Social scientist’s perspective on the reaction of the Indonesian government to COVID-19 in the first phase

Abstract

The Indonesian government’s response tends to be slow in handling the surge of COVID-19 in the first phase. This study aimed to examine the Indonesian government’s response to the spread of COVID-19 in the first phase from the social scientist’s perspective. This study is a qualitative research with a constructivist paradigm because it examines the perception of social scientists about how the Indonesian government handles the issue of COVID-19 at an early stage. The results showed that the Indonesian government’s reaction had weaknesses, including inconsistency, multiple interpretations, disregarding people’s safety in favor of economic and political interests, and the president’s lack of Pancasila values. Several ministers responded to journalists’ questions regarding information that COVID-19 had entered Indonesia with jokes that did not reflect sympathy for the public’s anxiety. Furthermore, the government seems to have underestimated the warnings from media coverage with no restrictions on international flights. All the social scientists agreed that the Indonesian government’s response failed in handling public communication through mass media to COVID-19 in the First Phase. Therefore, this study recommended effective public communication management regarding substance and delivery techniques to promote cooperation in dealing with the pandemic.

Keywords:

• COVID-19
• Indonesia government
• public communication
• social sciences

1. Introduction

COVID-19 is a global threat that has led to a lockdown policy on international visits by various countries, including China, Italy, England, France, Poland, Spain, Malaysia, and Thailand (Sebayang, 2020). These countries take lockdown policies to anticipate the spread of COVID-19 from one area to another or even from one country to another due to the nature of COVID-19, which spreads so quickly and endangers human health (Venkatesh et al., 2022). The policy during the COVID-19 pandemic was taken. It was considered capable of inhibiting the spread of COVID-19 because it limited the movement of residents who could potentially carry the transmission of COVID-19 (Dhama et al., 2020).

When other countries chose to lock down as a policy for handling the spread of COVID-19, the Government of Indonesia opened itself up to foreign tourists visiting Indonesia, then raised controversy in the public sphere. Some Indonesian government statements have caused various arguments. The Institution of Research, education, economy, and social studies found 37 blunders in statements by the Central Governments, including controversial public officials’ policy inconsistencies and conflicts between the central and local governments (Farisa, 2020). The spread of hoax information, including social media rumors that the virus was not dangerous, rejection of health protocols, and conspiracy theories, complicated the pre-crisis period of the pandemic (Marhaejanti, 2020; Spring, 2020).

The government can manage state resources to control the crisis and the community’s concerns and uncertainties by implementing emergency policies (Djalante et al., 2020; McConnell & Stark, 2021; Yanto, 2020). Public protection policies include international flight lockdowns (mainly from China), available hospital infrastructure, and medical personnel. However, the Indonesian government did not implement a lockdown on international flights or issue policies to address and prevent the spread of COVID-19 until the first case was experienced. Some examples of a lack of the central and regional governments’ coordination and influence were the rejected lockdown policy of the Malang City Government (Detik.com, 2020), DKI Jakarta by the Central Government (Warezza, 2020), and the increased influx of foreign workers from China (Prabawanti & Gewati, 2020).

The government was unable to control the spread of the virus by making omissions on international flights and foreign workers from China into the country. In response to the pandemic, public communication involved controversial, inconsistent, and contradictory statements between public officials in central and local governments. Effective public communication can manage a crisis to prevent critical situations (Nutbeam, 2020; Porat et al., 2020). However, the incorrect communication method causes more problems outside the substance of the communication process. Therefore, Indonesia requires a crisis communication strategy to provide public policy information during the pandemic and maintain public certainty and calm (Alkomari, 2020). Indisari stated that the government requires a communication model to handle the health crisis and the negative information in the media (Indasari & Anggriani, 2020).

