The socioeconomics of Ethio-Turkish relations: an appraisal of two decades

Abstract

Ethio-Turkish relations have gained momentum over the past few years. The first important point that demands meaningful discussion concerns the temporal genesis and contours of this momentum. The article argues that although Ethio-Turkish relations can be traced back to the sixteenth century, momentum has started to take effect since 2002. The second equally important point concerns the manner in which this momentum is expressed. By thoroughly analyzing pertinent publications and official reports, this article explains how Ethio-Turkish relations have transformed in the fields of humanitarian aid and development assistance, as well as bilateral trade and investment. However, inter alia, the study found that Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistance to Ethiopia do not seem to show any predictable pattern. Another critical issue worth attention is the growing challenges that have the potential to undo this momentum.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• Turkey
• AKP
• Ethio-Turkish relations
• Abiy
• Erdoğan

Reviewing Editor:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

Subjects:

• African Studies
• Political Studies
• International Political Economy
• International Relations

Introduction

A review of the relevant literature reveals significant differences in the spatiotemporal contours of Ethio-Turkish relations. Some suggested six phases, while others provided three distinct periods of the Ethio-Turkish relationship. Among others, Abdu Mohammed observed that Ethio-Turkish relations went through ‘six phases’ of ups and downs (Abdu, 2012). Of these phases, he postulated that the relationship started with what he called ‘mutual misunderstanding and conflict’ in the years between 1527 and 1896. It was followed by ‘mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence’ for about four decades since 1896. Between 1936 and 1957, Ethio-Turkish relations experienced a period of ‘cordial friendship’. However, in the fifth phase, which runs from 1974 to 1991, the relation entered into a phase of ‘icy relations’. Finally, Abdu argued that Ethio-Turkish relations came to be more robust and long-lasting since 1991 and styled this phase as a period of ‘closer ties’ between Ethiopia and Turkey (ibid).

Other researchers viewed Afro-Turkey relations in general and Ethio-Turkish relations in particular in three distinct historical phases. For instance, Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, Karen Kaya and Jason Warner argued that Turkey’s relations with African countries can be easily discerned in three moments (Kaya & Warner, 2012; Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The first period ran from the times of the Ottoman Empire up to the point when Turkey was born as a republic in 1923. Under this period, they argue, the ‘Ottomans had considerable relations with Africa’ (Kaya & Warner, 2012, p. 3; Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 95).

The second period encompasses the years between 1923 and 1998, during which they claim that relations between African countries and Turkey were apparently ‘downgraded to the lowest level’. However, Abdu’s detailed archival research makes a relatively different but nuanced point. He found that Ethio-Turkish relations were going through a period of ‘mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence’ in the years from 1896 until 1936, and again, the revival of ‘cordial friendship’ between 1957 and 1974.

Finally, the third period runs from 1998 to 2005 when the relationship between Turkey and African countries peaked. However, there is hardly any convincing evidence that suggests a different form of relationship, particularly different from the 1920s and the 1990s, before the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s political field. The only thing incessantly recycled as evidence in this and other literature is the adoption of the ‘Africa Action Plan’ designed by then Turkey’s foreign minister Ismail Cem in 1998 (Akca, 2021; Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014; Kaya & Waren, 2012; Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The action plan aimed to improve the political, economic, developmental, and cultural relations between Turkey and African countries (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014). However, it was only a much-talked-about and inflated ‘action plan’ that was not implemented, and thus did not bring about any meaningful outcomes in the relations between Turkey and African countries. In these years, the relations were not beyond average and did not differ from the previous decades in many ways. Therefore, without necessarily undermining the symbolic relevance and paradigmatic shift that it may entail for Turkey, the action plan could not have been pursued for at least three important reasons.

