The vicious cycle of power rivalry and fear of losing power syndrome in Ethiopia

Abstract

After a hundred years of political debacle and depression, Tigrayans came to power in 1991 and implemented strategies to maintain power in their hands. This article is aimed at analyzing the dynamics of power rivalry and strategies designed to maintain power exclusively by Tigrayan elites since 1991. This heyday came after the Tigrayans had lost their power to their neighbor-the Amhara twice. While the first was on the eve of the end of the Zemen Mesafinint (the era of princes), the second was in 1889 when emperor Yohannis IV fell at the battle of Metemma. Fear of losing power haunted them for decades as they regarded Amhara as their enduring power rival. The study employed a qualitative research approach by which the data was collected from articles, books, online video records, reports and interviews. The study revealed that Tigrayans had designed several strategies to ensure that no other power could challenge their positions that they assumed after a heavy bloody civil war. The article argues that the ultimate objective of Tigrayans was to control the upper political and economic echelon and make Tigray a core nation within the Ethiopian polity. However, the power rivalry and fear of losing power once again has remained lingering problems which even expanded its dimension and entered into a new phase after the Oromo has seized the core political position since the 2018 political reform.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• Power rivalry
• Amhara
• Oromo
• Tigray

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

Throughout Ethiopia’s history, politics has been characterized by competition for exclusive control of power. Those who obtain power use all means necessary to sustain it, leading to struggles and enduring power rivalries. In the post-1991 period, the Tigrayan elites dominated all aspects of the state machinery to retain power for a longer period of time, given that they had obtained it after a bloody war lasting 17 years. However, due to large scale social movements/popular protests, internal fissures, and the start of reform, the Tigrayan elites’ dominance has diminished. The post 2018 era has opened a new phase of competition and power rivalry among the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray. This unending cycle of power rivalry requires serious elite bargaining and consensus on fundamental issues.

1. Introduction

In the modern political history of Ethiopia, controling state power has been characterized by the acute struggle between rivalry groups. For instance, there has been a hegemonic competition between Amharas and Tigrayan elites in leading the Ethiopian state. In the aftermath of the fall of the Zemene Mesafinint (the era of princes-1769–1855), it was Tigray that was in a position to nominate an emperor for Ethiopia. Dejazmach Wube Hailemarima¹ from the Simen was the best candidate for this highest political position and was powerful to deter any contender at the time. However, at the battle of Deresge, Wube was defeated and captured by Ras Hailu of Gondar-an Amhara (later emperor Tewodros II-1855–1868). Eventually, the Tigrayans tried the chance of leading Ethiopia during the time of emperor Yohanis IV (1872–1889). However, Tigrayans’ core position was lost shortly after the death of Yohanis who fought with the Derbush Sudan at the battle of Metemma. Again, Tigrayans lost their position to the Amhara leader–emperor Menelik in 1889. Regarding this power shift, an eyewitness² of the scene reported that while the situation marked dawn to Amhara, it signaled darkness to Tigray.

After the death of Emperor Yohannis at the battle of Metemma in 1889, King Menelik was crowned as Emperor Menlik II. Consequently, the political ambition of Tigrayan nobilities to crown Ras Mengesha, the son of Yohanis IV as a successor of his father was doomed to failure. This moment led to the shift of the geo-political power center of the Ethiopian state from Tigray to Shewa (Hagos G/Yohannes Hadera, 2003). The Tigrayans characterized the period from the rise of Emperor Menelik upto 1991 as a period dominated by Amhara-Shewa elites (Aregawi, 2008). The Tigrayans argue that the rise of Amhara ruling elites led the politico-economic marginalization and depression for the Tigray people. Their argument has been that Tigray was a core state (Ethiopia’s Prussia) (Meressa, 2019) but undermined by the Amhara elites after the death of Yohanis IV. Although they blamed Amhara for the impoverishment of Tigray (Gabra-Heywat, 2003,), the continued ambition to regain the throne and the rivalry among Tigrayan nobilities/chiefs perpetuated turmoil and course of events in Tigray (Aregawi, 2008; Hagos G/Yohannes Hadera, 2003). In its manifesto adopted in 1975, the TPLF stated that the “Amharas will never maintain their stability unless they stop oppressing Tigray.” The TPLF also subtly encouraged anti-Amhara propaganda during the armed movement (Aregawi, 2008, p. 201). This provides a corroborative evidence for the power rivalry theory, which states that power rivalry between two groups exists when they engage in verbal condemnation, threats of physical violence, or actual violence (Conrad et al., 2021).

Tigrayan elites had been waiting for hundred years to be the core of Ethiopia’s politics and economy before they came to power in 1991. After the 17 years of armed struggle, they succeeded in assuming the Ethiopian state power by creating a camouflage organization called Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF³) to realize their ambition. Tigrayans elites carefully neutralized contenders and stayed in power almost for 30 years by using different strategies to deter opponents at bay. Therefore, the objective of this article was to analyze the power struggle and rivalry dynamics among groups in Ethiopia. This study also aimed to discuss the strategies employed by rivalry groups to deter contenders and maintain power exclusively. As this trend has perpetuated a vicious cycle of power rivalry, it has significantly impacted state stability which in turn has perpetuated a fear of losing power among the rivalry groups.

2. Methodology and methods

For this study, a case study with a qualitative approach that involves a politico-historical analysis was employed. This research was an explanatory research design that obtained data from articles, books, reports, online video records, and interviews held during fieldwork between September 2020 and August 2021. Key informant interviewees were purposely selected from different sections of the society such as university professors, researchers, activists and protest participants. The criteria used to select participants were based on their knowledge and expertise in the Ethiopian politics. The data have been thematically discussed pertaining to the research objectives of this study.

3. Theories of inter-group power rivalry

The political power competition and confrontation in Ethiopia can be viewed from the perspective of the theory of enduring political and power rivalry. Enduring rivalry as pinpointed by Gochman and Maoz (1984) has theoretical importance to this study as it aimed to analyze the historical continuity of the militarized and antagonized relationship between two rivalry groups. In other words, enduring power rivalries involves repeated conflict (Goertz & Diehl, 1993). Although enduring rivalry was usually employed to analyze international rivalries, it can also be used for intra-state politico-economic dynamics. The Arab/Palestine-Israel conflict is the most enduring rivalry the world has ever witnessed. The India-Pakistan case also falls into this category. (Diehl & Goertz, 2001) Studies and analysis indicated that 45% of militarized disputes took place in the context of enduring rivalries. In the case of intra-state contestation, the Amhara and Tigray and the Amhara and Oromo are typical examples of enduring rivalries in Ethiopia.

The article has three parts. The first part discusses the pillars of maintaining power at the hands of the Tigrayans. The second part delves into highlighting the dynamics of power rivalry and fear of losing power syndrome and finally, a conclusion is made.

