Development of relations between Ethiopia and China during Emperor Haile Selassie: a product of timing or the leadership?

Abstract

This article delves into the development of the diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and China during Emperor Haile Selassie. The author utilizes a combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were collected from various institutions and offices such as the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and periodicals that included memoirs, speeches, and correspondence exchanges. Secondary sources were gathered from both published and unpublished materials. The study focuses on defining the evolution of diplomatic relations between the two countries throughout the 1970s. This particular period witnessed China’s diplomatic triumph on the global stage, prompting Ethiopia to seek an alternative ally to the West. This development occurred when the United States attempted to exploit this advantage by re-establishing its ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The findings of this study assert that after Ethiopia set aside all obstacles and endeavored to establish diplomatic ties with China on December 1, 1970, it became evident that the country was adopting a hedging strategy to distance itself from its long ally, the US. Following Haile Selassie’s visit to Beijing, Ethiopia and China signed a joint communiqué on economic and technical cooperation. Consequently, the study concludes that the development of diplomatic relations between the two countries coincided with the gradual decline of the US’s influence in Ethiopia.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• China
• Haile Selassie
• development of relations
• foreign policy

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Read Robert
• Economics
• University of Lancaster
• Lancaster
• UK

SUBJECTS:

• International Politics
• International Relations
• Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns

1. Introduction

As of the mid-1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie was cognizant that his country was no longer as strategically important to US policy as it had been in the 1950s. During his visit to the White House on October 1, 1963, the Emperor requested additional economic and military aid and voiced his concerns about receiving less attention from Washington (Ayle, 1977, pp. 40–46). He even informed the US officials that if the necessary military aid was not provided, he would have no choice but to seek support from the East (China and the Soviet Union).¹ After the Accra declarations in 1958, Emperor Haile Selassie began to understand the importance of diversifying Ethiopia’s allies for various reasons. Consequently, Ethiopia’s relations with China started to develop in the 1970s as the People’s Republic of China made efforts to establish a modest presence in Ethiopia. In line with its initial non-aligned foreign policy, Emperor Haile Selassie did not solely depend on the US. By pursuing a strategy of exploring different options simultaneously, the Emperor sought to find alternative partners.

At the same time, Beijing needs to improve its ties with many African countries to deal with the Soviet threat and bid to gain admission into the UN. As a result, China was admitted to the UN in place of Taiwan on October 25, 1971. China’s admission into the UN was achieved with the vote given by twenty-six African countries including Ethiopia (Yuwei & Lin, 2021; Wei, 1982, p. 229). Therefore, in many cases, China responded very positively to the African countries in general and Ethiopia in particular. Chairman Mao (Zedong) expressed this support, ‘we have been brought back into the United Nations by our fellow African friends’ (Oqubay & Justin, 2019, pp. 63–65). This allowed China the opportunity to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia for the benefit of political, economic, and technical cooperation.

Between January 1970 and December 1972, China made significant efforts to gain international support and recognition, successfully establishing diplomatic relations with eleven African countries, including Ethiopia.² The turning point of Sino-Ethiopian relations was the year 1970, although the actual commencement of the relationship between the two countries was before 1970 (Seifudein, 2012, p. 41). If we take the year 1970 as the watershed for the diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and China, which lasted until September 1974 when the long-reigning Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed through popular revolution, the diplomatic relationship between the two countries during these years can be viewed from the Cold War perspectives. This article aims to explore the reasons why Ethiopia, under Emperor Haile Selassie not suit other African countries to forge diplomatic ties with China in the 1960s. It also underscores the efforts made by both Ethiopia and China in this regard.

The main body of the discussion consists of three sections. The first discusses Haile Selassie’s survival diplomacy and His turn to the East. The second section broadly sketches the end of the Sino-American détente and the road towards diplomatic relations. The third section focuses on Haile Selassie’s visit to Beijing and the development of diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and China. It presents also the findings (on the internal and external aspects of Selassie’s policies) before drawing its conclusions.

2. Literature review

Various key studies have extensively covered different aspects of the diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and China. Venkataraman and Gedion (2009), Xiudong (2011), Anshan (2016), Seifudein (2012), and Xiaoguang (2014) provide detailed insights into the evolution of Sino-Ethiopian relations during and post-Cold War era. The development of formal ties between Ethiopia and China during the Cold War and its aftermaths are explored by Anshan (2016, pp. 49–51), who emphasizes that political and economic relations between Ethiopia and China have shown rapid growth since the early Cold War era, and economic and technical cooperation between the two countries began during the Imperial rule of Emperor Haile Selassie, especially during his last formative years.

