“Caliphate no in Indonesia”: Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi critiques toward Islamic State discourse in Indonesian Islam

Abstract

The establishment of the caliphate in Indonesia is offered as a solution to advancement based on theological considerations by its advocates. Many Muslim academics, including Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi, have disputed this allegation. Using data from written works and interviews, this study examined the perspectives of these two figures. The findings revealed that caliphate speech is problematic, conceptual, social, political, and argumentative. As a result, efforts to create this discourse as a concept in Indonesia are not only superfluous, but also futile, laborious, and harmful to the principle of monotheism and the spirit of teaching Islam with blessing for the world (rahmatan li al-‘alamin). Pancasila is the best option supported by Islamic teachings that have a strong ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundation. When understood, believed, and implemented consistently, the numerous precepts consist of historical justification, reason, and actuality, which can sustain remarkable achievements in the life of the nation.

Keywords:

• caliphate
• Pancasila
• Nurcholish Madjid
• Yudian Wahyudi
• Indonesia

Public Interest Statement

The Islamic caliphate discourse in Indonesia has become a long discourse that is not only tiring, but also detrimental to Indonesian Muslims. Therefore, Nurcholish and Yudian strongly criticised the discourse as an illusion in the context of Indonesian Islam. Instead of spending energy to fight for the discourse, the two figures offer solutions so that Indonesian Muslims no longer favour a scripturalistic and formalistic view of the relationship between Islam and the state, but rather put forward a substantialistic and integrative view. Both believe that what Indonesian Muslims need is not an Islamic state, but an Islamic country in which all Islamic teachings can not only be manifested freely and receive state protection, but also thoroughly inspire the management of the state. For both of them, Islam and Indonesianness are not two things that must be opposed, but can actually work symbiotically-mutually.

1. Introduction

The confession of the Khilafatul Muslimin group in Lampung and several other places in May 2022 demonstrates this sect’s desire to establish an Indonesian caliphate (Asiyah & Hakim, 2022). Because of the different supporting reasons, the proponents of this movement led to the rejection of the state ideology known as the Pancasila (Kholid, 2021). The desire to establish an Islamic state (caliphate) through political channels, legal constitution, or physical conflict against the legitimate government has been a feature of the Muslim struggle in Indonesia throughout its history (Effendy, 2003). The considerable time it takes to accomplish these objectives with modest outcomes demonstrates that it raises not only philosophical but also sociological and political difficulties and is no longer the mainstream of people’s thought (Zuhri, 2021). Aside from a decrease in the number of adherents, the Indonesian Muslim community’s proclivity to evaluate Islamic political beliefs has shifted and reoriented (Rosyidi, 2015). At the same time, the state has created tight policies to oversee such discussions (Arifianto, 2020).

So far, studies on the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia have primarily focused on typologies and categorisations. Each inclination has been represented by a number of intellectuals. Two current studies highlight a lack of focus to the component of fortitude to decisively reject the caliphate. To begin, several studies focus on the pro-con component of the caliphate debate in Indonesia (Effendy, 2018; Rosyidi, 2015; Van Bruinessen, 1996). For example, Haidar Putra Daulay points out that all of the narratives surrounding the khilafah discussion in Indonesia are merely a part of a never-ending fight (Daulay et al., 2021). Second, there are studies that focus on the state’s assertiveness regarding caliphate movements in Indonesia (Manik & Hasanuddin, 2018; Zamani & Hamidah, 2021; Zuhri, 2021). Saiful Arif, for example, demonstrates the contradiction of khilafah supporters’ beliefs on Pancasila (Arif, 2016). According to the trend of available studies, it indicates that Indonesia’s boldness to declare caliphate no has not been fully proved. In the midst of an almost continuous war of ideas, firmness with strong foundations can be a solution.

This supplemented the current studies’ weaknesses in analyzing how Nurcholish and Yudian Wahyudi explain the caliphate epistemologically. Furthermore, it is critical to understand how the arguments advanced by these personalities influenced this topic. From the philosophical and ushul fiqh perspectives, this work answers to the fundamentals of Nurcholish and Yudian’s opinions on the caliphate. A thorough knowledge of caliphate epistemology led to the development of a problem-solving model that incorporated lessons acquired from implementing active plans for dealing with Islamic and Indonesian concerns. Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi’s study of the caliphate is motivated by three factors. First, from the Islamic Boarding School through the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) and Western institutions, the educational background of these reformer personalities is more than sufficient to present a comprehensive view of this discourse. Second, some organizations continue to “misunderstand” the caliphate and conflict with Islam and the official philosophy known as the Pancasila. Third, in the age of information digitization, misleading narratives about the caliphate are simple to spread. As a result, from a more intellectual standpoint, a balanced counter-narrative is required. Yudian’s position as a Head of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (Badan Pembinaan Ideology Pancasila—BPIP) resulted in the use of tangible steps in socializing and structurally strengthening specific concepts.

This study is founded on the following argument: Muslim groups’ aim to establish a caliphate in the country, notwithstanding their weak presence. Building a synthetic and symbiotic mutualism in Islam and Indonesia, on the other hand, is counter-productive from an intellectual and sociological standpoint. Failure to build a unified or convergent knowledge is still causing unique issues. Various mis-conceptions in society as a result of insufficient information serve as the foundation for long-term mis-understandings. Simultaneously, pervasive misinformation has hampered public education. Appropriate knowledge is overwhelmed by incorrect information supplied by supporters of the caliphate via social media. It necessitates the socialization of the counter-narrative to this viewpoint. This argument has been theoretically counter-narrated by Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi using epistemological, philosophical, and ushul fiqh approachs.

