Ethiopian citizenship: The Nexus between indigeneity and Ethnicity in post-1991

Abstract

The critical concern of this article is to investigate the common drawback of politicizing indigeneity against Ethiopianness, indigenous in Regional States’ Constitutions and its impediment to building a mono-politico-economic community. However, nowadays, Ethiopia encounters sporadic ethnic conflicts, all-out civil war, and massive displacement due to the indigeneity dichotomy, where politicizing indigeneity as an expression of identity politics poses such problems. Politicizing indigeneity creates a double whammy of discrimination against individuals or groups labeled non-indigenous and Ethiopia has experienced acute social disintegration. Thus, Ethiopianness is in peril as a result of indigeneity’s politicization. Threats to ethnic lines must be handled through multiculturalism. The more Ethiopian politics adapts to the creation of Ethiopianness, the better citizens would understand the idea of “divided we fall, united we stand”. The study used a qualitative research method with explanatory. In terms of data sources, both primary and secondary sources were used.

Keywords:

• Ethiopianness
• Ethnicity
• Ethnonationalism
• indigeneity

1. Introduction

In Ethiopia, after federalism has been introduced as a means of political and territorial governance (Bekalu, 2018; Clapham, 2017; Habtu, 2005; Smith, 2007; Tewfik, 2010; Vaughan, 2003), the Regional States’ constitutions, except few, systematically dissect people in line with indigenes and non-indigenes. Covertly or overtly, they divide their populations into indigene and non-indigene on ideological, institutional, and policy grounds and this has been utilized as the base for regional administrates (Abbink, 1997). All of the regions have adopted their own constitutions under the authority granted to them by article 52(2) (b) to enact a constitution. Based on the FDRE Constitution, all Ethiopian ethnic groups are presumed to have their origins in a certain part of the nation, which is situated in one of the twelve regions. In other words, it presumes that ethnic and regional boundaries overlap, which supports the label “ethnic” federalism. Therefore, inhabitants of all regional states are both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Thus, as Van der (2007, p. 160) explains the fact that

The point is therefore that the ethnic groups explicitly mentioned and empowered by the regional constitutions are the “indigenous” groups of the region, i.e. the groups that have their place of origin in that region. The implicit or explicit differentiation between indigenous and non-indigenous groups has implications for the rights of the two categories of groups.

Based on the non-indigenous people and indigenous people dichotomy, systematic and persistent rights violations have been conducted for decades, even before ethnic federalism has been functioning (Bassi, 2014; Fikre-Selassie, 2013; UNCERD, 2007). The indigene non-indigene dichotomy that predates the ethnic federalism is the result of caricatured political narratives vis-à-vis the formation of modern Ethiopia. The political elites of the 1960s—sometimes referred to as “the Generation”—and ultra-ethno-nationalists are both familiar with these caricatured and occasionally unreliable political narratives (Kiflu, 1993). The conflicting political narratives have resulted in Ethiopia’s current state structure and definition of citizenship.

By privileging indigeneity, the national regional states have infringed on the non-indigenous citizenship¹ rights and undermined their status as full citizens with the right to reside in any part of Ethiopia and enjoy equal rights. The dichotomy is legalized constitutionally. Thus, indigeneity is treated as a distinct ethnic identity.

Therefore, Ethiopia’s ethnic federal structure provides a political landscape in which regional states plunge into the politics of preference, which stems from indigeneity- the “sons of the soil”. Non-indigenous peoples were repeatedly threatened with expulsions and, in some cases, required to return to their ancestral homeland, according to Gagnon and Tremblay (2020, p. 274).

The article is divided into five sections, introduction, covering Ethiopian federalism, indigeneity in regional state constitutions, the dichotomy of Ethiopian citizens as indigenous and non-indigenous, the relationship between indigeneity and ethnonationalism, and concluding with a remark.

2. An overview of the Ethiopia’s federalism and indigeneity in regional states

2.1. The genesis and foundational principle of Ethiopia’s federalism

Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism came into effect in 1995. Since then, many researchers have focused on examining its structure and its puzzles in Ethiopia (Abbink, 1997; Asnake, 2013; Clapham, 2017; Frank, 2009; Markakis, 1987; Merera, 2003; Lyons, 2019; Smith, 2007; Yonatan, 2017). Nevertheless, a few researchers studied the indigene and non-indigene dichotomy.

For instance, Cambou (2015) emphasizes the necessity to define a group of indigenous people to enjoy the right to development. She concludes that the Ethiopian government resists recognizing indigenous societies. It rather forwards an alternative, “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” Tilahun (2019), by drawing on international and regional (African) criteria of indigenous people, assesses the appropriateness of identifying groups of people as indigenous to pursue justice against the dispossession of land in the context of Ethiopia. Gizachew (2015) demonstrates that though political participation is the right of all nations, nationalities, and peoples, regional states, notably Benishangul-Gumuz, systematically discriminate against non-indigenous peoples from political participation. Mulu (2020) explains that in Ethiopia, recognizing ethnic groups as indigenous would cause tension among nations, nationalities, and peoples.

While all the researches acknowledged so far help understand the possibility of identifying indigenous people in the context of Ethiopia to pursue indigenous rights and expose how non-indigene people are suffering from political participation, the politicization of ethnic identity as indigene versus non-indigene (“we” versus “them”) divide, are yet to be thoroughly and extensively studied. Besides, the above-mentioned works are limited in place, topic, and issue, identifying indigeneity as the oppressive side of ethnic politics, and how the dichotomy of indigene and non-indigene impedes citizenship and nation-building.

The main problem this study grabbles with is the contradiction between indigeneity politics and citizenship rights under the regional states’ constitutions and its socio-economic and political ramifications for the non-indigene-designated population.