Between 1990 and 2000, Turkey experienced local rough times. For instance, Turkey was devastated by an ‘earthquake in 1999’ and the ‘economic crisis in 2000’ (Bacchi, 2015). Secondly, and most importantly, before the advent of AKP and the economic transformation that followed, Turkey largely adopted a foreign policy that was significantly oriented to ‘the West’ and as a child republic learning to walk, Turkey had meager resources at its disposal enabling it to forge lasting relations with Africa (Kaya, 2021). Finally, according to Murat Bilhan, who was Turkey’s Ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996 to 2000, Afro-Turkish relations in general and Ethio-Turkish relations in particular were not different from the previous decades and thus was ‘insignificant’ (Bilhan cited in Bacchi, 2015).

Now, first, to avoid running the risk of superfluous details and unwarranted phases, which ultimately poses a question as to whether, for instance, Abdu’s six phases were justifiably called for, and second, to tackle the untenable ‘lowest’ relation points in the years between 1923 and 1998as in the writings of Özkan & Akgün and Kaya & Warner, the present contribution suggests a relatively different temporal contour.

The following paragraphs point out two markedly identifiable periods in Ethio-Turkish relations. The first period must have been when Ottomans started their initial communications with Africa in general and Ethiopia, in particular, in the sixteenth century. However, this has not yet received contradictory appraisals. This continued until Turkey became a republic in 1923. However, the second critical period must have started in 2002 when the AKP came to power in Turkey. The advent of AKP in Turkey’s political field was complemented, albeit a decade earlier, by the emergence of the TLPF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front)-led EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) in Ethiopia.

The first encounter took place in the first half of the sixteenth century and further strengthened in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although long-distance trade might have already paved the way for interactions between the Turks and Ethiopians in the remote past, societal and interstate engagements are largely due to the internal frictions that devastated Ethiopia in the sixteenth century (Mukerrem, 2017). The Portuguese and Ottoman Empire were involved, by supporting like-minded religious groups, in a crisis involving Christians and Muslims in and around today’s Ethiopia. This encounter has since been interpreted in radically asymmetric terms (Mukerrem, 2015). However, it is less of a matter of debate that the underlying cause of this revolved around religion (ibid).

Beyond the simple categorization of actors in terms of foes and friends, the first interstate encounter played a foundational role. On the one hand, this can be seen in the remaking of Ethiopia’s political order and cultural landscape in the post-sixteenth century, and on the other hand, in cementing Ethio-Turkish relations in later periods. In the former context, the encounter underscored that modern Ethiopia, albeit politically ‘realized’ lately under Menelik II, had to reckon with the fact that it was a country of multiple religious and cultural groups. This meant that Ethiopia as a country and any form of political organization pursued had to be inclusive of and reflect its multicultural state. In some ways, this could have facilitated the rethinking and renegotiation of the role of Islam and Muslims under traditionally and historically Orthodox Christianity-dominated Ethiopia in later periods. In the later context, Ethio-Turkish relations have paved the way for the inception of formal and strong ties between Ethiopians and Turks (Orhonlu, 1996).

The sixteenth-century encounter was further revitalized especially since the second half of the nineteenth century. This was initiated by Ethiopia’s emperor Menelik II when he sent two ambassadors to Istanbul. Mr. Josef and Kont de Leonitif went to Istanbul tasked with requesting Ottoman support for the protection of Abyssinians and Abyssinian ‘properties’ in Jerusalem, especially the monastery of Deiru’s Sultana. From the Ottoman Empire’s side, Sultan Abdulhamid II made efforts to seize the opportunity and build a lasting rapport between the two countries. In his response to the emperor’s request, Abdulhamid II assured the safety of the Abyssinian and the monastery in Jerusalem (Muzeyen, 2015). However, Afro-Turkish relations in general and Ethio-Turkish relations in particular have never been comprehensive and strategically deep before the AKP’s advent in Turkey. Therefore, in what follows the article develops the argument that Ethio-Turkish relations have been significantly transformed since 2002, and as such, it merits consideration as the second foundational moment in Ethio-Turkish relations.

Materials and methods

This study draws largely from the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency’s (TIKA) consecutive annual reports from 2004 to 2020. It also utilizes other reports, Internet sources, articles, books, and personal observations. It comprises three major components. The first part aims to clarify the nature of Ethio-Turkish relations both temporally and substantively. It argues that Ethio-Turkish relations were significantly transformed after the AKP came to power in Turkey. The second part closely examines how this has been happening over two decades in the spheres of, on the one hand, humanitarian aid and development assistance, and on the other, bilateral trade and investment. Finally, the third section explores contemporary challenges in Ethio-Turkish relations.

