International relations and the concentric hermeneutic circle: Wendt’s constructivism and the inevitability of circular interpretations

Abstract

The nature of the hermeneutic circle was a contentious debate among philosophers in the early to the mid-20th century. A considerable number of academics have been against the idea of interpretation moving in a circular motion and the presence of presuppositions to generate finer interpretations due to the subjective bias it may cause. Nevertheless, this article attempts to revisit past debates on the hermeneutic circle to studying international relations, specifically, Wendt’s conception of constructivism. This article delves into the philosophical position of Wendt in the social construction of anarchy and social theory of international politics and finds commonalities to the philosophical stances of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Bultmann, related to the authenticity of interpretations that can be generated from being inside a hermeneutic circle. In defense of the hermeneutic circle and against the idea of it being a vicious circle, the arguments presented in this article are twofold; 1) Wendt’s intentional submersion into the hermeneutic circle of international relations, constructivism, and neorealism, and 2) Construction of concentric circles and the importance of intersubjectivity. It also contends that future inquiries of constructivism and international relations, in general, will not escape this hermeneutic circle, leading to the production of authentic interpretations of our international relations inquiries.

Keywords:

• hermeneutic circle
• international relations
• constructivism
• philosophy

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

This article attempts to revisit past debates on the hermeneutic circle to studying international relations, specifically, Wendt’s conception of constructivism In defense of the hermeneutic circle and against the idea of it being a vicious circle, the arguments presented in this article are twofold; 1) Wendt’s intentional submersion into the hermeneutic circle of international relations, constructivism, and neorealism, and 2) Construction of concentric circles and the importance of intersubjectivity. It also contends that future inquiries of constructivism and international relations, in general, will not escape this hermeneutic circle, leading to the production of authentic interpretations of our international relations inquiries.

1. Introduction

The study of international relations has enjoyed constructive development in theory-building in the past several decades. World politics have enjoyed a diversity of interpretations as to how the world works and how states perceive one another. Nonetheless, this is not without debates among proponents of particular theories that have emerged amid the presence of newly introduced concepts in international relations. The great debate of the early 20^th century established differing positions between idealists and realists, arguing different versions of interpretation of the nature of international politics amid the rising tensions in world affairs (Baylis et al., 2019).

A post-positivist account of international relations also emerged in the late 20^th century, arguing for the social construction of world politics. Rather than interpreting that the world is in a fixed anarchic structure as defended by the neorealists and neoliberals, they favored explaining the social construction of states, national interests, and the overall structure of world politics (Walt, 2005). Critical theorists of international relations have also argued the need to focus more on emancipatory agendas for international relations topics, one that, among others, attempts to expose the deficiencies of capitalism (James, 2010). Nevertheless, one conclusion we can draw from the divergent interpretations of international studies is that interpretation is an inevitable variable in our quest to understand the world better. One thus can argue that we may be stuck in an unavoidable circle of continuous interpretation, making new understandings out of previous understandings of world politics.

One needs to revisit the past debates on hermeneutics to better understand the significance of interpretation in international relations. In simple terms, hermeneutics is the idea of interpretation, defended as a valid source of knowledge. Interpretation has been at the heart of post-positivists’ argument, arguing that a different approach is required in generating new knowledge for social sciences (Bowie, 1998; Shklar, 2004). As time passed, academics have been close to concluding that the methods needed to advance sciences in the social sciences require much more than a positivist methodology such as that of natural sciences (Putra, 2023). It requires a deep understanding of the subjects, demanding a researcher to provide the most possible valid interpretation of the issue (Schuetz, 1953). In Taylor’s past study, he also recognizes that we need to acknowledge the presence of a “sciences of man,” in which sciences that have humans as the subject of inquiry needs to be understood differently from that of the natural sciences (Taylor, 1971).

The history of hermeneutics can be traced back to the times of religious and ancient text interpretations. Considering the complexities of understanding such texts, it was difficult to adopt a single approach to understanding texts produced hundreds of years ago (Grondin, 2015). A significant component of this interpretation process is that to comprehend a text fully, and we need to connect the parts of the text to the whole. Such raises a scenario in which, in genuinely understanding texts, one must presuppose what the text may mean at the end (Dilthey, 1996; Maddox, 1983).