Public communication was transformed into crisis communication to handle the pandemic. However, this caused a crisis, as shown by public officials’ controversial, inconsistent, and contradictory statements (Farisa, 2020). The government’s public communication protocol through the Presidential Staff Office (PSO) to handle the Pandemic was ineffective. Therefore, there were high COVID-19 cases, hoaxes (Marhaejanti, 2020), and conflicts between central and local governments. According to Robert and O’Hair, implementing crisis communication is ineffective for a prolonged crisis, though an appropriate approach can help to contain the situation (Heath & O’Hair, 2020). A successful social change depends on an effective leader communicating to the public in managing and handling the COVID-19 pandemic together, particularly how the leader chooses and selects the proper words (Sujoko et al., 2022; Watkins et al., 2021). A public communication that considers the community’s conditions positively impacts the trust and compliance in following government policies or health protocols (Nutbeam, 2020; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). However, the situation is different when the leaders are ineffective in the change process, as in the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia.

The government’s public communication problem promoted various studies, Djalante et al. (2020), which focused on the government’s pandemic response. Yanto (2020) discussed government crisis communication at the village level. Alkomari (2020) studied public communication from the Regional Government during the pandemic. Yudarwati et al. (2023) discussed participatory risk communication in handling the pandemic. Sujoko et al. (2022) identified the role of political rhetoric used by leaders to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Other studies by intellectuals, associations of scientific institutions, universities, and government agencies discussed the pandemic issues through webinars, seminars, or international conferences and focused discussions. Based on the latest science, the critical view can be a government input or lesson in handling the pandemic. According to Zreik (2021), intellectuals should be honest with the public and the authorities, even when contrary to the authorities. Therefore, their knowledge contributes to the nation’s and country’s development.

As an official, the Indonesian government is considered not empathetic with Indonesian citizens during the pandemic. This study presented the intellectuals’ thoughts from the social science clusters of the Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Sciences on the government’s public communications, solutions, and policies during the pandemic. These intellectuals agreed that the government’s public communication, solutions, and policies during the pandemic were ineffective from all social science perspectives. This research shows how informants respond to the government’s behavior or attitude toward Indonesian society during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the objective of this study was to examine the Indonesia government’s response to the spread of COVID-19 in the first phase from the social scientist’s perspective.

2. Methods

2.1. Research design

This research is a qualitative research with a constructivist paradigm because it examines the perception of scientists about how the Indonesian government handles the issue of COVID-19 at an early stage. Creswell stated that the constructivist paradigm builds knowledge through systematic and detailed explanations of empirical social phenomena (Neuman, 2014). The subject included 10 intellectuals with expertise in communication, sociology, politics, economics, and public administration from the Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Sciences in East Java.

2.2. Data collection

A descriptive qualitative approach systematically explains study objectives through in-depth narratives by describing social phenomena based on their natural setting (Neuman, 2014). Qualitative research does not require a sampling method but refers to portal criteria’s suitability. News portals must be Press Council verified and not affiliated with political party administrators. Therefore, in-depth data was collected to present a holistic picture of the government’s public communication in dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic. In this study, there are two gathering data techniques.

Firstly, the researcher collected 24 news from 9 online news portals that publish controversial statements from the Indonesian government. These 24 news articles were taken during the February and March 2020 media coverage. The 24 news articles refer to the content of the news that criticized the attitude of government officials after the incident occurred, namely the early days of COVID-19 entering Indonesia. This also refers to the function of the press as a watchdog over the government (executive), legislature, and judiciary. This trial relates to the time and stage of COVID-19 development. Before the initial phase of COVID-19 entering Indonesia, the media in Indonesia had intensively reported the incidence of COVID-19 in various countries with the impact of increasing death tolls. This also happened in neighboring countries. Some countries have also implemented lockdown policies and restricted international flight restrictions, especially from the source country of the COVID-19 outbreak (China). However, for more than 2 months since the outbreak in the world, it seems that Indonesia has not taken it seriously by continuing to open international flights from China and Europe. When the media reported the danger of the spread of COVID-19 and the increasing risk of death, the beginning of the phase was not accompanied by a sense of empathy from the government.

