Zimbabweans behind the November 2017 coup: A case of conscious political naivety

Abstract

Using content analysis, observation and interviews, this article sets out to demonstrate the naivety of Zimbabweans in supporting the coup that happened in 2017. It also contributes to knowledge by showing how this naivety was conscious, therefore developing and advancing the concept of conscious political naivety. It shows that the coup was never meant for the people but was largely a consequence of power struggles in ZANU PF. More importantly, ZANU PF had presided over a comatose economy and a political dictatorship for so many years. What new things did the citizens expect that warranted the solidarity that was given to the guns (soldiers and war veterans) that engineered and executed the November 2017 coup? The army-induced coup renewed hope among the citizens that steps would be taken to ameliorate the socio-economic and political conditions in the country. It was against the backdrop of many decades of economic suffering, human rights abuses and political repression that the coup got the blessings of the masses. But the question is: On what premise did the civilians think that ZANU PF would reform itself out of power? The central argument is that the citizens were only chasing shadows because the motivations for the coup were never people-centric, and ZANU PF’s political and economic record was tainted and battered for the citizens to expect miracles just because a coup had been successfully plotted and executed.

Keywords:

• Zimbabwe coup
• politically-motivated violence
• political repression
• factional politics
• economic meltdown
• conscious political naivety

1. Introduction

Politically, things moved very fast in Zimbabwe in 2017. The year 2017 will be remembered in Zimbabwean history for the manner in which it “altered” the political landscape of the country. For all those who followed the country’s succession politics, 2017 probably marked the peak of factional fights within the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party when the then First Lady, Grace Mugabe, publicly influenced the sacking of Vice President (VP) Emmerson Mnangagwa. 2017 will also be remembered as the year when Mugabe’s political authority was publicly challenged by the military which was arguably incensed by Mnangagwa’s sacking.

On 15 November 2017, Robert Mugabe was reported as being under house arrest, together with some members of the Generation 40 (G40) faction in order to allow for the smooth transfer of power. Nonetheless, Mugabe himself never mentioned about him being put under house arrest. Two days after the alleged house arrest, he was allowed to officiate at the Zimbabwe Open University graduation ceremony. The army did not want to be seen as forcing Mugabe to resign. The national broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation was briefly taken over by the military. The national television and radio stations went into revolutionary frenzy. Liberation war songs received frequent airplay. State media ceased to attack members loyal to Mnangagwa as was happening before. The Christopher Mutsvangwa-led war veterans’ organisation began to be recognised as the legitimate body representing the war veterans. The army took control of main roads. The troops seized control of the airport, key government offices, parliament, and other strategic sites.

Anti-personnel tanks made unusual movement in the capital while soldiers were uncharacteristically equipped (Hunt & Perring, 2017). Thereafter, the country’s 10 provinces stampeded to endorse votes of no confidence in Mugabe. The end was nigh for Mugabe despite being ranked as one of the shrewdest politicians who could stay in power through playing his enemies off against the other. Mugabe had also given important posts in government and military to his loyalists and relatives (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). Violence was also key to his stay in power (Hove, 2016; Masunungure, 2011; Onslow, 2011). Mugabe was thus keen to consolidate power using every means at his disposal. Resultantly, he did not foresee any serious repercussions arising from the sacking of Mnangagwa. For that reason, one can be forgiven for not taking seriously Mnangagwa’s statement released in exile threatening to come after Mugabe (Jongwe, 2017).

The biggest day was 21 November 2017 when Mugabe resigned after the military had practically left him powerless. The new interim government and parts of the international community refrained from calling Mugabe’s ouster a “coup” because such a label had consequences for development cooperation and membership in the African Union (Basedau, 2020). The coup was referred to as a military-assisted transition. Phakathi (2018) argued that the hesitation by the African Union to call it as such gave the coup leaders the confidence to carry out their plans of an unconstitutional takeover. On 24 November, Emmerson Mnangagwa was inaugurated as the new President of Zimbabwe.

Using the concept of conscious political naivety, this article argues that Zimbabweans sanitised and/or were made to sanitise a coup that had nothing to do with them, and not for their benefit. The paper further qualifies this naivety by tracing Zimbabwe’s history of human rights abuses and political and economic decisions that disadvantaged many. What then did the people expect to change post-2017? This unfounded hope of expecting remote change is what this article refers to as “conscious political naivety”. “Conscious” because the citizens were very much abreast of ZANU PF’s reluctance to institute political and economic reforms for the benefit of all. Current studies on the motivations of the coup have even shown that the politicians had an agenda of their own not even close to the needs and expectations of the masses. For instance, Tendi (2020) argued that the coup was a vote of no confidence in Mugabe’s leadership. It succeeded because soldiers from Zimbabwe’s liberation war subscribed to the coup’s stated ideal to restore liberation struggle principles (Tendi, 2020). Beardsworth et al. (2019, p. 580) contended that the coup was facilitated by Mugabe’s decision to sideline senior military figures, including army chief Constantino Chiwenga—and to sack one of their closest political allies, Mnangagwa. This decision was described by Phakathi (2018) as a turning point. Southall (2017, p. 86) pointed out that military intervention was precipitated by Mugabe’s dismissal of Mnangagwa and his plans to move against the latter’s supporters amongst the senior military. These factional struggles played out against the backdrop of an economic crisis and fears that the country was, once again, lurching towards an uncontrollable spiral of inflation (Southall, 2017, p. 87).

It can also be argued that the military had political ambitions as evidenced by the quick transition of many coup leaders to political careers. Military leaders like Constantino Chiwenga became the Vice President, the late Major General Sibusiso B. Moyo (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) and the late Air Marshal Perence Shiri (Minister of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement), just to mention a few occupied powerful political positions. These senior military officers were also facing the same predicament as Mnangagwa and the coup was not just a need to restore the so-called liberation legacy or to restore the sacked Mnangagwa, but also an issue of survival. These and other appointments suggested that the influence of the security forces within the government would loom even larger than it had under Mugabe (Southall, 2017, pp. 85–6). As noted by Ndawana (2020, p. 203), the militarisation of politics and the state in Zimbabwe deepened under the Mnangagwa administration, with far-reaching consequences on socio-economic and political development. Mnangagwa also promoted Chris Mutsvangwa, leader of the powerful war veterans’ association who pushed for Mugabe’s ouster (BBC, 2017). Besides the war veterans, social movements and groups played a key role in the run-up to the November 2017 coup, and some were part of the mass mobilising spaces. Social movements revived the resistance that was carried out in 2017 and made it easy for people to be on the streets. Social media was the prime tool for disseminating information. It was also used as a tool to mobilise, inform and engage with the citizens.