When hermeneutics was initially introduced, many questioned the scientific validity of interpretations. But upholding this idea of possibly differing interpretations between one individual and the other, one starts to ask then how we could be sure that our interpretation falls under the scientific category. In bettering our understanding of interpretations, past academics have taken this question very seriously. As will be described in the following section, the presence of presuppositions has been considered a vital element in producing solid and valid interpretations (Gadamer, 1990; Heidegger, 1996). Another form of debate concerning hermeneutics is what variables should be considered in understanding interpretations. Some academics, such as Geertz, attempted to integrate the variable of culture in perfecting our interpretations. He argued that culture would be an integral part of one’s life, thinking, and, thus, interpretation (Geertz, 1973). Geertz’s analysis of “thick description” concludes well how in understanding social realities, one must also see how the subjects perceive their surroundings. Schuetz, in a study conducted in 1953, also shed light on how interpretations are generated by individuals, assessing how as part of common-sense thinking, one attempts to interpret based on the selection of past experiences and previous stocks of knowledge (Schuetz, 1953). The diversities in opinions on hermeneutics only confirm Davey’s conclusion that the study of hermeneutics/interpretation is an open domain, and defining it is not easy (Davey, 2017).

The uniqueness of the study of international relations is the abundance of empirical data that scholars can analyze. Taylor terms empirical data as “brute data,” a particular form of data in which different types of interpretations to it cannot invalidate past interpretations. Thus, when Wendt argued in the past that anarchy is what states make of it, he was not dismissing the overall concept or presence of anarchy itself. He attempts to understand better why specific structures emerge and how perceptions of such structures matter.

Wendt’s constructivism has been much discussed in the study of international relations. Two of his seminal works, “anarchy is what states make of it,” and “social theory of international politics” have been the study’s fundamental grounds for contemporary constructivism research. If assessed in detail, both of his works attempt to build up past interpretations of the variables he is considering; states, international structures, anarchy, and state behavior. During the rise of the international relations study, realists enjoyed a relatively dominating position in the study through their conclusion of materialist-based explanations of international relations. They argue in bettering our understanding of international relations, and one must acknowledge that states have self-interests and the structure of the international system is that of anarchy. Wendt’s role, thus, was to provide more profound, socially-based argumentation as to why certain behaviors are adopted or why specific structures show higher tendencies to surface. In a way, we can conclude that Wendt’s social construction of constructivism interpretations is conducted within a hermeneutic/interpretation circle that attempts to better understand international relations by building up and perfecting past interpretations of international relations. This essay will argue that Wendt’s constructivism introduced in the late 20^th century, is a testament to international relations constructivism being “stuck” in an inevitable hermeneutic circle and has produced comprehensive interpretations for studying international relations. To defend this, I will argue; 1) the deliberate construction of Wendt’s neorealist and constructivist hermeneutic circle and 2) the presence of concentric hermeneutic circles and the case of intersubjectivity.

2. The hermeneutic circle: A vicious cycle?

Boeckh introduced the term “hermeneutic circle,” a philologist attempting to explain the motion one goes through in producing an interpretation (Seebohm, 1977). During the early introduction of the hermeneutic circle, there were not many discussions, let alone controversies, about the hermeneutic circle. Ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates only occurred as philosophers in the early late 19^th century and early 20^th century started to increase the importance of circular motion in interpretation. The central debate in the past was whether being stuck in a hermeneutic circle was considered a bad or a good thing. But the debate does not seem to be solely on such grounds, as the divisions among opinions tend to be based on the positivist and post-positivist division. Those defending the circle argued that by referring to presuppositions and past interpretations, the only outcome is a better interpretation resulting from the processes. Meanwhile, those against it argued that the validity of interpretation could not be guaranteed.