Secondly, I conducted two focus group discussion sessions with different topics during the Focus Group Discussion (FGD): 1) “Public Communication of Government Elites in the COVID-19 Pandemic” and 2) “Social Science Perspective in Viewing the COVID-19 Pandemic Policy: Human Sides”. The criteria for informants in FGD (Forum Group Discussion) are known, namely, lecturers who focus on studying the social humanities. The time of implementation was the initial phase of COVID-19 entering Indonesia and the rise of media criticism of the government’s attitude in November and December 2020. The FGD was conducted online with professors and social sciences scholars using the Zoom application in this study. This FGD was adjusted to explore the social science scholar’s views on government public communication during the pandemic. FGD determines the attitudes, behaviors, and groups’ points of view (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018).

2.3. Data analysis

The researcher uses FGD data to use Miles et al.'s (2014) method for data condensation, display, and conclusion drawing. All data are analyzed using NVivo Pro software sourced from a certified online news portal, serving as discussion material in the FGD.

3. Results and discussions

3.1. The chaos of public communication by public officials during the COVID-19 pandemic

The confusion of information between the central government public officials, observers, and academics began in February 2020. Y1, a Professor and Chair of the COVID-19 Task Force from Brawijaya University, explained different opinions on the pandemic beginning between President Joko Widodo and several academics. The president stated that there were no COVID-19 cases from the test results of 16 suspected patients. Y1 explained that the president’s statement provided a rebuttal to several academic circles stating that the virus had spread into the country. Specifically, the Tokyo City Government of Japan referenced a statement that citizens who had previously visited Indonesia had COVID-19 (Y2, FGD on 19 June 2020).

The public officials at the minister’s level also implemented public communications, with connotations undermining COVID-19. At the beginning of the pandemic, some Ministers made jokes, such as cat rice could cure the virus as stated by the Minister of Transportation. According to the Minister of Health, the virus had not spread into the country because of prayer. In contrast, the coordinating minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment stated that Indonesia was the Corona Car. According to Y1, these statements by public officials at the ministerial level amounted to poor public communication. The beginning of the pandemic in February—March 2020 was the appropriate time to handle it. However, it was ignored or underestimated, leading to continuously increased cases (Y1, FGD on 15 May 2020 and 19 June 2020). His views are similar to Djalante, which found the government’s response to the pandemic’s beginning to be slow and ineffective (Djalante et al., 2020). The following are some of the findings of this study related to jokes by Ministers in response to the arrival of COVID-19 in Indonesia (Figure 1):

Figure 1. Jokes of statement from elite politic handling COVID-19.

(Source: Result from news data analysis from Detik.com; Kompas.com; CnnIndonesia.com; Tempo.co; CnbcIndonesia.com; Republika.co.id; Suara.com; Viva.co.id; Okezone.com).

The chaos in public communication from central government elites is also reflected in the statements of central government public officials who seem to take it for granted and set aside scientific studies in dealing with COVID-19 in Indonesia. For example, the statement by the Minister of Health Terawan, who seemed to refute foreign scientists who thought that COVID-19 had entered Indonesia; Statement by Vice President Ma’ruf Amin that survivors of COVID-19 can recover by drinking wild horse milk; Statement from the Head of BNPB & the COVID-19 Task Force, Doni, that people have strong immune systems because they often drink herbal medicine; Luhut Binsar Panjaitan’s statement that the hot weather in Indonesia made COVID-19 not strong in Indonesia. Public communication carried out by the Central Government elite in a rhetorical perspective is far from the logos dimension which requires that messages in communication must have logical logic and be accepted by the public (Sujoko et al., 2022). Following (Figure 2) are some statements from public officials who are unscientific in dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic in Indonesia:

Figure 2. Statement without scientific from elite politics handling COVID-19.

