The Somali nation and the hazards of the nation-state model in the horn of Africa: lessons from Somaliland

Abstract

The paper aims to evaluate the risks associated with the Western nation-state model in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Specifically, it examines the effects of the nation-state model adopted by the Somali people in the region. The work was done qualitatively, using data gathered from secondary sources. The study’s findings indicate that the Somali nationalism/nation-state project has both internal and external destabilizing effects. Internally, it caused tensions within clans, and externally, it supported the self-determination of Somali-speaking territories in neighboring countries, as well as dissidents within those territories. The project also provoked the Ogaden War (1977–78) with Ethiopia, leading to the downfall of the regime and ultimately the disintegration of the state, resulting in the emergence of clan-based militias and Islamic fundamentalists. The paper also suggests that Somaliland’s hybrid governance model might offer a solution to the ongoing turmoil affecting the Somali people and others in the region.

IMPACT STATEMENT

The Horn of Africa has been characterized as a region known for complex problems. The region has been plagued by prolonged interstate and intrastate conflicts, massive displacements, catastrophic hunger, political oppression, economic exploitation, and state failure, among other challenges. Various studies attribute these issues to different factors. This research also attributes the turmoil in the Horn of Africa states to the nation-state model they adopted from the West, which appears to have been largely overlooked until now. The study demonstrates how the adoption of the nation-state model by the Somali people has resulted in clan-based conflicts, the disintegration of the Somali state, and hostility with neighboring states that embrace Somali-speaking territories. In the end, it is recommended to consider Somaliland's hybrid model as one of the potential solutions for the complex problems in the region.

Keywords:

• Nation-state
• horn of Africa
• Somalia
• Somaliland

SUBJECTS:

• Comparative Politics; International Politics; International Relations; Political Theory

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Cristina Elena Popa Tache, Law, Andrei Şaguna University, Bucharest, Romania

1. Introduction: conceptual issues

This short essay attempts to demonstrate the hazards of the nation-state model in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Specifically, it analyzes the Somali nation-state project and the resulting conflicts, both within the country and with its neighbors. Moreover, it examines the potential lessons that can be derived from the unique model of self-declared independent Somaliland. Therefore, before delving into the unification and self-determination trajectory of the Somali people and its effects in the region, it is essential to begin with some fundamental concepts that provide a framework for the essay, including nation, nationalism, self-determination, and nation-state.

There is no hard definition for these concepts. Stalin defined the nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture” (Young, 2021a, p. 58). Similarly, Habermas and Cronin (1998, p. 399) defines it as “a political community shaped by common descent, at the minimum by a common language, culture, and history.” Therefore, a nation is a community of people organized based on shared characteristics. Nationalism also refers to “an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity of that nation” (Rejai and Enloe, 1969, p. 141). It involves a political aspiration expressed as a pursuit of, or the desire to maintain, political independence or statehood (Heywood, 2013). This is the most powerful force that disintegrated old empires and led to the birth of new states in the world. A very important related concept is self-determination, which, according to Heraclides (2010, p. 7), “is the normative version of nationalism, contending that every nation can correspond to a state if it so desires.” It has two basic dimensions: internal and external. Internal self-determination is a quest for autonomy (self-rule) within the existing state, while external self-determination involves seeking separation (secession). Self-determination, as self-rule, is recognized by the UN Charter, but secession is not (ibid). However, whenever the situation requires it and/or the interests of powerful states demand it, secessions are carried out. We can adduce, in the HoA alone, the cases of Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somaliland: the first two are de jure and the latter de facto.