But at the center of the debates lies the influence of pre-understanding. Those against the hermeneutic circle have argued that we can never attain authentic interpretations if we are only going to refer to something that we have presuppositions of. Meanwhile, those defending the hermeneutic circle argue the importance of such presuppositions in order to grasp better and produce better sciences. This goes in reference to Taylor’s seminal work in 1971, arguing the importance of intersubjectivity in understanding human sciences. As Taylor claimed, humans can only comprehend certain realities by intersubjective understanding (Taylor, 1971). Intersubjectivity here means a specific meaning that is commonly held by a group of people, which sheds light on differing perspectives on issues. A key component in society is the dynamics that continually evolve. Having a natural science method of fixed interpretations can cause us to misinterpret our observations due to a single-imposed definition of different types of dynamics (Shklar, 2004). Several philosophers have been defending the importance of having a certain form of presupposition in interpretation (can be in the form of understanding, expectations, or anticipations), including Bultman, Ricoeur, and especially Heidegger and Gadamer. They have built up the past assumptions of this hermeneutic circle coined by Boeckh, and further developed by Schleiermacher, to explain the advantages of being in this constant circular interpretative motion (Martin, 1972).

Schleiermacher provided a descriptive understanding of the circular motion of interpretation. He argued that not only is interpretation tended to be in a hermeneutic circle, but other studies should adopt that interpretation itself. For Schleiermacher, the hermeneutic circle meant this process: if one wants to understand the whole, one needs to link parts of a text to the whole and vice versa (Duke & Forstman, 1978; Schleiermacher, 1998). Schleiermacher didn’t give much more meaning to the term “circle” besides that in interpretation, and one will always have to refer to something else to understand better.

Following Schleiermacher, Heidegger introduced new concepts concerning the hermeneutic circle. For Heidegger, the circular motion of interpretations leads one to attain authentic interpretations (Heidegger, 1996). But in order to do so, one needs to adopt anticipations in the process of understanding certain texts. Despite the possibility that an individual has no comprehension of what a text would mean, Heidegger, argues that a person does know the intention of a text and, in a sense, can somewhat comprehend the meaning of the text. Only if an anticipatory structure is present can an individual identify insufficiencies in text in order to substitute the deficiencies with a new interpretation and understanding (Grondin, 2015; Palmer, 1969).

Continuing the works of Schleiermacher and Heidegger, Gadamer was also an individual well-known for defending the hermeneutic circle. Different from Heidegger, presuppositions are labeled by Gadamer as prejudices. Pre-orientations for Gadamer lead to authentic interpretations. Meanwhile, bad prejudices may produce misinterpretations (Gadamer, 1990). Gadamer explains that to produce good prejudices, one must realize that the horizons between the interpreter and the text are probably different. Different horizons mean the time of publication is different, or perhaps the context is not accustomed to the context of the interpreter. Thus, the solution is to merge horizons by first acknowledging the differences of the horizons and, second, by attempting to grasp the context and understanding based on the text’s horizon (Maddox, 1983). In the process, Gadamer explains that we will be able to evolve our understanding (presupposition/prejudices), thus making the interpretation flexible to changes. The process of interpretation for Gadamer also involves prejudices that contain historical references, questions, and concerns, which an interpreter attempts to find and connect while going through a text. In conclusion, being a prominent defender of the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer contends that the hermeneutic circle is not vicious as long as one can extract understandings based on good prejudices.

The views of Bultmann and Ricoeur are also worth mentioning. For Bultmann, the key to interpretation lies in understanding the interpreter as a subject. Interpretation involves an individual embracing certain pre-conceptions (Bultmann, 1955). Thus, we can better understand by understanding more about the individual producing the text. Meanwhile, referencing religious texts, Ricoeur, in his past studies, elaborated on how we can only fully grasp an understanding of texts if we believe (Mootz & Taylor, 2011). Both authors defended the notion that hermeneutics, specifically the hermeneutic circle, is an invigorating circle.

Being stuck in a hermeneutic circle did not resonate well among other philosophers and academics. In explaining the nature of the circular motion of the hermeneutic circle, Boeckh argued that an interpreter needs to venture out of the circle because if interpretations are based upon presuppositions, it produces a subjective understanding of the texts (Grondin, 2015; Maddox, 1983). For academics such as Dilthey and Weber, preventing a subjective production of sciences should be the concern of social sciences. Providing interpretations not based on presuppositions leads to better objectivity and ensures interpretations’ validity (Dilthey, 1996; Dilthey & Jameson, 1972). Weber argues explicitly the importance of having empirical laws to attain verifiable results to a certain interpretation (Fieldman, 1991).