(Source: Result from news data analysis from Detik.com; Kompas.com; CnnIndonesia.com; Tempo.co; CnbcIndonesia.com; Republika.co.id; Suara.com; Viva.co.id; Okezone.com).

According to Y1, the public information confusion after the golden period (February—March 2020) was still inconsistent and contradictory. For instance, the central government’s statement allowing homecoming was temporarily prohibited. Furthermore, the coordinating minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment allowed online motorcycle taxis operations while the Regulation of the Minister of Health, which was then prohibited by the Governor of Jakarta (Jannah, 2020). There were inconsistent data on COVID-19 cases from the central government with Jakarta and South Sumatra. The inconsistent, contradictory, and unclear data of COVID-19 cases can exacerbate the crisis by causing public confusion of official information and guidelines. Therefore, the public depends on social media wild information (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020) that could lead to social unrest and accelerate the crisis due to hoaxes or incredible data (Zareh, 2020).

The chaos of government public communication or public officials can be explained from the classical sociology perspective that examines or predicts the factors and consequences of a social phenomenon. According to several professors of politics and public policy, the chaos in public communication is caused by political competition, economy, and leadership crisis. Political competition from public officials still predates pro-people public policies during the pandemic. This is reflected in the overlapping policies or public communication between the central government and the Jakarta governor, showing that the president and the cabinet ministers repeatedly canceled the governor’s policies. The president held a press conference prohibiting independent policies urging all regions to follow the central government policies, following the lockdown implementation by Governor Anies Baswedan. Similarly, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, the coordinating minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, repeatedly contradicted the narrative with the governor, such as online motorcycle taxis operations, inter-city buses, and PSBB policies (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Y2 considered the conflict between the central government, the Jakarta governor, and other local governments related to the social stage phenomenon. The officials used public communication as a social and political stage for electability (Y2, FGD on 15 May 2020). From a dramaturgy perspective, the front stage is a narrative war on public policies for handling the pandemic, whereas backstage enhances political electability. The public official’s competition for political electability was promoted by various surveys at the Survey Institute led by intellectuals, such as the Political Indicators by Burhanuddin Muhtadi, which showed changes in public opinion towards the officials and described the official’s elasticity at the central and regional levels (Kumparan, 2020).

Political competition from public officials led to confusion of information in public communication and was highly distorted on social media (Figure 3). Gustomy survey found that the two big poles of the narrative were opposite Twitter (Gustomy, 2020). Social media contains information related to COVID-19, where the trending views from buzzers and influencers immerse rational and critical narratives. Furthermore, Gustomy explained that the pluralist populist and the Islamist populist cluster were opposite poles (Gustomy, 2020). Y1 (FGD on 19 June 2020) identified that the society split between the populist pluralist cluster and an Islamist populist cluster was caused by the 2019 presidential election and ignored by the government during public communication. The government assumed that the people’s polarization from the election was achieved by “embracing” the opposition into the cabinet. However, polarization persisted until the COVID-19 Pandemic (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Figure 3. Political competition in public communication handling pandemic COVID-19.

(Source: Results from news data analysis from Detik.com; Kompas.com; CnnIndonesia.com; Tempo.co; CnbcIndonesia.com; Republika.co.id; Suara.com; Viva.co.id; Okezone.com).

The other highlighted weakness of the government’s public communication was diction, which has multiple interpretations. For example, the president distinguished “going home” and “going home” for Jakarta residents during the PSBB (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar/Large Scale Social Restrictions) at an interview on Narasi TV’s YouTube channel. According to Y1 (FGD on 19 June 2020), the terms “returning home” and “homecoming,” which were viral on social media, confused the public. Some people manipulated diction such as using the term “sungkem,” which means visiting parents, as approval to return to the village pages (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Furthermore, Y1 explained that the community did not understand terms such as social and physical distancing, OTG (Orang Tanpa Gejala/Person without Symptoms), ODP (Orang dalam Pengawasan/People Under Surveillance), PDP (Pasien Dalam Pengawasan/Patient Under Monitoring), PSBB, and other terms. Therefore, the complexity of these terms increased the public ignorance of the government’s public communications (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020).