Post-coup, the officers seen as sympathetic to Chiwenga were either retired or reassigned or neutralised. These included Major General Douglas Nyikayaramba (now late), Air Vice Marshal Shebba Shumbayawonda, Major General Martin Chedondo and Major General Anselem Sanyatwe (Reuters, 2019). This was a coup-proofing strategy on the part of the “new” regime. When one brings together what motivated the coup, and why the public supported it, it is a story of conscious naivety among many Zimbabweans.

This article is divided into five sections. It begins with the methodology section, and then it theorises coups on the African continent. It then discusses the dynamics of factional politics in ZANU PF after 2000. Thereafter, it addresses why the citizens supported the coup before it unpacks how conscious political naivety unfolded in Zimbabwe.

2. Methodology

This qualitative research attempts to explain how prolonged episodes of human rights violations and economic suffering in Zimbabwe inspired the citizens to naively support decisions which did not seem to benefit them in significant ways. In order to do that, data collection methods used were interviews, observation and content analysis. Qualitative interviews with six male and three female citizens from urban and rural areas were carried out between 2018 and 2022 in order to ascertain why they supported the coup and the lessons that can be drawn. The conclusions reached in this paper were not only hinged on the views of the people interviewed, but on the general fact that the coup attracted huge support from the civilians. Ethical standards such as the duty of confidentiality and anonymity were adhered to. Random sampling was used since the participants were ordinary citizens who all had the knowledge of the coup. The author also observed the reaction of the residents of Harare to the coup and realised that there was a lot of euphoria. It was thus important to establish the reasons for that euphoria and why it vanished after the coup. Key research guide questions were: What is your view on the coup that happened in 2017? Do you think the citizens needed to support the coup? What was your reaction to the coup and what were the reasons for doing that? Has anything changed as per your expectations? Content analysis of parliamentary debates, books, journals, newspapers and briefings, to mention a few, revealed among other things the political and socio-economic challenges the citizens endured under Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe and how that fed into the celebrations that occurred when Mugabe was deposed as President. It also highlighted the gloom that followed the 2017 coup. Purposive content analysis was employed as a filtering method.

3. Theorising coups in Africa

The relationship between civilians and the military (or armed servants in Peter Feaver’s words) is an art that demands vigilance from both sides. Feaver (2003) developed a theory of civil-military relations called the agency theory. Drawing on the principal-agent framework, Feaver (2003, pp. 2–3) proposed that civilians decide how to monitor the military based on various expectations they hold about whether or not the military will obey them faithfully in the particulars of what they ask. The military decides whether to obey in this way, based on military expectations or whether they will be punished by civilians (Feaver, 2003).

The first of black Africa’s many military coups happened in Togo in 1963 (Lancaster, 1983, p. 154). Before 1990, Africa was the region with most military coups, and many countries on the continent were ruled by military regimes. From 1990, however, the trend began to change as there were more democratic transitions. The military has been noted as steadily returning to the barracks. Despite this, the armed forces still matter in politics and remain a force to be reckoned with (Basedau, 2020). In 2021, there were fears that military coups were on the rise in Africa. Four heads of state were ousted in sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 as army interventions in Chad, Mali, Guinea and Sudan halted a years-long decline in military takeovers. The coups in Sudan and Mali came in the wake of previous military power grabs in 2019 and 2020, respectively (Carbone, 2021). Guinea Bissau had an attempted coup in 2022.

According to Ogueri (1973, pp. 285–86), coups in Africa happen for a number of reasons. These include genuine motives for change of government, rape of constitution by civil political elites, extravagance, low development, tribalism and ethnocentrism, foreign ideological contamination, capitalist versus socialist communist economic systems, contagion of coups, lust for power and glory, unattractive conditions of service, power vacuum—absence of military pacts, exit of expatriate military officers, traditionalistic extended African family life-style, and divine revelation (inspiration) theory. There are militaries which involve themselves in the political life of a country for gain, although usually on an individual basis. In many African countries, the state itself is the only real source of wealth, and ambitious individuals will try to capture and exploit it. The military can be tempted into this course as well, and there are even cases of different factions of the military fighting over the spoils (Chuter, 2006, p. 12). Chuter (2011), however, discussed that although there have been cases where desire for power or wealth has prompted military involvement, these cases are not numerous.

Military takeover can also be precipitated by political tampering with the army’s professional integrity, its hierarchy of command, budget, and personal amenities, fringe benefits, and pay scales (Decalo, 1973, p. 109). Decalo (1973, p. 108) further observed that there appears to be near-universal agreement about a syndrome of developmental strains and stresses in African political systems that provoke the military to seize power. R (1971), quoting Finer’s (1962) work, The Man on Horseback noted that the military is more likely to intervene in politics if political institutions are weak and lacking in legitimacy. This provides it with more reason for political action.

In terms of how coups in Africa have been received by the civilian population and their impact on the latter’s expectations, it is important to note that it has been a mixture of conscious political naivety and political naivety. Folahanmi Aina and Nyei (2022) argued that Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso succumbed to instability and experienced military takeovers long before the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic due to deep-seated vulnerabilities such as chronic insecurity, political corruption and mass unemployment. Military interventions came on the back of long-ignored systemic failures and growing societal discontent. The citizens in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea appeared to believe that the military could be a credible alternative to the band of corrupt and unrepentant political elites that had betrayed their confidence (Aina & Nyei, 2022). In many ways, the military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea performed no better than the governments they overthrew. Past and present case studies reinforce the perceptions of those who doubt coup leaders’ claims to act in their nation’s best interest (Baltoi, 2023). Radical transitions do not guarantee good governance and better livelihood in the future. Most of the deposed autocratic regimes in Africa came to power via military action in response to perceived grievances from the population. Yet, they turned out to be corrupt oppressors (Ani, 2021).

