An offensive realism approach to navigate the changing dynamics of summit-level dialogue between the AU and great powers

Abstract

This paper examines the changing dynamics of summit-level dialogue between the African Union and the Great Powers, using offensive realism as a theoretical lens. A qualitative approach with an in-depth literature review was developed. The findings indicate that there is a power transition tendency in Africa towards a bipolar arrangement. Moreover, the findings show that the ongoing great power competition in Africa is motivated by a clash of national interests as they all feel that Africa will play an important role in their quest for global primacy. China’s partnership success under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation compels the United States to consider a foreign policy shift towards Africa, resulting in the US aid syndrome mentality towards Africa being recently replaced by improved trade and investment agreements. The competition, however, favoured Africa, as these great powers embraced the African Union’s claim to join the G20 to avoid losing Africa in their race to global influence. However, some of the summits exposed several African countries to economic difficulties and debt traps because of their inadequate bargaining leverage with lenders, either individually or collectively. From this perspective, one could argue that the ongoing great powers summit under the auspices of the African Union may produce a zero-sum outcome unless the current weak bargaining power is improved, thereby posing a sovereignty threat to many debt-burdened African countries, as some lenders are merciless in dominating key economic sectors if debts are not repaid on time.

IMPACT STATEMENT

Since the turn of the millennium, major world powers have sought Africa’s votes to expand their global influence. To achieve their goals, major powers convened unilateral summits with African countries under the auspices of the African Union. However, Africa is becoming a geostrategic focus due to the fierce nature of competition. As a result, this study focuses on exploring the changing dynamics of summit-level dialogue between the AU and the Great Powers. In addition, it navigates the areas of rivalry between these great powers, as well as the dynamics of their power asymmetry. Finally, the main goal of this study is to provide a practical recommendation to strengthen the bargaining power of the African Union with major powers to ensure the comparative advantage of its constituents.

Keywords:

• Africa Union
• competition
• great powers summits
• regional hegemony
• offensive realism

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

SUBJECTS:

• International Politics; International Relations; Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns

1. Introduction

This study is unique in its approach to examining the summit of contemporary great powers held under the auspices of the African Union. This issue has received little attention from scholars and has modest coverage in current political science and international relations literature. Indeed, the turn of the millennium was a watershed moment for Africa’s voice in global politics (Omagu, 2012), as well as participation in global commons decision-making (Akokpari, 2009). Following this admission, Africa witnessed a new type of diplomatic cooperation with great powers through its unilateral summits (Carmody, 2023). However, this matter has not been fully explored in international relations literature, and little is known about the benefits and drawbacks of this scheme. Meanwhile, the summit is still ongoing (Taylor, 2017), and African countries under the auspices of the African Union have already hosted unilateral summits with the United States, European Union, China, Russia, and many other rising powers (Ji, 2021). Therefore, this study analyzes the scheme and generates findings that fill a gap in the literature while also providing solutions to increase the African Union’s bargaining leverage with major powers to ensure the comparative advantages of its constituents.

According to Kepe et al. (2023), Africa has become a focal point for geopolitical competition, with major powers actively selling their visions to African governments via their summits. In this regard, Carmody and Owusu (2007) added that Africa has increasingly become a geopolitical center for the rivalry between foreign and regional powers. Many great powers, with opposing geopolitical interests, have emerged. Scholars such as Vertin (2019) and Kantack (2018) have recently termed these growing dynamics as a new ‘scramble of Africa’. On the continent, the rivalry between the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia is intense. Africa’s contemporary geopolitical dynamics are defined by four distinct features: power projection, scrambling for military bases, competition for commercial ports, and the regional configuration of states (Abebe, 2021). It is necessary to pose research questions to understand the ongoing dynamics of rivalry in Africa. How do the twenty-first century’s evolving power dynamics define the fate of African countries in the global political flora? To conduct this study empirically, the following research questions must be answered. (a) Does ongoing competition between the great powers in Africa have the capacity to regenerate power transition? (b) What motivates the great power competition in Africa? (c). Is the African Union adequately authorized to bargain on behalf of its member states in ongoing great power summits to ensure their comparative advantages?

Therefore, to respond to these queries and understand the geopolitical dynamism of the continent, a theoretical framework must be used to validate empirical evidence. Consequently, offensive realism was used in this study to investigate power rivalry between major powers in Africa, as offensive realism is suitable for investigating power-driven competition. Thus, major power summits with the African Union can be studied using offensive realism. This is because these major powers use summits as power projection tools. Offensive realism can be chosen because it can explain the interplay between state behavior and power in an anarchic international system (Snyder, 2002). Furthermore, it provides a theoretical justification for the behavior of revisionist states (Mearsheimer, 2001). Most importantly, offensive realism embraces explanations of international outcomes at the system and foreign policy levels, and state alliance-building strategies (Toft, 2005). These features of the theory make it appropriate to use in this study to analyze summits.

Methodologically, a qualitative research approach was devised along with an extensive literature review. The rationale for using this approach is that it is appropriate to study the patterns of events scientifically, allowing researchers to examine state behaviour, organizational functioning, and interactions between states (Rahman, 2016). To achieve the objective of the study, the researcher employed an explanatory technique to provide a full and extensive explanation of the subject under inquiry (Patten & Newhart, 2017). This strategy is useful for analysing ideas, concepts, written documents, and official statements of governments and organizations (Creswell & Poth, 2016). Relevant books, journals, official statements, meeting reports, and other archival documents were analysed using content analysis. Thematic data analysis approaches have been used to analyse the data (Patten & Newhart, 2017).

