, but accompanied with hidden motives. Against this backdrop, this section highlights how Western foreign aid is used to dominate post-colonial Africa than ensuring viable democracy.

Artificial borders, ethno-religious cleavage, and mono-crop relics impacted Africa’s aspirations. Also, lose historical experiences (McAuslan, 1996) and the mismatch between the European model and national sociocultural facts disintegrated newly formed post-colonial governments. Africans were unprepared for democracy; using the rhetoric of democracy, National Movements leaders formed predatory governments (Bernhard et al., 2004). Artificial boundaries begat ethno-linguistic fraction (Bernhard et al., 2004): civil wars and coups obscured the existence of stable governments. Democratic and development efforts of Somalia, two Sudans, Rwanda, and Congo all failed, and democratization processes have been rife with violence. Stability, the third dimension of development and democracy (Mazrui, 2002), has been disrupted by political unrest. The politico-economic turmoil reopened Africa for intervention under the guise of economic assistance and political aid. Thus, let alone democracy, Africa faced difficulty to maintain peace and stable politics because of colonial legacies.

Imperialists exploited Africa during the slave trade, colonialism, and post-colonialism (Rodney, 1973). Masking civilization, they imposed alien culture and mode of governance. Even if direct political control ceased in the 1960s, Westerners maneuvered Africa using development assistance as they appeared to colonial re-imposition (Carmody, 1998; McAuslan, 1996). They profess democracy and development to maintain their vested interests (cheap raw materials and commodity dumping). Opposing such colonial re-imposition and extensive imperialist motive, McAuslan (1996, p. 168) stated the following:

The international community must start off from a radically different position: international involvement in Africa should be drastically scaled back and in some cases ceased altogether; African countries individually and collectively … should as far as possible be left to work out of their own salvation in their own way.

Foreign aid is simply used as an official account of intervention and domination. Prioritizing their interests, Westerners support even authoritarian regimes (Hagmann et al., 2016). The realpolitik behind foreign aid is not supporting the third world, but an imperialist conspiracy to control Africa’s economy, politics, and socio-cultural settings in favor of their interests.

The foreign aid Africa has received generated significant debt burden and economic recession. This structural reliance on Western fund in turn generated dependency syndrome and vicious circle of poverty. As Amartya Sen stated “the poor are powerless and voiceless,” Africa lost its policy and macroeconomic decision-making for donors. How can a nation achieve true autonomy while relying on foreign aid for basic expenditures? As it shifts government responsibility from locals to donors (Knack, 2001), African governments become responsible for donors, and donors hold Africa obedient. This is the reason Mkandawire (2010) opined that the debt burden created tradeoff between economic growth and political rights. Using aid, the West maintained their interest intact and Africa succumbed to donors’ politico-economic diktats. Africa uncritically accepted reforms as they are because of its dependence and lack of bargaining. Africa entered into a cycle of debt burden: Africa lobby aid for debt servicing. Thus, the West used systematic aid to keep Africa underdeveloped and aid-dependent.

Donors under the aegis of WB and IMF introduced SAPs with no discussion and negotiation (Adejumobi, 1996; Kalu, 2018). Nor Africa’s real socioeconomic and political context has been considered; it was imposed from above. The adjustment came up with an all-rounded disaster. Hellinger (1992, p. 85) observed that “SAP is not a true development policy, rather an economic prescription geared towards further opening of the economy to unregulated extraction of resources and the damping of imported food.” Though it was expected to promote democracy, authoritarianism and political repression take its flip side (Adejumobi, 1996). It reintegrated Africa into the global economy whereby Northerners impose their interests using conditionalities (Hellinger, 1992). Political liberalization and economic reform become conditions for aid (Okon & Ojakorotou, 2018). “African countries tradeoff sovereignty for loan” (Loxley, 1990, p. 8) and donors set the socio-economic basis, character, and ideology of political reforms (Adejumobi, 1996).

Also, explicit and implicit conditionalities attached to foreign aid (Biondo, 2009) affected Africa’s democracy. Conditionalities used both positively and negatively to further democracy with benefits pledged for meeting criteria and aid suspended for failure to comply with or uphold democratic principles (Biondo, 2009). Political conditionalities, therefore, assist development movements by funding democratization initiatives and imposing sanctions. Donors justify conditionalities as a means to monitor and regulate the proper and on-target use of aid. Human rights, competitive elections, rule of law, pluralism, etc., for example, are used as conditions to access aid in post-colonial Africa (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2010). The criticism, however, is that donors exploited conditionalities more than declared objectives using them as a tool to promote national interests, advance Western values, and establish friendly and obedient regimes. Hence, adherence to the ideology, values, and national interests of the West than the genuine and localized initiative of democracy seemed more likely for Africans to access foreign aid.