Ethiopia’s federal system, is a turning point in the politicization of ethnicity, which Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF, hereafter) manipulated as an essential resource for the solidification of ethnonationalism. Given that Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic state, EPRDF was dedicated to restructuring it into a multi-ethnic state based on ethnicity to “rectify and tackle past injustices”. On the one hand, different ethnic communities can replenish their ethnic norm, culture, language, and including particular lifestyles, on the other hand, to build a mono-politico-economic community out of different ethnic groups while maintaining ethnic diversity and upholding integration and diversity simultaneously. The former holds that the distinctive ethnic identity the past regimes ignored should be maintained so that ethnic groups can attain them (Tewfik, 2010). The latter maintains that nations and nationalities should live as one political community for developing long-term and mutually advantageous conditions for securing rights and liberties, as well as the collective advancement of their interests, without sacrificing diversity. Therefore, the proponents of Ethiopia’s current federal system, supposed ethnic-federalism is the panacea for the past injustices. Challenges related to the federal system are, therefore, a matter of implementation, not necessarily a matter of system.

Contrarily, some argue that, though the foundational principle of federalism that the EPRDF insisted on as a prime goal is to overcome injustices (domination and subjugation) of the past regimes, the apparent realities display that the regime fails to overcome Ethiopia’s sensitive problems of “tribalism, denial of human rights, and poverty” (Minasse, 1996, p. 4). To the extreme, scholars argue that tribalism and contending ethnonationalism were adopted officially in the form of federalism (Ibid, 1996).

In Ethiopia’s context, federalism has been introduced as political and territorial governance. The EPRDF pronounced and established a federalism state structure owing to ethnic diversity is the fundamental feature of Ethiopia. The regime provides federalism as a constitutional and legal item stated under Article 1 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution to materialize a “multi-nationalist project” (Semir, 2019, p. 11).

Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is the direct result of the political narratives of historic discrimination, colonization, inequality, and multi-ethnic societies’ liquidation. Concomitantly, various contending political narratives (anomalies) vis-à-vis modern Ethiopian state formation have grown since the 1960s, when the Ethiopian student movement, anticipated by socialism, started with a strident critic` of the imperial regime (Bahru, 2014). These anomalous political narratives include colonialism, reunification- reclaiming once lost territory, expansion, and oppression thesis.

Being major political agendas for competing for political elites and parties, these political theses, and antitheses have mobilized people to control power and influence policies. Besides, they determine contemporary Ethiopia’s ethnic-based state structure and become a source of identity politics. Therefore, EPRDF and its allied elites emulate their political question through two controversial political strategies- a question of nationality to arrange the right to “self-determination up to secession” and an ethnolinguistic-based federalism arrangement.

The federal state structure is anchored in the ethnic entity, mainly in ethnolinguistic entities as depicted under Articles 2 and 39 (FDRE Constitution, 1995). Both the preamble and these articles emphatically pronounce the idea of “nations, nationalities, and peoples”.

2.2. The dichotomy of indigeneity in the regional states’ constitutions

The term indigenous people is recent and traced to the 1990s. Before the 1990s, the marginalized indigenous communities were known as “First People” who settled in a specific territory before physical colonialism took place and colonizers lived in their colonies (Steeves, 2018). In line with this definition, the indigene versus non-indigenes dichotomy asserts that we are the original (aboriginal) inhabitants, while you are the settlers, aliens, newcomers, and so non-indigene (Clifford, 2013). This categorization is an unsophisticated conception of indigeneity set aside race, religion, and culture.

Besides, the term “indigenous people” has become intertwined with identity. People who identify themselves as indigenous, as Niezen (2003, p. 3), assume the term signifies “a badge worn with pride, revealing something significant and personal about the wearer’s collective attachments”. They plan to use songs, dramas, theater, and other forms of expression to communicate their culture, experiences, way of life and being in the world, songs, myths, beliefs, knowledge, and wisdom (Mathur, 2008). In the story of indigeneity as identity, culture, race, moral sentiment, wisdom, and other indigenous communities’ self-selected attributes triumph.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law respect the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as a collective or as individuals are rights of indigenous communities (UNDRIP, 2007. art. 1). Nonetheless after the UN conference was undertaken in 1977 on the discrimination of indigenous people remarkable development and achievements have been attained in framing mechanisms and developing international laws on the rights of indigenous communities.²

The indigenous people’s concept is inherently flawed, as it is linked to questions of rights, privilege, and wrongdoing. Furthermore, indigenous conceptions have been frequently used by researchers, activists, and politicians in a variety of contexts (Coates, 2004). It’s difficult to grasp the essence of identifying indigenous people without considering associated notions like common ancestry, race, culture, ethnic identity, and collective experiences shaped by discrimination and injustice (Spickard & Burroughs, 2000). Moreover, identity politics, patrimonialism, and autochthony are frequently associated with indigenous and non-indigenous peoples (Balaton-Chrimes, 2016). These are fundamental precepts and signals in the politics of recognition when taken together. Therefore, the concept of indigenous people is based on specific cultural groupings, attachment to a specific territory, way of life, population number (mostly the smallness of an ethnic group), legal categorization, and historical colonial phenomena (Anaya, 2004; Clifford, 2013; Guzmán, 2013; Hamilton, 2009; Niezen, 2003). Thus, the debate over the determination of people as indigene or non-indigene remains unsettled.

In African, some groups suffer from indigeneity politics and have been marginalized. This is very common in Nigeria. Minority ethnic groups in Nigeria have continued to struggle against the majority Hausa-Fulani ethnic amalgam. Many minority ethnic groups claim to be “indigenous” to the areas and consider the Fulani and Hausa to be “settlers” (Adebanwi, 2009). The struggle for political, economic, and social values and rights in these communities frequently results in violent clashes between indigenous groups and settler Hausa-Fulani (Ibid, 2009).

In Ethiopia, the term “indigenous people” has to be understood in Ethiopia beyond the point of “who settled (came) first in a given territory.” Rather, it structurally created political groupings through interconnected and interdependent societies in regional states. Therefore, a vital starting point is to understand that the concept of indigeneity emerged in political narratives within difference and sameness.