In his work published in 1977, Halliday highlighted the profound impact of the Ethiopian revolution on the region. This revolution created a significant opportunity for other actors to assert their territorial claims in the Horn of Africa and exert their influence in the area. As Legum (1975) pointed out, both internal and external factors provided favorable conditions for the imperial government of Ethiopia to redirect its foreign policy and seek external patronage in 1970. The intense power struggle among various factions within Ethiopia made it clear that Haile Selassie’s rule could not be sustained solely by allying with the US. Hence, the support of the United States for the Emperor played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Haile Selassie’s decision to move eastward was motivated by his recognition of the need to consolidate his power and establish an alternative alliance with the West.

In his work, Xiudong (2011) provided a historical overview of the Sino-Ethiopian relationship from multiple perspectives, but regrettably overlooked the influence of external forces. The author primarily focused on the period preceding and following the resumption of diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and China, which occurred during the Cold War era and extended until 2011. As elucidated by Spencer (1977, pp. 18–19), Haile Selassie’s pro-Western policy played a significant role in hindering Ethiopia’s diplomatic relations with China. The profound ideological discord between the two countries to the early 1970s not only led to diplomatic contradictions but also resulted in their involvement on opposing sides in the Korean and Congolese Wars.

In a study by Yu (1988, p. 859), the focus is on China’s role in Ethiopia and Africa. The study highlights three key factors driving China’s engagement in Ethiopia, such as internal ideological struggles within China, its disputes with the Soviet Union, and the power balance between the US and the Soviet Union. While the study touches upon the early stages of the Ethiopia-China relationship, it falls short in explaining the extensive political and economic developments during the early Cold War period. Focusing on the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, Legum (1975), Halliday (1977), Spencer (1977), and Lyons (1986) looked separately at the competition of superpowers, in the Horn of Africa.

The studies mentioned above have analyzed the timing and leadership quality of Ethiopia and China, either directly or indirectly. Other studies have delved into the domestic and international factors that impacted the bilateral diplomatic relationship between the two countries in the 1970s. Ayle (1977, pp. 46–65) highlighted the external forces that influenced Haile Selassie’s foreign policy during the mid-Cold War period, including superpowers, middle powers, and other actors like Egypt and Somalia. According to Schwab (1978), despite détente in the Horn of Africa, the ongoing Cold War relations between Ethiopia and China were based on their ongoing contestation and influence of superpowers in the region. Although the author considered the rivalry of superpowers as the result of political changes among the African countries, including Ethiopia and Somalia, Schwab’s analysis focused largely on the debate over how the competition of superpowers affected the development of Sino-Ethiopian relations in the early 1970s.

Lefebvre (1991, pp. 67–71) suggested that U.S. foreign policy in the Horn of Africa was not ideological, but primarily strategic and military. The center of gravity for the rivalry of superpowers was to control the Red Sea, and whatever its outcome, it was to have a major impact beyond the Horn of Africa and influence the course and evolution of Sino-Ethiopian relations at the beginning of the Cold War era. According to Lyons (1978), the crisis in the Horn, especially between neighboring Ethiopia and Somalia, could be partially explained in terms of the geostrategic interests of superpowers and China. It is the strategic location of the region that has become a base for rivalry for such great powers.

In his 2011 study, Xiudong concluded that the development of Sino-Ethiopian relations would lead to a new phase of relations, particularly in the post-Cold War era. These developments were significant for three main reasons: firstly, the improvement of Sino-Ethiopia/African relations following the restoration of Sino-Soviet ties in the early 1980s; secondly, the increasing frequency of high-level exchanges between leaders of Ethiopia and China; and thirdly, the impact of Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Africa and the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989. These developments played a crucial role in shaping China’s growing interest in Africa, including Ethiopia. According to Xiudong, it was only after the end of the Cold War era that a new level of cooperation between Ethiopia and China was achieved. This further confirms China’s expanding engagement in Africa, including Ethiopia. All the aforementioned studies, except for Spencer’s descriptive analysis, can be categorized into two groups: those focusing on different aspects of the foreign policy of the Ethiopian imperial government within the context of Beijing-Washington relations, and those examining the re-evaluation of Ethiopia’s foreign policy of towards the United States during the 1970s. Each study undoubtedly provides valuable insights and contributes to the understanding of the subject matter. However, they are also susceptible to criticism due to their limited scope of analysis.