2. The growing relevance of Africa in the contemporary great powers’ competition

According to Kepe et al. (2023) and Heidger and Garcia (2021), Africa has grown in importance in the context of major power rivalry, with the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia all competing on the continent. Since the end of the Cold War, Africa’s diplomatic ties have taken on a new dimension (Akokpari, 2009). This importance is connected to several factors (Mills, 2004). The first is related to the availability of natural resources. Africa is rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals, and farmland. These resources are highly sought after by great powers that attempt to secure their energy and economic interests (Kepe et al., 2023). The United States, EU member countries, China, and Russia-affiliated companies have shown increased interest in accessing African resources (Abebe, 2021), and under the auspices of the African Union, these powers have enacted a variety of policies and initiatives that have favored them over their opponents (Kepe et al., 2023).

Another aspect that contributes to Africa’s inclusion in international politics is the introduction of a financial market system into the global economy (Selassie, 2023). According to Omagu (2012), the market emerged as an essential element of supremacy, when capitalism became the dominant economic system. As a result, the great powers recognized that financial markets might be their best friends or the most difficult opponents in the quest for global supremacy. States pay special attention to their markets to win the race because they understand how markets decide their fortune (Heidger & Garcia, 2021). According to IMF African Department Director Abebe Aemro Selassie, this incident altered great powers’ foreign policy towards middle- and small-power countries (Selassie, 2023). This systemic change allows Africa to gain the attention of major powers because of their ambition to influence the global market economy (Mills, 2004; Selassie, 2023). Another compelling motivation for great powers to integrate Africa into the global economy is related to its subsequent economic growth. According to the McKinsey Global Institute (2010), African growth has averaged 5 percent since 2000, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing regions. Many African countries, including Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mozambique, have achieved double-digit economic growth. Consequently, the focus of the global economy has shifted to the Global South, which requires great power to compete in the African market (Cornelissen et al., 2012). These factors contribute to Africa’s growing strategic importance to global powers, as every major or rising power requires political support to pursue its global interests. This desire has made Africa a key player in global politics.

The third aspect relates to its geostrategic location. Geographically, Africa enjoys a strategic advantage in controlling international trade routes over the Red Sea and Suez Canal (Kepe et al., 2023). Controlling this region gives major powers leverage for global political and economic dominance, as the continent is adjacent to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, which connects Europe to Asia (Weber, 2017). This also provides them with a competitive advantage in terms of proximity to important ports and maritime checkpoints in the Bel-el-Mandeb Straights, which are critical for maintaining firm control over global trade activities (Nantulya, 2019). Africa is adjacent to the oil-producing countries of Arabia, the Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aden, which connects the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean (Abebe, 2021). Since the advent of colonization, these geopolitical dynamics have made Africa a major geopolitical region of the world, next to the Indo-Pacific region.

The fourth aspect was related to the coordinated terrorist attack on civilians in the United States on September 11, 2001, which altered the perceptions of great powers in the Global South (Carmody, 2005). According to the National Security Strategy (2002), the United States has decided to collaborate closely with African countries to hunt down al-Qaida leaders and militias across the continent. This motivation was bolstered by the ‘War on Terror’ agenda, which resulted in improved diplomatic collaboration between African countries and the United States, the European Union, and NATO (Phillips, 2023). However, since the September 11 attack, the continent has taken center stage in the emerging security discourse (Carmody, 2005). Consequently, international financial institutions have established a range of measures to incorporate developing countries into their short- and long-term development plans to eliminate poverty, with the goal of preventing economically disadvantaged people from being recruited (Mills, 2004). This returned Africa as the center of international relations, and African states began to participate in global political and economic affairs, particularly in the fight against poverty, counterterrorism, and other antipiracy activities in Africa (Carmody, 2005).

The last, but not least, factor was linked to China’s rise as an alternative global powerhouse (Abebe, 2021). For many years, the United States viewed Africa as a problem that needed to be resolved rather than as a diplomatic ally in global political affairs (Cornelissen et al., 2012). According to Colonel Joseph Bruhl, director of the commander’s initiatives group within the US Army Southern European Task Force, the US maintains an inconsistent posture in Africa, viewing it as a strategic partner that carries the ‘white man’s burden’. This view continues despite continents achieving economic progress (Bruhl, 2021). However, this diplomatic approach changed when China began to provide alternative diplomatic benefits to African countries. This is vivid for bilateral trade relations with Africa (Bruhl, 2021). For instance, according to estimates compiled by the US Agency USAID, the combined trade value of the United States and Africa in 2017 was $39 billion USD, ranking it third behind China and the European Union. Whereas, as per the figures from the General Administration of Customs of China, the value of China-Africa combined trade value in the same year was $148 billion USD (Smith, 2019). Overall, the aforementioned aspects indicate Africa’s increased strategic importance in the judgment of great powers since the post-Cold War era, as evidenced by its offers to Africa through its unilateral cooperation program.

The next section focuses on the theoretical framework used in this study, offensive realism and how changes in power dynamics lead to the emergence of great power competition in Africa.