The theories of civil-military relations and coups mentioned here were useful in understanding what motivates coups on the African continent, and how some of these explanations can be significant in appreciating what could have motivated the Zimbabwean coup. But that largely depends on one’s interpretation of events. The study attempts to contribute to theory and knowledge by demonstrating how conscious political naivety works using Zimbabwe as a case study. I argue that there are two major premises of conscious political naivety. One occurs when people give the benefit of the doubt to an autocratic and corrupt regime that claims to have renewed itself by installing a new leader. This is what happened in Zimbabwe in 2017. There was purported change of government when ZANU PF removed long-time leader Robert Mugabe. This created the impression among the citizens and ZANU PF that changes were going to happen. It is also possible to qualify the concept in the context of repeated military takeovers in a particular country. In this context, people continue to support coups even though they would have failed to institute significant changes and transform lives. But it is difficult to deploy the concept when a new political party, even though the leader could be coming from the ruling party, is voted into power. It is very possible for such leaders to perform dismally but that cannot be taken as conscious political naivety on the part of the citizens because they would have no prior knowledge of the new rulers to use in decision making. In this case, the concept of political naivety can be deployed. Overall, conscious political naivety assumes that people have a record and are knowledgeable about the inherent deficiencies of the ruling party but still continue to support these people expecting them to turn over a new leaf. I view this as a paradox or a contradiction.

4. An overview of factional politics in ZANU PF after 2000 and the fall of Mugabe

This section provides the background to the coup that happened in November 2017. This is important in understanding the naivety of Zimbabweans that supported the coup. Empirical evidence shows that the coup was a by-product of factional struggles in ZANU PF. It can be noted that factional politics dominated ZANU PF post-independence politics. Msindo Enocent (2016, p. 148) pointed out that Robert Mugabe himself was a product and beneficiary of the politics of factionalism within the broader nationalist movement and in his own party, before and after independence. Msindo Enocent (2016, p. 148) further remarked that Mugabe’s leadership was predominantly sustained by the tendency to generate and manipulate factions to weaken internal dissent in ZANU PF and government. Hove (2019) concurred with this view when he highlighted that Mugabe’s leadership was fundamentally sustained by breeding and manipulating factions to subside internal opposition in ZANU PF and government. Although the history of factionalism in the ZANU PF party can be traced back to the colonial era, this study used the events that happened after 2000 in view of their influence on the coup that happened in 2017. Moore (2018, p. 7) argued that ZANU PF’s internal divisions were most evident in the early years of the millennium’s second decade.

In 2004, there was what was known as the Tsholotsho Declaration. The plot was allegedly organised by former Information minister Jonathan Moyo (though the chief architect was allegedly Mnangagwa himself), who later on became a key member of the rival G40 faction (Matyszak, 2012, p. 20). The scheme envisioned making Mnangagwa the Vice President of the country after the death of Vice President Simon Muzenda in 2003. It was expected that Mnangagwa would eventually take over the leadership of ZANU PF and the country. Although Mnangagwa had secured the support of six or more of the country’s ten provinces, he was countered by Mugabe, angered by the Tsholotsho incident, who then amended the party’s constitution so that one of the party’s Vice Presidents would be a woman (Matyszak, 2012, p. 3). That decision saw Joice Mujuru being appointed Vice President. For the time being, Mnangagwa fell out. Mugabe played the gender card and that proved to be the master stroke.

In addition, there have been documented cases of political killings, disappearances and abductions of politically active individuals from both inside and outside of the opposition. Such deaths and disappearances have been described as “political accidents” by Fontein (2018). General Solomon Mujuru is one such widely referenced example. He allegedly had huge backstage influence that facilitated the rise of his wife Joice Mujuru in 2004. Mugabe allegedly feared his influence in the military and the politburo (Fontein, 2018).

Besides the Tsholotsho Declaration, it is alleged there was the aborted 15 June 2007 coup attempt code-named 1940. Mnangagwa’s name was again mentioned. The alleged coup resulted in the “mysterious” deaths of senior army officers such as Armstrong Gunda, Fakazi Mleya and Lifa Mleya. It is alleged that more than 400 serving and former military personnel, as well as civilians linked to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were arrested and tortured over the issue (Newsday, 2017, p. 8). Some of the arrested and tortured citizens were relatives of the alleged coup plotters (Manyukwe, 2008; Voice of America Zimbabwe, 2007). 1940 was the time at which the soldiers were supposed to storm President Mugabe’s residence in Borrowdale Brooke, Harare (The Zimbabwean, 2007). The attempted coup was allegedly sponsored by a clique of people connected to former army commander, Retired General Solomon Mujuru (The Zimbabwean, 2007). Solomon Mujuru’s backstage influence in ZANU PF was confirmed by the ZANU PF National Disciplinary Committee (NDC) in its report that sanctioned Joice Mujuru’s expulsion from ZANU PF in 2015,

From as far back as the 5^th National People’s Congress, the party and government were aware that Joice Mujuru was either leading or complicit in a plot to oust the President. She, then with the help of her late husband had plotted to thwart the President’s nomination at the 5^th National People’s Congress, mainly through the agency of her cabal’s handpicked or imposed provincial chairmen (Machivenyika, 2015).

The alleged 1940 coup plot wanted to overthrow Mugabe and replace him with Emmerson Mnangagwa (Newsday, 2017, p. 8). It was at Fakazi Mleya’s funeral that Mugabe spoke about attempts to topple him through the military, suggesting that the British government had sponsored an attempted coup against him (The Zimbabwean, 2007). However, the alleged coup plot was seen as an extension of the struggle in the ruling party to succeed President Mugabe (Voice of America Zimbabwe, 2007).

The bhora musango/ebola egan’eni (kick the ball off the field) debacle of 2008 can be seen as one of the effects of factionalism in ZANU PF. According to private media, bhora musango/ebola egan’eni was engineered by ZANU PF Members of Parliament candidates who urged the electorate to only vote for them and not the presidential candidate Robert Mugabe (The Standard, 2012, p. 11). In its report produced in 2015, the ZANU PF NDC said former Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband Solomon Mujuru were the architects of bhora musango/ebola egan’eni Bhora musango/ebola egan’eni saw ZANU PF candidates getting more votes in their constituencies than Robert Mugabe. This left Mugabe staring defeat in the March 2008 harmonised elections which culminated in the inclusive government (The Standard, 2012, p. 11). According to the NDC, bhora musango/ebola egan’eni went beyond alienating Mugabe through votes but secessions from ZANU PF by established and top members. Dumiso Dabengwa left ZANU PF to revive the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), while Simba Makoni fronted Mavambo-Kusile-Dawn (MKD) (Machivenyika, 2015).