Debeche (1987, p. 1026), for example, focuses his work on China’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, which was shaped by both its overall orientation and decreasing obsession against the United States in the early 1970s. He begins by criticizing what he defines as conventional wisdom between superpowers and China, toward a systemic approach. In such a synoptic overview review, each factor fails to capture the potential development of international relations at the systemic level of analysis, which illustrates the tendency for competition of superpowers including China to impose analytical barriers to research. Debeche developed a theoretical framework for overcoming the barriers. His work is a comprehensive study of China’s role and interest in Africa during the Cold War era. His particular advantage over other previous studies stems primarily from the theoretical framework. However, Debeche’s inability to specify the comparative aspects of systemic and sub-systemic factors and to delve into how the impact of external forces changes as he moves from one level to the next limits the possibilities of his model. Given this, he can identify a systemic and individual level of analysis that reveals a tendency to fluctuate and downplay the development of Sino-Ethiopian relations and individual African countries. Since his goal was to inspect how systemic and unit factors combine to produce international relations, in this case, the role of emperor Haile Selassie to the Sino-Ethiopia formal relations, and since this led him to use a linkage model for his analysis, one wonders whether there is not another model, theory, or approach that could fit the same goal, perhaps in a somewhat better and less controversial way.

3. Methodology of the study

The researcher employed a qualitative research approach to conduct this article. In qualitative research, there exists evidence arising from diverse historical sources that help to analyze the relations between Ethiopia and China. Some methods should be devised beforehand to collect the evidence to tackle the research problem. Document analysis is used as the research method of this article. Document analysis is a systematic research approach for evaluating documents—both printed and electronic material (Kothari, 2004). The review and analysis of documents will begin with a critical examination of the documents that deal with the formulation and basic tenets of the foreign policies of Ethiopia and China following the mid-Cold War era. This period ushered in a new chapter to the relationship between Ethiopia and China. A letter sent by the Chinese government to Emperor Haile Selassie in 1970 gives a summary of this new beginning. It states that:

The Chinese people resolutely support the Ethiopian and other African people in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and racial discrimination and to safeguard national independence (Peking Review, October 15, 1971).

China’s policy of cooperation, like that of other nations, had its own set of foreign principles that determined dos and don’ts. China vowed to offer technical and economic assistance to developing countries including Ethiopia. However, as spelled out in the speeches quoted above ‘China’s technical and economic assistance does not attach any conditions for any privileges’ (China Daily, August 13, 2010). Ethiopia was, likewise, in precarious situations in settling the internal revolts and in defending its territorial integrity from external threats. To achieve this, the country sought alternative partners from its Eastern allies including the PRC. Documents available in Ethiopia that discuss these national interests of the country, will be collected and subjected to critical scrutiny. These archives that discuss the national interests of Ethiopia are located at the National Archives and Library Agency (NALA). This includes, among others, memos and letters exchanged between Emperor Haile Selassie and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office of the PRC. These archives discuss also the national interests of China. Some of the documents contain descriptions of the dynamics on both sides that shaped their development of diplomatic relations.

Newspapers and periodicals published over the years are also relevant to deal with the interests and main concerns of the two nations. Like other historical evidence; newspapers have the characteristics of reflecting the circumstances of the time they were published and available at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) also be collected and subjected to critical examination to support this article. The newspapers to be collected for critical review are bound to reflect the relationship between Ethiopia and China. A large number of digital sources at the Peking Review and People’s Daily Online will also be carefully collected, sifted through, and analyzed to conduct this paper. As the two newspapers offered an online service, it is not difficult to state the contents of their documents. Their titles suggest, however, that the documents discuss diverse topics including but not limited to the leadership quality and the personalities of Emperor Haile Selassie as well as which his Government operated, his foreign policy, and its implication to the Sino-Ethiopian relations, technical supports offered by the PRC to the imperial government of Ethiopia, etc. Finally, the author triangulated the primary sources with secondary data sources.

4. Findings and discussion

4.1. Haile Selassie’s survival diplomacy and his turn to the East

For Ethiopia, the period of 1970s witnessed dramatic internal and external changes that propelled to establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the PRC. To show the development of Haile Selassie’s foreign policy shifts toward China, first, let’s see how the international situation changed dynamically in the 1970s. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the relations between Ethiopia and China were nothing like this. At that time, even some countries still wouldn’t establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC; because they pursued a hostile policy towards Beijing, and China was yet to admit its seat in the United Nations.

The 1970s saw significant shifts in the global arena, often described as the era of ‘big upheaval, big division, and big changes’.³ These changes were largely driven by the widening gap between the two dominant ideological factions, the Sino-Soviet disputes, and the US entanglement in the Vietnam War. The power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States evolved, with the former taking an offensive stance while the latter assumed a defensive position (Scalapino, 1964, p. 654). Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ketema Yifru, emphasized that Ethiopia plays a crucial role as China’s gateway to reach Africa, especially considering the presence of the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa.⁴

After the Sino-Soviet disputes, Ethiopia took advantage of the situation by adopting a hedging strategy to normalize its ties with the two largest communist nations, the PRC and the Soviet Union. Subsequently, from that time until the early 1970s, both Ethiopia and China made efforts to strengthen their bilateral ties and collaborated in the fight against colonialism, imperialism, and racism. However, Emperor Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia had to wait for nearly fifteen years following the Bandung Conference to formalize diplomatic relations with the PRC. Haile Selassie’s lack of enthusiasm to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC can be attributed to historical and ideological reasons.