4. The ascendancy of the TPLF to power and the rise of tigrayan elites

The role of Tigray, which dated back to the glorious Axumite civilization, has had tremendous historical significance to the political history of Ethiopia. After the fall of their civilization, Tigrayans were in a constant struggle for power with other groups such as Amhara, Beja, and Agew (Bahiru, 2008). Especially, in the second half of the 19^th century, Tigray lost its centrality to emperors who rose from the Amhara. Adhane (1998) argued that after the battle of Metema where Emperor Yohannis IV, an emperor of Ethiopia from Tigray lost his life, Tigray found itself politically orphaned, militarily battered, economically shattered, and psychologically disoriented. However, Adhane (1998) claimed that Tigray had never been subjugated until the return of Emperor Haile Sellassie I from exile after the defeat of Italy in 1941. He argued that Tigray was resisting the encroachment of Amhara powers in Tigray from 1889 to 1935. Similarly, Aregawi (2008) argued that the neglect of Tigray until the 1974 revolution was perceived by many Tigrayans as a deliberate policy of Shawa-Amhara ruling class to weaken Tigray. His core arguments emanated from his attempt to assert the prevalence of historical power rivalry between the two ruling houses (Tigray and Shawa-Amhara) and the Tigrayan and Amhara aristocratic classes.

Their argument rested on the belief that different circumstances, especially the oppressive approaches of the Ethiopian state towards Tigray, led to the rise of ethnic consciousness (Adhane, 1998). However, the movements of radical university students led to the rise of Tigray ethnic consciousness. The introduction of the principle of the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination among university students contributed to the rise of Tigray nationalism, and hence, to the launching of armed struggle in 1975 (Adhane, 1998). We argue that while Tigrayans did not totally abrogate their claim for centrality based on historical status, they were wise in sticking on the right of nations and nationalities for self-determination to get the support of other nations and nationalities to assume power in the center.

University students who founded the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) believed that ‘the misery in Tigray was due to the deliberate neglect of the province by the ruling Amhara elite at the center (Aregawi, 2004). They maintained that they had to fulfill two requirements to create a Tigray nation and ensure the right to self-determination within Ethiopia or secede to the worst: subduing the problem of sub-provincialism and bringing the Derge regime to its knees (Adhane, 1998). Thus, TPLF flamed nationalism in Tigray by blaming the “Amhara rule” for the material, environmental and psychological degradation of Tigray (Birhanu, 2007). They used the impoverishment of Tigray as an affirmation of their cause and mobilizing incentives (Aregawi, 2008). Depicting the Amhara as the enemy and the ever-power contender was a major component of TPLF’s campaign and mobilization (Abinet Hunegnaw, 2017). They depicted the Amhara as an enduring rival group which was clearly reflected during the armed struggle and in their unwavering stand against the Amhara even after their victory. This was the whole-mark of power rivalry as they have been engaged in condemning and blaming Amhara as a source of threat and violence against the other group (CF.) Diehl & Goertz, 2001).

The crux of Tigray’s struggle against the Derge regime was not mainly due to economic exploitation as Tigray’s economic importance was very limited to attract the Shewan-Amhara aristocracy for economic exploitation (Birhanu, 2007). The underlying reason for the persistent struggle was rather directly related to their age-old historical political rivalry with the Amhara group. This primacy sentiment has attributed to the long time defiance of Tigrayans against the rule of their counterpart-Amhara and their embittered unwillingness to accept their secondary status in the built Ethiopian state and unequal participation in the resource exploitation from the newly incorporated territories; south, southeastern, and southwestern parts of the country (Leencoo, 1999; Merera, 2003). As it has been observed in the post-1991 period, their ultimate goal was to become a core nation in the Ethiopian polity although they were initially designed to preserve the identity of Tigray. They claimed that they had a historical and moral right to be the center of the Ethiopian State (Kinfe, 1994).

Therefore, it can be argued that the goal of the Tigrayan’s struggle was to ensure that nothing could prevent Tigrayan elites to be an integral part of Ethiopia and become a hub for politics and economy in Ethiopia. It intended to restore the glory of Tigray which once was the prototype/core of the Ethiopian State. Tigray has been considered the cradle of both Christianity and the Ethiopian State itself. However, the centrality of Tigray was later taken by Shawa/Amhara in which Shawa-Amhara had been a prototype of the Ethiopian nationhood after 1889 (Adhane, 1998). This shift has created a sense of agony for Tigray.

To bring an end to the domination of Amhara elites,⁴ the TPLF had been assisted in training and material support from abroad, and from the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF⁵), which collaboratively launched an armed struggle since 1975 (Asrat, 2006; Yonas, 2014). Alemseged (2022) argued that Tigrayans and Oromos emulated the Eritrean struggle. After the 17 years of armed struggle, they succeeded in ousting the Derge regime from power. After this event, the TPLF started to believe that it decisively brought the Amhara elites’ politico-economic supremacy to an end.

Unlike Tigray and Oromo, Amhara did not have a party as well as an armed group by its name when the TPLF marched into Addis Ababa in 1991. As a result, the Amhara could easily be dismantled and controlled by the TPLF. Oromo and other groups could easily be coopted because the TPLF presented itself as the liberator of nations and nationalities (Mohammed & Solomon, 2021). The 1991 political process was an odd incident for the Amhara psycho-political construct. Amhara was not in the mood to form ethnic-based parties. Andargachew (1993) explained the situation of the Amhara as “we [the Amhara] found ourselves alone in the middle of nowhere, depressed, frustrated, disoriented and lost (Kebede, 2010a, 2016). Indeed, this circumstance was a good opportunity for Tigrayans to exclude and suppress their historical power rival-the Amhara. Unfortunately, the power shift from one group to the other would usually leave a perception that alludes as if the ordinary⁶ people were also beneficiaries of the system established by their fellow groups. In studies of this type, the condition of the ordinary people should not be misunderstood with the struggle outcome of rivalry elites.

Under the leadership of TPLF, the Tigrayan elites tried to assure their dominance, which was historically parallel to what the Amhara elite was able to achieve in the second half of the 19^th century (Merera, 2003). Striving to entrench their supremacy and keeping contenders aside, the Tigrayans devised strategies and systems not to lose power by excluding the Amhara from the national conference organized in July 1991 and the formation of a transitional period government. Losing power again for Tigrayans was meant losing the privilege and letting other contenders to play the core politics that would dwarf Tigray again which I call it “fear of losing power syndrome.” Both in the past and the present, exclusive power control has been one of the major features of the power rivalry relationship in Ethiopia. A university staff at Mekelle explained to Forsen and Tronvol, (2021) about what the central role of power was meant to Tigray as follows;

“Our balance of power depends on history, culture, and the 17 years of armed struggle, our sacrifice through the peasant movement and student movement. In the [Ethiopian] student movement, the leaders were mostly Tigrayans. […] So, in the student movement, in the peasant movement, in the armed struggle, in the civilization, Tigray has been always there. Although we have small number of people, we could proudly own the state (Thea and Tronvol, 2021:8).”

While this quote reminds us a lot about power struggle in Ethiopia, the central argument is that as Tigrayan elites were central in every struggle, they firmly positioned that they should be the core of the state both politically and economically.

4.1. The formation of a dominant party as a tool for a monopolized power

Two years before it captured state power in 1991, the TPLF convened a conference to announce the establishment of EPRDF. Regarding the purpose of the formation of this party, Merera (2003) argued that it was crafted ‘to speak in the mouth of people in and out of the territory of Tigray although it was sought to achieve beyond this. In the realm of practice, it was designed to ensure and lay the foundation for the centrality of Tigrayan elites in the future Ethiopia after the collapse of the Derge regime. Regarding this, it is important to note that the Ethiopian people’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), which was believed to represent the Amhara and other elites, had been instrumental to bring the TPLF out of Tigray into Amhara and other areas as well as to the formation of EPRDF (Henze, 1990). After the July 1991 conference, EPDM was renamed to Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM⁷) and given the mandate to rule the Amhara Regional State. The TPLF made this important decision in the belief that the top officials of ANDM that were deliberately assigned from ‘non-Amharas would not show any commitment to struggle for Amhara, their “permanent power rival.”⁸ As a result, so as not to lose their position and resources provided as a reward for their services to the TPLF, the leaders of ANDM did not have choices except to obey the rules of TPLF and be best loyal to it.