The issue of indigeneity is not in the sense of an analytical claim and it is hard to pin down in that way. A group identity (as indigene and non-indigene) has been forged to either expand or impede political participation and regional states use it as a means of discriminating against citizens who are designated as non-indigenous. This strategy is often primordial since it is based on ethnic groupings (nations, nationalities, and peoples) as the cornerstone of Ethiopian nationhood and identity. Nonetheless, this strategy permits nations, nationalities, and people to change the national identity, Ethiopianness, through regionalism. Except for a few, regional states made selectively particular ethnic group/s the holder of sovereign power over the regions. They selectively give political, economic, and social advantages to an ethnic group that claims the region as its homeland while denying such benefits to other ethnic groups. To this effect, a group identity, as indigene and non-indigene, has been forged to either expand or impede popular participation in politics. Contextually, non-indigenous peoples are treated as non-autochthonous and structurally lacking political power and autonomy. These groups are not accommodated by the current state structure and are often victimized by political narratives and ideologies that the Ethiopian federal government is anchored in.

Thus, non-indigenous citizens are denied the right to political participation and economic benefits, as well as being discriminated against based on ethnicity. Such a political circumstance poses a citizenship challenge (an impediment to extending rights) and structural injustice directly originated from a structural account of indigenous and non-indigenous social groups. Thus, privileges and opportunities are systematically and structurally denied to non-indigenous minorities. Thus, indigenous and non-indigenous communities are established in the skewed political system to discriminate against groups and privilege others.

Indeed, the Ethiopian government does not officially offer legal recognition to any ethnic group as indigenous, and their rights are enshrined in international declarations (Dereje & Meron, 2015). The reason is that in reference to the unique federal political order that it has established—a political order which has instituted cultural pluralism allowing ethnic groups the right to self-determination including and up to secession.

Kramer (2015, p. 102) contends that Ethiopia’s federal government did not acknowledge indigenous people and the existing government denounces the issue of their rights for the reason that it is “irrelevant in the new federal order of the Ethiopian state”. Though there are no official statistics and recognition of indigenous communities, there is self-proclaimed indigeneity. Some ethnic groups such as the Afar, Somali, Borana, Kereyu-Oromo, and Nuer identify themselves as indigenes. The African Working Group on Indigenous People (CHPR and IWGIA, 2005) also designates them as indigenous people. Therefore, post-1991 Ethiopia’s political structure lumped nations, nationalities, and peoples as indigenous people together and treat them as equal.

However, most regional states dissect people into indigenous and non-indigenous groups and create a political structure in which a single or some nations are empowered to have special political, economic, and social privilege over the regions. Complementing autonomy and sovereignty, their constitutions unambiguously warranted territorial autonomy and sovereignty for indigenous- allowed to possess land and resources and to control administration with full-fledged rights. Non-indigenous groups are treated as those who chose to work and reside in the regions. In Ethiopia, therefore, indigeneity is utilized to discriminate against other ethnic groups of citizens of the same nation-state (Ejobowah, 2012, p. 728; Waldron, 2003). Thus, the designation is an artificial classification resulting from political structure, which is, in turn, a reflection of the EPRDF’s political narratives and ideology. For indigenous people the regional state is their homeland and for non-indigenous people the regional state is not their homeland. Ideologically, institutionally (structurally), and constitutionally are just a few of the ways that this dissection shows up.

Overtly, the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State used the terms “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” to categorize its people (Benishangul-Gumuz Constitution, Article 2, 2002. Covertly, the Afar, Gambella, Harari and Oromia, Sidama, Somali, and South West Ethiopia Peoples’ National Regional States classified their population in a way that offers particular nations preferential treatment in political participation while discriminating against other ethnic groups. This classification infringes on citizens’ rights and makes citizenship status in the two regional states dependent on indigeneity.

Thus, regional states established a sociopolitical structure in which the particular nations were granted exceptional political, economic, and social rights over their respective territories. Conflating autonomy and sovereignty, their constitutions unambiguously warranted the particular nations’ territorial autonomy and sovereignty; indigenous allowed them to possess the land and other resources and control administration conferring full-fledged rights on what they define as an indigenous population while denying others similar rights. Their regional state constitutions granted selected nations the right to own the regions. Other ethnic groups are treated as those who have chosen to work and reside in the regions, knowing that they do not have equal rights to the indigenous populations. Essentially, the population of those regions is legally and constitutionally codified as indigenes and non-indigenes.

In Ethiopia, though a mono-politico-economic community is designed to be structured, the sovereign political power of the people is dichotomized. The dichotomy has been utilized as an instrument to deny shared national space, shared citizenship rights, and shared governance within for self-rule. In the regions, except a few, those non-indigenous people lose territorial autonomy for two reasons: 1) for the misapplication of the right of self-determination, and 2) for exclusive constitutional warranting of the sovereignty of people to a particular ethnic group and leaving others out.

For instance, the constitution of Oromia’s regional state gives sovereign power only to the Oromo Nation. It also installs sovereignty of the people “resides in the people of the Oromo Nation, and the sovereignty of the people is exercised through their elected representatives and direct democratic participation” (ONRS Constitution, 2001 art.8). Similarly, the Harari regional state limits sovereignty and territorial autonomy to Harari Nation (HNRS, Constitution, 2004). Article 2 of Benishangul Gumuz National Regional State’s constitution authorizes Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Komo to be indigenous ethnic groups. The rest ethnic groups who reside in the region, almost 50% of the regional population, are non-indigenes (Assefa, 2017). Moreover, Gambela Regional State’s constitution recognized only Nuer, Anuak, Mezhenger, and Omo ethnic groups and left others without saying anything (GNRS Constitution, 2002). The constitutions of other regional states including Tigray, Afar, and Somali give sovereign political power to Tigre, Afar, and Somali Nations respectively (ANRS Constitution, 2001; SNRS Constitution, 2001; TRS Constitution, 2005).