According to Y2, a Professor from the State University of Surabaya, the pandemic has become a social stage for public officials to gain electability. On public communication, he stated that the government views the public as passive objects. Sociologically, the community is viewed as rational subjects that can determine their choices or will (Y2, FGD on 15 May 2020). From a communication perspective, the government is still leveling the audience or the characteristics of the community and ignores feedback on public statements (Littlejohn & Foss, 2016; Mulyana, 2016). Y3, an Associate Professor and intellectual, provided an anthropological perspective on how society interprets the government’s public communications. Existentially, humans are influenced by helplessness, uncertainty, and the interpretation of culture (Y3, FGD on 15 May 2020). As previously discussed, the COVID-19 Pandemic affected various sectors, specifically the economy, leading to the community’s lack of power, confusion, and information uncertainty. Most people interpreted terms/diction on public communications, which affected those who did not “go one way” in obeying the rules or health protocols (Y3, FGD on 15 May 2020).

Y4 explained that the government’s public communication could not relay correct information in a crisis. Furthermore, Y4 explained that the information in various media, specifically social media, was difficult to trace because of the central government’s inconsistency (Y4, FGD on 9/11/2020). According Hu et al. (2020) and Zareh (2020), the information in the media is classified as infodemic and started at the end of 2019, when the virus was detected in Wuhan, China. Illegal and untraceable information on the virus culminated in an infodemic on social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, in January—February 2020. Therefore, the public dealt with health threats and infodemics that increased crisis during the pandemic.

3.2. Misinformation in public communication by elite public officials during the COVID-19 pandemic

The communicative abundance and a post-truth perspective mix factual information based on beliefs or deliberately. Misinformation or a hoax is essential (Farkas & Schou, 2019). Some literature discussed the abundance of information and hoax phenomena during the pandemic by dividing it into dis-information, misinformation, and mal-information (Baines & Elliot, 2020; Barua et al., 2020). Y1 highlighted the same concepts for government public communication and stated that the confusion of information falls under misinformation and malinformation (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Misinformation is not intentionally disseminated and caused by widespread disinformation (the spread of misinformation deliberately to confuse others), resulting in a misunderstanding. Mal-information is the dissemination of correct information that can potentially threaten a person’s or group’s life (Baines & Elliot, 2020; Barua et al., 2020). The public official’s statements that implied the virus would not spread into the country affected people’s behavior, including eating cat’s rice, performing certain religious traditions (reading Qunut and prayer form Kyai), and satirical communication on the complex licensing process.

Y1 believed the government had the best intentions for the community during the pandemic. However, the information and communication methods were inaccurate (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020), emphasizing the need for public officials to avoid jokes during a crisis. Y4 focused on public officials or the government’s ineffective communication skills and how they affected the public during the pandemic (Y4, FGD on 19 June 2020). Based on the communication science perspective, this causes an error in applying content and relations in the government’s public communication process. Mulyana, a professor in Communication Sciences, explained that the “content” aspect is the content of the message, while the “relationship” aspect is the delivery technique (Mulyana, 2016).

Y1 and Y2 explained that public safety should be prioritized more than other interests such as economy or politics (FGD, 15 May 2020). They focused on shared moral guidelines that should influence the government’s public policies and communications content. The government has not optimized the application of Pancasila values in decision-making, such as policies that lead to herd immunity. The government’s public communication can influence people’s behavior and immunity to viruses. The government has neglected its obligation to protect the people’s lives as per the fifth principle of Pancasila, “Social Justice for All Indonesians” (Y3, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Y4, a Professor of Communication Science, stated that experts did not support government public communication during the crisis. According to Y4, the government failed to implement a lockdown and preferred the PSBB due to economic interests than people’s safety. The government would bear the living costs of the community following the lockdown policy, though the PSBB policy was not costly. Furthermore, Y4 believed that the PSBB was not sufficient and endangered the community. Staying home for 2 weeks or a month could cause starvation while going to work or finding food would risk people’s health. The lack of PSBB implementation to reduce the spread of the virus was a government public communication failure.