From the outset, Ethiopia’s attention towards the East was primarily focused on Japan rather than China. This preference stemmed from Japan’s shared imperial background and the remarkable industrial success it had achieved, which captured the interest of Ethiopian elites and even the Emperor himself (Mamecha, 2022, p. 369). At the dawn of the century, the Emperor and his inner circles regarded Japan as a role model for the modernization of Ethiopia. Consequently, the first written constitution of Ethiopia in 1931 was drafted based on Japan’s Meiji constitution. Additionally, Emperor Haile Selassie made history by becoming the first African head of state to visit Japan in 1956 (Quirin, 2001). Subsequently, in 1958, both Ethiopia and Japan established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

Contrary to expectations, Emperor Haile Selassie viewed China as a bit far from the ruling system of Ethiopia and could not learn modernization from China, at a time when he was sandwiched by the US and the Soviet Union. However, it was ironic that when Zhou Enlai made an official state visit to Ethiopia, he met with the Emperor and paved the way for the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China. At that time, the position of Ethiopia towards China was not on good terms partly due to the pro-West policy of the Emperor. Establishing formal ties with the People’s Republic of China would have gone against US interests, as the US aimed to prevent the spread of communism in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region (Woodroofe, 2014, p. 89). The United States, therefore, attempted to dismiss any effort to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Despite US efforts to prevent diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, a significant shift occurred in the early 1970s. The development of Sino-Ethiopian relations highlighted the impact of the Sino-US détente in fostering ties between Ethiopia and China (Ethiopian Herald, February 1971, pp. 1–4). This period in Ethiopia was marked by student movements, challenging Haile Selassie’s government and American influence, ultimately leading to the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC in response to internal and external changes in the country.

In the 1960s, China encounters various internal and external challenges. Despite these setbacks, China’s activism in Africa including Ethiopia intensified. Following Zhou Enlai’s visit to Ethiopia in 1964, the relationship between Ethiopia and China began to gain a slight momentum. The exchange of messages and communications between the two nations started sporadically and gradually expanded over time.⁵ Before the resumption of formal ties with China, the main source of Ethiopia’s aid came from the United States and other West European nations. However, after establishing diplomatic ties with China in 1970, Ethiopia’s economic and technical support came from Beijing, initially in modest amounts which later increased substantially.⁶

China with its mutual benefit, respect, and non-interference foreign policy principles, along with its commitment to fighting colonialism and imperialism, has earned the goodwill of both the Ethiopian people and the imperial government. As mentioned earlier, during Zhou Enlai’s visit to Ethiopia, both countries agreed to strengthen their bilateral relationship. This visit played a significant role in fostering mutual understanding between China and Ethiopia. Moreover, Zhou’s visit also garnered Ethiopia’s support for China’s admission into the United Nations.

The support provided was deemed valuable, consistent, and timely, a gesture that China will forever hold in high regard. Nevertheless, despite Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Ethiopia, diplomatic relations with China did not materialize due to three main reasons. Firstly, Emperor Haile Selassie’s close ties with the West, particularly the United States, deterred him from establishing diplomatic ties with China. Secondly, there were widespread rumors in Ethiopia about China’s alleged support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was striving for independence and reportedly receiving significant weapon shipments through Aden via the Red Sea. Lastly, suspicions arose that the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was also receiving military aid from China’s government (Abir, 1974, p. 131).

More than a decade ago, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the relationship between China and Ethiopia did not progress as expected but showed some signs of improvement over time. By 1970, China had emerged as a significant player, and no one wanted to be left out while others formed alliances.⁷ The US took advantage of this situation to normalize its ties with China. This rapprochement was evident through high-level visits by US officials, such as Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in mid-1971, followed by Nixon’s visit in 1972. The Sino-American rapprochement was a signal for Emperor Haile Selassie to follow the outfit.⁸ On December 1, 1970; Emperor Haile Selassie decided to establish a formal diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China after waiting for a decade and a half while other African nations established diplomatic ties with the PRC. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China was made possible by shifts in China’s diplomatic relations with the US. This improvement in relations with the US was particularly notable during Nixon’s presidency. Subsequently, in October 1971, a UN resolution granted the PRC admission into the United Nations, leading to the rejection of Taiwan.⁹

The rifts that existed between China and the US for more than two decades restored and had positive spillover effects on the development of Sino-Ethiopian diplomatic relations. It has been proved that the early contacts and encounters between Ethiopia and China during the early Cold War period were mainly influenced by the configuration of Sino-American relations. In any case, the triangular relations between China and the US, and China and the Soviet triangles cannot be ignored for China’s relations with Ethiopia during the Cold War era. Apart from the above factor, Ethiopia’s strategic location in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region coincided with China’s desire to maintain its balance of power against the Soviet Union in the region, which was another factor that contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Apart from its strategic location, since the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s position in Africa has been very important to the Sino-Ethiopia diplomatic relations.