Thus, Ethiopia’s regional states’ political and constitutional arrangements are established structurally to be a discriminatory political system in line with indigeneity. This politics has grown out of identity and is constructed through the structural account of social groups of society in which historical marginalization and injustices persist. Thus, “non-indigenous” peoples have been considered second-class citizens not to realize their civil, political, economic, and social rights. Structural injustice is induced by a system rooted in skewed social structure and access to power (Jung, 2008). Almost all regional states created a social structure in which some ethnic groups become empowered to have special political privileges, and others are disadvantaged and closely resemble non-citizens. Complementing autonomy and sovereignty, some regional states’ constitutions exclusively make an ethnic group territorial autonomous, and sovereign. On contrary, some ethnic groups have become non-territorial settlers. This constitutes two different social structures; the advantaged and disadvantageous groups. This crooked social structure encourages marginalization and structural injustice.

The disadvantaged group, particularly the “non-indigenous peoples”, are persistently excluded, oppressed, and marginalized (Sisay, 2020). Therefore, it is surmised that structural injustices, such as the persistent exclusion of some groups of society based on indigeneity could not be alleviated through the dominant principles of liberalism. Of course, these principles try to establish non-discriminatory systems by applying the same evaluation principles and distribution for every individual irrespective of social status, race, gender, and religion. However, liberalism ignores the profound material/and economic differences in individuals’ social position, division of labour, social capacities, and regularizing and normalizing standard ways of life, which all make competition dire to some sections of society, including indigenous peoples (Young, 2007).

The above antecedently supposed statements prove that constitutions’ main tenets of ethnic-based federalism could not encompass the realities of Ethiopia’s diverse nations, nationalities, and peoples.

3. Research design

A qualitative research approach was used to conduct this study. It is popular in social science researches for different reasons (Creswell, 1999). Dawson (2002) rationalizes qualitative research by exploring respondents’ attitudes, behavior, and experiences via interviews. It also attempts to get an in-depth opinion from participants. Meanwhile, since the qualitative approach is based upon a thorough and intensive study of the phenomenon’s features, it helps the researcher look into all aspects of the phenomenon.

The article seeks to address how the indigene-non-indigenes divided citizenship poses a threat to Ethiopian citizenship rights. To generate relevant information, both primary and secondary data sources were used. Official documents like constitutions and interviews were used to collect the primary data. Besides, interviews were conducted as a source of data. Before mentioning their names or any identifying information, the researcher informed interviewees about the purpose of the interviews and obtain their consent. By doing so, researchers uphold the confidentiality and privacy rights of the individuals involved in the study. Secondary data was gathered from articles and books.

4. Theoretical framework

The article employed critical liberalism theoretical framework to analyze the classification of Ethiopians as indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in regional states.

States create social groups using different markers, including political narratives and restrict the citizenship rights of sections of society. One of these groupings is indigenous and non-indigenous.

Not all groups that use language or culture as a guiding principle will have the same justifications for making claims of justice. Groups formed through privilege and power will have different foundations than those formed through a history of exclusion, discrimination, and genocide. Just because both groups have unique cultures does not necessarily mean that a government that forms groups based on some narratives does not owe the same rights. The universal understanding of justice (state obligations) is unsuitable for the group formed by the state. Therefore, states must recognize and address the inequalities and discrimination that arise from these markers to ensure equal access to power and citizenship for all individuals within their borders. This includes implementing policies and programs that promote diversity, inclusion, and social justice.

Alongside the group, which is formed through different markers, an identity is developed. The fact that an identity is crafted does not necessarily mean that it does not exist or has no authenticity. An identity can exist and have authenticity even though it was created. Instead, it explains how, why, and the particular narratives, experiences, practices, and beliefs that have shaped it.

Critical liberalism, as Jung (2008) views it from a structural standpoint (structural origins of groups, not in the cultural difference of groups), is anchored in three normative theories of justice: a universal versus particular, procedural versus substantive, and individual versus collective rights understandings of justice.

Firstly, the mapping of justice as universal versus particular occupies the center stage in political theory and philosophy. Identity formation as indigene or non-indigene and so forth is related to particular historical processes and conditions, which in turn give rise to particular, as opposed to universal, obligations. A constructivist theory of identity generates a structural theory of obligation.

The second dimension, “procedural versus substantive conception of the good [justice]” (Ibid, 2008:233), aims to address the sources and conceptions of justice in a markedly diverse society. A substantive justice principle establishes the principle of justice that will govern society’s social, political, and economic conditions (Rawls, 1975). Proceduralists suggest that the legitimacy of democratic decisions lies not in their substantive content but in the fairness of the procedures through which they are made (Habermas, 1996). This approach aims to ensure that all affected parties have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making processes and that decisions are made through open and transparent procedures. Critical liberalism advocates argue for a contextualized approach to justice that takes into account the unique historical and social circumstances of each case of injustice. This approach allows for a more nuanced and effective response to specific instances of injustice.

The third dimension, as Jung (2008, p. 233), is the “individual versus collective rights” understanding of justice. Rights are crucial in defining the public sphere as a forum for interaction among free and equal people. Individual civil and political rights are given priority under human rights law over collective social and cultural rights. Individuals are the majority of rights holders, and their privileges safeguard a space of personal freedom from the exercise of governmental authority. Rights protect claims from public discussion (Poole, 1999, p. 126). This means that when someone claims a right, it is not up for debate or negotiation in the public sphere. However, this does not mean that rights cannot be challenged or re-evaluated through legal and political processes.

Critical liberalism rather employs its concept of rights, called membership rights, which are exclusive to group members and do not in any way confer collective rights on the group as a whole over its members. Besides, membership rights also respond to the fact that these groups have been precisely formed through the unequal distribution of citizenship, resources, and rights. Additionally, they are sensitive to the fact that such groups are a crucial political asset and a prerequisite for collective action. In essence, membership rights are distinct individual rights.

The rights of membership respond to the idea of justice as requiring fairness (Carens, 2000). Justice will occasionally call for policies or outcomes that are difference-blind, and justice will occasionally call for outcomes that are difference-sensitive, mindful of the group affiliations that influence access to status and rights. Differentiated individual rights are provided based on structural differences rather than cultural differences, so anyone, regardless of race, economic status, sexual orientation, or gender identity, is eligible to claim them.