Ethio-Turkish relations in post-2000: a transformative beginning?

Although the 1990s marked a period of promising trajectory in Ethio-Turkish relations, it became relatively comprehensive in terms of economic, humanitarian, and development-specific spheres following the advent of the AKP in Turkey and the emergence and consolidation of the TPLF-led EPRDF regime in Ethiopia. As will be discussed shortly, Turkey’s invigorated interest in Africa in general, and its relation with Ethiopia in particular, owes significantly to the emergence of the AKP in Turkey’s political field. Similarly, Ethiopia’s relations with Turkey started making significant changes following the advent of the TPLF-led EPRDF. A brief account of this development is as follows:

Before 2000, Ethiopia was generally inward-looking; thus, in relative terms, the 1990s was a period of nation and state (re)building in Ethiopia. In the 1990s, Ethiopia went through a period of uncertainty expressed through internal crisis, political realignment, Eritrea’s independence, the proliferation of insurgent groups, the introduction of ethnolinguistic federalism, and a transitional government. In 1991 the TPLF-led EPRDF seized power from the Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRF) (Tuso, 1997).

The regime inherited a country crippled by incessant food insecurity, drought, famine, an unsettling humanitarian crisis, internal rivalries between armed and political groups, and mass killing. For instance, many people died of what was then called Qey Shibir (Red Terror), and the 1983–1985 famine that had claimed close to 400,000 Ethiopian lives (DeWaal, 1997). Furthermore, in 1991 Ethiopia was under a transitional government spearheaded by the TPLF. It adopted what was then called the ‘Ethiopian Transitional Charter’ (ETC) (1991). In an unprecedented move, the ETC redefined Ethiopia’s local political geography, foreign policy, and relations. It was under this transitional administration that Ethiopia, for the first time in its history, set off experimenting with ethno-linguistic federalism and reconfiguring provincial boundaries in Ethiopia. The transitional period encompassed 1991–1995. Since then, a coalition called the EPRDF under the leadership of the TPLF came to dominate Ethiopia, at least until it was ousted from power in 2018.

From the above preliminary observations, four important points are worth noting. The 1990s was a unique period in Ethiopia’s modern political history. During this period the Ethiopian government and many political elites redirected and deployed their energy to local rather than international concerns. Locally, as noted above, the country was going through rough times and the elites were obsessed with chasing power. Apart from the socio-economic crisis that involved the continuing trauma of drought and famine since the 1980s, almost half a million Ethiopians were violently massacred in the 1970s, and the specter remains unimaginably horrific. One could not forget the Ethio-Somali, aka the Ogaden war in 1977–1978 and its consequences.

Second, many of the insurgent and political groups in the country, some of which trace their struggles back to the monarchical periods in Ethiopia, beefed up their political movements and activities in and around Ethiopia. Although the TPLF stood out in the fight against the Socialist Dergue regime and formed a ‘pseudo’ coalition called EPRDF, other insurgent groups like the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) largely remained active in and around Ethiopia. The killings and detention of political actors and leaders were the norm rather than the exception from the times of the Dergue until the end of the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia.

Third, an important part of what has just been mentioned is the independence of Eritrea spearheaded by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1993. Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia represents a critical juncture in shaping Ethiopia’s very being. The Horn of Africa observer Christopher Clapham rightly observed Eritrea’s independence,

marked the first successful case of territorial separatism in post-colonial Africa, and thus provides an important precedent for the rest of the continent …The truncated Ethiopian state from which Eritrea had separated, on the other hand, introduced a drastically changed political structure which sought to represent, rather than to suppress, the different ethnic groups or ‘nationalities’ within its territory. (Clapham, 1996: 1)

Finally, the effects of the Cold War era hardly ended in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ideological cum-political groups such as Ethiopia’s TPLF started with a full-fledged socialist vision and mission. However, following changes in the global order, Ethiopia under the TPLF-led EPRDF regime had to rethink its enemies and allies, and thus its foreign policy. Although the USA had been active in facilitating the TPLF’s eventual step-up to power in Ethiopia, it is hardly plausible to claim that Ethiopia joined the Western block in toto. Rather, the TPLF-led EPRDF regime under the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi ‘successfully ushered in the post-Cold War era by strategically realigning to China as a way to leverage against U.S. hegemony’ (Kibsgaard, 2020).