Concerning both the intra-party and inter-party relationships, the TPLF designed two strategies. The first was the formation of EPRDF⁹ which was totally under their direct control. Members of the EPRDF coalition such as OPDO, ANDM, and SPDM were not evolved from their fellow people but were falsely represented. For instance, Aregawi (2008) argued that EPRDF was regarded by many as a Tigrayan front. The evidence was that most of the founders of OPDO, for instance, were prisoners of war captured by the TPLF during the armed struggle with the Derge regime. But, the TPLF was the senior, war-tested party that was determined to remain the strongest political organization in the coalition (Cohen 1995, cited in Bekalu, 2017). The strongest TPLF and the other three weak parties agreed to be together calculating the benefits they would earn out of it and worked to make EPRDF a dominant party¹⁰ in Ethiopia. For the TPLF, the camouflage party was an instrument to keep power at its hand and keep the centrality of Tigrayan elites both in economic and political terms.

Having formed EPRDF, TPLF also employed the second strategy that excluded multi-national parties from the political field in Ethiopia. The EPRDF/TPLF began its journey of assuring the status of a hegemonic party first by excluding multi-national parties and second by removing the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the transitional government. In the power rivalry dynamics, reducing the number of contenders during power sharing/assuming process using force or other tactics seems to be inevitable (Conrad et al., 2021, p. 762). For such reasons, in July 1991, the TPLF excluded the major political parties-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and MEISON or All Ethiopian Socialist Movement in the Addis Ababa conference, whereas the EPRDF was a rule setter and facilitator for the process of establishing the transitional period government (Khisa, 2019). EPRDF showed its strong desire to control and consolidate power at its hand, and hence, pushed the major parties out of the transition process. Lyons (2011) extrapolated that this type of behavior could emanate from the war discipline and ideology of the party; democratic centralism and revolutionary democracy, i.e. the Marxist culture of dichotomizing people/groups into friends and foes was entrenched in the party’s political culture. The party favored ethnic-based parties to operate as far as it believed that they were not threats to TPLF-EPRDF’s power. Otherwise, it considered multi-national parties as antagonistic and enemies of TPLF’s reputation and its ethnocentric approach.

The trajectories of establishing the dominant party began especially after the 2005 national election when members of EPRDF, especially OPDO, were involved in recruiting new members vigorously. Regardless of the constitutional provision which endorsed a multi-party system, EPRDF practically emerged as a strong authoritarian dominant party after the 2005 national election. In the realm of practice, a multiparty system is not convenient for the prevalence of a minority-dominated government. In 2010, Meles Zenawi remarked that EPRDF emerged as a dominant party due to the strong support it earned from the people of Ethiopia with 99.6 landslide victory in the 2010 national election. In 2015, Haile Mariam, his successor also claimed that EPRDF emerged as a strong dominant party due to the failure of opposition parties to discharge their responsibility of challenging the ruling party in power politics. Despite their political gymnastic in attributing the reasons for the emergence of a dominant party to different reasons, they worked hard to make the TPLF-dominated EPRDF a dominant party to ensure that their authoritarian resilient government to stay in power for an unlimited period. Regarding this, the long-term plan of EPRDF’s document revealed that revolutionary forces can attain hegemony and stay in power continuously (EPRDF, 1993 G.C.) (1985 E.C).

The rigid position they held to ensure the dominance of EPRDF can also be reflected when the EPRDF leaders entered into excessive electoral fraud and disregarded the possibility of forming a coalition government to avoid the post-election violence. In the belief that the ideology of EPRDF and the opposition parties are contradictory, Meles Zenawi disregarded such schemes as sources of the crisis. The EPRDF rather bred hostilities between the people and opposition parties through the public media. The core party TPLF worked relentlessly against opposition parties so that the people would regard opposition parties as enemies of nations and nationalities, anti-federal structure and anti-peace and development to distance contenders from power and avoid the possibility of losing power again. This assertion was consistent with the need to control core power positions and increases the possibility for power rivalry (CF.) Conrad et al., 2021).

The TPLF-EPRDF also exponentially recruited members in mass through incentives of job opportunities to dominantly survive and entrench the resilient authoritarian system under the minority Tigrayan control. Approximately 80%¹¹ of university graduates were compelled to join the party in search of employment (Fact Magazine, 2013, 19). It established complex networks by putting its party members in every institution and village, including universities. The party members/representatives had more power than university presidents; no decision was ever made without the knowledge and approval of these representatives. Both the staff and officials of universities approached the EPRDF’s delegated people “party men” apprehensively. This strategy gave strength and dominance to the party until the emergence of intraparty friction and the reform in 2018. The protest movements intended to end the hegemony of Tigray/TPLF took place from 2015 to 2018. The TPLF’s loyal partners (the OPDO and ANDM) rebelled within the EPRDF using the protest movement as a good opportunity to push TPLF out of power. Regarding this development, after assessing the structure and functions of the EPRDF Lyons (2011) argued that the EPRDF was strong but brittle. Leaders of the party did not see the brittleness of their party and government although they focused on the means of ensuring a dominant authoritarian party system that would stay in power for a longer time.

4.2. The build-up of the economic empire

In the past, Ethiopian emperors equated themselves with the state as if the resources of the state belonged to them. On the top of this, they used to associate the destiny of the state with their fate (Atnaf, 2014). They amassed resources by their name without any accountability as they claimed that they were descendants of King Solomon and Queen Sheba. The TPLF which adopted revolutionary democracy as a new world view could not amass wealth by claiming as a descendant of King Solomon like the previous emperors. As discussed above, the major struggle of TPLF was related to political and economic issues including the claim that Tigray was the most impoverished region in Ethiopia. Their political grievance also stemmed from the long time desire to position Tigray as a core of the Ethiopian state. Tigray had been neglected from participating and sharing resources from the newly incorporated regions under the leadership of emperor Menlik II in the second half 19^th century (Leencoo, 1999; Merera, 2003).

After the TPLF came to power in victory in 1991, they devised that the best strategy to divert resources and create Tigray’s economic elite was through creating “Business Empire” and establishing big companies under the control of the party (Dima, 2009). Immediately after coming to power, the EPRDF established the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (or “EFFORT”) with considerable Ethiopian capital. Leaders of EFFORT were nominated and fired by the Party (TPLF) and its ultimate goal was to realize an industrialized Tigray. In 2002 alone, EFFORT established 28 companies (see Birhanu, 2007, p. 317). EFFORT¹² was the primary ¹³ beneficiary of the privatization of the state-owned firms. To mention some of them, it converted Kuraz publishing company to Mega, Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation (EDDC) to Guna Trading, Ethiopian Freight Transport Service into Trans Ethiopia (Legesse, 2016). Growing rapidly, EFFORT was able to control over 60 large companies that operated in important business sectors such as banks, insurance, and construction (Sisay, 2022).