The bhora musango/ebola egan’eni phenomenon was a consequence of succession struggles in ZANU PF. As pointed out by Ncube (2016, p. 208), prior to the 2008 election, some ZANU PF leaders felt that the party needed another leader to replace Mugabe because of worries about his age, among other things. The 2007 annual ZANU PF conference, which was expected to resolve the issue, went on to endorse Mugabe’s candidature for the 2008 election. This bred discontent within the party. ZANU PF politburo member and former finance minister Simba Makoni pulled out of ZANU PF to contest Mugabe for the presidency (Ncube, 2016, p. 208). Makoni was linked to a powerful ZANU PF faction led by former army commander, General Solomon Mujuru and supported by top politicians such as Dumiso Dabengwa (Tran, 2008). It is argued by some that bhora musango/ebola egan’eni marked the beginning of troubles for Joice Mujuru, not in 2014 when Grace Mugabe entered mainstream politics as ZANU PF Women’s League leader. Because of bhora musango/ebola egan’eni allegedly engineered by Solomon and Joice Mujuru, Mugabe performed poorly against Makoni and Tsvangirai in Mashonaland East, a perceived ZANU PF fortress. Mugabe ordered a recount thinking the vote in Mashonaland East had been rigged. This emanated from the fact that ZANU PF MPs in Mashonaland East got more votes against the opposition while he recorded a low tally when he would have been expected to garner the same votes as his MPs. Mugabe’s defeat by Tsvangirai was seen as sabotage. Solomon Mujuru was viewed as the architect of the fielding of Makoni and engineering the bhora musango/ebola egan’eni strategy (Bulawayo24, 2014).

In reaction to electoral defeat, Mugabe unleashed a wave of violence that left a trail of bloodshed, tattered relationships and revenge-seeking (Masunungure, 2011; Mutanda, 2019a). The military, war veterans and party militias were at the forefront of mobilising and organising the torture of mainly opposition supporters and members of the civil society. The retribution exercise was also seen as punishing Mujuru and Mashonaland East province for bhora musango ebola/egan’eni and propping up Makoni (Bulawayo24, 2014). As compensation for the 2008 election result that favoured but did not give the MDC electoral victory, the 2013 election slogan for ZANU PF was “Bhora Mugedhi/Ibhola Egedini” (Ball in the net). When Mugabe and ZANU PF fashioned their 2013 election on the slogan bhora mugedhi/ibola egedini, it was a warning to the architects of bhora musango/ebola egan’eni to mend their ways by backing Mugabe and ZANU PF in that election (Bulawayo24, 2014).

The race to replace the ageing Mugabe resulted in the creation (or visibility) of initially two ZANU PF factions in 2014, one led by Joice Mujuru (initially known as Gamatox), and the other by Emmerson Mnangagwa (known as the Weevils but later on changed to become Lacoste). Then ZANU PF secretary for administration and Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, Didymus Mutasa, argued that there were weevils in the party and that the only cure was gamatox. By then, Mnangagwa had the support of Grace Mugabe. Breaking ranks with the Lacoste faction, Grace Mugabe fronted the G40 faction with the support of prominent politicians such as Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuwao and Kudzanai Chipanga (Chidza, 2017, p. 2). Factional fights reached crescendo towards the 2014 December congress. ZANU PF prepared placards which denounced Joice Mujuru, Ray Kaukonde, Temba Mliswa and Jabulani Sibanda, among the other so-called “Gamatox” members.

The firing of Mnangagwa from ZANU PF in 2017 marked a decisive break between Mugabe and his allies that fought in the independence war and propelled him to power in 1980. The dismissal of Mnangagwa was a short victory for Grace Mugabe’s G40 faction of largely younger members of ZANU PF (Marawanyika et al., 2017). The war veterans and military were known to be huge supporters of the sacked Vice President Mnangagwa. Besides, it was assumed that Mnangagwa had close contacts in the military (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. 1). Moore (2018) thus argued that the ouster of Mugabe emerged out of ZANU PF’s internal feuds, and these emanated mostly from Robert Mugabe’s refusal to retire. Hodgkinson (2019, p. 981) saw the coup as a decisive move by Emmerson Mnangagwa and Constantino Chiwenga to gain control of the ruling party, which was under siege from the G40 faction. But it should be noted that the military, war veterans and party supporters are not united in the way they support ZANU PF and its leadership. They have always been divided along factional lines since way back and that explains why most of the time they play to factional struggles. The dynamics of ZANU PF’s politics eluded or were not taken seriously by the generality of Zimbabweans who understandably saw the coup as Zimbabwe’s opportunity to do things differently.

5. Making sense of the reaction of the public to the coup

Southall (2017) noted that the military-assisted ousting of Robert Mugabe and his replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa was widely welcomed by Zimbabweans. The involvement of the citizens was further noted as a sign of desperation and weariness with, “ … ZANU PF’s woeful management of the economy and its crude authoritarianism … ” (Southall, 2017, p. 84). The desperation inevitably led to conscious political naivety. There was jubilation countrywide. People from across the political divide enthusiastically converged at Zimbabwe grounds in Highfield (Harare) on 18 November 2017 to show solidarity with army action. The march attracted thousands of people. People could not hide their happiness (Helliker & Murisa, 2020, p. 7).

Although some of the citizens were sceptical about the future, the removal of Robert Mugabe was all that mattered and therefore a cause for celebration. Questions were asked if Mnangagwa would be able to deal with the numerous political and economic upheavals before him or if the opposition was still relevant but the important question on the “invincibility” of Mugabe had been answered. The civilians celebrated the fall of Mugabe because they expected a new era of improved socio-economic and political conditions. As noted by Ogueri (1973, p. 286), the overthrow of a government usually is a culmination of accumulated wrongs and injustices. Any agency of change that steps forth to correct the social ills is welcomed with open arms. Zimbabweans celebrated in anticipation of a better future. Two issues were at stake: economic improvements and political freedoms (Southall, 2017, p. 92).

The reaction of the public was understandable: it reflected fatigue with Mugabe and hope among Zimbabweans, as well as external parties that the new rulers would reverse the economic decline and political repression (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. 2). The relief brought by Mugabe’s departure was captured by the International Crisis Group (2017), “Zimbabweans spilled out into the streets in droves to celebrate his departure. The scene was set for Mnangagwa’s triumphant return.” The ousting of Mugabe opened a window of opportunity for reforms, with high expectations from the citizens and the international community alike. There was a profound sense of hope (Gruzd & Lalbahadur, 2020). Nonetheless, Mnangagwa retained the same old repression tactics such as dwindling democratic space through suppressing human rights and the programmes and activities of civic society, and opposition parties. The economy remained stagnant and the standards of living never improved as anticipated by the public. As desirable as change was, by supporting a ZANU PF-engineered coup Zimbabweans were chasing shadows because the coup plotters were playing power politics that had little to do with the concerns and welfare of the masses.