A nation-state is formed when a single nation constitutes a state, although it is difficult to achieve in practice. It occurs when the borders of the nation are approximately coterminous with the borders of the state (Rejai and Enloe, 1969). A notable example of a nation-state in Africa is Somalia. Somalis are ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous. A nation-state is a state with a relatively homogeneous population. A nation and a state may not emerge simultaneously. In Europe, nations were established before and formed the state, whereas in non-Western regions like Africa, the state comes before and establishes the nation (ibid). This shows that, in Africa, it is the state that takes on the task of nation-building or homogenization. Therefore, the nation-state model is implemented in a centralized, top-down, and elite-controlled manner. According to Markakis (2021, p. 21), “nation-state building is expected to replace ethnocultural diversity with a singular identity, a consciousness of national unity and undiluted loyalty to the state”. This necessitates the dissolution of all traditional and local affiliations and loyalties, including but not limited to, ethnicity, religion, and clan (Geping, 2010; Rejai and Enloe, 1969). Ultimately, this leads to not only a homogenous population but also the monopolization of power by the state (Geping, 2010). Centralizing power is thus an indispensable aspect of a nation-state. National integration involves a process of acculturation, assimilation, and, when necessary, forced conversion (Markakis, 2021). This is typically done in the image of the ruling elites who are involved in the process of nation-building.

2. A brief discussion of the nation-state in the horn of Africa

According to Davidson (1992), African leaders embraced nation-statism as the sole means of liberating themselves from colonial domination. They did so by accepting the West’s preach that tribalism is the root cause of all the political problems that Africa faced (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993). After gaining independence, they persistently enforced the Eurocentric nation-state model on a multicultural society. This is directly responsible for the enduring ethnic conflict and political instability that characterize Africa, and most importantly, the HoA (Markakis et al, 2021). This is the situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

Sudan is a diverse country with over 200 ethnic groups (Markakis, 2021). The ruling elites attempted to establish a nation in this diverse society in the image of the Muslim Arab (Wassara, 2022), which ultimately led to the alienation of the Southerners. This led to a prolonged civil war that ended with the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The problem, however, persisted in the Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan regions of Sudan as the government continued to act in the same manner (Schlee, 2021; Bereketeab, 2013). The newly born South Sudan is also facing similar challenges, as the Dinka-dominated government is adopting the same Western model previously used by the Khartoum governments (Bereketeab, 2013).

The same was true for imperial Ethiopia. It comprises more than 80 nations and nationalities. The imperial regimes of Ethiopia attempted to build a nation reflecting the Northern Christian Abyssinians, particularly the Amhara (Markakis, 2021; Záhořík, 2022; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993). This led to various national insurgencies, including the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). National questions persisted during the Derg and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) period, despite some modifications to the model (Schlee, 2021). Similar to South Sudan, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and subsequently became oppressive and intolerant of diversity under the guise of “Eritrean national identity” (Markakis, 2021, p. 50). Therefore, we can understand that the pursuit of the nation-state project has led to marginalization, destabilizing conflicts, and secessions with regional repercussions.

3. The objective of this study

The objectives of the study are the following:

• To demonstrate how the nation-state model adopted by the Somali nation has led to instability in the region.

• To explore how Somali nationalism contributed to the formation and eventual breakdown of the Somali Republic.

• To examine the possible lessons that Somaliland offers to its volatile neighbours.

4. Methodology

To achieve the above-stated objectives, the study employed qualitative methodology owing to the nature of the study. Besides, the necessary data were collected from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, reports, and news.

5. Significance of the study

On the broadest level, by addressing the above-stated objectives, the study contributes to the existing knowledge in this area. This study contributes to the discourse on the nation-state model and to the scant literature available on the HoA case. In addition to its contributions to knowledge, the study has policy implications for concerned bodies in the region, urging them to reconsider the model they are adopting and thereby minimize its impact on the peace and stability of this already turbulent region.

6. Somali Republic: the first phase of the nation-state project

Before colonialism, Somalis had no central government but instead had clan allegiances (Schraeder, 2006). The clan played a central political role (Záhořík, 2022). Their experience with central administration came through colonialism. Colonialism dismembered them under five distinct administrations: British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ogaden in Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya. Unlike other African countries, the challenge with the Somalis’ nation-state project (hereafter interchangeably used with Somali nationalism, Somali unification, and Greater Somalia Project) was not nation-building, as they are already homogeneous, but rather unifying all Somalis scattered in the region under a single nation-state with one flag (Omar, 2021; Abdullahi, 2022; Schraeder, 2006; Markakis, 2021). Accordingly, British Somaliland (Somaliland/Northerners) and Italian Somaliland (Somalia/Southerners) initiated the unification by forming the Somali Republic, which was tasked with incorporating the remaining territories (ibid). Such an obligation is evident in Somalia’s constitution and its national flag, which features a five-pointed star in the center representing the five dismembered Somali territories. Hence, Markakis (2021, p. 41) rightly stated that “the Somali Republic was born in 1960 with a deep-seated grievance and a readymade cause for conflict with all its neighbours”. The following discussion aims, therefore, to highlight the domestic and external hazards of the Greater Somalia Project under both civilian and military rule.