The Tigray region’s per capita share of the federal subsidy was consistently higher than the total sum of Oromia, Amhara, and SNNP regions although these regions constituted more than 80% of the country’s population (Paulos, 2007; Valfort, 2006). In big cities, people from Tigray were also more advantageous in owning big hotels and business centers. An interviewee in Addis Ababa stated that;

Tigrayans are not traditional business people like Gurage. However, in the last 27 years, Tigrayans were able to open big Hotels in Addis Ababa where the majority of them were named after important and historical places of Tigray. To mention some: Debre Damo, Axum, Adolis, Ezana, Nexus, Harmony, Golagol, Capital, and many other big Hotels and business centers. We can find only two or three Hotels owned by Oromo business persons: Ellele and Romada Hotel. The import and export Sector was dominantly owned by Tigrayans. This could not happen without the support of the party and government. The Tigray elites aren't special merchants or business people but could own large hotels and shopping malls in Addis Ababa. There are very few Oromo investors. This is a clear sign of embezzlement out of proportion and unfairness in economic benefits.¹⁴

Controlling the economy was one of the ways used by the TPLF to retain political power where it created synergies between political and economic power to keep the core position of Tigray. In Africa, it is a well-known fact that assuming political power leads to economic dominance. The point is that access to business or wealth depends on one’s closeness to power.¹⁵ In Addis Ababa business centers, out of 112 import and export merchants in Merkato and Tekele Haimanot, 109 of them were Tigrayans. In addition, in 2016, in Gambella regional state, out of 300 investors in large-scale agriculture, only one person was non-Tigrayan (Sisay, 2022, p. 47 and 50). The synergy among politicians, business people, and the army was highly essential in maintaining the centrality of Tigray elites (Tefera, 2019). Tigrayan investors were found in large numbers in Gambella Regional State (Fana, 2016:18). Why? Fana argued that it was partly due to the hegemonic leadership of TPLF and it might have been because Tigrayans were the first to rush to invest in the region.

TPLF’s plan that was aimed at creating and keeping the centrality of Tigray resulted in imbalances among regional states. The regional disparities were manifested in the access to health facilities, electricity and road network which have a tremendous impact on growth and investment. Based on a spatial review of Ethiopian road density within 10 years (2006–2016), the report published by the World Bank (2017) showed the highest road densities within the 10 years in Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia towns and Tigray region, whereas the least road networks or densities were found in Amhara region in particular and rural areas across the country. The World Bank further noted that changes in road density pointed to greater economic concentration toward the center of Ethiopia and north of the country.

The issue of fair distribution of wealth at grass root level was questionable. Aynalem (2019), argued that after TPLF came to power, Tigrayans have had better access to health facilities, better education but not wealth accumulation. She questioned the whereabouts of wealth appropriated by Tigrayan elites and politicians. When the secret was unveiled, TPLF successfully created oligarchies for sake of maintaining power (Tefera, 2019; Yonas, 2014). Taken all these together, although the TPLF fought for the betterment of Tigrayan people, it ended up in creating oligarchies (Tefera, 2019).

4.3. Security sector as a backbone of political power

The lack of political neutrality in the army has been one of the problematic areas in Ethiopia. In other words, a group in power has used the army as an instrument to stay in power. The security sector in general has been a coercive instrument, not a body to protect citizens both in the past and the present. All regimes have been dependent on the security forces to oppress their people—be Haile Sellassie I or Mengistu Hailemariam or TPLF-EPRDF.

In order to ensure its dominance and maintain the core positions of Tigrayans in the Ethiopian politics, the TPLF demobilized the previous national army. Instead, it recruited its guerrilla fighters into the national army. It also established para-military forces such as the federal police and Agazi division mainly responsible to suppress dissents and opposition movements. Agazi was a division within the army to suppress dissents across the country. For instance, this group massacred more than 30 protesters at Bahir Dar in August 2016 (Sekokaw, 2018).

As a minority rule, the TPLF’s dominance in the military and other security apparatus was to ensure the long-term interest of Tigrayan Elites (Merera, 2011, p.668). As a result, the security sector was almost full of Tigrayans.¹⁶ The leadership structure, the foot soldiers of the national defense force, and the security sectors were almost dominated by the TPLF members. As the members of the TPLF had served for a longer time in the military during the armed struggle against the Derge, this might have been done when the higher contribution of the TPLF members was taken into consideration. Concerning this, Lyons (2011, p. 11) noted while the military is multi-ethnic, its top officers are overwhelmingly from Tigray where out of the 61 top officers, 58 of them were from the members of the TPLF. This gave leverage to the TPLF to dominate the political and economic wheels of the state. Controlling the defense force and the security system was the best means to maintain/protect power at the Tigrayans hands. For this reason, the TPLF created the national defense in the image of Tigray where all the strategies it employed were intended to make Tigray powerful over other regions combined. The major power indicators such as oil reserves, strategic weapons, and large military bases all were built in Tigray (Abiy, 2020). They boldly claimed that these efforts were made to avert misfortunes and not to repeat their ancestors “mistakes.” Here, it is plausible to argue that the motive behind establishing a dominantly TPLF led military and intelligence was not only to satisfy personal ego but also ensure the centrality of Tigray that had been planned during the armed struggle.

4.4. Foreign support as leverage for power consolidation

Although the TPLF was known for its authoritarian rule, it obtained international diplomatic and political support at three important junctures: at the 1991 London conference, during the post-2005 election crisis, and for the war with counter-terrorism. Particularly, on the verge of the collapse of the Dege Regime, EPRDF obtained the blessing of the US at the London conference as the only capable force to capture state power and ensure stability to save Addis from facing the fate of Mogadishu and Monrovia (Lyons, 1991; Ottaway, 1995). To accomplish this, the US unwaveringly facilitated TPLF/EPRDF’s march to Addis in 1991 (Seifuden, 2012). However, America’s “no democracy, no support” condition was systematically neglected later. This nominal conditionality withered away when the US did not condemn the TPLF for its gross human rights violations across the country where donors were generous to the TPLF in the name of supporting Ethiopia’s development although the resources were diverted to a few TPLF oligarchies (see Dima, 2009; Paulos, 2007; Tefera, 2019; Valfort, 2006).

Because of its engagement in the counter-terrorism, Ethiopia achieved both internal and international benefits. 1. The sanction imposed on Eritrea for its alleged support of terrorism has weakened Eritrea’s economy, so Eritrea was unable to sustain the strong military force, 2. TPLF used it (the war with Islamic Court Union (ICU) in Somalia) as an opportunity to divert public attention and regain the legitimacy it lost in the post-2005 election. Internationally, Ethiopia obtained diplomatic, economic and military support from the USA despite gross human rights violations reported (Semir, 2018; Yonas, 2016). In terms of diplomatic gain, the USA, for instance, remained silent regarding Ethiopia’s reluctance to accept the decision¹⁷ of the Ethio-Eritrea border commission, which was established after the 2 years of the 1998–2000 heavy war with Eritrea and continued military and economic aid to Ethiopia (Semir, 2018).

The TPLF’s leaders were the most trusted allies to the West and the best partners in the war against terrorism (Semir, 2018). The ugly face of the discourse on terrorism was that authoritarianism was tolerated as long as the regime accorded with the interests of the West. The aid poured and the diplomatic support earned helped the TPLF to control and consolidate power. In a study conducted to investigate the aid and development initiatives in Ethiopia, Kay McVety (2012) revealed that aid historically enabled “the state to control the people in a more dangerous way.