In short, given the protracted consequences of the Cold War era and Ethiopia’s socialist past, local socioeconomic and political crisis, the proliferation of insurgent groups, Eritrea’s separation, the introduction of federalism, and all these and other local conditions under a new political system, Ethiopia was essentially engrossed in state and nation (re)building. Due to this, Ethiopia’s foreign relations remained foggy, including its relations with Turkey. However, it is relatively certain in the 1990s that Ethiopia was largely inward-looking and was not prepared to forge a lasting relationship with any country. This holds true for Ethio-Turkish relations in the 1990s.

However, in the post-1990s, gradually but steadily, a new set of countries came to have much stronger ties to Ethiopia. This was partly following the TPLF-led EPRDF regime adopting a new Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy in 2002, which prioritized ‘strategic trade negotiations, aid, and foreign direct investment’(Muzeyen, 2015). Under the guidance of this foreign policy, apart from the US, Ethiopia started strengthening relations with countries such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Gulf States (Cheru & Abi, 2012).

From Turkey’s perspective, the advent of the AKP in Turkey’s political field and the pursuit of its new foreign policy fundamentally transformed Ethio-Turkish relations since 2002. Under the AKP, measured by many indicators of interstate relations, Ethio-Turkish relations have unmistakably transformed into a more comprehensive and strategically enduring one. This is further detailed under two major themes. But before that, it would be worth asking as to what explains Turkey’s ‘opening’ to Africa in general and Ethiopia, in particular, on the eve of AKP’s advent in Turkey. A review of pertinent literature reveals that three major factors might have contributed to Turkey’s (re)emergence in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular.

The first factor concerns Turkey’s geopolitical interest in bringing together Africa and the Middle East. Power politics and strategic competition involving Qatar and Turkey, on the one hand, and Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, political issues in North Africa (e.g., Libya, Egypt) and the Horn of Africa (e.g., Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia) (Akca, 2021; Berg & Meester, 2019; Fabricius, 2021; Vertin, 2019). Another issue that facilitated Turkey’s renewed and massive engagement in Africa has been linked with stalled membership talks with the European Union and the need to redirect strategic partnerships elsewhere (Langan, 2017; Vertin, 2019). The second issue concerns Turkey’s short-and long-term economic pursuits in Africa (Bilgi & Nascimento, 2014; Kaya & Warner, 2012; Ozkan & Akgun, 2010). The third issue concerns Turkey’s socioeconomic, cultural, humanitarian, and developmental ventures in Africa (Bir, 2021; Ozkan, 2010). In short, Frederico Donelli (2021, pp. 71–74) summarized these under what he called ‘the three interrelated dimensions’ and seven specific detailed factors. However, of these three factors, the political dimension has been examined in detail elsewhere (See, for instance, Sıradağ, 2013; 2018; Fabricius, 2021; Vertin, 2019). Therefore, by focusing on humanitarian aid and development assistance, and second, the economic aspects involving trade and investment, the upcoming discussion explores Turkey-Africa relations in general and Ethio-Turkish relations in particular.