2. Short biographies in comparison

Nurcholish and Yudian have separate biographies, which are listed here. Nurcholish was born on 17 March 1939, in Jombang, East Java (Jun, 2022), and Yudian was born on 17 April 1960, in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (Djidin & Syamsuddin, 2019). Nurcholish attended the Islamic Boarding School because his father, KH Abdul Madjid, was a well-known Kiai in Mojoanyar Hamlet, Mojotengah Village, Bareng District, Jombang Regency, East Java, and a Masyumi supporter (Naim, 2015). Yudian’s father, Asmin Prajabangsa, was an army officer from Banyumas, Central Java, who was deployed to Balikpapan in 1948. Mr. Asmin was a santri (Islamic Student and Nationalist (Army) who taught Islamic knowledge (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

Nurcholish finished primary school in Jombang, whereas Yudian attended Pacitan. Nurcholish also attended Junior High School Jombang while studying at the Rejoso Islamic Boarding School and Madrasah al-Wathaniyah (Mukaffan & Siswanto, 2019). Nurcholish continued his education at the Kulliyatul Muallimin al-Islamiyah (KMI) and the Darussalam Islamic Boarding School in Gontor Ponorogo, East Java, where he graduated in 1960. Yudian completed her education at the Pacitan Tremas Islamic Boarding School, which was run by KH Habib Dimyati from 1972 to 1978, and the Krapyak al-Munawwir Islamic Boarding School from 1978 to 1979 (Supriatman, 2017). Since their primary and secondary studies, both people have demonstrated outstanding achievements. Nurcholish and Yudian had hoped to continue their studies at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, but both were unable to do so owing to personal circumstances. Nurcholish was unable to enroll due to the contentious Suez Canal dispute and problems in acquiring visas (Tajuddin, 2021), while Yudian’s father was opposed for security reasons, as Egypt and Israel were at odds at the time (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

In 1968, Nurcholish was awarded a Drs (Doctorandus) degree at the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, from the Department of Arabic Literature and History of Islamic Thought after publishing the thesis of “Al-Qur’an: Arabiyyan Lughatan ‘Alamiyyan wa Ma’nan (Hidayatulloh, 2020) Yudian obtained a BA and Drs (Doctorandus) degree from the Syariah Faculty of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, in 1982 and 1987, respectively. He was also awarded a BA from the Faculty of Philosophy at Gajah Mada University in 1986 and an MA degree from McGill University, Montreal, Canada, in 1993 after writing a thesis on “Hasbi’s Theory of Ijtihad in the Context of Indonesian Fiqh (Mansur, 2012).

In March 1978, Nurcholish received a scholarship from the Ford Foundation to continue studying at the University of Chicago, earned a Doctorate in Natural Science and Philosophy as well as graduated with Summa Cumlaude honours in 1984, with a dissertation entitled “Ibnu Taymiyah on Kalam and Falsafah a Problem of Reason and Revelation in Islam” (Solikin, 2021) On the other hand, Yudian earned a Ph.D. with a dissertation “The Slogan Back to the Qur’an and the Sunna: Comparative Responses of Hasan Hanafi, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri and Nurcholish Madjid” in 2002 (Wahyudi, 2002). In Western universities, these figures could access classical and modern literary sources and direct discussions with Muslim reformers, such as Fazlur Rahman and Hasan Hanafi.

The academic works of Muslim thinkers have been recognized. For instance, Nurcholish wrote over 15 books, and dozens of scientific articles were published at home and abroad (Rozak et al., 2015). Likewise, Yudian also produced 12 book titles, 52 Arabic, English, and French translations, and dozens of scientific articles, primarily presented in international forums. Although filled with pros and cons, Nurcholish’s character was appreciated by Tempo magazine by the term “the locomotive towing the carriage of the splendor of the Islamic development in Indonesia” (Naim & Muhajir, 2020). At the same time, Yudian’s character, specifically in the field of jurisprudence (fiqh and ushul fiqh), received special recognition from Kersten and David R. Vishanoff. Necdet Subasi even put Yudian on a par with contemporary Islamic thought experts such as Hamid Inayat, Michel Cuypers, and John L. Esposito. Ellen McClaney also equated Yudian with Issa J. Boulatta (Djidin & Syamsuddin, 2019).

3. Method

This study focuses on the ideas of Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi. In their own jargons, each reflect each age strongly opposing the caliphate. Nurcholish’s philosophical approach and Yudian’s ushul fiqh approach both lead to the same conclusion, namely the rejection of khilafah in the context of Indonesia. Thus, the rejection of the khilafah is based on multiple epistemic perspectives. This study is qualitative and employs a case study approach. The research was carried out in great depth, detail, and breadth. Several variables are analyzed and traced, including the two figures’ life history and social surroundings.

To investigate Nurcholish’s ideas, a search of materials written directly by Nurcholish or written by other researchers interested in Nurcholish Madjid was done. Yudian Wahyudi’s ideas were investigated through the use of primary literature as well as in-depth direct interviews. The researcher’s participation in Yudian’s “Majelis Ayat Kursi” and frequent online studies every Wednesday night from 2021 to 2022 made it easier for the author to completely understand Yudian’s beliefs.