6. ‘New’ leadership, same old problems: conscious political naivety further explained

ZANU PF’s power retention strategies are firmly rooted in authoritarian discipline (of which violence and intimidation are key) developed during the liberation war in order to deal with the various threats that emerged during that time. Post-independence, criticising ZANU PF came with huge costs such as torture, disappearance, incarceration, exclusion from government programmes, and in the worst scenarios, death. The citizens ought to watch how they spoke, behave, associate and dress. It was therefore important to be seen as politically correct by attending ZANU PF programmes and activities, putting on ZANU PF regalia, and putting ZANU PF insignia on the screens of vehicles. Authoritarian discipline, among other strategies, enabled the party to weather internal and external storms. Now, for the citizens to support a coup expecting change under the same autocratic ZANU PF regime showed how desperate the people had become. Desperation bred naivety. This desperation also extended to some members of the international community as highlighted by former government minister Jonathan Moyo when he criticised a survey carried out by the London-based SABI Strategy Group in January 2023 that purported that the majority of Zimbabweans supported the Nelson Chamisa-fronted party, Citizens Coalition for Change (New Zimbabwe, 2023). Such surveys ignored how authoritarian discipline had helped ZANU PF attain a strong rural base, among other pro-poor policies such as the land reform and indigenisation policies. But one thing cannot be taken for granted. Inasmuch as President Mnangagwa should be credited for preaching peace towards the 2023 elections, the citizens had come of age in relation to political tolerance. People realised that elections come and go but relationships cement communities. People learnt to respect each other despite supporting different political parties. But fear remained ingrained in many opposition supporters.

6.1. Intimidation and intolerance

Since independence in 1980, ZANU PF instilled cultures of intimidation and intolerance. Consequently, Zimbabwe became a highly polarised society, with distinct “pro-government” and “pro-opposition” camps (Gruzd & Lalbahadur, 2020, p. 16). At the height of the fast-track land reform programme (between 2000 and 2002), for example, former MDC Member of Parliament for Dzivarasekwa, Evelyn Masaiti, criticised government for using land redistribution to attack MDC supporters (Zimbabwe. Parliament: House of Assembly, 31 August 2000a: 809–11). Lack of tolerance to political diversity increased the incidences of direct and structural violence. Tolerance would be helpful to the Zimbabwean society in accepting election results, guaranteeing freedom of political participation, ensuring that law enforcement agents and the judiciary do not discriminate against opposition supporters, and that the citizens equally participate in developmental programmes such as food and seed distribution, to name but a few (Mutanda, 2019a, pp. 183–86). However, ZANU PF has never wanted these things to happen in a manner that disadvantages it as articulated by a victim of political violence,

The Mugabe government did not play its part in granting political security to the people. We were beaten up and lost property to ZANU PF supporters in 2008 for supporting the MDC. Rural areas became inhabitable. It is important that people are not punished for supporting political parties of their choice. Now, the Second Republic has shown that it is not very different from the Mugabe regime as people do not enjoy their political rights such as demonstrations (Interview with BJJ, 2019).

Political violence and intimidation during the Mnangagwa era was mainly an effort to consolidate newly acquired power. Barely a year after coming to power, six people were killed when the army attempted to clear protesters from the centre of Harare on 1 August 2018. The army intervened to stop post-election protests in the capital caused by the alleged delay of the announcement of election results (Mutsaka, 2018). Demonstrations and protests remained banned as in the Mugabe era.

6.2. Human rights challenges and the lack of rule of law

One of the reasons why the public supported the coup was because of many years of human rights abuses. ZANU PF’s disregard of human rights and the rule of law started soon after independence. Government overrode several High Court decisions involving state security. This included the re-detention of people acquitted by the courts. For example, on 31 August 1983, Judge Enoch Dumbutshena freed six white air force officers because they had been “persistently and deliberately” denied access to their lawyers before making their confessions. The four had also allegedly confessed after tortured by electric shock (Rich, 1983, p. 5004). On 27 April 1983, ex-ZIPRA leaders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku were re-detained despite acquittal. Dabengwa and Masuku were found not guilty on charges of treason and illegally caching arms and had been detained for more than a year before their trial (Rich, 1983, pp. 5004–05).

In addition, the country’s security forces, including party militias executed operations that led to bloodshed, destitution and misery. For example, the Gukurahundi killings decimated tens of thousands of people in the 1980s (Cameron, 2018; Eppel, n.d.). It is alleged that ZANU PF recruited the youth militia into the police and army through its control of recruitment into the civil service and the security sector (Kriger, 2012, p. 16). This perpetuated and sustained a system of patronage that had little respect for human rights.

The increased use of intimidation and violence against opposition parties, human rights defenders, dissenting voices and civil society since independence, as well as the use of government resources to finance ZANU PF campaigns led to a growing belief, especially after the 1995 elections, that constitutional change was a necessity targeting limiting the powers of the president (Dansereau, 2005, p. 17). An alliance was formed, which was a broad coalition of labour and citizen groups such as churches, cooperatives, human rights organisations, and student groups, organised into the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) (Dansereau, 2005, p. 17). In May 1999, the coalition created a broad-based people’s movement, the National Working People’s Convention. Four months later, it became the Movement for Democratic Change, organised with the intention of mounting a political challenge to the ruling party by contesting the 2000 parliamentary elections (Dansereau, 2005, p. 17).

In the face of growing opposition, ZANU PF organised a constitutional review culminating in a referendum in February 2000. Its rejection by the voters meant that it was ZANU PF’s first electoral defeat since independence. This precipitated a crisis (Dansereau, 2005, p. 17). From the ruling party’s perspective, the defeat not only registered the birth of a huge political opposition, but also opposition which was backed by white farmers and supported by the West, and which was determined to roll back the gains of the liberation achieved by armed means (Mlambo, 2006; Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004). Government adopted drastic measures in order to retain its hold on power. It increased security and limits on political freedoms to shield itself against growing opposition and electoral challenge as well as the institution of a far-reaching land reform programme in which the ownership of all but a few farms belonging to white commercial farmers was transferred to government for redistribution (Dansereau, 2005, p. 17). ZANU PF focused its anti-MDC campaign around the land legacy of the liberation movement. It also assimilated the MDC into the category of “agent of imperialism”, and diverted debate from the wider issue of its own increasingly authoritarian rule (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004, p. 364). According to Mlambo (2006, pp. 54–55), the invasions of white commercial farms beginning 2000 marked the beginning of the Zimbabwean crisis. However, the dishing out of unbudgeted huge sums of money to war veterans in 1997 and the country’s participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo War in 1998 have been cited as the genesis of the Zimbabwean crisis.