The TPLF-dominated EPRDF also earned economic and diplomatic support from European countries and China. TPLF took East Asian countries as role models, emulated their policies and tried to implement it with the support of China since 2001 (Clapham, 2006, 2018). The developmental state discourse helped to strengthen control of power in domestic policies since then (Tefera, 2019). Due to its resource-based diplomacy towards Africa, China was the major investor in Ethiopia (Seifudin, 2012). China has invested heavily in infrastructure, including telecoms, railways and in the hydroelectric and irrigation dams (Clapham, 2018). Meles Zenawi was grateful for importing the Chinese policy towards Africa and Ethiopia (Bräutigam, 2009). It is also important to note that the Chinese “non-political interference” policy was also suitable for the TPLF to consolidate its power.

4.5. The continuity of power rivalry and the fear of losing power syndrome

The concept of enduring power rivalry states that it is essential to express the background relationships between or among protagonists to analyze the present situation although the rational actor model questioned this assumption contending that the past does not have relationship with the present (Goertz & Diehl, 1993). In the context of Ethiopia, the past has continued to persist indicating that the past has not been totally disconnected from the present. A group that assumed power has never erased the historical events from the current politico-economic discourse, which instead devised necessary mechanisms to retain power. Recently, power rivalry has entered into a new phase in the post-2018 period in Ethiopia.

In light of the enduring power rivalry assumptions, in the aftermath of the 2005 election, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi assured to Tigrayan university students when he stated that “we Tigrayans are heirs of the crown/throne of emperor Yohanis IV’’ and never relinquish power to any group. The way emperor Yohannis lost power to Menelik II of shawa-Amhara, has been always at the back of their mind, which in turn has created an endurable trauma. They knew the agony of leaving power to their historically enduring rival—the Amhara in the past. Accordingly, keeping the centrality of Tigray was the only way to amass wealth for a few oligarchies (Tefera, 2019). They did it carefully and skillfully for 27 years. The conglomerate business empire called EFFORT possessed over 60 companies (Sisay, 2022). The TPLF wielded almost unlimited power for more than two decades A. (Jeffery, 2016). This was true until the start of the reform within the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front in 2018.

Protest movements intended to end the hegemony of Tigray/TPLF took place from 2015 to 2018. The TPLF’s loyal partners: the OPDO and ANDM rebelled within the EPRDF using the protest movements as a good opportunity to push TPLF out of power. This opened a new power struggle among Amhara, Tigray and Oromo. While the Amhara elites have tested the agony of losing power at least for more than 30 years, the Tigrayans have had the trauma of losing power during the imperial period. On the other hand, the Oromo elites usually argue that Oromos have been the most oppressed people by both the Amhara and Tigrayan rule in alternation. However, when Oromos have recently come to power, it began to play the central power politics and has been accused of working to make the Oromo a core nation signaling the perpetuation of power rivalry. Some Oromo elites argue that the victimhood politics and secessionism did not help the Oromo people in contemporary Ethiopian politics.¹⁸ Rather, they have begun asking questions such as why Tigray and Amhara have always oppressed us alternately in the state power in modern political history of Ethiopia (Ezekiel, 2016).

In the modern political history, Ethiopia’s ruling elites have largely come from the two ethnic groups—Amhara and Tigrayan (Van Veen, 2016). The Amhara and Tigray elites have taken turns in dominating the political and economic center for decades/centuries (Moti Bya, 1996). This does not necessarily mean that the other ethnic groups were not involved but the front line was taken by the two elites. As a result, Oromos have begun to argue that the assumption that only these groups have been presumed to be legitimate contenders and holders of power at the center should come to end (Ezekiel, 2016). Ezekiel argued that to be the center of power and economy, the Oromo must do two things. Firstly, the Oromo must reject the political project that has relegated them to the periphery. Instead, they have to step into and claim their position as a major actor in the political center and must use constitutional means to claim that access and gain that leadership (Ibid). Similarly, Merera also stated that the Oromo is closer to the power center (Arat Killo) of the state than those who came from the North (Amhara-Menez and Tigrayan-Adwa¹⁹) (Opride, 2016). In fact, historically, since the 16^th century (actually Mohammed Hassen argued since the 14^th century) Amhara and Oromo were in constant struggle for power, territory and resource.

The Oromos are not new to power struggle especially with the Amhara. In the 18^th and the first half of the 19^th century, the northern Oromo elites were dominant in the power play (Yates, 2020). They substantially shaped the politics of Ethiopia during the Zemene Messafint/era of princes-1769–1955. However, the rise of Amhara leaders in the second half the 19^th century was believed to have brought the end of Oromo dominance (Merera, 2003). The end of Zemene Mesafinint was marked by the rise of Emperor Tewodros from Gondar-Amhara in 1855. This period also marked the beginning of the modern history of Ethiopia. The Oromo also played a tremendous role in the state-building project and in the fight against Italians at the Battle of Adwa (Yonas, 2016). However, since the establishment of Mecha-tulama development association in the 1960s, Oromo elites started a struggle to maintain the rights and justice for the Oromo believing that the Oromos were under oppression politically, culturally and economically (Tronvol and Ostebo, 2021). One of the informants in Ambo had the following idea;

የኦሮሞ ጥያቄ እና የኦሮሞ ተሳትፎ በኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ውስብስብ ነው፡፡ በ16ኛው ክፍለ ዘመን የኦሮሞ እንቅስቃሴ ተራ የህዝብ እንቅስቃሴ አልነበረም፡፡ በጦር የገጠመውን በፈረሰኛ ተዋጊዎቹ እያሸነፈ የራሱን አምሳል ሀገረ-ምንግስት የመመስረት እንቅስቃሴ ነበር፡፡ፀሀፊዎች ግን በተዛባ መልኩ እንደ ወራሪ እና ተሰፋፊ፤የህዘብ ስብጥር እና የባህል ለውጥ ያስከተለ ብቻ አድርገው ይስሉታል፡፡ በኋላም በሚኒሊክ ዘመን ኦሮሞ በሀገረ-መንግስት ግንባታው ላይ ተሳታፊ ነበር፤እንዲያውም ለሚኒሊክ ሀይል መግነን የኦሮመዎቹ አስተዋጽኦ የላቀ ነው፡፡ ነገር ግን የብሄር ብሄረሰቦች ጥያቄ ሲነሳ ኢትዮጵያ የተሰራችው በአማራዎች ብቻ እንደሆነ፤ኦሮሞን እንደጨቆነች፤ከሚኒሊክ ጎን የቆሙ ኦሮሞዎች አንደ ከሀዲ ተቆጠሩ፤የሀገረ-መንግስት ግንበታውንም የቅኝ ግዛት አደረጉት፡፡ኦሮሞ ትግል የጀመረበት ዋናው ምክንያት ግን የመሬት ባለቤት ለመሆን፣ባህሉን እና ቋንቋውን ለመጠበቅ፤ፍትሃዊ ማህብራዊ ተጠቃሚነትን ለማረጋገጥ ነው፡፡ በተጨማሪም በንጉሳዊው ዘመን የነበረውን ኦሮሞም፤ አማራም፣ጉራጌም ሳትሆን ዝም ብለህ ኢትዮጵያዊ ሁን የሚለውን ሥርዓት ለማስወገድ እንጅ ከኢትዮጵያ ለመራቅ ወይም ለመገንጠል አይደለም፤ኦሮሞ ግንድ ነው ወደየት ይገነጣላል፡፡