These discussions produce a framework for making political claims, a method for democratic legitimacy, and a concept of the nature of rights when viewed through a constructivist lens. Moving from this level of abstraction to the specific, critical liberalism promotes using the language of structural injustice rather than cultural difference to establish the legitimacy of specific claims, using disagreement over consensus as a source of liberal democratic legitimacy, and using the category of membership rights as a conceptual improvement of the proper subject of rights. In other words, critical liberalism emphasizes the importance of addressing systemic inequalities rather than cultural differences, embraces disagreement as a means of strengthening democracy, and focuses on membership rights as a more effective way of framing human rights. This approach seeks to create a more just and equitable society through political discourse and action.

The three dimensions of justice are directly or indirectly linked to the politics of indigeneity. This politics has grown out of identity and is constructed through the structural accounts of social groups in which historical marginalization and injustice persist. The universal versus particular justice debate induces the idea that since a group’s identity is formed through historical processes, the indigenous and non-indigenous identities formed linked with Ethiopia’s modern political trajectory. The political achievement of the EPRDF was the separation of indigenous and non-indigenous identity; this separation is not based on the ethnic group that a person is born into. Instead, this supports the notion that all Ethiopians were under the Abyssinian (predominantly Amhara) sway in all aspects of life, including political, economic, and social (cultural, linguistic, etc.) affairs. The Amhara were supposed privileged and thus, indigenous peoples had been considered second-class citizens and have not realized their civil, political, economic, and social rights until 1991. This holds the idea that non-indigenous groups do not have the same rights as indigenous people in Ethiopian regional states simply because they are the settlers in indigenous groups’ home regions.

In the eyes of critical liberal theorists, a substantive conception of justice is inadequate to address the particular historical circumstances that have given rise to specific injustices for the simple reason that it is universal and will appeal to people in all societies and to all social groups. Furthermore, critical liberalism is incompatible with deliberative democracy since consensus is an “unlikely and undesirable” result of it (Jung, 2008, p. 253). Consensus is undesirable since it results in injustice by concealing the dynamics of power and exclusion on which it is based. Consensus is reached through deliberation, which adopts “enlarged mentality” biases and a broad or general perspective that ignores particularities. In other words, people’s ability to participate in debate on an equal basis is limited by the way the public sphere is constructed to exclude affected groups and by the lack of attention paid to power dynamics and politics.

Thus, critical liberal theorists advocate contestation over the framework of consensus. However, contestation is not free from problems and cannot be a source of justice. Privileged groups can manipulate in terms of shaping, dominating, and determining issues and boundaries in terms of contestation. Meanwhile, it has buttressed political boundaries instead of transgressing them, automatically giving transformative power, privilege, and voice to those who are excluded. In order to make contestation functional as the source of justice, it has to be made to recognize injustices and accept the principle of affected interest, which entails that everyone whose interests are affected by a decision or a set of policies should have a right to be involved “to have their voice heard” in the decision-making process (Shapiro, 1999).

The individual versus collective right dimension is also questionable and is not sufficient to have privileged indigenous groups and non-privileged non-indigenous groups. Events and circumstances that have caused people to become members of a group also imply different rights for the members of the group when interpreting individual rights. True, any version of collective rights that purports to grant a right to a group as if it were an organic unit rather than merely formed groups based on political discourse of domination and possessing a “new” home region is incompatible with the view of an organic unit of group. Collective rights, like sovereign absolute power for particular ethnic group(s) (nation(s)), given by Ethiopia’s regional states to particular ethnic groups raise moral and legal questions about their practice, and this is especially true once we have acknowledged that all Ethiopians, except political elites and their cliques, have suffered for centuries. Thus, though reality appeals to even-handed and difference-blind justice and policies, Ethiopia’s regional states become responsive in a difference-sensitive fashion.

As Jung (2008) instills, structural injustice is induced by a system rooted in a skewed social structure and access to power. The Ethiopian state has created a skewed social structure. The federal constitution begins with the preamble, which reduces Ethiopians into nations, nationalities, and peoples. The preamble of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia reconstitutes Ethiopia’s state structure and creates nations, nationalities, and peoples to rectify “historically unjust relationships” (FDRE Constitution, 1995). The political structure empowers ethnic groups and gives privileges to those with socio-economic advantages. Complementing autonomy and sovereignty, some regional states’ constitutions exclusively grant an ethnic group territorial autonomy and sovereignty. On the contrary, some ethnic groups have become non-territorial settlers. This constitutes two different social structures; the advantageous and disadvantageous groups. In Ethiopia, crooked social structures encourage structural injustice and marginalization.

Hence, structural injustice is a distinctive injustice induced by a system of rule and politics and the formal institutional rules that emanate from social structures (Ibid, 2009). The social structure, both formal and informal, is a means of gaining political power and resources while excluding others from resource distribution and political power (Haslanger, 2012). The salient differences among groups, which Mabloco (2019:1189) called it “dominant positional differences”, result from structural injustices. Thus, since institutional practices have marred the opportunities of minorities, the structural imbalance of social structure imposes injustices on non-dominant groups, most often minorities. This institutional setup and its principles justify the marginalization, discrimination, and oppression of minorities (Young, 2009).

The relationship between structural injustice and indigenous politics is crystal clear. The politics of indigeneity, especially in Africa, since all Africans are indigenous peoples, revolves around an appeal to structural injustices, which originate from structural accounts of politics. Structural injustices limit citizenship status, rights, and membership in making social categories a disadvantageous ethnic group. Nonetheless, the liberal political tradition assumes that its principles are conferred to guarantee legal citizenship status and rights, yet widespread violations of citizens’ rights continue (Balaton-Chrimes, 2016). In other words, liberalism may not protect individual autonomy and rights, but it determines the limits of citizenship. Therefore, no matter how it is deployed, liberalism produces winners and losers; it emancipates some social groups while repressing others.