In addition, Emperor Haile Selassie firmly adhered to the ‘One China’ policy, which asserted that Taiwan is an integral part of China. Ethiopia has maintained this stance since 1959, with China’s foreign policy priority being the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with other countries. Anshan (2007) argues that the actions of the Chinese people in the 20th century can be seen as an attempt to regain lost pride following European encroachment in the latter part of the 19th century.¹⁰ This historical context has influenced China’s foreign policy since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In this setting, Ethiopia was in a good position to establish a formal diplomatic relationship with China because Ethiopia has never recognized Taiwan as the representative of the whole of China.

Following the disputes between China and the Soviet Union, the United States seized the opportunity to improve relations with China. President Nixon’s inaugural address in Kansas City in January 1970 marked the first instance of his willingness to engage with Chinese leaders. Emperor Haile Selassie also noted the shift in US foreign policy towards China and showed interest in establishing diplomatic relations. It is crucial to investigate the reasons behind Emperor Haile Selassie’s decision to establish diplomatic ties with China in the 1970s.

The decision of Emperor Haile Selassie to establish formal relations with China was influenced by six significant factors. Initially, the diplomatic shift was a proactive measure to acknowledge the upcoming independence of African nations, affecting China’s admission into the UN. Additionally, Ethiopia aimed to maintain its leading role in the Pan-African and liberation movements.¹¹ The Sino-Soviet disputes also influenced Ethiopia’s support for China’s entry into the UN. Moreover, Ethiopia’s recognition of Taiwan as part of China was expected to be reciprocated regarding Eritrea and Ogaden. By the mid-1960s, Haile Selassie was aware that his country was no longer as important to the US as it had been in the 1950s. Ultimately, the Emperor recognized the necessity of diversifying Ethiopia’s allies for strategic purposes.

The decision to establish diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China in the 1970s was driven by various factors. The foremost reason behind Emperor Haile Selassie’s interest in forging diplomatic ties with China was Ethiopia’s strong sense of perfidy by the United States, coupled with the need for alternative partners outside the Western sphere (Vestal, 2011:139). The Ethiopian government was well aware of the changes in American foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, particularly following the establishment of a military base by the US on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Ethiopian government closely observed the evolving American stance towards China. The timing of the Sino-American rapprochement might not have been just a coincidence, or sheer ignorance on the part of the Nixon Administration for Ethiopia. The abrupt changes in American policy, the survival of the imperial power, national interests, and security became the focal points of Ethiopia’s foreign policy goals in the 1970s. Given that both Ethiopia and the United States felt they had been wild by the East camp, the two countries shared a common interest in banding together to devise a strategy of national security against their perceived ideological adversaries.

Another reason for the strengthening of Ethiopia’s relationship with China since the 1970s was the economic need. The economies of Ethiopia and China were complementary. While Ethiopia is primarily an agrarian nation, its manufacturing sector is not as advanced as China’s. China sought access to Ethiopia’s markets and the importation of goods like coffee, sesame, cotton, maize, oilseeds, and other primary products to support its consumer economy. Conversely, Ethiopia required capital, expertise, and investments from China, especially in the realm of diverse manufacturing industries.

In a similar vein, China’s campaign to gain international recognition and legitimacy from African countries, including Ethiopia intensified in 1970. During this time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic ties with eleven African countries, including Ethiopia, from January 1970 to December 1972.¹² This factor played a significant role in China’s decision to expand its diplomatic relations with Ethiopia since the 1970s. Likewise, the government of Ethiopia saw China as a valuable platform for its diplomatic operations in Asia. China, along with three other Asian consular missions, maintained its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia after 1970.¹³ Since establishing diplomatic relations with China, Ethiopia has sought to utilize China as a ‘bridgehead’ to expand its ties and reach out to the Far East. Notably, Ethiopia’s position was favorable for establishing formal diplomatic ties with Beijing in the early 1970s, as it had never recognized Taiwan as an independent entity. The official establishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China took place on December 1, 1970.¹⁴ Regarding the development of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries, it is unclear whether the Ethiopian emperor waited for President Nixon’s visit to China before establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing. However, it can be said that Ethiopia was aware of the Sino-American détente and may have considered it a useful strategy for formalizing its diplomatic ties with the PRC. Additionally, it remains uncertain whether China was aware of Ethiopia’s closer ties with Moscow since 1959.