The Amharic verbatim account of the interviewee above could be translated as “the question of Oromo and Oromo’s participation and its role in Ethiopian politics is complicated²⁰. In the 16th century, the Oromo movement was not an ordinary movement. It was a movement designed to establish a government in its own image after defeating any force encountered in their way using their cavalry power. However, previous writers portrayed it as an invasion and expansion, which only resulted in demographic and cultural change. Later, during the era of emperor Menlik, the Oromo were involved in the state building process, and the contribution of the Oromos to the power of Menilik²¹ was great. However, when the question of nations and nationalities was raised, agencies of the Oromo struggle argue that Ethiopia was made only by the Amharas who oppressed the Oromos.The Oromos who sided with Menilik were considered traitors, and they were perceived by the Oromos as supporters of the building of the Ethiopian state or a colonial project. However, the main reason why the Oromo started the struggle was to be the owner of the land, to protect the culture and language, and to ensure the benefit of social justice such as education. It was not to secede or separate from Ethiopia, but to get rid of the system which influenced people to be just Ethiopian alone without being Oromo, Amhara or Gurage, which existed during the imperial era. (Interview with a university lecturer Ambo, March 18, 2021)

Eventually, the political relationship between Amhara and Oromo has gradually evolved into two categories, which oscillated between the ‘Sergegna Teff²²/mixture of Red and white Teff/metaphor representing their cooperation and blood ties and the “fire and hay” metaphor denoting their rivalry struggle for a number of reasons (Mohammed & Kidane, 2023). Regardless of historical facts, the dynamics of power rivalry has gotten new phase in post-2018 period and has been taken as a new turning point in the political dynamics of Ethiopia.

The inception of political reform in 2018 has paved the way for the ascendancy of the Oromo to play the power politics at the front line.²³ Oromo elites under the “Umbrella of Oromo prosperity party” stated that now Oromo is in charge of leading the Ethiopian state although Oromo had also contributed to the state-building process which I call it “assertive political discourse.” In short, this group has wanted to play the politics of the center. In the 2018 conference organized in Ambo town to cheer and congratulate Prime Minister Abiy, both Abiy and Lemma remarked that Oromo has begun leading the Ethiopian state.²⁴ These remarks signal that the Oromo has recently entered into power rivalry and competition with Tigrayans and the Amhara.

The process of power shift from Tigray to the Oromo did not transform suddenly. The OPDO which was formed by prisoners of war (Negasso, 2021) has been previously perceived as the best ally/to TPLF to counter the influence of the Amhara elites—Tigrayans’ historical power rival and reduce the influence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Therefore, OPDO was allowed to recruit educated Oromo youth in mass through offering them benefits for those who wanted to join the party. The OPDO also wanted to win the hearts and minds of the Oromo people. Gradually, this helped the OPDO to expand its social base at grass root level in the aftermath of the 2005 election. As a result, vibrant Oromo youth began to come in the leadership position of the OPDO by which these youth gradually questioned the dominance of the TPLF.²⁵ Young people who held ideological differences with the ruling party, including those who supported the OLF had joined the EPRDF²⁶ but later during the protest they reached the middle-level leadership position and strongly supported the protest.²⁷ This gave energy to the OPDO to rebel against the TPLF during the Oromo popular protest/social movement. The Oromos were aware that it was difficult to ouster TPLF via armed struggle. A case in point here was that OLF failed to deliver this (Khisa, 2019, Jawar, 2013). Thus, the best option left was to rebel from the inside and push the TPLF out of power.

An important development that severed the partnership between OPDO and the TPLF happened in 2014. The announcement of the Addis Ababa integrated master plan soured their relationship and ignited a popular protest movement across Oromia led by “Qeerroo” out of which OPDO itself was among the organizers.²⁸ Protesters claimed that the master plan would cause the displacement of the Oromo in mass and would violate the internal autonomy and territorial integrity of Oromia (Wayessa, 2019). Later, the issues grew up into calling for a regime change. This favorable opportunity was well exploited by the OPDO to rebel against the TPLF. OPDO switched its alliance from TPLF and formed a partnership with ANDM. They formed the Oromara tactical alliance in an attempt to promote a cordial relationship between Amhara and Oromo elites. This relationship can be taken as a signal for the beginning of the end of the era of TPLF and hence the end of Tigrayan elites dominance. Knowing the consequences, intended to bring on the fortune and centrality of Tigray, the TPLF ridiculed the alliance as an “alliance between ‘fire and grass/hay’.”²⁹ They undermined it as a baseless and unprincipled relationship. For 27 years, TPLF was successful in leading Ethiopia by pitting the Oromo and Amhara against one another (Jawar, 2018; Tsega, 2018).

The Oromara alliance and the protest movement in Amhara and Oromia forced the ruling party to start a political reform. This led to the rise of Abiy Ahmed, who is from the Oromo, to come to power in Arat Killo.³⁰ Accordingly, the TPLF, a disgruntled group, withdrew from Addis Ababa to Mekelle. It seems that the TPLF was not satisfied with the selection of Abiy to lead the EPRDF and the state (Jawar, 2020).

TPLF organized public discussions with the people of Tigray and pledged to redress maladministration in the region. The TPLF deliberately did this because they knew that the national reform under the existing status quo would reduce the power and influence of TPLF in the political and economic realms. They distinguishably knew the impact of being powerless and the benefit of powerfulness. Therefore, the TPLF left no stone unturned to avoid the debacle of losing power and thereby remain a major power contender. They also knew that power consolidation at Arat Killo by non-Tigrayan hands was meant to be a blow/disaster to Tigray. TPLF attempted to create an alliance with “federalist forces” even before the demise of EPRDF as a party at the end of 2019 and the birth of the prosperity party. The new power holders at Arat Killo–Addis Ababa were perceived by the TPLFs as dangerous for the reputation of TPLF and the core position of Tigrayan elites. All the strategies that were employed to undermine the federal government fell unsuccessfully and finally ended up in the declaration of war on November 4/2020.³¹ The war was the last resort to ensure unchallengeability and maintain the centrality of Tigrayan elites in the politico-economic life of Ethiopia.

Although the TPLF tried to repulse the reform by declaring war, their adventure failed in disarray. The federal government of Ethiopia mobilized a much larger force and resisted/repulsed the comeback attempt of the TPLF. The Amhara and Oromo and other minority groups did not allow the TPLF to come back. The TPLF on its part never wanted to see the reduction of the status of Tigray from the core to periphery similar to the previous time. For this reason, they tried to repulse the rise of Oromo and Amhara to power by declaring war in November 2020. However, TPLF was highly weakened due to the war in which some of its veterans were killed and arrested and military superiority was soon taken by the federal government. The ambition/plan to recapture national power was less likely for them, but its autonomy might not be infringed (Fana & Yonas, 2023). Opting for secession from the Ethiopian state seemed to be very difficult without Wolkait³² and Raya Territories which are geopolitically and economically important areas.

It is worth mentioning here that neighboring Eritrea contributed to the decline of the power of the TPLF. Isayas has been believed to have the desire to punish³³ the Weyane (aka TPLF) in any way possible. In addition to this, reforming important state sectors must have been undertaken to weaken the power of TPLF. Abiy remarked that the reform primarily³⁴ intended to weaken the financial capacity of TPLF, its dominance in the security sector at various levels and networks.