5. Nexus between indigeneity and Ethnonationalism

Politicizing indigeneity as ethnic identity leads to conflict among ethnic groups. States with diversified ethnic groups in Africa embarked on building a nation-state based on declaring ethnicity as “the most potent force for political mobilization” (Salih & Markakis, 1998, p. 7). This suggests that ethnicity matters more in the political life of people. In the literature on Ethiopia’s politics, most articulations and discussions are confined to ethnic politics. Politicians politicize identity for their advantage and this, in turn, affects indigeneity (Gerharz et al., 2018). This kind of politics discriminates against individuals or groups using the framework of the “us” versus “them” dichotomy of citizenship categorization.

Nowadays, Ethiopia’s political atmosphere is infected with the politics of foes and friends among ethnic groups due to politicizing ethnicity in the form of indigeneity (Lyons, 2019;). The government manipulates ethnicity and ethnic anxieties “to various ends” (Ismagilova, 2004, p. 182). Ethnic groups have subscribed to demanding a degree of autonomy to overpower the dominant ones because “ethnic identity was to be the basis of politics” (Abbink, 2011, p. 596). Hence, politicized ethnonationalism becomes the order of the day in Ethiopia, which is a devastating end to Ethiopianness and national harmony among ethnic groups.

Thus, the political climate of Ethiopia’s most regional states encourages ethnic groups to prioritize their interests at the cost of others, even at their Ethiopianness since all ethnic groups have a sense of us and others due to “a strong sense of territoriality”, which weakens the peaceful co-existence of particularities and Ethiopian identities (Feyissa & Zeleke, 2015:123).

Accordingly, sporadic inter-ethnic conflicts, massive dislocation and displacement, and systematic and persistent violation of rights are very common since 1991 across Ethiopia (Bassi, 2014). The current upswing in ethnic violence is primarily attributable to a dramatic rise in opposing ethnonationalism in the setting of the apparent party and state fragility, i.e., “incoherence and brittleness” (Semir, 2019, p. 2). Consequently, Ethiopia has faced an acute social disintegration, and the absence of consensus on some commonly shared agenda goals, and national harmony (Ibid, 2019).

Even in the current administration resentment, rivalry, disagreement on the national flag, constitution, unrealized political and economic community, and so on are time-sensitive activities. The project of a creation of one economic and political community has faced a problem in that, the “‘Ethiopianising’ project anchored in the promotion of common culture and language was not, however, seen favorably by certain groups of people, especially outside the Amharic-speaking north” (Ibid, 2019:5). This implies that incompatibility among diverse ethnic groups will persist in the future if indigeneity remains to be manipulated for political reasons.

It seems that the political situation will get worth from its current conditions. An interviewee, in Adama, explains the fact that Oromo youths have developed a negative attitude toward other ethnic groups than adults and aged people. As he said

This is because, in recent years, there has been ethnic nationalism and allegiance to one’s ethnic group in the younger generation. In the past, Ethiopians did not feel uncomfortable living together. Therefore, I do not think there was a different attitude towards older people. Maybe someone is categorized as Amhara; someone else is Wolayita; someone is Sidama. Beyond simple categorization, I do not think there was a different [negative] attitude exhibited towards this person than it was in the past by the old ones. Adults can be seen in two categories. We can categorize them as people who have retained the ideas of older people and as people who are now nurtured by the [views and attitudes] of the youth. The youth, in my opinion, can be said to have a unique or negative attitude towards non-indigenous people. However, not all of them are ethno-fundamentalist.³

Abrham Fantu, an officer of the Prosperity Party’s training office, believes that the political structure of Ethiopia’s regional states is discriminatory against non-indigenous ethnic groups for which the region is not their home.⁴ Abrham goes on to argue that even citizens’ right to life is not secure and hopes that the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission will resolve it. Similarly, Dr. Yonas Adaye, Commissioner of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, demonstrates Abrham’s assertion that the Commission intends to solve the country’s long-standing problems.⁵

However, it seems that the “Commission” hardly accomplished its mission since it needs willful and competent political leaders both in federal and regional states. Looking at the schism behind the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, which happened on 22 January 2023, gives the clue that Ethiopian political leaders suffer hard to solve problems. Political leaders at both levels orchestrated and galvanized the crisis that very likely led to the disintegration of the country.⁶ In addition, the statement given by the Oromia National Regional State was very destructive, which indicates that the regional government was involved and orchestrated the crisis that the rebel bishops claimed the church denied the right to use the mother tongue of the Oromo people. It writes that

In spite of this, a few stymied-persons who comprehend equality as wrong are reflecting old stories [superiority complex] that do not take into account the historical background of the formation of the Ethiopian state. These forces are moving to fulfill their evil political goals by covering up the division between the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church Fathers of faith. The fanatical groups of the old system [Non-Amhara Orthodox Believers who are keen to their religion, Orthodox Amhara, and non-Orthodox individuals] who wear religious masks, are conducting a campaign of hatred against the general public, especially the Oromo people, in a way that is against the constitutional system.⁷

6. The plea for Ethiopianness: a suggestion to reconstruct Ethiopianness

Despite differences in the degree of mobilization, African countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and so forth continue to face challenges related to a particular type of indigeneity (Balaton-Chrimes, 2016; Sisay, 2020). They are all deeply divided societies. As such, indigeneity becomes the prime source of political mobilization around which political claims for recognition, resource control, accommodation, and self-rule are framed, elections are contested and the government is composed to promote the interests of a particular group. Indigeneity politics, especially in Africa including Ethiopia, revolves around an appeal to structural injustices, which originated from structural accounts of politics and states’ constitutions that limit citizenship status, rights, and membership in making indigenous and non-indigenous social categories. Due to this, for decades, systematic and persistent breaches of rights have been committed based on the dichotomy of non-indigenous peoples and indigenous peoples (Bassi, 2014).