Being an “emerging donor” (Chaponnière, 2009), China as non-conditional aid provider for Africa is worth mentioning here. Shifting from recipient to donor (McCormick, 2008), China’s grants, zero-interest loans, and concessions to Africa, Latin America, and Asia have increased (Brautigam, 2011). Unlike the West which set political conditionalities, China’s emphasis on stability (van Dijk, 2009) presents it as the best option for African dictators to fill development and loan gaps. However, China’s aid packages are not free lunches, but rather tied to the use of Chinese goods and services (McCormick, 2008). The China–Africa aid and trade relations that seemed South–South in the structure are North–South in pattern (McCormick, 2008) because Africa is still an aid recipient, source of raw materials, and place to dump commodities. Except for the difference in conditionalities and emphasis, China’s aid carries vested interests for raw materials, marketplace, and outweighs Western influence.

As it causes deviation from the scope, the effect of China’s aid on development needs a separate analysis. It is suffice that, even so China provides sizable non-conditional aid and development assistance, it has little to do with democratization. Conversely, China’s aid promotes neither procedure of good governance nor human rights standards; rather, it is a part of “authoritarian regimes band to resist democratization” (Ambrosio, 2009, p. 3). Unlike standards of liberal democracy often demanded by the West, China’s non-political aid is welcomed by African autocrats to satisfy their lust for power. Needless to say, using aid as an instrument, China attempts to challenge Western liberal model and legitimize authoritarianism in its competition to the West (Hackenesch, 2019). Of course, securing raw materials and marketplace, winning Africa’s diplomatic support, presenting alternative development models, and assuring its superpower status are aims China wants to maintain via its economic assistance (van Dijk, 2009, pp. 11–12). Once more, using alternative development model, China’s aid is a part of superpower competition for resource, influence, and alliance. Being anti-assistance and counter-democracy promotion (Ambrosio, 2009), China’s aid is thus unlikely to ensure democracy.

Another impasse foreign aid came up with is imposed democracy. Claude Ake (1993) asked whose role is important for African democracy, and answered it is not the WB, IMF and Western NGOs, but African elites. Greig and Enterline (2014) argued that domestic (civic culture) and international environments (global/regional peace and stability) are factors that affect democratic imposition. Coming to post-colonial Africa scenario, the social structure is marked by ethno-linguistic fracture with rare civic culture. Democracy is imposed in times of global and continental crisis: oil crisis and subsequent politico-economic turmoil. For democracy to be meaningful, it must be related to the living conditions of the people (Adejumobi, 1996); however, Africa’s democracy is externally engineered without institutional and normative foundations (Okon & Ojakorotou, 2018). Planted in wrong contexts, elections and democratic processes become sources of conflict and political rift. The externally driven liberal democracy becomes unsuited for Africans because “liberal democracy with its emphasis on methodological individualism becomes unsuitable to African societies rooted in methodological collectivism” (Okon & Ojakorotou, 2018, p. 242).

Democracy aid is based on universalization of western values. Fearing detract from such model, customizing democracy to Africa was undesirable (Ake, 1993). The logic is “countries with Western style middleclass or individualism could become democratic” (Carothers, 2002, p. 8). Liberal democracy needs capitalist society but African society is pre-capitalist society with different cultural idiom. Supporting this Ake (1993, p. 243) stated that Western liberal democracy is incompatible because “Africa is a communal society, and it is this communalism which defines people’s perception of self-interest and their freedom is social wholeness.” This makes the imposition of democracy little sense for Africans. Violating the basic dictum that Africa’s democracy should reflect local realities, Westerners imposed alien values using a carrot and stick strategy. Ake opined that for democracy to be relevant, it has to be radically different from liberal democracy. The solution is thus “homegrown, indigenous processes, initiated by Africans themselves, taking into account their own historical, social, and cultural values and traditions” (Martin, 1993, p. 7).