Veterans of TPLF who were at Kality prison-Addis Ababa deeply regretted the inception of the transition/reform process let alone accepting/apologizing for the injustice they committed in the past. The following is their grievance explained to a person in the prison house;

“We have trusted Abiy since he delivered his inaugural speech on April 2/2018. In his speech, he pledged to endorse the developmental state approach and ethnic federalism, and he expressed his loyalty to EPRDF, the party which elected him to lead the state. We rendered our support and agreed to work together. However, for unknown reasons, a conspiracy has been made to push TPLF out of the federal government. Of course, if we had known about this plot in advance, we would have come out of the self-evaluation meeting and devised a plan to curb any attempt against the survival of TPLF. (Keleb, 2021)

As the post-2018 political arena is versatile, it has become subjects of discourses and accusations. Views indicate that it is Oromo’s turn to lead the state, so fear of Oromo elites’ domination under Orommuma ideology has been looming. Regarding this issue, a key informant at Bahir Dar, stated the following;

የኦሮሞ ተረኝነት የሚለው አተያይ ላይ ጩኸት በርከት እያለ ነው፤በሀገሪቱ ላይ የተረኝነቱ አየሩ አለ ነገር ግን በማስረጃ ማስቀመጥ አይቻልም፡፡አዲስ አበባ ላይ ብቻ በግልጽ እየታየ ነው፡፡ በስልጣን፣ በኢኮኖሚ፣በፕሮጅክት እና በማህበራዊ ጥቅሞች ላይ ያለው ሁኔታ ጥናት ይፈልጋል፡፡

Literally translated as “there is a lot of clamor on the point of view of Oromo’s turn; recently there is an atmosphere of Oromo’s turn in the country, but it cannot be proven. It is clearly visible only in Addis Ababa. The power relation, economic, project and social benefits of the process need to be studied.

The post-2018 reform needs to seriously engage in the work of addressing the desire for Oromo hegemony³⁵ within the ruling party (Messay, 2021). Messay warned that the hegemony of one ethnic group, whichever it is, would plunge Ethiopia into extensive and bloody ethnic conflicts. The possibility for the breakup of Ethiopia would loom large if the conflicts engulfed the Amhara and Oromo due to hegemonic struggle. The prevention of hegemony opens the road to peace and prosperity (Messay, 2021). The prevalence of Oromo elites’ supremacy needs yet to be seen as they are still struggling for greater autonomy. However, the solution for the vicious cycle of power rivalry is on the table as the discourse of Oromo elites’ turn is dominating the political atmosphere. An informant³⁶ in Woldiya had the following concerns:

ከ16ኛው ክፍለ ዘመን በጣም ሰፊ የሆነ የኦሮሞ ንቅናቄ በኋላ ኦሮሞ አሁን ለሁለተኛ ጊዜ ሙሉ ስልጣን ይዟል፤አዲስ አበባን ውጠው ከጨረሱ በኋላ ወሎን ለመዋጥ መንቀሳቀሳቸው አይቀርም የሚል ስጋት አለኝ፡፡ በተጨማሪም የአጣየ ከተማን እተመላለሱ ደጋግመው አውድመዋታል፤አማራን ለማዳከም እና ለመበታተን አበክረው እየሰሩ ይመስለኛል፡፡

The Amharic verbatim account of the interviewee above could be translated as “after the extensive movement of the Oromo movement in the 16th century, the Oromo now is commanding full power for the second time. After incorporating Addis Ababa (Oromonizing it), I fear that they will also turn their face to Wollo, they have repeatedly destroyed Ataye town, I think they are working to weaken and disintegrate Amhara.

Some scholars associated the political nemesis with challenges the reform process has encountered (Jima, 2021). A new turn in power rivalry among the three groups has been looming steadily since 2018 characterized by making and breaking alliances. They have not gotten a panacea for this vicious and unending trend so far. The expected panacea, however, is inclusive negotiation and elite bargaining, however tiresome it may be.

5. Conclusion

Power rivalry in Ethiopia is not a new development as it is rather part and parcel of the political culture of the country. The Amahara and Tigray rivaled for power for centuries if not for a millennium. In order to defeat and annihilate the respective rival group, both used controlling a state’s power as the best instrument. Accordingly, exclusive control of power has sustained the vicious cycle of power rivalry and fear of losing power. Leaving power by any means was meant losing privileges and being pushed to the edges depriving of political and economic benefits. Consequently, gaining power by the one was meant losing it for the other indicating an enduring/vicious problem as a group once captured the state power, employed every possible means to retain it.

Tigrayans were suffering from neglect and being distanced from the center where they blamed Amhara for lowering their status and impoverishing their province-Tigray. They took up arms to change the situation in Tigray and succeeded in 1991. Since then, they controlled the defense force, the economy and the security system to stay in power and unwaveringly ensure the core position of Tigray until 2018. After the TPLF came to power in 1991, Tigrayans obtained support from western countries and used it to consolidate power at their disposal. However, the core position and hegemony of Tigray elites came to an end in 2018 due to the inception of political reform after the popular protest that rocked the country from 2015 to 2018. The new political dynamics opened the path for the Oromo to enter into the power rivalry politics afresh. Now, although they have faced resistance from the Amhara and Tigray, the Oromo has been accused of working to become the core nation in Ethiopia. In this way, the vicious cycle of power rivalry and fear of losing power will continue unabated unless genuine bargaining among elites is made to break the vicious cycle once and for all.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The research received funds from the Open Society Foundation (OSF).

Notes on contributors

Mohammed Yimam Endris

Mohammed Yimam is an assistant professor and PhD candidate at Bahir Dar University in Ethiopia. He earned his BA in Political Science and International Relations from Addis Ababa University and his MA in Peace and Security Studies from the same institution. His research interests include social movements, political changes, ethnic relations, power politics, interfaith relations, development, and peace. Since 2006, he has taught various courses related to conflict resolution, peace-building, public policy formulation, governance and leadership, human rights, democracy and democratization, critical thinking, Civics and Ethical Studies. Additionally, Mr. Mohammed has held positions as Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Director of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Directorate at Bahir Dar University.

Notes

1. His genealogical identity was controversial but he was able to control the whole Tigray after the death of Dejach Sibagadis Kassa.

2. A large Amaha army led by Emperor Menlik II marched to Tigray; their number was as large as the soil of the earth. When we observed the face of the Amhara and Tigrayans at the time, the difference was clear; it was like the difference between the day of light and the darkness of the night. The situation marked dawn/sunrise to the Amhara and darkness to Tigrayans. Tigrayans were leaders but later were demoted to be followers after the death of Emperor Yoanis IV (Fisseha Yebyezgi, 1899 cited in Sekokaw, 2018).

3. Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a coalition of four ethnic based parties; Tigray People liberation front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo people Democratic organization and Southern Ethiopian democratic Movement (SEPDM).

4. In studies of this type the condition of ordinary people should not be confused with the struggle and rivalries of Elites. During the Amhara elites ruling time, Ordinary ammhara earned no special benefit or treatment. In 1993, two year after the TPLF captured state power, Andragachew wrote about the down trodden condition of the Amhara people, in terms of health facilities, access to road, access to taped water, access to education.In general Amhara lagged behind in every aspect. However, it seems that Amhara elites accepted the imperial rulers emerged from Amhara community and Ethiopia is a creation of Amhara in cooperation with others. But, the post 1991 period is not good for the Amhara. The Amhara regions is the poorest in road network and health service (World Bank, 2017). Amhara domination’ does not include the Amhara peasantry as dominators but only refers to the ruling elite of Showa (Clapham 1975 cited in Aregawi, 2008). The Amhara elites were not alone in domination the power politics, they involved Tigrayans and Oromos as junior partners (Merera, 2003, ates 2020; Abinet Hunegnaw, 2017).