6.1. Somali nationalism during the civilian rule

Internally, the Republic experienced nearly a decade of democratic rule with three successive leaders, in contrast to the military takeovers that are characteristic of the region. Despite the presence of democracy, dissatisfaction arose due to differing colonial legacies and their impact on the adopted model. The Northerners were not that alienated from their traditional institutions and values by the British indirect rule, while the Southerners were under a highly centralized elite-controlled Italian rule (Ali, 2022). Therefore, the adoption of a Western-style centralized state system contradicted the northerners’ preference for decentralized, clan-based governance. This led to an aborted coup by junior officers in the north, marking the beginning of the schism that ultimately dissolved the union (Markakis, 2021). Ever since, there has been resentment among the nomadic northerners due to the economic and political domination by Italian-trained and assimilated southerners (Ali, 2022). The nation-state project focused on Mogadishu, which alienated the people in the northern regions. The accusation continued even during the premiership of Egal, who was from the Isaaq clan in the North (Schraeder, 2006). Domestically, the nation-state project aimed to centralize power by transcending traditional clan divisions and allegiances, which created resentments and tensions based on clans.

Externally, as per Abdullahi (2022), the consecutive democratic governments in Somalia adopted a moderate approach by advocating for the self-determination of their lost territories and providing support to dissident groups in those areas (Abdullahi, 2022; Schraeder, 2006). Accordingly, they supported the WSLF in Ethiopia, which later led to the 1964 conflict between the Somali and Ethiopian national armies (Omar, 2021; Schraeder, 2006). They also incited nationalist sentiment among the Oromo and Afar people, exacerbating social and political unrest in 1960s Ethiopia, which led to the Bale rebellion (Záhořík, 2022). Similarly, they also provided financial and military support for the self-determination of Somalis in the NFD in Kenya, leading to protracted guerrilla warfare in the region (Omar, 2021; Schraeder, 2006; Markakis, 2021). Similarly, Somalia supported the Pan-Somali guerrilla movement created in Djibouti in 1963. This indicates the destructive impact of the nation-state project on the Somali people, leading to the pursuit of self-determination and armed insurgencies in neighboring countries. In other words, this clearly demonstrates the destabilizing impact of the nation-state model on the region. The previous democratic leader introduced a new policy aimed at improving Somalia’s strained relations with its neighboring countries by implicitly recognizing their territorial integrity (Abdullahi, 2022). However, this policy was not accepted by the Somali people, who viewed it as a betrayal of the Somali unification cause and a denial of the oppression of Somalis in neighboring countries (Omar, 2021; Schraeder, 2006). This contributed to his downfall and subsequent replacement by military rule in 1969.

In summary, despite a moderate approach, the nation-state project under civilian rule led to internal clan-based tensions and external hostility with neighbors by provoking dissidents.

6.2. Somali nationalism under Barre’s military rule

After nine years of civilian rule, Mohamed Siad Barre seized power militarily in 1969. Unlike his predecessors, he pursued a radical military approach to Somali unification, both domestically and externally (Abdullahi, 2022; Abdullahi, 2017; Omar, 2021). Internally, he attempted to bring societal unity by, among other things, eliminating clan divisions (Abdullahi, 2022; Markakis, 2021), as he believed they hindered the Greater Somalia project (Schraeder, 2006). He adopted scientific socialism “as the most effective means of overcoming the destructive tendencies of clan affiliation” (ibid: 121). And he went as far as to outlaw clan-based identifications and behaviors (Schraeder, 2006; Markakis, 2021). Anything with clan connotation was altered. This, however, intensified the existing clan-based tensions. Similarly, the law he introduced to establish gender equality and ban polygamy went against the interpretation of the Quran, thus radicalizing Islamism (Markakis, 2021). As a result, his revolutionary pursuit of societal unity exacerbated internal tensions by radicalizing clannism and Islamism.