3. Theoretical framework: offensive realism

This study uses John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism to understand and inspect the changing dynamics of summit-level dialogue between the African Union and the great powers. In fact, John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism aims to correct Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism’s ‘status quo bias’, (Waltz, 1979) with the justification that power is ambiguous and difficult to quantify. Although both strands of neo-realism (defensive and offensive) agree that states are wary of increasing security, they differ in the amount of power required to achieve this goal (Mearsheimer, 2001). All offensive realists share the view that international politics is conducted in an anarchical environment where there is no ‘authority above governments’ to enforce laws and punish those who violate rule (Mearsheimer, 2001). Power is everything to offensive realists. As Mearsheimer illustrates, no state can know with absolute confidence how much power is required to ensure its survival. Offensive realists believe that states should maximize their authority because anarchy makes security rare, making a state feel secure (Gilpin, 1981).

States are wary of amassing power to ensure their safety considering the ever-changing global power balance. Consequently, they often seek to increase their power at the expense of their rivals (Mearsheimer, 2001). Being much more powerful than other states is the ultimate source of security for great powers. He suggests that being a hegemonic power provides the best guarantee for security, as no other power can challenge it (Mearsheimer, 2001). For offensive realists, international politics is a zero-sum game in which each nation must increase its own strength while preventing other nations from increasing its power as it threatens its national security (Gilpin, 1981).

As anarchy is a fundamental feature of international politics, states must strengthen their power to protect their citizens and advance their interests. Sheehan and Sheehan argued that, in the anarchy of international politics, where each nation must look out for its own interests, the concept of power is inextricably linked to the idea of national interest (Sheehan & Sheehan, 1996). Consequently, states seek to exert influence over existing power structures to shift the balance of forces in their favour, thereby protecting their interests (Gilpin, 1981). Many realists believe that in an anarchic system, power transitions can occur at any time because the system allows states to amass as much power as possible (Mearsheimer, 2001). Furthermore, the system grants state monopolies of power, and any rising power can easily challenge the existing order until it develops a counter defensive mechanism that could come from the system’s guardian (Schweller, 1999). Consequently, offensive realists believe that maximizing power and becoming a hegemon are the best sources of survival (Gilpin, 1981).

However, power accumulation changes power distribution, which affects the overall power dynamics (Sheehan & Sheehan, 1996). If nation ‘A’ has power distribution in its favour against nation ‘B’ then balance of power can be said to be in favour of ‘A’. The dynamics of power are central to this argument, as they follow a realistic theoretical approach (Baldwin, 2016). With anarchy as a structural element of international politics, nations must strengthen their power to maximize their security and interests. As Sheehan points out, national interest is inextricably linked to the concept of power because international politics are governed by anarchy and nations must protect their own interests (Sheehan & Sheehan, 1996). Consequently, nations try to gain leverage over the distribution of power to shift power dynamics in their favour, and in turn, secure their national interests (Gilpin, 1981).

Since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the world has tipped in America’s favour (Hess, 2021). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US became the only global power capable of rapidly deploying force in any part of the world (Akokpari, 2009). It helped the United States meet its security and national interest goals by maintaining the power balance in its favour. In a world in which anarchy is the guiding structural factor in international politics, individual countries naturally seek to move the balance of power in their favour relative to their enemies (Baldwin, 2016). Thus, it could be argued that new rising powers will always challenge the status quo balance of power in international politics because they seek to move the distribution of power in their favour (Wohlforth, 1993). Overall, a nation that becomes more powerful will try to increase its sphere of influence and dominance in the international economic system (Gilpin, 1981). Throughout history, major world powers have frequently used the anarchy of the international system as a grey zone to maximize their advantages over potential rivals. This behaviour is evident in their attempts to establish links with African countries. In this regard, major world powers, particularly the United States, China, European Union, and Russia, have held unilateral summits with African countries under the auspices of the AU. These powers use their unilateral summits as tools to compete with one another for influence, markets, resources, and diplomatic support.

Therefore, the next section is devoted to a literature review to examine the guiding principles of the African Union with great powers, the features of each summit, and whether the African Union’s activity in the context of relations with great powers duplicates the foreign policies of individual member states or adds new value.

4. Literature review

4.1. Sovereignty, the African Union, and summits of great powers

The concept of sovereignty had an impact on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU) (Organization of the Africa Unity Charter, 1963). These opposing ideas of sovereignty evolved during the early talks of member countries, which were divided into the Casablanca and Monrovia groups (Farmer, 2012). Members of the Casablanca Group considered political unity the most effective way to protect the newly independent continent’s economic, political, and social interests (Blake, 2005). However, the Monrovia group was more concerned with safeguarding and maintaining sovereignty than the necessity of African cooperation (Farmer, 2012). Furthermore, the OAU Charter also highlighted where member states lay over sovereignty. According to Article 2, states have full authority over their sovereignty, while the OAU’s role is to ‘defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence’ in accordance with their desire (Elias, 1965). Article 3 of the Charter elaborates on commitment to sovereignty by stating the principles of non-interference as well as respect for each state’s ‘inalienable right to independent existence’ (Farmer, 2012). This shows that Monrovia Group’s concept of sovereignty was integrated into the OAU Charter.