Secondary facts can also be found in literary works regarding the two figures. Furthermore, data analysis was carried out in accordance with Huberman and Miles’ three stages of reduction, display, and verification (Miles & Huberman, 2014). Data was reduced by categorizing it depending on the study questions. The display approach was carried out using tables, while the verification procedure was carried out by comparing data from multiple sources and then utilizing interpretative analysis to determine its relevance.

4. Results and discussion

4.1. Islamic caliphate from the perspectives of Nurcholish and Yudian

Nurcholish views the concept of an Islamic state as an apologetic propensity for two reasons. First, the deepening of apologies to Western ideology, which produces backwardness in numerous parts of Muslim life, notably the political, economic, and social sectors, due to the fostering of cultural innovation. As a result, they develop inferiority complexes, resulting in a thorough intellectual appreciation of Islam and the aspirations of a “Islamic state.” The second factor is legalism, which is characterized by a tendency for legalistic appreciation of Islamic teachings, accompanied by the belief and gratitude that it is an organized collection of laws (Nurcholish Madjid, 1987; Rozak et al., 2015). Nurcholish went on to say that it is a continuation of fiqh-ism, and that via the concept of a “Islamic state,” some rules are only comprehended through this lens. It was then emphasized that the supporters were fighting for a distortion of the proportional relationship between the state and religion (Nurcholish Madjid, 1987), which would lead to the growth of spiritual power (ruhanniyyah) institutions that Islam does not justify (Nurcholish Hajam & Saumantri, 2023; Madjid, 1987).

Nurcholish also said that the term “Islamic state” has no historical precedent (Madjid, 1984b; Naim, 2015). The evidence for the succession pattern after the Prophet’s death is ambiguous, indicating that governmental considerations are not central to this faith. In terms of historical development, abandoning national states in favor of establishing a universal one that encompasses the entire Islamic world is implausible (Madjid, 1984b; Tajuddin, 2021). As a result, Nurcholish declared that no barrier prevents any Muslim from being a nationalist. Nurcholish stated, using QS. Al-Hujurat (49):13, that Islam’s goals are lita’arafu, interrelated, and not mutually superior (Madjid, 1984b; Sopandi & Taofan, 2019). According to this fundamental viewpoint, Indonesian Muslims do not need to mandate the state or government to become Islamic, rather the content or substance, rather than the formal form, is more significant. A cultural approach in the broadest sense, comprising education, da’wah, art, and intellectual dynamic, can help the country flourish (Nurcholish Jun, 2022; Madjid, 1984c)

However, supposing Nurcholish called the caliphate an apologetic tendency, Yudian called it a system of government that was dead and irrelevant and needed to be re-established (Nahuddin & Prastyo, 2020). The term caliphate (khalifah) is not written in the Al-Quran QS Al-Baqarah (2):30–37 only uses the idiom caliph (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022). Linguistically, it means a person who can manage mistakes, errors (khilaf), or differences and diversity (ikhtilaf) and, in the end, is perceived as a problem solver (Djidin & Syamsuddin, 2019). In an interview with Yudian, he emphasised that:

“Indonesia does not need a caliphate as a system of government, but it really needs as many caliphs as possible in the sense of professionals who fulfil qualifications and competences in various fields. But the condition is that they must master the names (al-asma’). Yudian interpreted al-asma’ with science, science and technology. In addition, the professionals must also win the match with the current system. Not just a sparring war that has the potential to flow blood (yusfikud-dima’) as predicted by angels.”. (interview with Yudian, Jakarta, September 2022)

According to Yudian, who agreed with Nurcholish that the word “Islamic state” was unknown in history, the proponents’ desire for caliphate supporters stemmed from the Prophet’s success in the Fath Mecca event. Yudian referred to the episode as the first bloodless revolution in history, which was made possible by the support of professionals from other areas. Unfortunately, caliphate supporters sometimes forget that the ensuing historical record, with the support of various ummahs, is no longer linear. The Ottoman Caliphate eventually fell owing to several challenges, and at the same time, the Arabs founded a kingdom (mamlakah) rather than a caliphate; so, this is history (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

To strengthen this thesis, Yudian reminded people why none of the founding fathers proposed a caliphate as an independent Indonesian state because they were aware that as a government system, it was dead and did not need to be re-enforced, specifically in this context. Wahyudi further stated the historical uniqueness of Islam, which has never been witnessed in any country worldwide. The kings of the archipelago consciously surrendered their power and pledged allegiance to Indonesia, a nation that had just been proclaimed on 17 August 1945. Contrary to historical facts, when Islamic figures such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani in other parts of the world called for the unity of the Ummah under the banner of Pan-Islamism, it was rejected by other Islamic rulers, namely Sultan Hasan I and Sayyid Ahmad Khan from Morocco and India, respectively. Interestingly, their refusal shows that the spirit of uniting all Muslims under the banner of the caliphate is only an illusion in the present context (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

Yudian then emphasized that in the Indonesian context, there is no need for a caliphate to be perceived as a system of government. Instead, it requires as many caliphs in various fields as possible who can join hands to defend the state ideology and realize the ideals of its independence as stated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Professional and competent caliphs, in Yudian’s perspective, are those who master the science of asma’ and emerge as winners in a competition. Al-Asma’ (names) are science, technology, and professional degrees. Indonesia needs caliphs such as Prophets Noah (KH, Bachelor of Shipping Technology), Daud (KH Bachelor of Military Technology), Sulaiman (KH Multi), Isa (KH Bachelor of Medicine), and others to show gratitude for being blessed with a great and peaceful country and to realize the mission of Islam that is blessing for the world [rahmatan li al-‘alamin] (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