It is crucial to comprehend that the focus of this article is viewed from the Cold War perspectives and realities, particularly in the context of triangular relations. The US-China-Ethiopia triangle, as seen during the Cold War, was short-lived. The alliances and shifts in alliances between Ethiopia and the US, Ethiopia and China, and Ethiopia, China, and the US were evident in these triangular relations. When relations between the two sides improved, their ties with the third side waned.

4.2. Striding towards diplomatic relations

The decision made by Haile Selassie to uphold diplomatic relations with China was a calculated maneuver, taking into account the alternative option from the Western countries. The Accra declaration indicated a change in Ethiopia’s relationship with the United States, which led the Emperor to establish ambassadorial-level diplomatic ties with China during the early 1970s. The signing of the economic and technical cooperation agreement in December 1970 represented a noteworthy milestone in their bilateral relationship.

On December 1, 1970, Ethiopia, under the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, decided to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.¹⁵ This move came after a series of developments had unfolded. The decision was driven by several key reasons, including the anticipation that the impending independence of African nations would impact the UN’s stance on China’s bid for membership. Ethiopia aimed to position itself as a significant player in the Pan-African movement (New York Times, March 8, 1964). Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split played a role in Ethiopia’s support for China’s admission into the UN, allowing Ethiopia to back China without aligning with the Soviet Union. Ethiopia also maintained a firm stance on the One China policy, recognizing Taiwan as part of China and hoping for reciprocal acknowledgment of Eritrea and Ogaden as integral parts of Ethiopia.

By the mid-1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie was acutely aware that his country’s strategic importance in the eyes of US policy had diminished compared to the 1950s. During his visit to Washington on October 1, 1963, the Emperor utilized the opportunity to request increased economic and military aid, expressing his concerns about the waning attention from Washington.¹⁶ He even cautioned US officials that if the necessary military assistance was not forthcoming, he would be compelled to seek support from the East.¹⁷ This shift in approach stemmed from Emperor Haile Selassie’s recognition, following the 1958 Accra declaration, of the advantages of diversifying allies for various reasons. Concurrently, China’s campaign to bid in Africa gained momentum, resulting in a diplomatic triumph for the nation. Within a span of one year, from November 1970 to October 1971, three African countries, including Ethiopia, established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.¹⁸ China’s effort to gain international support and recognition continued, leading to the establishment of diplomatic ties with eleven African countries, including Ethiopia, between January 1970 and December 1972.¹⁹

During that period, Beijing sought to enhance its relations with many African countries to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its admission into the UN. As a result, the People’s Republic of China achieved a significant diplomatic victory when it replaced Taiwan as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council on October 25, 1971. China’s admission into the UN is realized due to the support of twenty-six African countries, including Ethiopia.²⁰ Consequently, China exhibited a highly positive response towards the Third World in general and Africa in particular. Chairman Mao (Zedong) expressed this support by stating, ‘We have been brought back into the United Nations by our fellow African friends’ (Anshan, 2016; Oqubay & Justin, 2019). Since 1970, China has possessed veto power in the United Nations Security Council, enabling it to exert influence over international security matters alongside other council members.

During the late 1970s, Ambassador Yang Shouzheng, the Chinese Ambassador to Sudan, embarked on a clandestine journey to Ethiopia. He spent five days in Addis Ababa, where he played a pivotal role in facilitating the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Ethiopia.²¹ Merely a month later, on December 1, 1970, both nations reached an agreement to formalize their diplomatic ties. Expanding on this positive development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China officially designated Ambassador Yu Pei-wen to Ethiopia on April 23, 1971. Concurrently, China expressed its intention to elevate diplomatic representation in Beijing and awaited Ethiopia’s response.

Ambassador Yu Pei-wen, representing the Chinese government, showcased their benevolence and empathy towards Ethiopia a month before his arrival. This gesture took place during a simple protocol arrangement organized by the imperial government to mark the 8th OAU summit held in Addis Ababa, the capital city. The new Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia approached the Emperor and inquired about his interest in visiting China. In a courteous manner, the Emperor promptly expressed his eagerness to visit China at the earliest opportunity (Xiudong, 2011).

Meanwhile, the Chinese government responded to the ambassador by expressing their warm welcome to the Emperor’s visit and expressed the desire of the Chinese government to develop the broadest level of bilateral cooperation with the imperial government of Ethiopia. They also conveyed their desire to enhance bilateral cooperation with the imperial government of Ethiopia. This incident marked a significant turning point in the Sino-Ethiopia formal ties, as it helped overcome the challenges posed by the Cold War. Consequently, both sides expressed their intention to elevate the diplomatic ties to an ambassadorial level. In June 1971, the first Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Yu Peiwen, had the opportunity to attend the 8th OAU summit in Chad. During this occasion, China generously donated one million RMB and 200,000 units of cholera vaccine to the Chad government (Liang, 2011, p. 12). Three days later, the Ambassador met with Chad’s President, François Tombalbaye, and conveyed China’s sincere intention to establish diplomatic relations with Chad. Ironically, the Ambassador managed to achieve two goals simultaneously, as he paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties with the government of Chad a year later on that occasion.