The government’s misinformation and mal-information were a form of unorganized public communication, which transformed into a crisis. Ideally, it should be transformed into crisis communication to deal with the pandemic threatening society and create certainty and calm for the people (Nutbeam, 2020; Porat et al., 2020). In the abundance of information, there is a need to minimize misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information, increasing the crisis.

3.3. Economic orientation in public communication of the elite public officials

The government’s economic factors resulted in divided policies between dealing with the pandemic health crisis and managing the increasingly sustainable economic downturn. Y1 explained that the economy is a factor while handling the pandemic, shown using influencer funds to promote tourism, opening shopping centers or malls, and foreign policies for workers in the country (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Y5 explained that the government ignored the society’s lower layers during the pandemic by implementing incentive policies for entrepreneurs compared to the poor. The government chose PSBB over lockdown to avoid providing incentives for the community sustenance (Y5, FGD on 15 May 2020).

Y1 further established that economic factors protect the interests of political oligarchs. This is in line with Winters, which reported that oligarchs still exist in democracy, dominate several political parties, and indirectly influence public policy (Winters, 2013). Therefore, Y1 argued that an economic-oriented political oligarchy’s interests contributed to poor public communication (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Asrinaldi et al. established that the political oligarchy was maintained during the New Order era (Asrinaldi & Karim, 2021). However, there was a power reorganization of Indonesia’s political oligarchy during the reform era. It is common for an economy-oriented political oligarchy to influence public policy or public communication (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Economic oriented in public communication from political Elite.

(Source: Results from news data analysis from Detik.com; Kompas.com; CnnIndonesia.com; Tempo.co; CnbcIndonesia.com; Republika.co.id; Suara.com; Viva.co.id; Okezone.com).

According to Y6 (FGD on 19 June 2020), an East Java HIPIIS, there was no strong leadership spirit in managing public communication or making public policies. Y6 also stated that the president should have led the crisis and not controlled the cabinet ministers, as shown by the minister’s performance on the contracts of predictions in public communication. There was no public communication to provide certainty for the community amid the crisis (Y6, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Y1 stated that the government’s weak leadership spirit led to confusion, increasing uncertainty because the public official’s statements at the Minister level and the presidential spokesperson did not match in tone and had different perspectives. Therefore, the public in the central government eventually contracted each other (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Y6 and Y1 on government leadership in public communication had similarities and differences with Haÿry findings, which discussed the Finnish and Swedish governments’ response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (Hayry, 2021). The similarity of the Indonesian and Swedish government leadership in responding to the pandemic. Y1 explained that the Indonesian government’s policy is not herd immunity, though it translates to this in practice. The Swedish government honestly communicates that herd immunity is taken with the main argument of utilitarian health (Hayry, 2021). In contrast, the Indonesian government presents its public policy as non-herd immunity. However, this policy often translates to herd immunity practice.

The government’s public communication half-heartedly managing the spread of the virus into the country is a fatal omission by neglecting its obligation to protect citizens. The government claims that the public is not disciplined in following its recommendations even with the continuing increase in the number of confirmed cases (Y5, FGD on 15 May 2020). Through PSBB policies with difficult terms for the public, the media emphasizes that the community’s undisciplined behavior contributes to the pandemic. The mass media ownership is affiliated with political parties, supports the rulers, and tends to be the government’s voice in producing the ruling version of the truth to ask for public approval. Herman wrote of this phenomenon as manufacturing consent (Chomsky, 2005). The mass media outside these affiliations found it difficult to get detailed information on the pandemic and finally conveyed the government’s information.