Despite the fact that the African Union’s mandate is limited to the sovereign rights of its member states, the organization is entrusted with accelerating integration to play a vital role in global economic and political challenges (Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 2000). To achieve this goal, the African Union established a set of guiding principles to govern its ties with the great powers (Farmer, 2012). These include strengthening mechanisms for securing peace and reconciliation at all levels, addressing emerging threats to Africa’s peace and security, improving Africa’s place in the global governance system, promoting and defending its member states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, and accelerating the continent’s political and socioeconomic development (Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 2000). Although the institution is mandated for operations that require significant budgets, member countries are hesitant to pay membership fees (Getachew & Tessema, 2018). This makes the institution dependent on external donors to undertake its primary duties (Diatta et al., 2021). The African Union’s overall budget for 2021 was US$623, 836, 163, of which US$203, 500, 000 (32%) was financed by member state contributions and US$406, 194, 334 (65%) by external partners (Peace and Security Council Report, 2021). This standoff eventually renders the union powerless to achieve its stated goals (Diatta et al., 2021).

4.2. Great powers’ summits under the auspices of the Africa Union

Africa’s interactions with the rest of the world are evolving rapidly (Taylor, 2017). The frequency of post-Cold War great power summits held under the auspices of the African Union in particular is growing, as major powers seek Africa as a diplomatic and economic partner in international political flora (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). Many major powers have grown their interests, investments, and trade with Africa. In this regard, China, the United States, the European Union, and Russia have had unilateral summits with Africa under the auspices of the Africa Union. With their summits, each of these major powers provides African states with improved diplomatic cooperation and privileges (Carmody, 2017). This is because these major powers compete for resources and global influence and all believe that Africa’s resources and political support will help them to gain global influence (Ji, 2021).

In this context, China was pioneered in convening unilateral summits with African states through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Aiping & Zhan, 2018). FOCAC was founded in 2000 with the goal of promoting multilateral cooperation between China and African countries with the vision of realizing deeper cooperation (Omolo, 2022). China was successful in establishing a ‘win-win’ engagement with African counterparts through FOCAC, based on equal consultation, enhanced consensus, strengthened friendship, and increased cooperation (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], 2018). This collaboration has significantly improved trade between China and Africa. Notably, before the formation of FOCAC, trade between China and Africa was approximately $10 billion; following its formation, trade between the two them surged to $220 billion by 2014 (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020).

FOCAC is not a simple partnership but rather a complex network of relationships and interests shared by the two sides (Omolo, 2022). However, the partnership’s collective goal is divided into four main sub-goals: equal consultation, improved understanding, expanded consensus, and strengthening and encouraging cooperation (FOCAC, 2018). The motivation for FOCAC was that both China and Africa recognized that the current international order was unjust and resolved to work towards establishing a new international order that would allow developing countries to participate more fully in the international arena, both politically and economically (Omolo, 2022). Africa and China pledged to collaborate to promote economic and social development through trade, investment, and capacity building among other measures. For this purpose, they adopted the Beijing Declaration, which specifies FOCAC’s areas of engagement (FOCAC, 2018). Within this framework, China pledged $60 billion in 2018 and $40 billion in 2021 to support African growth. Furthermore, Beijing promised additional assistance to Africa’s economy, which was harmed by COVID-19, and set a target of increasing its imports to $300 billion over the next three years (Foreign Affairs Committee [FAE], 2022). In this sense, China uses ‘soft power’ to compete in Africa, mostly through development projects and economic collaboration with African countries (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020). However, its capital injection is viewed as both a threat and an opportunity in recent African economic success. However, all China’s efforts are not only increasing Africa’s economy, but trade between China and Africa is expected exceed $254.3 billion by 2023 (Subban, 2022).

This demonstrates China’s ‘soft power’ engagement with Africa, as evident from the FOCAC relationship (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020). According to Taylor (2010), China’s efforts to collaborate with African countries convey a bigger picture of Beijing’s long-term ambition to expand its presence to obtain power and influence over its competitors, particularly the United States. China is pushing for a multilateral alliance with 55 African states within the FOCAC framework to influence global politics (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020). From this perspective, FOCAC remains the most strategically integrated and far-reaching in terms of depth, scope, and level of cooperation, allowing China to strengthen its power and influence over its competitors in Africa (Aiping & Zhan, 2018).

In contrast, the United States founded the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit (ALS) in 2014 to promote democracy through trade and investment with African countries (Tarrósy, 2014). However, during the Trump administration, the summit was downplayed, as Trump felt that Africa was an aid-dependent rather than a strategic ally, which resulted in the cancellation of US funding for peacekeeping operations in Africa (Powell, 2018). Trump’s administration was accused of it and blamed for the deterioration of US-Africa relations (Dollar, 2016). However, the Biden administration responded to Trump’s foreign policy flaws towards Africa by welcoming Africa as a significant US ally. Washington hosted its second ALS summit in December 2022 (Levinson, 2022). During the conference, the US offered $55 billion to African countries over the next three years. The fund will assist the African Union’s Agenda 2063 by investing in human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, health systems, and security to enhance the shared US and African interests (Usman et al., 2022).

Furthermore, the Biden administration announced its willingness to formally support the AU’s long-awaited bid for its G20 membership (Mason et al., 2022). Despite the fact that acceptance occurs weeks after endorsements in Beijing and Paris, it still carries significant weight for the AU’s claim to be realistic (Duss & Yabi, 2022). Most importantly, for Africa, the Biden administration declared its goal of addressing Trump’s foreign policy flaws, as well as an emphasis on equal participation in trade and investment to improve relations (Duss & Yabi, 2022). ALS conclusions indicate a substantial paradigm change in the United States’ perspective of Africa as a continent vital to the global economy and world order (Ordu & Dollar, 2022). Washington seems to be amending its relationships with the continent in mainly positive terms by bringing the US core interests on board, while also escalating the great powers’ competition in Africa (Duss & Yabi, 2022). However, support from Congress to provide funds is essential for Biden’s desire to repair US relations with Africa and compete with China in the race for supremacy (Usman et al., 2022).