The land invasions resulted in rampant human rights abuses and the disregard of the rule of law. They were militarised, evidenced by the involvement of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and other state security agents and militias in the execution of violence that targeted the opposition and white farmers and their workers (Zimbabwe. Parliament: House of Assembly, 7 September 2000b, 27(13): 1220). The civilians were also dressed in military attire in order to intimidate the opposition. This was done under Operation Tsuro (Operation Rabbit) that was launched in March 2000. Mugabe shifted to the Joint Operations Command (JOC), an element of the Rhodesian Security Forces to coordinate Tsuro. Commercial farm owners, along with their workers, opposition party activists, civil servants (especially teachers and nurses) and peasants, to name but a few, were the targets of Operation Tsuro. Three months into the operation, close to a thousand white farmers had been chased off their land, 135 opposition supporters killed and thousands of villagers displaced from their rural areas (Tsvangirai, 2011, pp. 265–269). The military was central in the provision of logistical support and weapons to the war veterans and party militias (Mutanda, 2019b, p. 148).

By 2005, Zimbabwe was experiencing a crisis which took on many forms, including an economic meltdown, political repression, human rights violations, repression of the media and manipulation of the judiciary by government, a debilitating brain drain, and the effects of a run-away rate of HIV/AIDS infections and deaths (Mlambo, 2006). With the intensification of the militarisation of politics beginning in 2000, workers and workers’ organisations were identified by the ruling party as potential enemies. The ruling party was also determined to prevent its political base from being occupied and reorganised by its political critics (Saunders, 2008, p. 76).

The militarisation of politics and politicisation of the military intensified human rights abuses. Military leaders such as Vitalis Zvinavashe, Martin Chedondo, Thabani Khumalo and Douglas Nyikayaramba publicly declared that they would not support any leader without liberation war credentials (Gweshe, 2013, p. 7; Matshazi, 2012, p. 6). In the 2002 election, the Election Directorate Command Centre was closed to everybody except members of the directorate and security services (Sachikonye, 2005). This inevitably compromised the fairness of that election. In May 2012, Martin Chedondo told the media that soldiers would never be apologetic for supporting ZANU PF because it was the only political party that had national interests at heart (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2012, p. 4). In June 2012, Nyikayaramba said opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was a security threat to the nation. He also called on the security forces to be on stand-by to deny any election win by the MDC parties while addressing an army graduation parade in October 2012 (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2012, p. 4). Nyikayaramba’s utterances equally implied that MDC supporters were going to be treated as enemies of the state. This was confirmed by a wave of politically-motivated violence, involving security forces, since 2000. Security forces formulated and implemented an array of operations meant to curb and stifle the political activities of opposition parties (particularly the MDC) and civil society. This was arguably done in the spirit of maintaining the status quo that gave them privileges associated with, in Hendricks and Hutton’s (2009) words, “laagering” ZANU PF.

The security forces were also involved in Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Clear the Filth) in 2005. Operation Murambatsvina was militarised and affected most, if not all, urban areas. Saunders (2011, p. 126) described the operation as “ … a 2005 post-election security forces-led campaign directed primarily at MDC-supporting poorer urban areas, signalled the commitment and ruthlessness with which systematic violence was pursued.” Recalling the hardships caused by the operation, an interviewee highlighted that,

When I look back, I can tell you that Murambatsvina was a disaster. I stayed in Mufakose (a high-density suburb in Harare). In no time, we were told that backyard structures were going to be demolished. We put our property outside the structure and went to our relative just for squatting while we looked for alternative accommodation. By the time we found a place to stay, all our property had been destroyed by the rains. The reason why this operation was carried out and in that manner is incomprehensible. ZANU PF betrayed us. I never had any regret when Mugabe was removed by the soldiers (Interview with Kute, 2021).

In preparation for the June 2008 presidential run-off elections, the ruling party prepared a military, judicial and political blitz to demolish opposition structures and supporters. The operation was code-named “Operation Makavhotera Papi?” (Operation who did you vote for?). Principally prepared by the military, the operation also involved the police, intelligence, war veterans, traditional leaders and the “Green Bomber” youth militias (Chitiyo, 2009). The aim of the operation was to terrorise people into voting for ZANU PF in the June run-off election, or to force long-time MDC supporters to run away from their communities thereby losing the chance to vote (Chitiyo, 2009). The operation was the party’s strategy to make sure that a terrified population voted for Mugabe in the presidential election run-off (Chikuhwa, 2013, p. 147). Because of his experiences during the June 2008 run-off election, Whitehead noted that,

I participated in the march for Mugabe’s ouster because of the way my family and I had been treated by ZANU PF. We were harassed several times at our homestead and when we made reports to the police, we were told that the police could not deal with political matters. By participating in the march that contributed to Mugabe’s ouster, I thought I should support a government that was ready to address political violence. I am not sure if this is going to happen (Interview with Whitehead, 2018).

Whitehead’s comments speak to the naivety that this paper is trying to address. In other words, Whitehead wanted ZANU PF to be a solution to its problems. Ideally, this is possible but reality refutes this type of thinking as ZANU PF has its own power retention strategies that were ignored by the public. The forced removal of Mugabe itself was testimony to the fact that violence still reigned supreme.

Mai Jagger, who underwent psychological torture as a result of her family’s political activities, had this to say about Mugabe’s ouster,

In 2002, a gang of ZANU PF supporters tried to break into our homestead but failed because we had vicious dogs. My husband was beaten when he was found at a local shopping centre. This resulted in him fracturing his hand. In 2008, my children and I ran away from our new home after a series of threats and harassment. It is an experience no one wants. We expect the new ZANU PF government to put an end to this (Interview with Mai Jagger, 2019).

Konz, a teacher, weighed in by saying,

While we are cautious, the removal of Mugabe cannot be regretted. Many of us in the civil service were subjected to constant embarrassment, particularly during election periods. I saw colleagues being frog marched, beaten and verbally assaulted in front of the public and their students. This brought shame to the profession and the dignity of the teachers in-service (Interview with Konz, 2020).