The concept of manufacturing consent was supported by various groups from medical personnel to media workers with the campaign “Let us work, you stay at home,” “I stayed at work for you, “You stay at home for us” to “Indonesia Terserah” (Indonesia up to you). This shows that it was extremely challenging to make people stay at home. The government could not support the basic needs of those who followed the rules and stayed home. The inconsistency exacerbates this and multi-interpretive diction in public communication, interpreted and manipulated by the community, such as manipulating the terms homecoming and returning home with sungkem or visiting parents. For this reason, the community fails to comply with the government rules or health protocol advisories (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020).

The government’s volatile public policies and unresponsive communications over these changes led to judgments on its inconsistency and incompetency. Social media became the means for unsupported public expressions by the mainstream media. The public expressions included refusing to wear masks and wash hands, the viral movement to reject the rapid test on the Bali island (Kompas, 2020), and the hashtag “Indonesia Terserah” movement to critic the government (Shalihah & Wedhaswary, 2020). Ineffective implementation of public communication led to attitudes or behaviors that were paradoxical to the government’s policies. Y3 viewed this as a human anthropological phenomenon, meaning that people’s actions or behavior were based on uncertain cultural censorship (public policy) in the crisis (Y3, FGD on 15 May 2020). Moreover, the government should effectively manage the pandemic to avoid the PSBB becoming social disobedience (Y6, FGD on 19 June 2020).

3.4. Public communication formulation for handling the COVID-19 pandemic crisis

This study provided several recommendations for public communication implementation.

First, a “one door” public communication builds “one tone” of government policies to reduce public uncertainty. According to Y1 and Y4, the “one door” public communication prevents contracting statements between the central government public officials or the central and regional governments. It helps rearrange the public’s rejected wild information or discourse on the established public policies (Y1 & Y4, FGD on 19 June 2020). Y1 further explained that “one door” public communication should be followed by information disclosure and accuracy concerning the COVID-19 case data. The data is still confusing or unclear and contradicts the local government’s (Y1 & Y4, FGD on 19 June 2020).

The government’s “one-gate system” public communication will prevent the social stage ridden by public officials to enhance their political electability, as previously explained by Y2 (FGD on 15 May 2020). Social scientists’ recommended “one-gate system” public communication, in line with the Policy Brief Universitas Gajah Mada that suggested reorganizing public communication and the single public communication channel for handling crises (Policy Brief Universitas Gajah Mada, 2020). Public communication structuring should focus on the message substance and effectively convey it to the public. Mulyana stated that one of the communication principles is that it occurs in two aspects, the content (message substance) and the relationship (how messages are conveyed to the public) (Mulyana, 2016). Furthermore, Y7 emphasized that interactive public communication increases enthusiasm and community volunteers. Therefore, interactive one-toned public communication increases public participation enhances governments crisis management.

Second, the diction should be clear and easily understood by all circles of society. As previously stated by Y1, multi-interpretive diction in public communication can be manipulated by public elements. Therefore, using straightforward and easy-to-understand diction prevents multiple interpretations that the government should adopt to improve public communication (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Y6 also recommended adjusting the diction in public communication to the community characteristics. This is because not everyone understood the foreign terms, such as physical and social distancing. Therefore, most people could not distinguish the two. Hence, the government should use clear and easy diction (Y6, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Third, strengthening the role of mainstream media as inoculation of social media wild information on the pandemic. The concept of inoculation can be used as an “antibody” to resist social media wild information. The government can collaborate with digital and print press to provide valid information. These recommendations depend on the characteristics of the media or journalism bound to the moral ethics of protecting the public from misinformation (Sujoko, 2022).

According to Y4, strengthening conventional media’s role and the press supporting public communication prevents information bias during the pandemic (Y4, FGD on 19 June 2020). Mainstream mass media can be collaborated with by the government to provide education for the public in handling COVID-19 Pandemic (Sujoko et al., 2023).