Whomever side one chooses, it is inevitable to argue that the study of international relations has been stuck in a hermeneutic circle, especially the studies under constructivism. Nevertheless, this article echoes the thoughts of Heidegger, Gadamer, Bultmann, and Ricoeur, who emphasizes that the presence of a hermeneutic circle only leads to the production of better interpretations of a study. This article will now focus on how Wendt’s constructivism from his 1992 and 1999 seminal works on anarchy and the social theory of international politics is a form of deliberate submersion into existing hermeneutic circles.

3. Wendt’s constructivism and the hermeneutic circles of constructivism, international relations, and neorealism

In (Wendt’s, 1992) article on anarchy, Wendt attempts to discuss the construction of key terms in international relations that were taken for granted. The terms include anarchy, national interest, and power. For the neorealist school, anarchy is the inevitable structure of international relations due to the self-help and self-interests of state actors in the international system. Wendt argues that the international system may face anarchy, but what should be considered critically is why the terms are constructed in such terms. As the title indicates, anarchy is not an automatic system in the international structure. The presence of anarchy does not automatically lead to coerciveness as it is independent of how states perceive the level of rising hostilities (Wendt, 1992). In furthering our understanding of the nature of constructivism, Wendt is building up on past material-inspired argumentation of neorealists and neoliberals, an attempt to provide alternative understandings.

This section argues that Wendt has intentionally submerged himself into the hermeneutic circles of constructivism and neorealism. As Wendt mentions in his article, Wendt recognizes that his alternative interpretation is based on what Nicholas Onuf termed as constructivism (Wendt, 1992). Onuf used the term constructivism to explain how, like individuals, state actors live in a constructed world (Onuf, 1989). Onuf thus makes the breakthrough of introducing the ontological discussion on the constructed realities of international relations, inspired by sociological and socio-psychological analysis. Wendt was highly influenced by the ontological position of Onuf and decided that existing theoretical developments of international relations simply conclude that the world is constructed based on specific structures, such as anarchy, without examining how this phenomenon came into existence. As an interpreter of international relations phenomena, Wendt positions himself as embracing the stance that no current understanding is ever complete (VanLeeuwen et al., 2017). Thus, related to the thoughts of Bultmann, by perceiving the interpretation as a whole context of understanding from an individual (who embraces different cultures and has different presuppositions), we can obtain better understandings (Bultmann, 1955).

The first hermeneutic circle is the capacious hermeneutic circle of international relations. As a study, international relations have never been independent of past sociological observations and concepts. Early realist thinking referenced existing interpretations of human behavior brought by the likes of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. The perception is that humans are selfish creatures thinking to advance their self-interests. Like humans, classical realists bridged the conceptions of studying states into international relations (Baylis et al., 2019; Griffiths, 2020). Following after are new interpretations of studying international relations introduced under neorealism (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979) and neoliberalism (Brown & Ainsley, 2005; Keohane, 1984). The emergence of such interpretations, thus, is a product of building up past interpretations by providing alternative understanding. What Wendt attempted to undergo in his project of constructivism in 1992 was to focus on crucial terminologies and offer alternative interpretations to them. Terms such as anarchy, states, and international structure, quickly became the objects of inquiry for Wendt as he attempted to uncover different meanings of the terms. Existing materialist-oriented arguments, stating that anarchy is the automatic system that would emerge, for Wendt, are too conclusive and are arguments that social theories can perfect. Thus, by elaborating on the social construction of anarchy, Wendt immerses himself in the extensive hermeneutic circle through reference to socially-constructed argumentations.