Externally, his military pursuit of the political unity of all Somalis in the HoA provoked the Ogaden War (1977–78), which resulted in a humiliating defeat with far-reaching impacts on the regime and the Greater Somalia Project. The military defeat led to widespread demoralization, sparked opposition, and diluted Somali nationalism. His humiliating defeat, along with his policy of eliminating clan-based divisions, led to the emergence of a series of rebel groups opposing the regime. These included the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SSDF) in 1978, the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1988. They were all based in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government supported them in order to weaken Barre’s regime. The war with Somalia also fueled insurgent groups in Ethiopia, including the WSLF, EPLF, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which received support from Somalia in various ways (Záhořík, 2022). This shows how Barre’s radical nation-state project provoked a destructive war with his neighbor and resulted in the proliferation and intensification of opposition forces, which were utilized for mutual destabilization.

Ironically, Barre himself became absolutely dependent on the support of the three Daron clans with whom he had kinship ties. He was preoccupied with responding harshly to the opposition and their respective clans. The retaliation against the Isaaq clan in the northern region, who supported the SNM, was exceptionally bloody (Omar, 2021), resulting in the deaths of 50,000 people and the displacement of the remaining population (Abdullahi, 2022, p. 84). The SNM’s strongholds faced merciless repression and bombardments, leaving them roofless (Clapham, 2017). This dictatorial rule further exacerbated the grievances of the northerners, who had already begun to complain about injustice during the civilian rule. Eventually, the SNM, together with the aforementioned opposition groups, toppled Barre’s regime.

In conclusion, the military pursuit of the nation-state project further radicalized and militarized clan-based opposition, causing extensive destruction. Externally, it provoked a direct war with Ethiopia, which had a fateful impact on the project and the regime.

7. The collapse of Somalia: Clannism and Islamism

The military regime failed amidst the intensification of clannism and Islamism. The fall of the regime led to competition among different opposition groups for power, which later enmeshed them in a protracted civil war. Amidst the turmoil, Somaliland declared its independence, which, according to Abdullahi (2022, p. 85), was “the greatest setback and regression for Somalia’s quest for national unity.” It can be inferred that the nation-state project pursued by successive regimes, especially Barre’s militarization of the project, went against the unity of the Somali Republic and hindered efforts to bring others back into the fold. Somalia itself collapsed. The absence of a functioning central government created a breeding ground for the rise of clan-based warlords and Islamic militant groups. Islamic militant groups emerged one after the other, namely the Al Itihad Al Islami (Islamic Union), the Joint Islamic Courts (JIC), and Al Shabaab, with the aim of unifying all Somalis in the HoA into a single Islamic nation-state. This poses a direct threat to neighboring countries. This was evident in the recent infiltration of Al Shabaab into the Somali region of Ethiopia, while Ethiopia was preoccupied with the crisis in the north. Al Shabaab also has a unit called Jaysh Ayman in Kenya (Bacon, 2022). The Western-modeled federal government, established long after the collapse of the state, is not sufficiently robust to ensure peace and security for the Somali people and prevent Islamic insurgents from targeting neighboring countries. In a word, a closer examination of this all reveals the suicidal nature of Somali nationalism.

8. The de facto secession of Somaliland: state-building and recognition

Up until the fall of the regime, northerners did not plan for secession but rather sought internal autonomy (Ali, 2022; Schraeder, 2006; Kaariye, 2021). However, they were disgruntled by the actions of the opposition in the south, specifically the USC, for controlling the government power and excluding them by disregarding the agreement to collectively decide on the future political system of the state (Schraeder, 2006). This power grab, along with the atrocities committed against the northerners, led them to reconsider secession (Schraeder, 2006; Kaariye, 2021). Accordingly, Somaliland declared its independence on 18 May 1991, at the Burao conference. Henceforth, Somaliland has been focused on state-building and seeking recognition. Though still unrecognized, it has achieved remarkable success in establishing a relatively peaceful and democratic state, as will be demonstrated below. This can serve as a valuable lesson for countries in the region.