The humiliation suffered by teachers in-service was also explained by one teacher:

Teachers were condemned for the way they had allegedly handled the March 2008 voting process. It was said that when illiterate voters said they wanted padura (literally referring to ZANU PF – means granary in English), teachers would put an “X” on MDC candidates. Rural teachers were also castigated for going on strike from January 2008 up to the period of the election in order to soil the image of the president. Teachers were then made to kneel down and dig “pits” with their bare hands and spit in them saying, Handichazozviitizve kudyisa vaMugabe maelection. Kana mbuya vakati isa padura ini ndoisa paMDC (I will never again betray the president by subverting the will of the voters). After that, they were made to close their “pits” with soil. Our experiences under the Mugabe regime as teachers were horrible. We were seen as enemies of the state even though we were raising genuine issues (Interview with Batanai Mhosva, 18 September 2020).

Post-Mugabe, human rights and the rule of law have remained topical issues. The euphoria of a new dispensation vanished because of perceived state brutality and vote rigging (AFP, 2018; Ncube & Mushava, 2018). Hopes for substantial democratisation were frustrated because of the continuation of authoritarianism (Basedau, 2020). Zimbabwe was accused of pivoting to authoritarian rule. The undermining of democratic reforms was perceived as deliberate because undertaking them would weaken the administration’s hold onto power (Beardsworth et al., 2019, p. 596). The citizens’ naivety was summed up by former Finance Deputy Minister, Terrence Mukupe, when he said, “How can we say, honestly, the soldiers took the country, practically snatched it from Mugabe, to come and hand it over to Chamisa?” (Mhlanga, 2018, p. 1). Having signalled a desire to stabilise the economy and ease repression, President Emmerson Mnangagwa was described by the International Crisis Group (2020) as having disappointed. The government arrested opponents who protested government corruption and incompetence (International Crisis Group, 2020). Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004) thus pointed out that violence and intimidation in one form or another, including political murders and incarcerations, played a vital role in the broad political strategy pursued by ZANU PF since the shock referendum defeat. Put into perspective, the civilians in 2017 chose to ignore this past in anticipation of a revived and repentant ZANU PF but forgot that the same ZANU PF was being driven by power interests in all the things that were happening.

6.3. Economic revival

The quest for economic revival explains why the public, irrespective of political affiliation, was largely supportive of the coup. At independence in 1980, the government inherited a dual economy, with a fairly-developed urban-oriented economy and a neglected rural economy. There was also a skewed distribution of land with less than one percent of the population owning 50 percent of the land (Zimbabwe Press Statement, 576/87/CB/SN). In 1991, the government introduced a structural adjustment programme (the country’s version being Economic Structural Adjustment Programme-ESAP) in order to address the economic challenges in the country. ESAP was viewed as a means of arresting economic stagnation (UNDP, Poverty Reduction Forum and University of Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, 1998, p. 6).¹ It was the conviction of policy makers that ESAP would liberalise the economy and encourage domestic and foreign investment to generate sustainable economic growth and hence expand employment (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998: 2). The removal of subsidies, wage freeze, rise in interest rates, credit squeeze and the general deflation of the economy to contain inflation worsened poverty levels. The devaluation of the dollar made exports very cheap, while imports were expensive beyond the reach of the average citizen (Zimbabwe. Parliament: House of Assembly, 13 May 1993, 19(80):6476–77).

Parliamentarians argued that when the government saw that ESAP had failed to rectify economic issues, it started to put laws that suppressed workers (Zimbabwe. Parliament: House of Assembly, 6 September 2000, 27(12): 1076). ESAP was succeeded by the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). ZIMPREST survived from 1996 to 2000. Its stated aim was to strengthen the reforms implemented under ESAP and removing the remaining structural weaknesses in the economy (African Development Bank/African Development Fund, 1999: i). In 2013, ZANU PF introduced the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) economic blueprint with the aim of accelerating economic growth and creating wealth (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013, p. 6). Mapuva (2017) described most of these policies as interventionist and characterised by heavy political overtones. Policy inconsistency also marred the implementation of these blueprints (Mapuva, 2017). In fact, since 1990, a poor policy environment, government controls, droughts, and measures to address social inequalities via the provision of basic and social services at the expense of production, combined to cause the poor performance of the economy (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 1). While so articulate on paper, government policies were hampered by glaring weaknesses that were left unattended to. These included rampant corruption, kleptocracy, impunity and lack of policy clarity and consistency.

The economic and political upheavals that characterised Zimbabwe since 2000 ended up being referred to as the Zimbabwean crisis (Raftopoulos, 2004: viii). Shortages of food, pharmaceuticals and petrol, galloping inflation rates, unemployment and poverty at about 75 percent, as well as documented human rights abuses and press censorship were some of the indicators of Zimbabwe’s crisis (Dansereau, 2005, p. 7). There was also lack of progress towards economic and political justice (Huyse, 2003, p. 36; Raftopoulos, 2004). As pointed out by Mapuva (2017), since 2000 Zimbabwe’s economy has been on a downward trajectory (perhaps with the exception of the Government of National Unity period), characterised by high inflation, spiralling prices, chronic unemployment and soaring national debt levels. Consequently, South Africa became home to more than one million Zimbabweans who had fled political persecution, economic meltdown, poverty and misery at home (The Zimbabwean, 2015a: 6). Against the backdrop of hyperinflation which had reached 500 billion percent towards the end of 2008, Zimbabwe adopted the multi-currency regime in February 2009 (Biti, 2015, p. 2; Marawanyika & Latham, 2016).

In an attempt to address the cash shortages, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced bond notes on 28 November 2016, pegged 1:1 to the US dollar (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2016). However, the citizens were pessimistic about the introduction of bond notes. Furthermore, there was public discord over cash shortages, crumbling infrastructure and a collapse in government services (Marawanyika et al., 2017). As bad as the situation was, it is not true that state employees such as soldiers and police officers, as claimed by some journalists, went for months in 2017 without getting their salaries (Burke, 2017).

ZANU PF’s economic policies (and political decisions) destroyed the once vibrant manufacturing industry (Zvomuya, 2017). As described by Zvomuya (2017), the politicians in government mandated to fix the economy were more focused on fighting each other in the battle to succeed Robert Mugabe. Votes of no confidence, expulsions, suspensions and hate speech, to name but a few became common in the ruling party. Addressing the press on 13 November 2017 at KGVI (pronounced KG 6, now Josiah Magama Tongogara barracks) barracks in Harare, then Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga reminded Mugabe and ZANU PF how infighting had derailed economic development,

As a result of squabbling within the ranks of ZANU PF, there has been no meaningful development in the country for the past five years. The resultant economic impasse has ushered in more challenges to the Zimbabwean populace, such as cash shortages and rising commodity prices. While our people may be persuaded to take what is going on in ZANU PF as internal political matters in that party, the truth remains that ZANU PF’s conduct and behaviour as a ruling party has direct impact on the lives of every citizen-hence all of us, regardless of political affiliation, are affected by the party’s manner of doing business (Kwaramba & Tafirenyika, 2017, p. 2).