4.2. Islam and Pancasila from the perspectives of Nurcholish and Yudian

Nurcholish recommended the acceptance of Pancasila based on two considerations. First, its values are justified by Islamic teachings. Second, it functions as the pillar of agreement between various groups to realize political unity simultaneously. To strengthen this recommendation, Madjid compares the position and function of the Pancasila with the Medina Constitution (Madjid, 1992; Sulbi, 2021). In this context, Madjid stated that:

In comparison with the attitude of Indonesian Muslims to accept Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, those led by the Prophet Muhammad accepted that of the Medina based on its values justified by Islamic teachings and its functions as an agreement between these groups to build a common political society. Similarly, the Prophet Muhammad and some followers did not perceive the Medina Constitution as an alternative to their new religion. (Madjid, 1992)

Nurcholish stated that based on such arguments, Muslims need not encounter psychological and ideological burdens in accepting the Pancasila. Therefore, when the state implemented its single principle, Nurcholish saw it as a positive attitude and dismissed the concerns of Islamic groups who perceived the enactment of Law Number 8 of 1985 on Community Organization as a potential that would reduce the role of religion. It is intended to remain and continues to exist, but its dimensions tend to be different from the role played in the past. There will no longer be parties fighting for a religious state; religion will exist as a source of inspiration and aspiration (Nurcholish Khaeroni, 2021; Madjid, 1984c).

According to Nurcholish, the Pancasila was initially seen as an open doctrine. As a result, everyone may add their own perspectives on the significance of its precepts. It cannot be described once and for all as a source of political legitimacy and great national aspirations. Pancasila is a gradual and on going process endowed with an open attitude aimed at achieving a national convergence of Indonesian ideals (Nurcholish Madjid, 1987; Rozak et al., 2015). According to this viewpoint, there is a strong basis (kalimatun sawa’, a common platform) among various social groups. Nurcholish went on to say that Indonesia is fortunate to have the Pancasila, which can be a national basis and a strong adhesive cement in the midst of an exceedingly diverse nation (Nurcholish Abdullah, 2021; Madjid, 1987).

In line with Nurcholish, Yudian also reported that the Pancasila was God’s greatest gift to the Indonesian nation in the 20th century (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022). Therefore, it needs to be cared for by strengthening the country’s unity according to the national consensus. Yudian further described it as a unique and miraculous ideology in the 20th century that could unite specific belief systems at that time. It was also mentioned that the Pancasila is perceived as a middle ideology (moderate) that later became the Indonesian nation’s core character (Nahuddin & Prastyo, 2020).

The meeting point between religion and Pancasila in Yudian’s perspective is possible for two reasons. First, it is in line with Islamic principles where the precepts of Belief in One God are manifestations of the initial pillar of Islam, namely monotheism. Second, Pancasila is a kalimatun sawa’ because it has become a consensus (ijma’) of all nation elements, specifically for Muslims who are obliged to fulfil specific promises (contracts) (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022). For Yudian, Islam and Pancasila do not contradict each other. Pancasila is referred to as the “objectivity” and “locality” of Islamic values and sharia, where it universally manifests in Indonesia through the country’s philosophical ground slag (philosophical basis).

As a scholar with a scientific background in ushul fiqh, Yudian intelligently demonstrated Pancasila’s compatibility with the concept of maqashid al-syariah, which is popular in Muslim epistemology. The suitability between these two is seen in Table 1.

Table 1. The relationship between Pancasila and maqashid al-syariah, according to Yudian

No	Pancasila	Maqashid al-Syariah	Maqashid Indonesia
1	Belief in the one and only God. (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa)	Hifdz -al-din (maintaining religion)	Divinity
2	A just and civilized humanity. (Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab)	Hifdz al-nafs (maintaining soul)	Humanity
3	Unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia)	Hifdz al-nasl (maintaining descendants)	Unity
4	Democracy, led by the wisdom of the representatives of the people (Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebjaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan)	Hifdz al-‘aql (maintaining common sense)	Society
5	Social justice for all Indonesian people. (Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia)	Hifdz al-mal (maintaining the property)	Justice

Source: Compiled by researchers, 2022.

Divinity, humanity, unity, democracy, and justice are universal noble values in line with Islam. According to Wahyudi, Pancasila as a whole is the vision of Islam in the treatise. However, both existentially have their autonomy, and the three priorities in Islamic sharia have also been operationalized in Pancasila. Maqashid dharuriyah is reflected in all the precepts of Pancasila, and to fulfil the Pancasila, maqashid hajiah is needed in the form of a united and democratic national life. Pancasila, including its concept and symbol, is an ornamental dimension of tahsiniyah in the locality of the Indonesian nation. It simply means that the people locally practice it to realize maqashid syariah (Wahyudi, 2015).