8.1. A hybrid model of governance: democracy and peace

The SNM assumed transitional power, which lasted from 18 May 1991, to 18 May 1993, with the task of establishing future government structures. Despite the fast-approaching end of the transition period, the SNM was unable to complete its task due to internal disagreements (Duale, 2017). During the Boroma Conference held from January to May 1993, the Elders assumed responsibility from the SNM and established a highly legitimate and functional government structure capable of maintaining the country’s unity (ibid). The conference adopted a Peace Charter and a Transitional National Charter, which functioned as a workable constitution until the promulgation of a new constitution in 2001 (Clapham, 2017). It also provided for the election of a civilian president and vice president. It was unusual for power to be peacefully transferred from Tuur to Egal in the region, unlike the situations in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia after the fall of dictatorial regimes (ibid). Most importantly, the Elders’ conference established a bicameral parliament, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Elders (Guurti). The first is popularly elected for a five-year term, while the latter is selected by clans for a six-year term (Duale, 2017; Kaariye, 2021). This demonstrates a hybrid form of government that incorporates both modern and traditional institutions, in contrast to neighboring countries that imposed Western institutions and values on their indigenous ones. The Guurti is mandated to handle the mediation and reconciliation of conflicts. Accordingly, the unique case of peace and stability that Somaliland has maintained in this volatile region is attributed to the remarkable work of the Guurti (Bereketeab, 2013; Duale, 2017).

The Elders Conference laid the foundation for electoral democracy. In fact, the tradition of peaceful transfer of power can be traced back to the internal democratic culture, including the election and rotation of leadership, within the SNM in the Ethiopian jungles (Kaariye, 2021; Kaplan, 2008). Building on this, Somaliland after separation successfully managed power transfers. Its election results were usually peacefully accepted by all opposition parties, a rarity in the region known for post-election violence. The 2003 re-election of Kahin and the opposition’s acceptance of defeat is an intriguing case. Kahin belonged to the small Gadabursi clan (De Waal, 2015; Clapham, 2017; Kaplan, 2008) and had fought for Siad Barre against the Isaaq, the majority clan in Somaliland (Kaplan, 2008). The free, fair, and competitive elections conducted are attributed to the Somali tradition of governance through consultation and consent (ibid). Furthermore, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has been widely praised as the most competent of Somaliland’s government institutions (ibid), in contrast to the institution’s negative reputation in neighboring countries for favoring the ruling party. Somaliland has a commendable track record in elections. Some even went so far as to say, “Somaliland is a consolidated democracy” (Kaariye, 2021, p. 219).

The newly formed state possessed a large arsenal and had a highly militarized society, with over 30 militant groups operating under separate and individual command structures (Duale, 2017). However, its political stability is unusual in the region (De Waal, 2015). This was made possible by an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process, which was based on the Peace Charter. The process was locally owned and implemented by the Guurti. Owing to the legitimacy of the elders, the process was remarkable in that the fighters showed enthusiasm in laying down their weapons (De Waal, 2015; Markakis, 2021). Most of the fighters have demobilized and returned to civilian life, which is not the case in other countries in the region (Ali, 2022). Huge arsenals were surrendered to the government, and many of the demobilized fighters were enlisted in the new national army (Mohamed, 2017; De Waal, 2015). This helped the government consolidate its power and effectively control the entire state’s territories. This is exceptional because large parts of other states in the region are controlled by insurgencies, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia. As a result, the last two are considered failed states, while the former two are staggering to fail. Besides the DDR, all other inter-clan conflicts were resolved through grassroots, participatory, and consensus-oriented deliberations led by the Elders (Duale (Bobe), 2017; Clapham, 2017). Now, Somaliland is “a center of stability in the sub-region” (Ali and Ylönen, 2022, p. 105).