In this case, Chiwenga laid bare not only how factionalism had affected political and economic development in the country, but how the military was also interested in these internal wrangles.

While Africa overall has enjoyed a growth boom, Zimbabwe’s economy roughly halved in size from US$8.5 billion in 1997 to US$4.4 billion in 2007; with unemployment around 90 percent (Bagaria, 2018). Zimbabwe has vast potential to develop but self-inflicted problems such as political intolerance, corruption, mismanagement and poor policies have contributed to her downfall. In 1983, Jeffrey Davidow boasted that Zimbabwe was a success,

In the future Zimbabwe’s position as a regional power, and perhaps as a leader of Africa as a whole, will increase as it becomes more willing to focus beyond its pressing domestic problems and to exert itself on a larger stage. Zimbabwe’s real and potential wealth will provide additional weight to its future geopolitical role. The country possesses two-thirds of the world’s known reserves of metallurgical grade chromite and ranks among the top three in production of chrysolite asbestos. Zimbabwe is the world’s second largest producer of chrome and the fifth largest producer of gold. It mines 36 other minerals including nickel, platinum, copper, and coal (Davidow, 1983).

Such a huge potential never translated into real economic growth. The potential was even realised by Tony Rich who when discussing Zimbabwe’s teething troubles in the 1980s never mentioned economic troubles. He writes, “The Zimbabwean government has had to contend with several major problems which are already suggesting divisions along class, racial, ethnic and regional lines” (Rich, 1983, p. 507).

During Mugabe’s reign, tax revenues and exports fell, the banking system was starved for cash, unemployment rose, poverty was rife, and public health services collapsed (Southall, 2017, p. 87). Zimbabwe’s total public debt ballooned to US$11.1 billion in 2021. The country was in default beginning 2000. The country relied largely on domestic resource mobilisation and borrowing from non-Paris Club members like China as international financial institutions halted lending until debt arrears were cleared (African Development Bank, 2021).

Improving the business environment, while simultaneously creating jobs and tackling corruption have been noted as some of the standard practices in any economic recovery plan, and Zimbabwe was encouraged to do the same (Gopaldas, 2018) because poor governance had resulted in the collapse of public infrastructure and industry (Daily News, 2017, p. 8). It is also imperative to decisively deal with the culture of impunity and lack of accountability on both economic and political fronts. Due to the rampant politics of patronage, there was little accountability for those fingered in corruption, mismanagement and embezzlement (Mapuva, 2017, p. 41). In the light of the foregoing, when the citizens said “yes” to army action in 2017, it was for a good economic and political cause driven largely by the benefit of the doubt (like let us give ZANU PF another chance), which this work describes as conscious political naivety, driven purely by an unfounded source of hope.

As pointed out by a citizen here named Zvareva, the biggest challenge faced by the Zimbabwean economy was confidence crisis: “When ED (Emmerson Mnangagwa) got into power, people gave him the benefit of the doubt but they quickly lost faith in him as a result of the execution of political violence and doing little to arrest economic decline” (Interview with Zvareva, 16 May 2020). Takas also shared his disappointment in Zimbabwe’s “failed” transition, “We thought things would be better since Mugabe is gone but nothing has improved (Interview with Takas, 2020). Without citing any particular reason, Sokos asserted that nothing had changed since Mnangagwa’s takeover (Interview with Sokos, 2022). Based on these sentiments, it was clear that the country was moving in the wrong direction. The lives of ordinary people did not improve and Mnangagwa seemed inclined towards authoritarianism (Rwafa, 2023).

7. Conclusion

This article acknowledges that the generality of Zimbabweans celebrated military takeover because of the escalating economic hardships and the dwindling democratic space under Robert Mugabe. The deteriorating economic situation became a facade for the military and rivals within ZANU PF to topple Mugabe, and the responses of the masses vindicated the actions of the coup plotters. The citizens wanted a new era of doing politics and the resuscitation of the ailing economy. Mnangagwa’s “Zimbabwe is open for business” mantra resonated well with the expectations of the people and the international community. But when one looks at the beneficiaries of the coup, primarily the military and a rival ZANU PF faction, the pro-poor agenda read out at army barracks in Harare by the then commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces amounted to little more than window dressing. The paper contributes to scholarship by introducing and showing how “conscious political naivety” functions in African countries. It uses an academic lens to question why Zimbabweans rallied behind the guns even though it was clear that the coup was a culmination of power struggles within ZANU PF, and therefore an attempt to resolve them using the military which also had vested interests in these power struggles. The citizens were also conscious of ZANU PF’s inconsistent economic and political record but still expected it to correct its wrongs when other attempts had failed in the past. The central argument is that the civilians needed to understand the context of the coup and the history of ZANU PF’s reluctance to institute effective economic resurgence strategies and healing and reconciliation programmes. This would have assisted in comprehending what and who the coup sought to serve, and this would have avoided and/or minimised the disappointments that followed the coup. Conscious political naivety best describes the actions of the civilians in 2017. And this naivety was found across the political divide. Amidst this naivety, the onus is on the post-coup leaders to exercise sincerity in addressing the socio-economic and political challenges facing the country.

Declaration by author

The manuscript has not been published elsewhere and it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Darlington Mutanda

Darlington Mutanda a lecturer and researcher of Peace and Security Studies at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. His research interests are strategic studies, healing and reconciliation and peacebuilding. He is a Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Politics and IR. He is also a lecturer and researcher of Peace and Security Studies at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. Research interests are strategic studies, healing and reconciliation and peacebuilding. He has published in peer-reviewed and renowned journals that include African Security Review, Social Dynamics, Cogent Social Sciences, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, African Identities, Journal of Asian and African Studies and the Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research. Darlington is currently engaged in research that seeks to achieve healing and reconciliation and peacebuilding using heritage-based, victim-centred, non-legal, bottom-up, innovative and home-grown solutions. He is also interested in the strategic and tactical dynamics of guerilla and conventional warfare.

Notes

1. ESAP survived from 1991–1995.