Ethiopia’s political landscape has been wagged by indigeneity. The obsession with indigeneity is particularly obvious in regional states, which are hotbeds of exclusion and violent conflict. For example, the National Regional States of Oromo excludes non-Oromo from membership in the group of people who have sovereignty over the region and denies them rights despite they constitute 12.18 percent of the total population of 3,285,166 (ECSA, 2007). Conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in this region over political participation and resources resulted in a wave of mass killings, dislocation, and eviction of non-Oromo people.

Issues that continue to affect Ethiopia’s peace and conflict dynamics stretch back to the period of modern Ethiopia’s state formation by Emperor Menelik at the end of the nineteenth century (Levine, 2013). Unlike other African states, its elites led Ethiopia’s state-building process. Yet its formation and nation-building process became the sources of fragmentation, suspicion, and conflict. Some claim that the Ethiopian state in some ways was achieved through colonization similar to Europe though the rulers were Abyssinians (Amhara) rather than white colonialists (Asafa, 2020). Others argue that modern Ethiopia is the result of re-unification by reclaiming once-lost territory during the Gragn’s war and the Oromo migration from the Southern tip of Ethiopia to central and northern Ethiopia (Habtamu, 2020).

Nonetheless, some academicians claim that the emergence of modern Ethiopia was an effort of expansion to build a nation. It then claims that Showan nobility expanded into the historical area of the Ethiopian Empire, which was more closely related to Ethiopia than any other kingdom before the sixteenth century (Messay, 1999). Another perplexing political narrative is the oppression thesis, known as the “Nationality Question”, which claims that Ethiopia is a centuries-old nation that emerged from Abyssinian military conquest at the end of the nineteenth century. Though the distinction between Northerners (Abyssinians) and Southerners was overtly recognized, the conquest took place to construct a nation-state comprising many ethnic groupings (Abbink, 1997; Temesgen, 2016). Consequently, proponents of the narrative argue that individuals from the north dominated politics and the economy, either directly or through loyal military chiefs and aristocracy entrusted to administer the country’s southern provinces. People from the South, on the other hand, have been pushed to the margins of politics and the economy (Ibid., 1997; Ibid., 2016).

With the respective differences, those political narratives commonly have few characters. Ethnic cleavages, including religion, have been utilized as the main instruments of mobilization to garner support for their insatiable desires for power, as well as the struggle over the nation’s resources (Amare, 2020). Moreover, in addition to tarnishing Ethiopianness (pan-Ethiopianism), they distorted and politicized Ethiopian history, and following this politicization of history, certain extremely powerful elites, religious, and ethnic groups allied against the Amhara who controlled power for centuries (Ibid., 2020). Those competing narratives portrayed the Amhara as intruders and troublemakers.

Those political tales all share an animosity for the Amhara. As Tezera (2021, p. 298), those political narratives assist people to create an unfavorable attitude toward Amhara, and they feel that their national areas were either integrated or occupied by “the Ethiopian empire” and that Amhara culture dominated theirs. Furthermore, they think that the invading Amhara had exploited all non-Amhara at least for a century (Ibid, 2021). To this effect, the Amhara have been labeled as oppressors, colonizers, and expansionists. The national oppression narrative, the cornerstone of Ethiopia’s post-1991 political system, claims that the 1960s student questions such as land to the teller, nationality questions, and democracy were all generated by Amhara dominance in all sectors of life of non-Amhara Ethiopians (Ibid, 2021).

The state formation process was led by Abyssinians, designated as “centrists”, in some cases by forcefully liquidating quasi-autonomous kingdoms, and a few peacefully. Though some individuals participated in the state-building process, people from its southern parts were left-outs. The left-outs resent and have continued to challenge the center. In the 1960s organized political opposition against the centrists and the regime of Haile Selassie I started (Merera, 2003). Therefore, Ethiopia’s nineteenth-century state-building discourses are a source of major political paradoxes that the EPRDF sought to address, but they continue to be Ethiopia’s core political problem, making the country fragile.

Through over three decades of political journey since 1991, Ethiopia has been suffering from its “undoing” past political paradoxes. EPRDF assumed that all “undoing” historical events are because of the Amhara domination for centuries almost from 1270 to 1991. Those political narratives, except the reunification thesis, are against particular groups, typically the Amhara (Amare, 2020). Due to this, the Amhara are labeled fully liable for previous injustices and atrocities. In short, the EPRDF devised a mechanism to maintain political power through pressure, fostering animosity and, at times, mitigating all the political blunders of the past on the Amhara ethnic group (Ibid., 2020). Since 2018, however, the political problem has resurfaced in practically all ethnic groups.

After EPRDF, was reformed into Prosperity Party (PP), the country’s political crisis is not over yet. Since 2018, Ethiopians have lived in an unpredicted political situation that deteriorates the human rights and security of people (HRW, 2021). Political tensions and unrest are rising rather than diminishing. The country’s political scene has been marked by ongoing breaches of human rights, armed group attacks on civilians, murderous violence along communal and ethnic lines, and an all-out political crisis.

In such conditions, states’ effort is to rescue the problem of disintegration and integration of fragile communities. However, as under Article 39, the EPRDF constitution unambiguously deciphers Ethiopia’s federal system that fosters unique accommodation of ethnicity through self-administration up to secession- accommodation and exit principle. Subsequently, it establishes “less nation-statebound communities”, to use the terms of Smith (2014, p. 2). A demand for more autonomy and self-government is on the rise in nearly all parts of Ethiopia. The Sidama and South West peoples (Keffa, Sheka, Bench Sheko, Dawro, West Omo Zones, and Konta) have enjoyed autonomy and self-government recently, while many more waiting on the list. Bear in mind secession is the unconditional right to nations and nationalities, regional state constitutions identify Ethiopians with those having sovereign right over the region and its resources and others who simply chose to live and work there. Those who chose to live in regions do not necessarily have the sovereign right in the affairs of the region. Therefore, because of various cleavages, Ethiopia continues in the quagmire of resentment politics and faces a threat of disintegration.