When Wendt discusses the social construction of anarchy, he makes substantial reference to anarchy. But rather than arguing about falsifying the presence of anarchy in the international system, Wendt is using existing sciences as a form of pre-understanding. As Heidegger argues, an essential part of interpretation has a particular prior understanding of the phenomena being inquired, which in this case, is the neorealists argumentation of international relations (Heidegger, 1996). By having such an anticipatory structure, Wendt attempts to ontologically contribute to the discussion of anarchy in international relations structure and argue that the emergence of it is not natural and predisposed. On the contrary, he argues that anarchy can take into multiple forms, not only leading to foreign policies of self-help and maximization of power. For Wendt, Anarchy has three possible forms of culture, including Hobbesian, Kantian, and Lockean cultures of anarchy (Wendt, 1992). In a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, states in the international system perceive the structure as coercive, thus leading them to hostile policies in their international relations interactions. Meanwhile, in a Lockean culture of anarchy, the emphasis is competitiveness, yet one that recognizes sovereignty and is bounded by certain rules and norms. In a Kantian culture of anarchy, coercivity is near absent, and states tend to adopt policies that cooperate with one another.

Wendt’s anticipatory structure thus can be concluded to consider past neorealist positions and materialist-based assumptions that anarchy is the fate of states. Wendt famously argues that anarchy itself is just a word, an empty vessel that does not automate state actions and behaviors (Wendt, 1999). What matters eventually is how states perceive it and should act in accordance (Hopf, 1998). Thus, Wendt immerses himself in the hermeneutic circle of neorealists with the intention not to falsify existing assumptions but to provide ontological foundations to comprehend the existence of anarchy better.

A central theme to (Wendt’s, 1999) book, the social construction of international politics, is the role of ideas, cultures, and norms in constructing international relations realities. He argues that by investigating ideational factors, we can better comprehend why states act in a certain way and how structures of the international system are formed. In reality, such variables have already been explored in other interpretations of international relations, including past interpretivism and relativism works on international relations. For example, several existing works have assessed the significance of ideas concerning culture and norms in international scholarship (Kapitonenko, 2022). Alternative interpretations and understandings have also been introduced by the feminist research agenda of international relations (Hoffman, 2001; Whitworth, 1994, 2016) and colonialism/post-colonialism (Idowu, 2010; Loomba, 2007; Meer, 2018). Analysis of the meaning of texts and emancipatory agendas in international research was also evident during this time period (Ashley & Walker, 1990; Cox, 2016).

As Gadamer elaborates on the hermeneutic circle, part of the process of interpretation is having good prejudices and having concerns and questions in mind (Gadamer, 1990). Thus, although presuppositions are central to authentic interpretations, immersing in a text with certain focused concerns and questions makes for a holistic interpretation. Wendt’s questions and concerns include the idea that states act out of automatization. The presence of an anarchic system will lead to, for example, power politics, self-help, and coercive relations among states. Wendt questions this tendency by investigating the roots of national interests and how a state abides by a certain identity in international politics. In explaining the three forms of anarchy cultures, Wendt is flexible in his interpretation. He asserts that no single definition and scenario could arise in all different circumstances. Thus, by having Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian anarchy of cultures, Wendt affirms the possibility of what Adler states as “cognitive evolution” (Adler, 1992). Cognitive evolution embraces the idea that social realities develop and evolve with time. Thus, one needs to be wary of this possibility to produce knowledge.

With the hermeneutic circle, Wendt echoes the idea that the presence of alternative interpretations produces authentic interpretations (Bultmann, 1955; Gadamer, 1990; Heidegger, 1996). Wendt arguably provides one of the most comprehensive elaborations on the social construction of international relations realities. Still, one can argue that this was not independent of prior knowledge of the topic. As stated, in order to have alternative interpretations of international relations, Wendt had to immerse himself in the hermeneutic circle of existing international relations studies to generate a theory on the social construction of international relations. Constructivism and the role of ideas have existed in past studies. Thus, Wendt is building up past assumptions by making deeper inquiries into the social constructions of the realities taken for granted in existing literatures at that time. Therefore, the hermeneutic circle that Wendt is submerging himself into has not harmed the interpretation. By borrowing concepts of sociology and socio-psychology, one can grasp a more realistic understanding of world affairs.