5. In the process of the birth of TPLF, two EPLF comrades (Jmaica and Mehari Tekelle) joined TPLF; they trained and indoctrinated TPLF, See Asrat Abrham’s book ‘Kehager Bestjerba/Behind Our country: the TPLF-the Trojan horse to EPLF.

6. During the Amhara elites ruling time, Ordinary Amhara earned no special benefit or treatment. In 1993, two year after the TPLF captured state power, Andragachew wrote about the down trodden condition of the Amhara people, in terms of health facilities, access to road, access to taped water, access to education.In general Amhara lagged behind in very aspect.However, it seems that Amhara elites accepted the imperial rulers emerged from Amhara community and Ethiopia is a creation of Amhara in cooperation with others. But, the post 1991 period is not good for the Amhara. Amhara regions is the forest in road network and health service (World Bank, 2017). Amhara domination’ does not include the Amhara peasantry as dominators but only refers to the ruling elite of Showa (Clapham 1975 cited in Aregawi, 2008). The Amhara elites were not alone in domination the power politics, they involved Tigrayans and Oromos as junior partners (Merera, 2003, ates 2020; Abinet Hunegnaw, 2017).

7. See Henz’z interview with Meles Zenawi; ‘The EPRDF was a combination of the EPDM and the TPLF. We work together. We have given the EPDM the military support which has made it possible for them to keep advancing toward the south … . there are many different currents and attitudes in the EPDM. Though it is not as well organized as the TPLF, it does not consist of separate organizations either. We have to help it get better organized, Meles said.

8. Interview with a university professor, March 17/2022, Gondar.

9. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was a ruling party since 1991–2019. It was a coalition of four ethnic based parties; Tigray People’s liberation front (TPLF), Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo people’s Democratic Organization and Southern Ethiopian democratic Movement (SEPDM).

10. Samuel Huntington who came to Ethiopia at the end of March 1992 advised the TPLF to define the future fate of Ethiopia through a dominant party system. He recommended the suitability of the formation of dominant party in Ethiopia. Huntington relegated multi-party system for Ethiopia as desirable but improbable basing his views on the socio-economic condition of Ethiopia and it is a western model so Ethiopia is not conducive for such system. He told Meles Zenawi a dominant party system preferable for Ethiopia.

11. Fact Magazine, Vol.2, number 7, August 2005 E.C/2013 G.C.

12. Sibhat Nega (aboy Sibhat-TPLF’s veteran) confirmed that EFFORT is the biggest Corporate in Ethiopia. Interview with VOA Amharic Service in June 2009 cited in http://ethiopianreview.com/content/10088

13. Wikileaks. 2008. “Privatization or Monopolization in Ethiopia?” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ADDISABABA82_a.html.

14. Interview with a researcher on peace security issues, March 30/2021,Addis Ababa.

15. See Ermiyas Legesse; Addis Ababa Balebt Alba Ketme and the legacy of Meles.

16. In all divisions of the army Tigrayans were dominant. The complex thing was that the northern command of the national army which comprised more than half of the armed forces’ total personnel and mechanized divisions was stationed in Tigray (ICG, 2020), after the start of the reform, TPLF resisted the redeployment of this division in other areas. But later, in November 4, suddenly TPLF demolished this division which marked the outbreak of war between the federal government and TPLF.

17. Ethiopia under leadership of the new prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, elected in April, 2018 fully accept the border commission’s decision and endorsed in the new agreement (article 4) signed in Jidda (Saudi Arabia).

18. Interview with researcher, March 29/2021, Addis Ababa.

19. Merera Gudina 2016: Oromo protests and the future of Oromo struggle, available at https://www.opride.com/2016/08/03/merera-gudina-oromo-protests-and-the-future-of-oromo-struggle/

20. Regarding the Contradictory history of the Oromo and the Ethiopian state, see Brian yates, 2020; “the Other Abysynia”.

21. See Briyan Yates, 2020, the Oromo were key in Menilek’s rise to power in Shäwa and later Ethiopia.

22. “Teff, one of the main crops produced in Ethiopia, has different colors: “ቀይ” “red”, “ነጭ” “white” and “ሠርገኛ”’ “mixed red and white teff.” Farmers store red and white teff separately so that their identities can easily be maintained. However, it is difficult to separate if the red and white teff are mixed see Barkessa’s Discoursive analysis on Oromara alliance

23. Possessed the Premiership, the army chief, the air-force commanding position.

24. They claim the responsibility of leading the state falls on the shoulder of the Oromo.

25. An expectedly OPDO rebel against the TPLF, interview with a senior Oromo politician, March 22/2021, Addis Ababa.

26. Fact Magazine, Why the youth doesn’t protest, Vol. number 7, August 2005 E.C/2013 G.C.

27. Fact Magazine, Protest and Massacre in Oromia, vol.2 number 45, May 2006 E.C/2014 G.C.

28. Interview with one of the leaders of social protest movement in Shashemene, April 2/202.

29. Getachew Reda the Minister of Government Communication Affairs in 2016 remarked that the Oromo and Amhara are like “Grass and Fire.”

30. Arat killo is one of the Quarters of Addis Ababa where the national palace (the office of the Prime Minister) is located.

31. After two years of devastating war, in November 2022, the two forces signed peace agreement in South Africa, Pretoria-the Pretoria Accord.

32. Tigray regional State lost these two fertile territories to Amhara, previously they were the Amhara’s ancestral land but anxed by Tigary in post 1991 Ethiopia, without the consent of the people inhabiting the area. These territories are detrimental in the relationship between the two groups.

33. Meles Zenawi (see Alex De Wal, 2018) said that Isayas cannot forgive the Weyane/TPLF for defeating his unconquerable army and so he is looking to punish them. He tried to do it in two ways; by dismantling Ethiopia or finding enough Ethiopians who can also demonize the Weyane. But in 2018, Abiy and Isayas created friendship; so is it another way of punishing the weyane? TPLFites think in this way.

34. We can imagine that the TPLF-dominated government has been founded on four major pillars. After identifying these four major pillars, we came to see how they can be cut. Touching those four pillars was in itself a difficult task. As everyone knows, the reformist group has no army, it did not have weapons and indeed it did not have the power to rely on. As identified, pillar one comprises the law enforcement organizations such as the defense force, the justice, the National Intelligence office, the information Network security agency, federal police, Addis Ababa police, and the attorney general. Pillar two consists of the party system-sister parties and partner parties and their ideology (democratic centralism), Pillar three is the finance sector, and Pillar four includes the Social bases—Media and religion. We have faced all forms of pressure to stop us from taking on the reform of these four pillars (Abiy, 2021, p. 140).

35. The discourse on Orommumma and Oromo supremacy has become agenda recently, after the coming of Oromo Prime Minister to power in 2018.

36. Interview with a university lecturer, Woldia, November 28/2022, my informant also divided the Wollo elite into three proponents of Amhara identity, Pro-Wolloye identity, and pro-Oromo. Misganaw Andualm the author of a book entitle ‘Ghionawinet:the birth and Destination of Amhanet preferred to use Lasta instead of Wollo as Wollo is the name given to the area by Oromo “invaders.”