However, in terms of using other terminologies related to the ushul fiqh, Yudian stated that the supreme law of God governing social and political life is not a holy book but a constitution. Constitutionally, Pancasila had been accepted as a consensus or ijma’. It is the highest consensus of the nation because it needs to be maintained, and anyone who opposes the consensus will be sanctioned. Even Yudian stated it is against the will of God (Wahyudi, 1995). With great enthusiasm, Yudian explained as follows:

Indonesian Muslims are obliged to defend Pancasila and implement its values in the life of the nation and state, as a manifestation of the fulfilment of the commandment of QS. The covenant in the verse must be interpreted with all agreements made by humans, including political agreements. Therefore, all Indonesian Muslims, and even all components of the nation’s children, must defend NKRI and Pancasila and build it continuously in accordance with the development and situation of the times. Defending NKRI and Pancasila for Muslims is obligatory, because otherwise there will be division and conflict. In ushul fiqh, the concept of sadd al-dzariah (closing the road/preventive action) is known. You can imagine if a group of people proclaimed another form of state in the name of the majority, such as the caliphate in an area in Indonesia, then other areas where the majority of the population is non-Muslim, certainly not willing to obey and submit to the rules made by the state. If left unchecked, the worst possibility is that they will also establish states such as the Hindu State of Bali, the Christian State of Manado, the Christian State of Papua and others. If that happens, then certainly civil war will occur. Therefore, Pancasila and NKRI must be defended to avoid internal conflict among the nation’s children. Moreover, substantively, none of the five precepts of Pancasila contradict the teachings of Islam. (Yudian, interview, October 2022)

According to Yudian, Pancasila has an ontological solid, epistemological, and axiological basis for morality and national-state direction. Each precept has historical justification, rationality, and actuality, which, when understood, believed, and practiced consistently, can sustain outstanding achievements in the nation’s life. Pancasila is the pairing integration between “godly” (“ilahi,” that is, hablun minallah) and “humanly” (“wad’iy,” that is, hablun minannas), a concept of balance in Islamic teachings (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

4.3. Sociological settings and implications

Nurcholish and Yudian conveyed ideas in the context of the New and Reformation Orders, respectively. These two figures are representatives of their respective generations. For example, when the first generation depicted by Soekarno was tasked with exploring and formulating the Pancasila, Nurcholish represented the second generation whose target was to live and practice it. In contrast, Yudian represented the third who were focused on understanding, strengthening, and implementing Pancasila.

According to Nurcholish’s observations, in the 70’s era, there were positive developments marked by the increasing number of Muslims and the appreciation of Islam by the higher social class. Nurcholish noticed that the ummah’s senior figures, leaders, and elites were busy getting involved in protracted and exhausting internal political conflicts. Furthermore, Islamic parties failed to build a positive and sympathetic image (Madjid, 1987; Putera, 2018). Nurcholish concluded that the Muslim community was not interested in parties but in Islamic ideas (Jun, 2022). Based on this context, Nurcholish coined the slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic party No.” Nurcholish intended to emphasize that they were committed to only Islam and not institutions often used in its name. Moreover, political behavior and the use of Islam undermine the valid values of its teachings (Madjid, 1992; Nurdin, 2016).

Nurcholish reported that the leaders of these Islamic parties at that time were no longer channeling Muslim aspirations but were either fighting for the group’s interests or themselves. Furthermore, these parties were divided according to different sects or schools of thought and must be more clearly committed to the community’s struggle (Rahman et al., 2022). At the same time, Muslims were still concerned about quantity rather than quality. Pride related to the number factor proves that the majority were promoted to carry formalistic political jargon such as the caliphate. It aimed to rally for unity to face the forces that drive and influence the political map and its development. Nurcholish stated that the myth of quantity and unity creates defects that harm Muslims politically and culturally (Madjid, 1984a).

In the context of political parties, the application of “solidarity making” employed by the Masyumi party after the 1955 General Election was explicitly criticized. With a solid ideological orientation, this party was categorized as “extreme right” and aligned with the Indonesian Communist Party, regarded as “extreme left.” However, it has great potential and power to change the state ideology (Nurcholish Latief, 2017; Madjid, 1971). Such attitude raised concerns from the military and New Order elite regarding the rise of Islam as an alternative political force. Interestingly, the New Order government tried eliminating forces that could disrupt national stability and unity. At the same time, there is only one demand for Islam, namely the rehabilitation of Masjumi or the legalization of Islamic parties as a prerequisite for supporting the New Order. This thought tendency, in turn, is less favorable, and the reactive and defensive attitude towards the New Order government’s policies regulating issues perceived as the national consensus eventually caused Muslims to be regarded as anti-development and anti-modernization (Khaeroni, 2021; Madjid, 1994).

In this setting, Nurcholish advocated for a revival of rational thought in response to the empirical conditions of the period. The older generation, on the other hand, was more preoccupied with scripturalist beliefs. Nurcholish stressed viewpoint liberalization, which had at least three characteristics: secularization, freedom of thinking, and the concept of progress (Nurcholish Madjid, 1985; Nulhakim, 2020). In this context, secularization means desacralization of transcendental (ilahiyah) nature, namely this universe. Nurcholish even asserted that idealized secularization is designed to strengthen the human mission as khalifatullah fi al-ard or to familiarize Muslims with the caliphate mission (Nurcholish Madjid, 1993; Sopandi & Taofan, 2019).

According to Munawir Syadzali, Nurcholish’s ideas about the need for an Islamic state and the invented language “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No” had a great impact on the New Order’s political accommodation of Islam (Effendy, 2018). Accepting Pancasila has relieved Munawir of the anxiety and trauma linked with the establishment of Islamic state aspirations (Effendy, 1995). Muslim Abdurrahman shared a similar viewpoint. For Abdurrahman, the concept of “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No” simply implies release from stigma and historical constraints that are detrimental to Muslim progress (Hosen, 2005). Robert W. Hefner also asserted that the renewal of Nurcholish’s jargon is a “cultural approach” in revitalizing this religion in Indonesia in the 70s. The strategy was adopted to gradually instill the core of Islam into the nation (Hefner, 1993).