In (Wendt’s, 1992) seminal work, Wendt argues how anarchy is what states make of it. By making this inquiry, Wendt is constructing the ontological foundations for understanding anarchy based on existing ontological inquiries concluded by neorealists and neoliberals. Neoliberals acknowledge that we live in a state of anarchy but that states tend to adopt policies that generate the most benefits for the country. On the other hand, Neorealism takes a robust approach to explain how systematic determinants are the key to understanding international affairs. The system of anarchy generates power-maximizing policies and a tendency for states to be self-interested. Wendt argues that this existing hermeneutic circle of anarchy and state behavior has alternative interpretations that can better be comprehended by inquiring into the construction and perceptions of those contested. Thus, in producing his alternative interpretation of anarchy, it is inevitable to conclude that he has been, since the beginning, stuck in the hermeneutic circle. However, in contrast to being supportive of the past claims, Wendt is operating what contemporary scholars such as Al-Kassimi argues is a form of “hermeneutics of suspicion,” a form of skeptically reading past texts with the intentions of revealing illusions and ideas not perceived as the truth (Al-Kassimi, 2023).

But contrary to what Boeckh encourages, Wendt has no reason to get out of the hermeneutic circle. If he did not immerse himself in the circle, then anarchy would not be the main point of inquiry in explaining social constructs in international systems. Thus, we can validly argue that Wendt’s immersion into the hermeneutic circle has benefitted his attempt to provide authentic interpretations of anarchy, and his 1999 work on the social theory of international politics contributed immensely to the roles of culture, norms, and ideas in international relations.

The development of ontological security is arguably another point to why the hermeneutic circle contributes to new ideas in bettering scholars’ understanding of international relations. Ontological security academics such as Brent Steele also immersed into the hermeneutic circle of an initially realist-dominant international relations. Past studies of security in international relations oriented to hard power assets in making sense of the security decision of states. Steele’s hermeneutic circle starts by raising the theoretical puzzle of security being too dominated by the realist assumptions of safeguarding a state’s physical features (Steele, 2014). He argues, in the case of individuals for example, the presence of insecurity is most likely caused by emotional or psychological factors. Ontological security theorists conclude that the existing understanding of security is missing something, and it is only through the consideration of past assumptions on security that such a theoretical puzzle could be discovered. But the value of the hermeneutic circle can be found in how Steele considers the importance of continuity and preserving a certain identity to understand what factors drives a state’s security policies (Steele, 2005). He references Wendt’s past assumptions on the importance of predictability and identity, by focusing on the continuity and how states’ willingly affirm a certain identity through consistency of actions.

4. Wendt’s concentric hermeneutic circles and the case of intersubjectivity

In 1983, Maddox argued that those defending the hermeneutic circle argued that what it creates is not an ordinary circle but one that is concentric (Maddox, 1983). A concentric hermeneutic circle is the process of interpretation evolution. The core of a certain hermeneutic circle will only evolve through the presence of new interpretations aimed at explaining cognitive evolutions (Maddox, 1983). Nevertheless, an essential point about the hermeneutic circle is its centrality. It argues that despite evolving interpretations of a subject or object of inquiry, past interpretations are at the center or foundation of a circle. Thus, newly developed interpretations are simply developments of past interpretations.

In understanding the concentric circle, a point worthy of being re-referenced is Taylor’s “sciences of man.” In his seminal 1971 work, he argues that scholars cannot approach social sciences in a positivist way like that in the natural sciences. The only possible solution to generate proper interpretations of human action is acknowledging intersubjectivity. By definition, intersubjectivity is an understanding that a society holds concerning something (Taylor, 1971). To fully comprehend dynamics in human actions, we must understand that different cultures have different views and perceptions of how they understand a certain phenomenon or object. By painting a single brush on all events, we risk the issue of misinterpretation.

(Wendt’s, 1999) book on the social theory of international politics embraces these two concepts. He first shows that not only is he inside the hermeneutic circle of existing material-based assumptions to the determinants of state action in world affairs, but it forms a concentric circle. At the center of the circle is the role of ideas (Wendt, 1999). He defends the notion that nothing is naturally-given in this world, which also means that certain state behaviors are not the result of certain robotic mechanisms of the international system. On the contrary, she argues that the existing inquiries of international politics, including questions such as why states behave in a certain matter, what it means to be a state, what constitutes interests and identities, what is the meaning of anarchy, as well as what constitutes the structure of international relations, can all be explained through the core concept of ideas. Thus, for Wendt, ideas lie at the heart of his concentric hermeneutic circle.