On September 12, 1971, the Imperial government of Ethiopia appointed Ambassador Makonnen Kibret as the first ambassador to the PRC.²² Additionally, Ethiopia expressed its willingness to enhance diplomatic ties with Beijing in all areas of cooperation. Some diplomats from Socialist countries in Addis Ababa perceived America’s attitude towards Ethiopia as a potential threat. This sentiment was widely shared among socialist states in Addis Ababa in response to the US’s actions (Spencer, 1977). However, Emperor Haile Selassie shifted his focus towards China as American interest in Ethiopia decreased. Therefore, it was reasonable for the Emperor to reconsider his foreign policy and establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China.

4.3. Haile Selassie’s visit to Beijing and development of diplomatic relations

Less than a year after recognizing the PRC, Emperor Haile Selassie made an official state visit to China in October 1971. During his visit to Beijing, the emperor praised both the progress being made in China and Chairman Mao’s outstanding achievements (Seifudein, 2012, p. 31; New York Times, October 6, 1971). His remark reveals that he had already an interest in establishing formal diplomatic ties with the PRC, by tracing and appreciating the long-standing civilization of China. In return, during a dinner banquet, Mao Zedong aptly said to the emperor and his delegation, ‘We are grateful to the Ethiopian Government for its just stand of supporting the admission of China of all her legitimate rights in the United Nations and opposing the US’s imperialist scheme to create ‘dual China’.²³

Haile Selassie’s visit to Beijing was a milestone in developing the diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and China. In a broader context, the two countries agreed to struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and racial discrimination. In addition to that, Haile Selassie’s visit brought economic and technical cooperation with China. After the two countries entered joint communiqués on economic and technical cooperation in 1971, the volume of trade began to surge slightly over the years.²⁴ His China visit also represents a major move in Beijing’s efforts to gain momentum in Africa by entertaining the most prestigious chief of state in Africa. Besides, Haile Selassie’s Beijing visit had a special meaning in terms of making his foreign policy and relations with both the East and West camps. During his arrival in Beijing, he was welcomed by the Vice Chairman of China.²⁵ As part of this visit, the Emperor and his delegation used to visit some industrial areas in Shanghai.²⁶ During his stay, the Emperor also hinted to turn for China’s financial assistant.

The decision of the emperor to establish formal diplomatic ties with China resulted in a pledge to halt offering military and technical aid to the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF) and assured support for Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. Besides, China extended interest-free loans of 200 million RMB to the Ethiopian government to be used for development-related projects (Ethiopian Herald, October 8, 1971). These projects were said to have been the first batch of projects. In that regard, Chinese technical aid to Ethiopia was noticeable. However, due to the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia, the practicality of the Chinese projects in Ethiopia was accomplished during the PMAC. For instance, the construction of four rural area projects in Ethiopia, which include the Woldiya-Woreta Road, the construction of twenty water wells and distribution systems, a veterinary station, and eight diesel power stations for provincial towns in the country.

Haile Selassie’s visit to China also represents a major move in Beijing’s efforts to gain more influence in Africa by entertaining the figureheads of Africa.²⁷ Largely, his visit to Beijing has a good reputation and success. The agreement on economic and technical cooperation signed between the two countries was expressed in indulgent economic relations (Peking Review, October 15, 1971). To adjust the trade balance, China agreed to purchase the worth of two million dollars of coffee from Ethiopia (Ethiopian Herald, October 6, 1971, p. 12). This agreement seemed to spark Ethiopia’s interest in expanding bilateral trade ties with China. To increase the market potential of Ethiopia’s exports, Ethiopia sent two experts for experience sharing to China from October 1972 to June 1973 (Debeche, 1987, p. 965). In technical cooperation, the Chinese road survey team and a technical investigation team also arrived in Ethiopia in May 1972.

5. Conclusion

Since 1970, the relationship between Ethiopia and China has experienced significant development. Haile Selassie’s objective in establishing formal ties with China was to shift the focus of national interests based on internal and external realities. Consequently, the Emperor abandoned the ideological alignment with American foreign policy that had prevailed since the 1950s. However, in the early 1970s, China’s diplomatic victory on the international stage prompted Ethiopia to seek an alternative ally in the West. The Imperial government of Ethiopia was well aware of the changes in America’s foreign policy towards China.