The impact is related to the appearance of a friendly, open, and creative Islam initiated by the Nurcholish. According to Dawam Rahardjo, its success is attracting sympathy from various parties, including the government. Similarly, it diverts Muslims from the opposition party to participate actively in the development process. Nurcholish’s thought has different characteristics and vision from his predecessors, especially in three aspects, namely: (1) the style of Nurcholish’s thought is more in touch with social and state issues in a broad sense, (2) Nurcholish’s thought succeeded in bridging the “conceptual tension” between Islamic ideas and political and state ideas that emerged during the New Order period. The impact of this conceptual tension has given birth to misunderstanding, even conflict that strains the relationship between Islam and the state. Nurcholish tries to unravel this condition by offering actual and substantive thoughts that he hopes can be taken into consideration and alternatives for both Muslims and the government; (3) Nurcholish’s thinking has created a new paradigm that has a political impact on the dialectic and positive interaction between Islam and the state in the 1990s. In essence, Nurcholish’s thinking was welcomed with relief not only by the New Order government, but also by other groups who were still haunted by the fear of the ideal of an Islamic state.

In contrast to Nurcholish, Yudian initiated the caliphate and Pancasila in the context of the Reform Order. Although Yudian’s idea was introduced in 2003, the epistemology of thought regarding Pancasila and the caliphate is more populist. It is because Yudian actively counters-narratives against the idea of a caliphate championed by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), like other scripturalist and revivalist parties, promotes the caliphate struggle in Indonesia. Most HTI activists believe Indonesia is a favorable ground for the establishment of a caliphate (Syah & Setia, 2021). It meets the requirements for establishing a caliphate since it has the ability for political independence from other countries’ dominance as well as national resilience to safeguard Muslims (Arif, 2016). HTI’s view in Indonesia’s potential as a caliphate was officially communicated to the government in 2005, when an Open Letter to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was submitted. It even threatened national officials who did not support the establishment of a caliphate at the National Ulama Conference on 21 July 2009 in Jakarta. Pancasila, according to HTI, is a kufr ideology that must be rejected for two reasons: first, it allows for religious diversity, and second, it allows for non-Islamic ideologies like as socialism, democracy, and nationalism (Azmy, 2020). For HTI, the Islamic mabda’ is the most suited, as it is related with the term “save Indonesia with sharia” (Qohar & Hakiki, 2017).

Yudian counter-narrated HTI’s idea of a caliphate by using maqashid al-syariah as an analytical tool. Continuing what reformers have pioneered in explaining Pancasila with national arguments, Yudian completed this illustration with theological-epistemological opinions. The common thread of these explanations boils down to the idea that Pancasila is the basis of the state and the ideology of a religious and Islamic nation.

Yudian stated that the argument for harmony between Pancasila and Islam is packaged in the term “kalimatun sawa” plus ijma’. It implies that this principle is a political manifesto related to the deliberate teachings of the Qur’an. It is also perceived as a contract that is agreed upon and a common consensus (ijma’) that binds all citizens together, including Muslims (Sadari, 2018). Under the maqashid syariah, Yudian stated that Pancasila emphasizes religious tolerance to realize Indonesian unity (Rouf, 2022). Therefore, when Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) declared Indonesia as Darul ahdi wa al-shahadah (land of treaty and witness) and Darul mitsaq (land of agreement), respectively, then Yudian asserted that it is a Darul Ijma’ (country of consensus). As a mutually agreed homeland, Pancasila, as the basis of the state, not only needs to be defended and safeguarded. Its sovereignty and unity, the integrity of all citizens, also must be loved and respected by the nation. Yudian even reminded Muslims of the symbolic meaning of prostrating 34 times (kissing the homeland), which must be carried out day and night during prayers. According to Yudian, one of its meanings is for every Muslim to internalize the spirit of patriotism. Yudian further stated that love for the homeland reflects faith (tauhid) and commitment to the agreement (ijma’) (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022.

Tawhid is the process of integrating Allah’s verses in three aspects, namely theological (the Qur’an and the hadith), cosmos (natural law), and cosmic (humanity law). These three verses are also contained in Pancasila. The precept of belief in the one and only God is a theological verse because it reflects monotheism. The precepts of nationhood and democracy are verses of the cosmos, as well as that of humanity and social justice are verses of the cosmic. The act of practicing the Pancasila means monotheism, which is integrating the “nature-humanity verse” into theology (Wahyudi, 2015). Pancasila’s nature also implies sharia’s character, which requires Yudian to initiate a balanced law. Yudian stated that Islamic Sharia is godly (ilahiyah) and humanly (insaniyah), universal, local, absolute, relative, eternal, and temporal. Therefore, just as the Javanese mosque (Meru) is different from Arabic (dome) and justified by sharia, Pancasila is also a local form of this law because it protects the dharuriyat human rights such as the right to religion, life, thought, and self-respect (Wahyudi, 2007).

Yudian even acknowledged Bung Hatta’s ijtihad by removing the seven sentences from the Jakarta Charter, leaving just the belief in the one and only God. It adhered to certain principles of Islamic law (qawaid fiqhiyyah). The first principle is that “rejecting damage takes precedence over benefiting.” When the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter were signed, the threat of East Indonesia seceding had to take precedence above the benefits achieved by ratifying the goals of forming an Islamic state. Second, “anything that cannot be achieved does not need to be abandoned.” Non-Muslims must support the establishment of an Islamic state from Sabang to Merauke, with the excision of seven words for the sake of autonomous Indonesian territorial unity (Yudian Wahyudi, interview, 2022).