Furthermore, Wendt also acknowledges that to attain a full grasp of why certain phenomena arise, including their meaning of it, one needs to refer back to intersubjectivity. Wendt’s idea of intersubjectivity is similar to the arguments of Heidegger’s’ anticipation structure and Gadamer’s good prejudices (Grondin, 2015; Palmer, 1969). It is based on the fact that people must embrace certain understandings to produce authentic interpretations, but what we know depends much on intersubjectivity. In understanding why states do not invade states, one could inquire about the intersubjective meaning of sovereignty for state actors. It is not because of the presence of a robotic system that automates to invade or not, but it is due to how states come to understand the term sovereignty. Just like in the context of social interaction, the intersubjectivity of a term is developed within a society. In the international system, states have defined this notion of sovereignty as control within the border of a state and a concept that states must respect.

Before elaborating individual concentric circles on several key themes, we need to understand that Wendt is simply constructing an ontological foundation in understanding assumptions of neorealists, neoliberals, and even Marxist assumptions. They all conclude the presence of this base-superstructure leads states to behave in a certain manner. As seen in most literatures of realism, their constant reference to terms such as anarchy, power-politics, and self-help, indicates their belief in the ability of those terms to bring their actions to life without being constructed. As Heidegger reminds us about the process of being in a hermeneutic circle, one is not simply making interpretations. One is trying to deliberately find deficiencies in a text and have anticipatory structures in interpretation. How anticipatory structures resonate in this case is an understanding of how naturally-given explanations do not answer many changes to international relations. This, however, is a common feature in the study of international relations, as the lack of clarity or ability of a theory to explain growing dynamics tends to lead to the development of emerging theories. Nevertheless, Wendt’s constructivism aims to address the non-robotic nature of international relations, a deficiency that he identifies as persistent in the existing literature of the mid to late 20^th century.

The existing literature during the 20^th century showed a tendency to define states as exogenously predetermined. Thus, one of the core ideas that Wendt introduced in his seminal work in 1999 was the construction and nature of states. States during that time were viewed as power-maximizing actors in the international system. Realism argues that states are egotistical and tend to prioritize their national interests over others (Steans et al., 2010). For neoliberals, it differed only in the point of focus, in which states were acknowledged as actors that seek benefits as their primary concern, adopting rationalism as its philosophical foundation (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Keohane, 1984). For Wendt to understand the nature of states, one needs to place ideas at the core of the concentric hermeneutic circle. By understanding ideas of what constitutes states, we could attain a holistic view of why certain states seem to be different in international politics. Wendt believes that the ideas contributing to the construction of state actors are inseparable from the intersubjective understanding of the meaning of being a state (Wendt, 1999). Wendt further argues states that have tendencies to invade one another, or undermine sovereignty, such as in cases of colonialism, is due to the issue that states during such specific periods embrace different versions of intersubjective understanding of states.

Following up on that notion, thus, we can then understand the differences in state behavior due to the importance of ideas in showing the differences in intersubjective understandings. Ideas also generate what was that time, an unelaborated variable, state identity. State identities come from a plethora of variables, such as that of social identity. What eventually matters is not only how one perceives itself as its identity, but one needs to consider further the role of how other states perceive that state (Wendt, 1999). Wendt argues that this internal and external determinant of identity is integral to understanding state behavior. Thus, states behave not due to an automatic response to a certain system. States behave based on the identity they embrace, ultimately leading to adopting certain policies. Because of this, state actors need to have certain features and criteria to be considered a certain identity.