Is Western aid really for democracy? My argument is it is not; aid is the means to an end. Even if donors routinely profess aid to the poorest of poor, aid flows do not primarily reflect recipients’ development needs (Hagmann et al., 2016). Donors back even coup d’états to secure their interests as shown in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011. Westerners backed Mobutu Seko against Patrice Lumumba because of his socialist leanings (Okon & Ojakorotou, 2018); France provided aid to Biya against Fru Ndi (Hagmann et al., 2016); United States supported anti-communist African dictators (Carothers, 2002). In spite of multiparty rhetoric, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda were among the most aid recipients in 2013 (Hagmann et al., 2016). So, donors not only support but also align with authoritarians who reject liberal values. Here, Mkandawire (2010, p. 1150) stated that “even if they swear by democracy, part of the aid establishment is still preoccupied with funding means and ways to insulate aid from encumbrance of democratic politics in democratic countries by creating what have been aptly termed authoritarian enclave.” This suggests that aid is not a matter of democracy but a matter of donors’ vested interest.

Kalu (2018) argued that aid has promoted Africa’s development and democracy. However, Africa’s development index and level of democracy are in stark contrast to this argument. If someone else contends that foreign aid promotes democratization more in the long run by ensuring institutional development, Africa would have been more democratic than today. These days authoritarianism has increased across the continent (Tshuma, 2022): aid cannot bring democracy in Togo, Sudan, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and many other countries (Resnick, 2012). After three decades of extensive aid according to the Freedom House (2020) report, only nine countries are categorized as free, the rest are partly free (11 countries) and not free (the remaining). Aid becomes more of a palliative that treats symptoms of Africa’s development and democracy challenges. There are analyses that acknowledge the need to reform aid systems to make it successful; however, do donors provide selfless aid is the question. I answer it as no because it is the recipients’ strategic importance, not democracy that matters foreign aid.

In short, Africa is the largest recipient of foreign aid, but this aid promotes neither democracy nor economic development. Instead, as Moyo (2009, p. 17) opined, “aid has helped to make the poor poorer, and growth slower. Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not ended but have increased. Aid has been and continues to be an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster.” Being the extension of modernization discourse aimed to diffuse Western models as effective ways to establish and sustain development and democracy in Africa, foreign aid is alienated from African facts. Mismatch between economic growth and development and recession of democracy (Zeleza, 2019) is a manifestation of the twenty-first-century Africa. However, even these days, Africa is under persistent struggle for economic development and democracy. The gamut of foreign aid put Africa under a debt servicing crisis. Africa is poor and its poverty undermines political autonomy to choose and decide on economic models and regime types.

7. Conclusion

One might be optimistic of Africa’s progress after the successive aid packages, and it is plausible for those who are wallows of democracy and economic development. But, if not a pessimist Afrocentric, development and democratic assistance open up a new circle of imperialism and sovereignty deficit via political conditionalities. Since its independence, Africa has received various aid packages that have been ostensibly justified as fostering economic growth and political transformations. In contrary to such benevolent expectation, Africa has failed to achieve economic development and democracy. Rather poverty, political instability, and structural aid-dependence remained its defining hallmark. The bilateral and multilateral aid Westerners provide is tied and conditional intended to achieve vested interest rather than genuine motivation for Africa’s progress. Note to say, aid exploited as neocolonial extension of imposing domination for raw materials and marketplace for commodity dumping. The politically motivated and externally engineered aid cannot relieve Africa’s democracy and development snags; instead, it foisted dependency culture.

The democratic aid that replaced previous aid packages cannot bring democracy. With scant attention for local realities, Westerners imposed liberal democracy in an illiberal society via aid. What aid promoted is decontextualized and alienated democracy that pursues universalization of Western model of governance. Using a carrot and stick approach, they manipulated Africa, and sovereignty is a tradeoff for aid. Since the real motive is not democratization but imposition of interests, Westerners planted superficial and symbolic reforms that underscore abstract political rights and civil liberties in the absence of basic needs. Remarkably, while adopting democracy, they used a top-down approach without any consultation, discussion, and consensus building. By imposing externally engineered democracy, Westerners attempt to institute democracy in undemocratic manner. It might be too sweeping to argue that aid is completely unacceptable, but the manner it is delivered and the motives behind are very critical. The deontological maxim “the means justifies the end” works to evaluate Western aid on Africa’s development and democratic progress. Foreign aid may promote democracy and development; however, in Africa, it perpetuates the reverse, domination. Thus, foreign aid for Africa is neither a means to democracy nor economic development but a systematic instrument of imperialism and domination.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).