Humanitarian aid and development assistance

Regardless of the nature of the relationship between Ethiopia and Turkey, it has been undoubtedly strong and relatively stable since 2002. One of the many ways through which Ethio-Turkish relations have been built involved humanitarian aid and developmental interactions. Turkey is one of the few leading countries in the world in terms of humanitarian aid and development assistance. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report for 2019, Turkey spent about $7.6 billion in humanitarian assistance in 2018, followed by the US ($7 billion), Germany ($3.3 billion), the UK ($3.1 billion), and Saudi Arabia ($1.4 billion) (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2019). Turkey’s contribution constituted approximately 26% of all global humanitarian aid in 2019, according to the same annual report. As a trend, the successive reports of the Development Initiative’s Global Humanitarian Assistance established that Turkey’s humanitarian aid expenditure was among the top three in the world, the third in the years from 2013 to 2015, and the second in 2016. According to TIKA’s former president, Serdar Çam:

Turkey’s emergency and humanitarian aid fund was around $3.2 billion in 2015, $6.4 billion in 2016, and had surpassed $8 billion in 2017, corresponding to 0.85 percent of the country’s national dividend. With these numbers, Turkey is leading the world in humanitarian aid. (Erbay, 2018)

Turkey has been leading the global chart in net Official Development Assistance (ODA). Statistical data from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ascertained that Turkey’s official ODA to gross national income (GNI) ratio has been significantly above the OECD’s average since 2012. For instance, according to the OECD, in 2015, Turkey’s new ODA stood at $3.9 billion, an increase of almost 26% from the previous year. The ODA to GNI ratio, therefore, increased from 0.45% in 2014 to 0.50 in 2015 (OECD, 2016). Furthermore, Turkey’s ODA to GNI ratio significantly increased both in 2018 and 2019. In these two years, the ratio increased fairly from almost 1.10% ($8.6 billion) in 2018 to 1.15% ($ 8.7 billion) in 2019 (OECD, 2020).

From Turkey’s worldwide humanitarian aid and development assistance expenditures, it is relevant to ask how much of it has been reaching Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. For this purpose, Turkey’s TIKA provides a good preliminary starting point. TIKA’s official website has consecutive reports of Ethio-Turkish humanitarian aid and developmental assistance-based interaction from 2004 to 2020.

Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistance reaches Africa through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral platforms. From this, a review of the consecutive reports of Turkey’s Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı-TIKA) reveals that Turkey principally uses unilateral and bilateral mechanisms to provide developmental assistance and humanitarian aid. Of the two, for the last six consecutive years, Turkey has been using bilateral platforms to provide more than 99% of its Official Development Assistance.¹ However, a closer look at these reports showed that TIKA’s annual report started displaying quantitative data segregated by country and the share of unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, and private flows only after 2014. Therefore, the following paragraphs are primarily drawn from these reports. First, a general glimpse at Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistance to Ethiopia from 2004 to 2013 will be provided. This will be followed by further data for 2014–2019.

Almost two years after the AKP won the November 2002 elections in Turkey, Turkey’s official developmental assistance increased significantly. In 2002 and 2003, Turkey’s ODA was $85 million and $76 million, respectively (TIKA, 2018). However, this changed in 2004 when Turkey’s ODA was four times larger than it was in the previous years and reached $339 million. This amount doubled in 2008 when it reached $780 million. In 2013, Turkey’s ODA became a staggering $3.3 billion, becoming one of the few leading donors in the world (ibid).

Now, in the years from 2004 up to 2013, Turkey had been providing various kinds of humanitarian aid packages and development assistance to Ethiopia. Thematic analysis of TIKA’s reports revealed that there were at least five major streams of engagement. The first involves developmental assistance focusing on health, water, and education. In fact, more than 50% of all of Turkey’s development assistance to Ethiopia was primarily spent on these three. It included projects and activities such as material provision, training, education, consultation, and direct participation in projects such as patient screening and treatment (medication and surgeries), scholarships, and experience sharing.

Of the two major projects in 2004, one was in the area of health education and training (TIKA, 2004). In 2005, support activities associated with water, health, and education benefited close to 45, 250 Ethiopians compared to 234 Ethiopian beneficiaries in other activities (TIKA, 2005). Out of 36 projects, 29 were in the areas of health, water, and education in 2005 (TIKA, 2006). In 2007, close to 68% of all of Turkey’s development assistance to Ethiopia was in the areas of health, education, and water (TIKA, 2007). Similarly, this proportion remained around 60% in 2008 as well. A total of 20 water wells were drilled and approximately 7500 people reached in the area of health in 2008 alone (TIKA, 2008). In the next three years from 2008, Turkey’s development assistance largely remained focused on health, education, water and sanitation, and civil society support. Of these, the first three constituted Turkey’s main areas of development assistance to Ethiopia (TIKA, 2011: 189). Similarly, in 2012, approximately 63% of Turkey’s development assistance went to water, health, and education (TIKA, 2012). This has significantly increased from 63% in 2012 to 80% in 2013 (TIKA, 2013).