Despite China’s advantage in FOCAC, the end of the Cold War gave the US significant power over military and security matters in Africa (Akokpari, 2009). Consequently, the US established 29 military installations in 15 African countries, including 15 permanent bases and 17 semi-permanent bases (Tricontinental, 2021). This extensive military and security participation was eventually supplemented by a better foreign policy that considered Africa as the primary security ally of the United States. This enabled the United States to preserve its military and security hegemony in Africa (Akokpari, 2009). In summary, the United States is now utilizing its military and security superiority as a balancer until its economic engagement matures to compete with FOCAC (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020).

The EU-Africa summit is another powerful summit, next to FOCAC and ALS (Kotsopoulos & Mattheis, 2018). According to Kohnert (2021), the summit was formed in 2000 to consolidate the EU-Africa alliance and to exert influence on the continent. Furthermore, its ultimate purpose is to increase economic cooperation and development between the two continents, while also addressing their shared security issues (Kohnert, 2021). In addition, promoting regional integration is a shared goal of EU-Africa relations to fulfil Agenda 2063 and realize the African Continental Free Trade Area (Piccolino, 2020). This shared goal provides an opportunity for the EU to collaborate with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as COMESA, CECOWAS, SADC, and MAEMU, to create collective and coordinated regional responses to establish a viable continental bloc in Africa capable of exerting influence on the global economy (Kohnert, 2021). To achieve this goal, the EU offered 150-billion-euro investment packages to support the common vision for 2030 and the AU Agenda 2063 (Africa News, 2022). According to The Council European Union (2022), the investment package seeks to increase public and private investment in a variety of areas, including energy, digital infrastructure, energy transition, green transition, digital transformation, sustainable growth and decent job creation, transportation facilitation, and the mobility and employability of students, young graduates, and skilled workers.

For decades, the European Union has ignored power politics in favour of economic integration, believing that global and regional security challenges can be addressed in institutional settings (Youngs, 2022). However, this stance is not realistic today. Consequently, the European Union pushed for a strategic shift to respond properly to geopolitical challenges that threatened the bloc’s viability. With this mindset, the EU is expanding its collaboration with state and non-state actors worldwide, including the African Union, to address its survival quest (Lehne, 2020). However, the real geopolitical challenge is at the economic heart of EU integration (Teevan & Domingo, 2022). Given the dominance of rival power blocs in the contemporary world, many of the EU’s trade, investment, and competition policies appear to be jeopardized (Lehne, 2020). The European Union has prioritized increasing its regional power and influence (Youngs, 2022), and for EU members to adopt EU-AU partnerships as a strategy to counteract the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between competing powers (Teevan & Domingo, 2022).

Finally, by re-establishing the former Soviet Union’s influence in Africa, Russia emerged as a strong geopolitical rival of the United States and other major countries on the continent. Russia’s efforts in Africa were designed to bolster Moscow’s position vis-à-vis its adversaries, primarily the United States. In line with this objective, Russia established the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 (Jones, 2021). Economic cooperation agreements were formed, although they were not as solid as China and the US provided to Africa (Philippa Larsen, 2022). For example, during the first summit, a trade agreement worth RUB1.004 trillion (US$15.7 billion) was signed with more than 29 African countries to deepen partnership (Abramova & Fituni, 2021). Russia’s engagement in Africa is more militarily through the Wanger Group, seeking political destabilization in Africa and aiming to increase access to natural resources (Philippa Larsen, 2022). The Wanger Group, a Private Military Company (PMC), operates in Africa under the Russian flag. In the larger picture, a group is seen to play a part in Russia’s geopolitical competition with the United States in Africa (Jones, 2021). Russia increased the geographic extent of its PMC deployments in sub-Saharan Africa following the use of PMCs in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Jones, 2021). Russia has targeted resource-rich countries with particularly weak governments, including Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique (Philippa Larsen, 2022). Although PMC missions have varied from case to case to match local needs, Russia has exchanged military and security support for economic, geopolitical, and military gains in each country (Jones, 2021). Overall, the PMC serves as a crucial foreign policy instrument for Moscow to develop its authority, influence, and strength in Africa, while seeking a foothold to compete with other great powers in Africa (Yordanov, 2021).

4.3. Examining the Africa Union’s relationships with great powers and its impact on member states

Africa’s global importance is growing, characterized by rapid economic expansion, rising educational standards, increasing gender equality, and expanding infrastructure and connectivity (Viswanathan & Mishra, 2019). This region has seen an increase in trade, investment, and innovation. African governments are no longer spectators in defining the continent’s future (Aiping & Zhan, 2018). As a result, great powers, such as the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, and other middle powers, are increasing their collaboration through summits (Viswanathan & Mishra, 2019). Nevertheless, the current implementation of Africa’s initiatives in collaboration with major powers is compromising several core principles of the organization. The African Union is recognized for its commitment to safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states (Yihdego, 2011). However, it has been observed that due its summits with foreign powers, the union is unable to use leverage to ensure the continent’s comparative advantages due to a lack of adequate financial capacities as well as full authority to negotiate on behalf of its constituents. Rather. The continent appears to be a geostrategic battleground for major powers to push their interests over others (Agence-France Presse, 2023). According to an Agence-France Presse (2023) report, the current head of the Commission has validated this assertion as follows:

“Moussa Faki Mahamat, AU Commission chair says that, in this international context of competing political interests, the will of each side threatens to transform Africa into a geostrategic battleground, resulting in a new Cold War”. He continues, “In this zero-sum game, where the gains of others translate into losses for Africa, we must resist all forms of manipulation of our member states”.