With this Yudian epistemological thought, the discourse on Islam and Pancasila ended with the acceptance of this principle by most Indonesian Muslims, including the most prominent mass organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah (Zamani & Hamidah, 2021). Unfortunately, it has been proven since the 1980s, and the fall of the New Order in 1998 has softened the adherents’ belief in Islamic scripturalism. As a result, the rhetoric of restoring the Jakarta Charter and formalizing sharia developed during the early days of the reform order (Arif, 2020). The development of a group with the intent of opposing Islam and Pancasila and reducing religious practice to their liking is perilous. The biggest enemy of Pancasila is religion, not ethnicity. With this statement, Yudian desires to remind everyone that this principle as the highest consensus of the Indonesian nation must be maintained as best as possible as well as become aware of religious groups with narrow and extreme understandings who often claim to be the majority and minorities, although this still contradicts religion and Pancasila (Asy’ari, 2015).

Unlike Nurcholish, who initiated specific concepts through an academic and cultural approach, Yudian was able to socialize and communicate Pancasila’s structural perspectives and love. Yudian, as a soldier and Islamic student, was able to successfully combine the spirit of Islam with country. As a result, every effort is made to impart or generate Islamic and Indonesian insights or knowledge. Yudian had made systematic efforts to disseminate this philosophy before being appointed as the Head of the BPIP. Yudian established the Center for the Study of Pancasila and State Defense while serving as Chancellor of the State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga. Currently, almost all institutions, particularly those affiliated with the State Islamic Religious College, have constructed a Pancasila Study Center adjacent to the House of Religious Moderation. Time spent as the agency’s head promoting the early ideas about Islam and Pancasila was well spent. The BPIP, as a ministerial-level entity, has an agenda, plan, enough human resources, and financial support to increase socialization and teach youngsters about the necessity of sustaining harmony and unity under the auspices of the nation. Yudian’s position tends to determine the direction and achievement of goals. It is not an exaggeration to say that Yudian is a history maker in this regard.

4.3.1. Discussion and analysis

This study showed that these two figures, with their respective approaches and challenges, tried to explain the issue of the caliphate in a more academic and argumentative manner. Nurcholish formulated some jargon “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No,” while Yudian used the fabrication “Caliph Yes, Caliphate No” (see table 2). Irrespective of the fact that these fabrications differ, both have the same concept of creating opportunities to synthesize some integration between Islam and Indonesianness without psychological and ideological burdens. The two figures also came to the same conclusion that the desire to revive the caliphate means ignoring the universal, inclusive, and open character of the religion, as well as contradicting the spirit of monotheism, which demands Muslims to break away from other beliefs asides from the Oneness of God. The caliphate concept is a discourse or an idea that does not need to be considered sacred, and it is not related to the Muslim faith but only a historical fact which, when applied in Indonesia, must consider its socio-cultural conditions mainly characterized by growth, development, and pluralism.

Table 2. Comparison of Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi’s thoughts on Islam and the caliphate as well as Pancasila

No	Aspects	Nurcholish Madjid	Yudian Wahyudi
1	Starting point or sociological setting	Stupidity, stagnation, the politicization of Islamic parties, and antagonistic relations between Islam and the state.	The rise of misguided Islamic scripturalism or revivalism, as well as harmonious relations between Islam and the state
2	Islam and the caliphate	Apologetic Tendencies and legalism	Non-dalil or argument and a history
3	Islam and Pancasila	Kalimatun sawa’ of open ideology	Kalimatun sawa’ + ijma’/ The greatest gift of the 20th century
4	Solution	Secularization or desacralization	Integrative or objective monotheism
5	Method of thought or epistemology	Philosophy or sociology	Maqashid al-Sharia or ushul fiqh

Source: Compiled by researchers, 2022.

With such an essential perspective, these two figures intend to remind future generations to build historical consciousness to realize contextual Islam. Nurcholish and Yudian cited the nasikh-mansukh theory and qawaid fiqhiyah that “al-hukmu yaduru ma’a ‘illatih wujudan wa adaman”, respectively. Both figures concluded that new and better teaching could replace any legal provision, depending on the situation. The fact that Indonesia is a heterogeneous nation in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture, and language should not only be accepted as something “given”. Instead, this also needs to be taken into account. When the idea of a caliphate is to be imposed on Indonesia, then it is not a solution and has the potential to cause conflict among the citizens. Moreover, historical records showed that every Muslim makes the caliphate a struggle mainstream, and its existence tends to be marginalized (Bolland, 2014). The two figures recommended the need for a state based on Islam and not an Islamic nation. In a state based on Islam, there is a national convergence that accepts and gives each other without ideological worries. Yudian even called Indonesia the best miniature paradise in the world, and the central axis is in the state palace. The two figures are united in the perspective that the distance between Islam and the state will make the struggle to teach this religion more difficult. Muslims need to be robust and Islamic politics should color and regulate, not partisan and marginal. According to Yudian, the Prophet never promoted fighting for Islam from prison, unlike some hardline Muslim activists, such as Nurcholish. From the palace, Islam can be fought for even more strategically.