Fourth, strengthening the leadership role in public communication. As previously stated by Y1 and Y2 as Professor intellectuals and the Policy Brief Universitas Gajah Mada, the leadership weakness in public communication could be improved by strengthening the leadership role to enhance certainty and government public trust (Policy Brief Universitas Gajah Mada, 2020). The president must act as a strong leader and fully commit to handling the pandemic and articulate discourse to ensure the ministers implement it in their region. Y4 added that strong leadership in public communication creates authoritarianism but should not be a problem when it favors the people’s safety (Y4, FGD on 19 June 2020).

Fifth, prioritizing people’s safety despite their differences in political views and economic interests. The political contestation in the 2019 presidential election polarized society (Gustomy, 2020; Sujoko, 2020) and affected the government’s public communication policy. As Y1 explained, the political differences between the central and the regional government, specifically DKI Jakarta, caused chaos in public communication, including overlapping information about the pandemic (Y1, FGD on 19 June 2020). Similarly, Bungin reported that the government’s failure to manage the crisis was not focused on the interests of people with low incomes (Y5, FGD on 15 May 2020) but served prominent business people, commonly referred to as political oligarchs (Asrinaldi & Karim, 2021; Winters, 2013). Disregarding political differences and economic interests to focus on public policies prioritizing public health will facilitate effective public communication to manage the pandemic.

The last recommendation refers to the Pancasila values not implemented as moral guidelines in government public policies during the pandemic. The values can be used as moral guidelines while implementing government public policies and communication. Watson explained that Pancasila’s moral values should reflect people’s behavior following public policies and communication. The importance of Pancasila is the spirit of cooperation that can be implemented to achieve an interactive public communication model that fosters community volunteerism and contributes to crisis management (Y7, FGD on 15 May 2020).

For further explanation, the theoretical solution of this case could not be generalized due to depending on the socio-cultural value of local wisdom thus, the applied theoretic solution must also examine several local wisdom perspectives.

4. Conclusion

The skepticism is based on the analysis of inconsistent public communication from Indonesia's government, multiple diction interpretations, contradictory statements between ministers, unclear data on the COVID-19 case, political and economic considerations during the crisis, and moral standards. These concerns must still be fulfilled while making public policy decisions during the pandemic. The chaos of public communication led to predictions by professors in social science of possible impact on government apathy and public rejection. Furthermore, the most significant effect was horizontal conflict caused by increased economic crises, health, and uncertainty of government information.

5. Limitation

This research focuses on social sciences scholars’ perspective in interpreting how government elites react to the COVID-19 issue. Interpretation as a principal part of the communication process becomes the main issue in this paper. This research does not discuss how public leaders manage COVID-19 issues from a government science or political perspective.

6. Recommendation

This study recommends: 1) the restructuring of interactive “one door” public communications, 2) the use of clear and easily understood diction by the community, 3) the strengthening of the conventional media role and data transparency of COVID-19 cases, 4) the strengthening of the leadership role in managing public communication, 5) disregarding political differences and economic interests to focus on managing public health, and 6) implementing Pancasila as a moral standard in effective decision-making by prioritizing the people’s interests during the pandemic.

Acknowledgments

The authors express gratitude to the Chair of the Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Sciences in East Java for the permission to hold focused discussions to address government public communications during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

Sujoko, A. (2020). HIPISS Jatim Series 1: Seri Diskusi Menyikapi Kondisi Sosial Masyarakat Indonesia [HIPISS Jatim Series 1: Discussion Series Responding to Social Conditions of Indonesian Society]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pc4Xl_2eohg. Accessed on 17 February 2021.

Additional information

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Notes on contributors

Anang Sujoko

Anang Sujoko is a Professor and Lecturer at the Department of Communication, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia. He has expertise in political communication and media studies. He focuses on research about communication and media studies.