In conclusion, Somaliland is relatively the most peaceful and democratic state in the region. This is largely attributable to the unique state model it adopted, which reflects its traditional values. It has adopted a successful society-led, bottom-up system of governance, in contrast to the Western-style, top-down, unitary state-building exercises commonly attempted in fragile states in the region (Kaplan, 2008). Its clan-based system of governance sharply contrasts with the Western-style nation-state, which requires the centralization of power and the removal of local allegiances. Later, to mitigate the adverse effects of clannism, the 2001 constitution allowed only three parties that had support from all clans thereby abolishing clan representation (Hersi, 2018). Thus, it has successfully integrated modernity with tradition, unlike other states in the region that supplanted their culture with a purely Western style. However, the discussion of its remarkable success does not overlook the persistent challenges, including poor investment, male dominance, disagreements with Puntland, and clannism compromising meritocracy (Kaplan, 2008; Clapham, 2017; Lewis, 2008; Walls and Kibble, 2010).

8.2. Lessons learned

The primary lesson that other states can learn from Somaliland is the successful blend of modernity with tradition. Somalilanders established a political system based on their traditional values. They opposed the purely Western nation-state, which necessitates the breakdown of traditional authorities, institutions, and allegiances. Therefore, Somaliland’s culturally rooted, bottom-up approach could be more effective than a purely Western model in other countries as well (Jhazbhay, 2017). All other lessons are extensions of this grand lesson.

The effectiveness of the DDR and other peace processes in Somaliland can largely be attributed to their homegrown and inclusive nature. The peace processes were homegrown and community-based, unlike the Western-dominated, top-down processes which have further fueled many problems in Africa and elsewhere (Kaariye, 2021; Bryden & Brickhill, 2010). The processes were also comprehensive and representative. This was not the case in the West-dominated peace process, such as the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, where the diverse interests of the Southerners were lumped and represented by the Dinka-dominated SPLM/A (Young, 2021b; Bereketeab, 2013; Williams, 2011).

Localizing the government’s responsibility to a more cohesive group of people is important. People have a special trust in and affiliation with their fellow community members. Therefore, they are more likely to engage in responsible, accountable, and productive activities (Kaplan, 2008). Somaliland did exactly that. Unlike a purely Western, centralized nation-state model, it adopted a clan or community system of governance, which has greater legitimacy.

So far, Somaliland has largely relied on itself. It might be because it didn’t have the opportunity due to lack of recognition. Be that as it may, it has benefited from it. It did not succumb to Western traps. Hence, the HoA states can be better off without excessive external involvement. For Somaliland, the lack of external support is actually a blessing in disguise.

Intra-party (or intra-movement) democracy is a precursor to democratic governance. As mentioned earlier, Somaliland’s democracy has its roots in the SNM’s democratic practices in the Ethiopian jungles. Therefore, opposition parties in other countries need to practice internal democracy before taking power. This is because democracy is not something that one acquires overnight.

9. Conclusion

The nation-state project, which aimed to unite all Somalis in the region into a single nation-state, has caused domestic and regional instabilities. The centralized rule of civilian leaders resulted in internal clan-based tensions and external hostility with neighbors, as they supported the quest for self-determination and insurgencies in the Somali-inhabited territories. Barre’s military pursuit of the nation-state project further radicalized and militarized clan-based opposition, leading to direct warfare with Ethiopia. This conflict weakened nationalism and ultimately contributed to his downfall. Following his downfall, the state itself collapsed and thus became a breeding ground for clan-based warlords and Islamic militant groups seeking to unite all Somalis under a single Islamic nation-state, posing a threat to both the local population and neighboring countries. The Western-modeled federal government, established long after the collapse of the state, is not sufficiently robust to ensure peace and security for the Somali people and prevent insurgents from targeting neighboring countries.

Another event that followed the fall of Barre’s regime was the secession of Somaliland. Unlike the turbulent states in the region, Somaliland has managed to achieve peaceful and democratic governance. This is largely due to the hybridization of modernity with tradition. Accordingly, Somaliland’s experience provides several lessons to the HoA countries, including the importance of anchoring their political system in traditional institutions and values, implementing homegrown, bottom-up, and inclusive peace processes, devolving government responsibility to local, more cohesive groups, reducing western interference, and ensuring that oppositions commit to practicing internal democracy before assuming power.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes on contributors

Endalcachew Bayeh

Endalcachew Bayeh is a lecturer and researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Bahir Dar University. He has published numerous articles on various topics, including conflict, peace, democracy, human rights, hydro-politics, and interstate relations. This research is part of the author's broader interest in intrastate and interstate politics.