Asides from the factor mentioned earlier, Nurcholish and Yudian’s thoughts about Islam, the caliphate, and Pancasila have promoted the acculturation of this religion through a kind of complex indigenization process. It is a creative and innovative procedure to broaden the horizon of understanding Islam. An incomplete or fragmentary comprehension of these two figures’ thoughts occasionally invites a strong reaction. However, these two scholars provide space for the creative actualization of Islam in the country through desacralization and objectivization.

This study confirmed that the idea of a caliphate lacks a clear concept and is not supported by social and political conditions. When it ever existed in Arab countries in the past, there is a possibility that some preconditions supported it. Forcing a caliphate in Indonesia can be interpreted as fighting for Arabization, not Islamization. The absence of a shariah text in the Qur’an and hadith is enough to end the caliphate polemic in Indonesia, which was never enforced literally. Due to Pancasila, these two figures invited all citizens to be confident in building the state’s future. Because it has been accepted as a final concept, the dream or wishful thinking to discover some form of state ideology other than Pancasila is no longer necessary. Based on this, these two figures emphasized the impossibility of alternative or rival concepts, including those in the name of Islam.

This present study confirmed that the two figures’ rejection of the caliphate discourse is based on epistemological awareness and historical-sociological insights. For Islamic thinkers, regardless of their cultural background, as long as they are committed to understanding Islam concerning human values, interpretations of the caliphate tend to emerge from various methodological sources and inspirations. According to an intellectual paradigm, both Nurcholish and Yudian were influenced by Ibn Taimiyah and Hasan Hanafi, respectively, in terms of actually struggling to “read” Islam in the present context. Therefore, when people read Nurcholish and Yudian’s thoughts about Islam and the caliphate, they could discern the dynamics of open Islamic thought. Nurcholish and Yudian’s thoughts may be faced with the perspective of exclusive followers claiming to refer to the spirit of Abduh, who tends to fight against the West.

This study assessed thinkers such as Nurcholish and Yudian, who progressively studied Islam based on future historical challenges as true mujtahids or reformers. Both figures opened up more significant opportunities for Muslims to take on historical roles and not hold back the dynamics of history (specifically its imprisonment with the illusion of the past). These individuals carry out the prophetic functions because they have freed the past from religious traditions with the power of personal creativity (a creative intellectual advantage in reading future history). Therefore, this study used the conscious and sustainable process of education, advocacy, and socialization by Nurcholish and Yudian to build a harmonious, tolerant, just, and civilized atmosphere of national and state life in Indonesia.

Misconceptions about the caliphate require an action plan that needs to be executed at two levels: anticipating the spread of misunderstandings and conducting ongoing education. presently, the Muslim community has not been protected by various provocations and politicization of the caliphate discourse. Therefore, they can be exposed to misleading knowledge and interpretations. Urgently, it is necessary to adopt educative regulations. Likewise, for groups exposed to the wrong perspective, it is necessary to open a forum for discussion and ongoing assistance. Public education as a discourse counter to news production and a misleading understanding of the caliphate needs to be developed.

5. Conclusion

As it turns out, the Islamic caliphate -which its supporters by its proponents for a long time in Indonesia,- has no ideological, sociological and epistemological foundations. It is more of a reaction to governmental policies that are perceived as failing to meet the needs of Muslims on any scale imaginable. Nurcholish and Yudian rationally and methodically identified the discourse’s shortcomings in the Indonesian setting. Nurcholish, who used a political philosophical or sociological approach, and Yudian, who used a maqashid syariah or ushul fiqh approach, both saw the caliphate’s struggle in the country as imaginative, illusive, apologetic, ahistorical, and unsupported by shariah texts. As a result, efforts to further develop this discourse as a sacred notion are not only pointless and tiring, but also destructive to the principle of monotheism and the teaching of Islam that is a benefit for the world (rahmatan li al- ‘alamin).

This study offers a fresh viewpoint on the khilafah discourse, transforming it from an intellectual to a religious discourse with a heavy psychological load. Meanwhile, the caliphate is a social, historical, academic, and epistemological discourse that can be examined more scientifically and proportionally. Its implementation in a state is determined by the citizens’ demands and agreements. It is incompatible with the conditions of a pluralistic nation and the founding fathers and citizens who have committed to accept the Pancasila for good in the Indonesian setting. Both people advocated for Indonesian Muslims to adopt this idea without psychological or ideological costs, as well as different scientific-academic arguments.

This study has limited data sources because it only photographed two figures from different ages. As a result, it is impossible to generalize the opinions of all Indonesian Muslim philosophers. As a lesson learnt, policy formulation necessitates a larger survey and in-depth interviews with informants. A study of these two persons’ thoughts is necessary because it can provide a solid foundation for enhancing relations between Islam and a symbiotic-mutualist state. Follow-up research is encouraged to accommodate other researchers’ broader ideas, and more diverse sources of information can be a source of knowledge for a deeper understanding and better structuring of social life in the state.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lahaji

Lahaji is a researcher and Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Family Law (Ahwal al-Syakhshiyah) Department, Faculty of Syariah at IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo, Indonesia. Received his Master Degree in Magister Department of IAIN Alauddin Makassar, 2000 and his Doctor since 2011 from Islamic State University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.

Ahmad Faisal

Ahmad Faisal is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Family Law (Ahwal al-Syakhshiyah) Department, Faculty of Syariah at IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo, Indonesia. His major research interest are religious studies, sociology of Islamic law and cultural studies.