The divergence in interests between the African Union and its member countries became apparent when twenty-two member states chose to abstain or not vote on a resolution presented at the UN General Assembly, which urged Russia to withdraw from Ukraine (Agence-France Presse, 2023). Eritrea and Mali voted on this motion. In this particular case, the African Union aimed to maintain a neutral stance on resolution because of its unilateral relations with Russia. Conversely, several other nations that also have unilateral ties with Russia and Ukraine have different viewpoints from those of the African Union (Nantulya, 2022). This conflict of interest highlights the lack of unanimous support among member countries for the AU-led summits involving major powers, thereby suggesting that the continent is being positioned as a platform for competing interests among these powers (Agence-France Presse, 2023).

Another difficulty affecting the African Union’s success in gaining the collective will of its member states is its lack of political will to maintain the balance of every segment of the organization (Nantulya, 2022). Contrary to the objective of the Constitutive Act, the African Union’s legislative, judicial, and technical organs remain weak, particularly in comparison to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which consists of the leaders of the organization’s 55 member nations (Louw-Vaudran, 2021). The Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council, which were created to offer civil society organizations a voice within AU institutions, continue to be advisory entities with no authority. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was designed to protect human rights and prevent impunity at the national level, remains ineffective (Nantulya, 2022). Furthermore, a lack of political support undermines adherence to common norms (Chutel, 2019). The African Union created a framework for condemning coups and expelling misbehaving member states during the 2000 Lomé Declaration. Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2015, 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020, 2021), and Sudan (2019, 2022) have applied this rule. It remains mute to others, such as Zimbabwe and Chad in 2017 and 2021, respectively (Nantulya, 2022). These organizational imbalances make it difficult for the African Union to gain full backing from its members, while also producing widespread frustration. Such discrepancies have led some Africans to criticize the Africa Union as a ‘presidents club’ (Fabricius, 2017; Nantulya, 2022).

Therefore, in the following section, the researcher applies the fundamental notions of offensive realism and knowledge of the existing literature on the issue under investigation to generate the study findings. Along with the results, discussion and analysis were conducted to provide a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

5. Results and discussion

5.1. The changing power dynamics and influence of great powers in Africa

Mearsheimer (2001) asserted that the structure of international politics and the interaction of states within the system provide a more comprehensive perspective from which to understand the state of affairs (Mearsheimer, 2001). He further explained that states are aware that the most reliable way to ensure survival in an anarchical system is to maximize their relative power with the ultimate goal of pursuing hegemony. The pursuit of regional and global domination between great powers has given rise to persistent security competition (Mearsheimer, 2001). From this perspective, the post-Cold War summit of major powers with African countries under the auspices of the AU is a tangible manifestation of their geo-economic rivalry (Kepe et al., 2023).

It is impossible to deny that the United States retains its military and security superiority in Africa (Hess, 2021). However, this is no longer a guarantee that the US will maintain its advantage, as other major powers compete with the US by offering benefits to African countries under the auspices of the African Union (Chutel, 2019). The presence of other major powers in Africa threatens the United States’ unipolar dominance while fuelling shifts in power with the emergence of competing power arrangements (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). Indeed, power is intrinsically elusive, making it difficult to assess a state’s capabilities until they are exercised. This makes it difficult to characterize the power transition between states (Wohlforth, 1993). However, the exertion capacities of states can be detected and measured when they compete with each other (Mearsheimer, 2001). In this regard, China, through FOCAC (Aiping & Zhan, 2018), the United States, via ALS (Tarrósy, 2014), the European Union (Kohnert, 2021), and Russia (Yordanov, 2021), all compete for influence in Africa.

Given Africa’s geostrategic significance to the global economy (Abebe, 2021), it is no surprise that these great powers have chosen Africa as their main destination because the continent possesses a strategically situated international shipping route via the Suez Canal that connects Europe and Asia (Carmody, 2017). Despite the fact that each great power has invested money in Africa within its respective summits, China’s FOCAC is far reaching its objective as it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative to exert more influence in Africa (Omolo, 2022). According to Schweller (1999), the ultimate goal of rising powers is to expand their footprint beyond their borders to exert influence; hunt for raw materials, markets, living spaces, and military bases; and compete with their opponents. In this sense, China’s influence via FOCAC and BRI is offensive in nature, as Beijing perceives the United States, European Union, and Russia as potential adversaries who block China’s influence on the continent (Hess, 2021). As a result, these great powers have engaged in intense rivalry to influence one another, but the pattern thus far indicates that China is committed to delivering more benefits to African countries under the FOCAC and BRI schemes than others to maintain its economic dominance on the continent (FAE, 2022; Subban, 2022). By doing so, China amasses influence, allowing it to compete with the United States for some type of bipolar arrangement in Africa rather than other competing powers (Chay & Menkhoff, 2019; Zhao, 2021). As the finding pointed out, prominent US politicians, military generals, and academics, such as Tibor Nagy, Paul Nantulya, Ryan CK Hess, and Hal Brands, among others, urged foreign policy shifts towards Africa to offset China’s influence on the continent (Hess, 2021). According to their analysis, the current rivalry between the United States and China as well as other great powers over Africa has resulted in a visible power shift indicator between the region’s old guardian (the United States) and its rising power (China) (Nantulya, 2019). Consequently, these politicians and policy advisors urged the US government to reevaluate its foreign policy towards Africa to reverse the situation (Hess, 2021).