In relation to the hermeneutic circle, assessing state behaviors of states in the early 20^th century requires one to what Gadamer states as merging the horizons. There is first a need to recognize the differences in the horizon, from that during the World Wars to the horizon that Wendt lived during the late 20^th century. By merging horizons, we can genuinely understand why realist assumptions were dominant during that period. The emergence of power politics, wars, and land contestations, fueled assumptions in international relations academia on the possibility of states being coercive actors. Nevertheless, in interpreting the phenomena, Wendt is wary of the possible good and bad prejudices of interpretation. He also had pre-disposed questions and concerns in the process of interpretation, which correlates directly to past assumptions of state behavior by the dominant materialist-argumentations. A major concern, for example, for Wendt is to really focus on possible non-exogenous factors to state behaviors, one that can provide clarity to different types of state behavioral patterns.

In relation to Gadamer’s point about prejudices, Wendt uses the same conceptions to find alternative interpretations to explain the structures of the international system. The core of Wendt’s hermeneutic circle is ideas, ideas which, in the case of the international system, empower intersubjective differences between cultures (Wendt, 1999). Rather than blatantly concluding a metaphysical reality of international structures, Wendt diverts the focus of the discussion of the international system to focus on the formation of regional communities worldwide. In places such as Europe, they could integrate their political and cultural differences to form an intersubjective culture of regional unity. The process of regionalism due to cultural integrations also appeared in other parts of the globe, including in Africa and Southeast Asia. Wendt’s immersion into this hermeneutic circle came with the concern of how existing realist claims is jumping to conclusions in explaining the structures and determinants of the international system.

Wendt’s social theory of international politics also updated the clarity of the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy. Suppose we are to connect the updates made to the centrality of ideas in Wendt’s concentric hermeneutic circle, thus. In that case, we can clearly see why international relations can be more hostile than peaceful at certain times. Through ideas and the development of certain norms and values within international political interactions, one can fully comprehend the transfer from one culture of anarchy to the other. For example, the possibility of states embracing a Lockean culture of anarchy is possible if they see the destructions caused are uncontrollable and the death rates are deemed unacceptable by state actors.

5. Conclusion

International relation is a study of interpretations. Unlike the conception of hermeneutics during ancient periods, the hermeneutics of international relations exposes the possibility of multiple interpretations. As can be seen with the development of international relations in the past several decades, one cannot single out a version of the most authentic interpretation that can explain international politics. No existing theories can explain everything in its entirety because interpretations will continue to develop with time.

This article revisits philosophers’ debate in the early to mid-20th century on the topic of the hermeneutic circle. Philosophers such as Dilthey and Weber have been critical in arguing that interpretation must have empirical laws or a certain criterion that can ensure validity and repetition, similar to positivist demands of the social sciences. However, this article takes the side of Heidegger, Bultmann, and Gadamer, arguing that the hermeneutic circle is not a vicious circle and certainly should not follow the suggestions of Boeckh to escape the circle. Being in a hermeneutic circle, the constant back and forth from parts to the whole, from one interpretation to another, generates novelty to studies in social sciences, especially in international relations where the inquiry is states and the international system.

This article argues that one of the leading thinkers of constructivism in international relations, Alexander Wendt, based on his seminal works in 1992 on anarchy and 1999 on the social theory of international politics, has been stuck in a hermeneutic circle. In contrast to those that view the circle as vicious, Wendt has shown that the circle generates novelty and authenticity in the process of interpretation. The ontological inquiries asked by Wendt are the same as that of past assumptions in the study of international relations, which concerns the presence of anarchy and the puzzle of why states tend to behave coercively against one another. As shown in this article, Wendt, in generating alternative interpretations of the conditions, has immersed himself in the hermeneutic circle of international relations, constructivism, and, specifically, the hermeneutic circle of neorealism. Furthermore, he has been able to construct concentric hermeneutic circles as an attempt to explore the significance of ideas in bettering our understanding of state behaviors and why certain international structures emerge. In the future, Wendt’s hermeneutic circle will continue to grow concentrically with new constructivist research inquiries on the roles of states, and the nature of norms and values in international relations.

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Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the - [NA].

Notes on contributors

Bama Andika Putra

Bama Andika Putra is a PhD student at the School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies, University of Bristol. He is also a lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Hasanuddin. He has written articles on the topics of Indonesian foreign policy, Southeast Asian regional dynamics, maritime diplomacy, and international relations theory.