It is hard, not impossible, to prevail in Ethiopianness (civic nationalism), based on individual and group rights in a deeply divided society since it challenges democracy and threats the existence and integration of a nation. Now, prevailing democracy and guaranteeing the very existence of Ethiopia are under threat. Since ultranationalists claim that unity in the name of Ethiopianness is a mask for the domination of Amhara in terms of political power and economy, and the promotion of Amhara’s culture, language, and religion as national culture, and language. Thus, the more elites try to champion Ethiopianness (national identity) over ethnonationalism, the more it provokes ethnonationalist to push to the extreme and does not have any business with the cohabitation of ethnic groups. They suggest that making a balance between diversity and unity (ethnonationalism and civic nationalism) will save the nation from disintegration and cease to exist.

The argument is anchored in the caricatured political narratives of colonization, domination, and expansion vis-à-vis the formation of the modern Ethiopian state. This overly generalized argument assumes everyone speaks Amharic and adopts the culture of Amhara. Yet a close and thorough investigation of Amhara’s struggle in pan-Ethiopian organized political politics from the 1960s to the present shows that Amharas’ struggle has been for democracy, not for domination over others (Bantayehu & Ishiyama, 2021). Whoever raises a question of democracy including Amharas is not a struggle to dominate over others; it is rather a demand for equality, equity, and respect for individual rights in the framework of balancing diversity and unity. The struggle for democracy and a just system is just a demand of any discriminated, exploited, and oppressed people.

Due to caricatured political discursive narratives (ideologies), realizing Ethiopianness is not something easily achieved. Some might assume it can be realized through liberal citizenship perspective. The fundamental principle of liberalism is that, due to the inherent goodness of human nature, we are endowed with fundamental rights that cannot be curtailed by the government or other people. Citizenship is, therefore, based on rights. The liberal model of citizenship assumes a dedication to a person’s freedom, status, and equality. Furthermore, it is claimed that all people, regardless of membership, are entitled to civil, political, and economic rights. However, in Ethiopia’s case, liberal theory could not be fruitful since people believe that the Amhara dominated the country in terms of culture, economy, politics and so forth. Besides, ethnic federalism was implemented in 1995 with the goals of reviving ethnic entities, maintaining national diversity and integration, and redressing historical injustices. Therefore, due to Ethiopia’s politics, liberal theory could not be the cure-all for Ethiopia’s topsy-turvy politics.

Though it is not ideal, multiculturalism is best among other policies. Multiculturalism would help to reanalyze and redefine the dominant concept of national identity of a country to respond to challenges related to diversified societies. Multiculturalism is a contentious concept since it bears ideological baggage as well as multiple meanings. It can be used to convey the concept of diversity (Parekh, 2000). However, it goes beyond the descriptive notion of diversity to encode the equal position of groups in public domains and peaceful coexistence under the equality principle (Mahajan, 2002). Therefore, multiculturalism is concerned with identifying, recognizing, valuing, and respecting diversity in society in order to create or imagine an all-inclusive and all-empowering environment in society. Thus, multiculturalism would include a diverse variety of groups and human attitudes aimed at embracing differences while being together (Vasta, 2007). As a result, the term “multiculturalism” has come to refer to any sort of governmental response to claims made by ethnocultural minority groups (Kymilcika, 2002).

Therefore, multiculturalism rejects the melting pot, and group dominance, while it endorses ethnic pluralism, and politics of recognition- cultures, and values of various disrespected cultural groups have to be respected and recognized. Bringing unity to a deeply divided society like Ethiopia, where there are mistrust, suspicion, and contradictory narratives about the past and future, through well-crafted institutions and policies, is “a job to be done” in the framework of multiculturalism to unify the society.

7. Conclusion

Since the politicization of indigeneity widens ethnic fragmentation and increases tension, violence, instability, and suspicion among ethnic groups, Ethiopianness is in dire condition. To this effect, securing the rights of all Ethiopians and treating them equally in all social, political, and economic affairs is difficult. Besides, accentuating national harmony and social cohesion among individuals and ethnic groups has become imperative for the future of the nation. Therefore, political systems that are deemed to undermine selected nations and nationalities as non-indigenous in the area where they live should be reformed, and any sort of difference should not impede social cohesion, the stability of the country, economic growth, and feelings of being united as Ethiopians.

However, the preceding paragraph’s message can be realized while the ethnic line threats must be addressed through multiculturalism, which entails the process of uniting different ethnic, religious, and regional entities into a community of citizens-in our case, Ethiopianness, based on equitable citizenship rights and shared political, economic, and social institutions. Ethiopianness should be highlighted in this scenario.

Above all, the political order of Ethiopia needs to adapt to the changing circumstances. Ethiopian politicians and scholars should ponder the importance of revising and amending both the constitutions of federal and regional states. Further, the need to reconceptualize political concepts that ethnic federalism entirely depends on should be given due attention. The more Ethiopian politics modifies itself to the making of Ethiopianness, the more citizens will understand the theme of “divided we fall, united we stand”.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In this corpus, unaffected by any ethnic cleavages, citizenship (rights) is both a set of obligations that the government must fulfil for citizens (individuals) and a set of rights and privileges that the government should satisfy for citizens.

2. The rights of indigenous communities include self-determination, free, prior, and informed consent, and land rights. Remuneratively, indigenous people are entitled to the right to own the land, territorial resources, self-determination, promote language and culture, political representation and participation, secured socio-economic wellbeing (Pelican, 2009).

3. Tulu Alemie, Name is changed for this research. Interview conducted in Adama on October 6/2022.

4. Abrham Fantu,Prosperity Party Cadre (Serving as head of training office). Interview conducted in Addis Ababa on 15/12/2022.

5. Dr. Yonas Adaye Adeto- Assistant Professor of Peace Studies, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.-Commissioner, the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission. Interview conducted in Bahir Dar on 24/12/2022.

6. https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2023/2/12/whats-behind-the-crisis-in-ethiopias-orthodox-tewahedo-church

7. ONRS, Press Release, February, 3, 2015 E.C. Addis Ababa. The quote is translated from Amharic into English, though there is an English version of it since the tonality of the message is different.