Given Beijing’s growing influence in Africa, the United States developed the Build Back Better World program in partnership with the G7 countries as an alternate channel to aid middle- and low-income countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (The White House, 2021). This initiative is an indication of the foreign policy shift and the determination to compete with China in African soils (Hess, 2021). The US government has encouraged private sector expansion in targeted BRI project countries in Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, with a distinct package of incentives for investors involved in these sectors to counterbalance China’s strategy (The White House, 2021). Part of this offsetting strategy is the International Development Finance Cooperation Plan, which includes a $ 5 billion investment in newly revitalized Ethiopian markets (Hess, 2021). As a result, the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia are now competing for a stronger presence in Africa (Lehne, 2020). However, China’s distinct bargaining skills, such as its non-interference posture and other soft power diplomatic approaches, have put it ahead of other major powers (Hess, 2021). All of these power shifts put the US base under strain, resulting in a dynamic shift in the power balance and influence of the region towards a bipolar power arrangement (Chay & Menkhoff, 2019; Zhao, 2021).

Another outcome of the ongoing Great Power Summit under the auspices of the AU has profoundly transformed Africa’s position in international politics in recent years. Gilpin (1981) contended that a change in the international system entails a shift in the allocation of power and benefits among states. According to this assertion, major world powers, in their fierce competition for global primacy, offer Africa an improved political status to use their votes in international politics scene (Abebe, 2021). This is evident in the fact that both the US and China have endorsed AU’s long-standing claim of membership in the G20 (Mason et al., 2022). Furthermore, the desire for a permanent place on the UN Security Council is stronger than ever before. According to Butty (2022), the US voiced support for Africa’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, despite the allegation that the US wanted Africa to alter the Security Council’s structure. Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, also made explicit calls to the international community to include Africa as a member of the UN Security Council (The Africa Report, 2023). To understand the objectives of the United States, it is useful to draw a link between its activities and Mearsheimer’s thesis on the behaviour of great powers in the international arena, particularly in their desire for survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). According to his argument, great powers strive to be the sole regional hegemons in their hemispheres, capturing as much of the world’s wealth as possible to ensure their long-term survival. To do this, great powers use a range of techniques to achieve their survival goals, with war being the most common strategy (Mearsheimer, 2001). The United States’ interest in Africa’s membership in the council was not due to its genericity; rather, China and Russia obstructed its interest in various council decisions. As a result, by naming Africa a new member, the United States wishes to restructure the Council. This trend, in one way or another, improves Africa’s significance, and if inclusion is realized, Africa will be able to leverage its comparative advantage in many other areas of global politics, aside from backing major powers. This suggests that a modest but planned power shift is taking place in Africa, making Washington and Beijing comparatively beneficial in comparison to other major powers who will finally settle for a bipolar system in the near future.

5.2. National interest driven competition between great powers in Africa

The findings reveal that Africa’s ongoing power competition is essentially a clash of national interests. International politics are based on the self-help principle in an anarchic system (Gilipn, 1981). Thus, national interest is the guiding principle for nations and statesmen’s interactions with other countries. Indeed, the anarchy governs international politics, with state actors or governments within the system regarded as the sole representatives of their national interests. Under this governing principle, no one can defend their interests (Gilipn, 1981). Consequently, states believe that controlling resourceful areas, strategic locations, international trade flows, and expanding partnerships beyond their borders is a necessary step in producing power to maintain or re-establish the existing international order in their favour (Sheehan & Sheehan, 1996). However, the path they chose to achieve their foreign policy goals through a unilateral cooperation framework with Africa has resulted in strong competition. This is because they all required the same types of advantages from Africa at the same time, hoping to use Africa as an international political ally.

Another important finding of this study is that China’s partnership success under FOCAC compels the US to follow a foreign policy shift towards Africa (Lehne, 2020). This shift has recently been reflected in the US-Africa summits, which have dealt with larger trade and investment agreements than ever before. This clearly makes the US one step closer to eliminating aid syndrome mentality towards Africa, as previously believed that Africa’s strategic partner is a ‘White Man’s burden’ (Bruhl, 2021). This shift in foreign policy is closely related to Mearsheimer’s (2001) idea that states can never be sure of the amount of power that they need to survive. In this regard, the US is concerned about the Chinese move to Africa and has decided to combat it at all costs. As noted by Sheehan and Sheehan (1996), because of the ongoing shift in power dynamics, the United States is more concerned about how much power is required to maintain its status quo in rivalry with China. This raised fierce rivalry among them, causing each to want to maximize its share of power at the expense of other states. Being far more powerful than other states is the ultimate source of security for great powers (Mearsheimer, 2001). Therefore, for offensive realists, international politics is a zero-sum game, as nations have to increase their share of power and not let other nations expand their power, which impacts their security (Giplin, 1981). Thus, from an offensive realist perspective, contemporary great power rivalry in Africa is the result of the fear of survival caused by the anarchic order of the international system.