The timing of the Sino-American rapprochement may not have been coincidental or a result of sheer ignorance on the part of the Nixon Administration regarding Ethiopia. In response to the sudden changes in American policy, Ethiopia’s foreign policy goals in the 1970s shifted towards the survival of imperial power, national interest, and security. By setting aside previous encounters and attempting to establish diplomatic relations with China, Ethiopia pursued a hedging strategy to distance itself from its long-standing ally, the US. Haile Selassie, considering the external factors where interests remain constant but alliances do not, reassessed Ethiopian foreign policy and forged new relations with the Eastern camp to expand the field of play.

Haile Selassie’s decision to maintain diplomatic ties with the PRC was a strategic move, considering the alternative partner from the West. The Accra declaration signaled a shift in Ethiopia’s relations with the US, prompting the Emperor to establish ambassadorial-level diplomatic ties with China in the 1970s. The economic and technical cooperation agreement signed in December 1970 marked a significant milestone in their relationship.

Disclosure statement

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest concerning the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1 Department of State, “From State Department to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa”, Central Files, 777.5/11-2462 (Washington, January 7, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/ch9.

2 For dates of establishing diplomatic ties between China with the African Countries/including Ethiopia, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/2193/.

3 For polarization of the Cold War, disharmony, and formation of alliances, see Jiang An, “Mao Zedong’s ‘Three Worlds’ Theory: Political Considerations and Value for the Times.” Social Science in China, 34(1), 35-57.

4 Tadias Magazine, May 25, 2013, http://www.tadias.com/05/25/2013/.

5 After Zhou Enlai visited Ethiopia, a series of congratulatory messages including from Liu Shaoqi were sent to Haile Selassie’s Birth Day. For more information, see People’s Daily, July 23, 1964, and July 23, 1965.

6 “Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement between the Imperial Government of Ethiopia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China signed.” Ethiopian Herald, October 6, 1971.

7 “China’s Might: Can the World Handle a Second Super Power.” Newsweek, Vol.3 (May 2005).

8 For an excellent analysis of the triangular relationship between China, the US, and Ethiopia during the Cold War, see Lyons, “The USSR, China and the Horn of Africa.” 10-16.

9 “UN voted to admit Communist China, expel Nationalist delegates)” Facts on File, 1971, p.825; International Labor Organization, “Representation of China within the United Nations System.” International Legal Materials, 11(3), 561-570.

10 “Text of China’s Anti-Secession Law”, BBC News, March 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4347555.stm (accessed March 12, 2021).

11 Jay Wale, “An Emperor Tries to Unite Africa.” New York Times, March 8, 1964; Black Past, August 7, 2009, retrieved from https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/speeches-global-african-history/1963-haile-selassie-towards-african-unity/; “Haile Selassie: why the African Union put up a statue.” BBC News, February 10, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47172020 (accessed May 20, 2021).

12 For the formal relationship between China and Africa, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/2193/

13 The other consular missions in Asia were Japan, India, and South Korea.

14 For diplomatic ties between the People’s Republic of Ethiopia and China, see People’s Daily, December 3, 1970.

15 For dates of establishing a formal diplomatic relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the imperial government of Ethiopia, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt; see also People’s Daily, December 3, 1970.

16 “Remarks welcome at the White House to Emperor Haile Selassie.” American Presidency Project, February 13, 1967. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-welcome-the-white-house-haile-selassie-emperor-ethiopia

17 From State Department to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa”, Central Files, 777.5/11-2462 (Washington, January 7, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/ch9

18 The other countries that established diplomatic ties with China were Cameroon, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. For more information, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/2193/ (accessed May 13, 2021)

19 For dates of establishing formal diplomatic relationships between China the African Countries/including Ethiopia, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/2193/

20 Hu Yuwei and Lin Xiaoyi, “How African Representatives ‘Carried’ PRC into the UN.” Global Times, October 26, 2021; Wei Liang-Tsai, Peking versus Taipei, 229.

21 For a formal diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and the PRC, see Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia (EMOFA), 109-02600-01; IES/MS, 327.36.

22 “Report on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and China”, Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EMOFA), 01998-01, September 22, 1971. Cited also in Xinhua News Agency, September 12, 1971.

23 For Mao’s speech at the banquet to Emperor Haile Selassie and his delegation, see Peking Review, no.42 (October 15, 1971), p.5.

24 For exchanges of commodities between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Imperial government of Ethiopia after the resumption of formal ties, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, DMC 54/11/2H/6985/68.

25 “Emperor Haile Selassie Arrives in China for Visit.” The New York Times, October 6, 1971; “Haile Selassie’s visit warmly welcomed by thousands of People.” Xinhua News Agency, October 7, 1971; “Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie Given Tumultuous Welcome in Peking.” Routers, October 24, 1971, retrieved from https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/622592

26 For Haile Selassie’s visit to China, see Sam Abrams, Peking Review (October 15, 1971), retrieved from http://dehai.org/dehai/basic/381250

27 “Mao Meets with Selassie and Is Said to Appear Fit.” The New York Times, October 9, 1971.