5.3. Market and resource-driven competition and its impact on the sovereignty integrity of AU member countries

The findings indicate that the ongoing summits of great powers with African countries held under the auspices of the African Union are motivated by competition for African resources and markets (Heidger & Garcia, 2021; Kepe et al., 2023). To win the competition, for example, China frequently gives loans to numerous African countries through FOCAC for the construction of critical infrastructure such as railways, roads, industrial parks, and other energy plants (Hörter, 2022). However, according to Vines (2022), a number of African nations, including Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia, are economically difficult or at risk of falling into a debt trap because of the high interest rates on Chinese loans. Due to debt distress, African governments are unable to pay their employees’ basic salaries for months (Wandera & Gachenge, 2023). The recent Kenyan government budget crisis is a prime example.

Kenya’s government has withheld pay from thousands of civil servants in order to save money to repay foreign loans. The president’s chief economic adviser, David Ndii, said on Citizen TV that the cost of servicing Kenya’s debt as a share of ordinary revenue has climbed from 49 percent in 2019/2020 to 65 percent in 2022/2023. This caused a budget crisis, forcing the government to choose between not paying public employees and risking mass unrest or defaulting on its debt (Condon, 2023; Wandera & Gachenge, 2023).

According to the Organization of the Africa Unity Charter (1963), ignoring this circumstance for the African Union is contrary to its principles, as the union is inherently formed to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socioeconomic growth of its member states. The union has the authority to bargain with China on behalf of its member countries under the China-Africa summit to ensure its comparative advantage (Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 2000). However, the bloc appears ineffective at extending debt repayment intervals to its member countries (Vines, 2022). Although the China-Africa summit was held under its auspices, the union appears incapable of convincing China to soften its loan-return policy (Hörter, 2022). From this perspective, one may argue that China poses the greatest sovereignty threat to many debt-burdened African countries because it is merciless to dominate important economic sources if debts are not repaid on time. Zambia provides a good example of this assertion. Due to Zambia’s inability to make loan repayment promises, China is acquiring national assets, such as the national electricity company ZESCO and the national broadcasting firm ZNBC. Furthermore, there are concerns that the main airport in Lusaka may become a Chinese target as the country’s debt repayment performance deteriorates (Anoba, 2018).

According to the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat, the African Union has done little to ensure Africa’s competitive advantage at the ongoing summits with major powers. Furthermore, the AU cannot defuse the emerging new type of Cold War rivalry between major powers due to a lack of effective authority as a continental organization (Agence-France Presse, 2023). In his assessment, Africa became a spectator of the rivalry between the great powers due to the union’s poor bargaining power (Vines, 2022). As these powers compete on a zero-sum basis, where the gains of others translate into losses for Africa, he urged member countries to collectively fight all sorts of manipulation to safeguard the continent’s comparative advantages (Agence-France Presse, 2023). This scenario suggests that contemporary great powers operating under the auspices of the AU duplicate their efforts. This is due to the fact that individual governments have bilateral arrangements with these great powers to carry out their diplomatic activities, and they remain able to negotiate with their lenders to seek a longer period to repay their debt. Unless its member states share some of their sovereign rights with the Union to exercise authority on their behalf, the African Union’s relevance to running the ongoing great powers summits may not provide genuine benefits, but rather duplication of activity.

6. Conclusion

This study’s contribution emphasizes that the African Union is not fully empowered to bargain for the comparative advantages of its members during ongoing summits. This is because member countries are not politically determined to share some of their sovereign powers to negotiate on their behalf, preferring to do so unilaterally. In this regard, the findings highlight that the African Union-owned summit with major powers appears to be a duplication of efforts, given that its member countries have parallel engagement with these great powers. Furthermore, the study also revealed that most African countries were prone to financial difficulties due to lenders’ stringent payback preconditions, while neither the union nor individual countries were able to soften their lenders’ payback process. Additionally, the study stresses that the ongoing rivalry in Africa is offensive in nature, and great powers are trying to assure their national interests over one another at the expense of African countries.

The results suggest that the unipolar status of the United States is jeopardized as China’s economic influence in Africa increases. As a result, the power dynamics are altering faster than ever before, shifting from unipolar to bipolar systems. This is plainly obvious, as China has surpassed the United States and other great powers as the primary economic players in terms of both trade and investment in the continent. This provided Beijing with economic leverage over other countries in terms of partnership with African countries. This enhances China’s status as a major power and allows it to consolidate geopolitical gains. This will be a challenge to the US-led order because the power dynamics will favour China, causing the US to lose its foothold. The shift in the region’s power dynamics will result in increased competition between the great powers in Africa.

Great power rivalries can be seen in various parts of the world, and the source of these rivalries is the clash of interests between the great powers and rising powers in either maintaining or deconstructing the established order. From this perspective, great powers compete in Africa with the expectation that it will play an important role in their quest for global dominance. However, Africa remains a politically unstable continent that requires proper assistance, and the return of great power competition exacerbates its political fragility. Since Africa is strategically positioned for the smooth flow of international maritime routes, and these great powers benefit from it, adopting a win-win solution that benefits all players is a timely response.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Tewodros Woldearegay

Tewodros Woldearegay is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government and International Affairs, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. His research interests include international relations, great power competition, rising powers, the media and politics, conflict studies, and other related topics.