The second area of focus for Turkey’s development assistance to Ethiopia is in the spheres of history, culture, and religion. This included intercultural communication programs; annual animal sacrifice programs for the Muslims’ Eid Al Adha holiday; collaboration for the ‘Harari day’ celebration; restoration of king Nejashi’s tombs and the tombs of the prophet Mohammed’s associates, Nejashi’s Mosque, and the restoration of Ottoman’s diplomatic center and the house of Mohammed Ali Pasha in Harar, and others (TIKA, 2005, 2011, 2012, 2013).

The third area of Turkey’s development assistance to Ethiopia focuses on media and communication. Turkey provided capacity-building training to employees of the Ethiopia News Agency (ENA), discussion and experience sharing with media professionals, talks, and agreement with Turkey’s TRT, and others (TIKA, 2005, 2006. 2008).

The fourth area of engagement has been concerning projects associated with government officials and political leaders. This includes Ethiopia’s road and transport authority visiting Turkey for experience sharing and discussions, Harari and Mekele officials’ visit to Turkey and postgraduate education opportunities for Ethiopia’s parliamentarians, experience sharing programs, capacity building for personnel and administrators of banking and finance, and others.

The fifth area of engagement has been supporting NGOs in Ethiopia. This included supporting the famous Addis Ababa-based NGO called Abebech Gobena. Provisions to an NGO called the Social Development Association, including basic facilities to an NGO called HAKID, and others (TIKA, 2005, 2007, 2013).

Finally, apart from the aforementioned major areas of intervention, Turkey has also been active in organizing various festivals (such as youth-centered projects in Ethiopia), visits (in Ethiopia and Turkey), and supporting various local initiatives in Ethiopia (such as supporting micro-and small-scale enterprises).

Turkey’s developmental relations with the Horn of Africa

What has been examined so far relatively provides a general overview of the nature of Turkey’s development assistance to Ethiopia in the years from 2004 to 2013. However, as country-specific segregated quantitative data has been included in TIKA’s reports from 2014, the following discussion principally reviews the amount of Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistance to Ethiopia in close comparison with Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea.

In 2014, Turkey’s bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) was approximately $3.5 billion. Of this, Africa received approximately $383 million. From the Horn of African countries, Somalia received $74.35 million, Djibouti $2.97 million, Eritrea $0.12 million, and Ethiopia $3.65 million (TIKA, 2014). Of the various projects implemented in Ethiopia, the training of 20 experts from Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy Resources ‘on the construction, safety, and management of dams and hydroelectric power plants, and management of water resources’ is worth mentioning, given the critical importance Ethiopia attaches to its Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) project (ibid, 29).²

In 2015, however, Turkey’s bilateral ODA increased by 0.3 million, and thus, reached $3.8 billion. Out of this, Africa received only about $183 million. Africa received 200 million less in 2015 than in 2014. From the Horn of African countries, Somalia received approximately $315 million, Djibouti $3.94 million, and Ethiopia $0.71 million. Eritrea was absent in TIKA’s 2015 report, and this may, among other things, mean that Eritrea received nothing and, therefore, meaningless to include in the report (TIKA, 2015). Similar to earlier periods, drilling water wells, treating cataract patients, and sponsoring religious holidays, such as Ramadan and Eid al Adha were among the activities carried out both in 2015 and 2016 (TIKA, 2014, 2015).

The next year, Turkey spent about $6.2 billion in bilateral ODA, almost twice as much as the previous two years. However, Turkey’s overall ODA for Africa decreased significantly in 2016. Notwithstanding this, the share of some of the Horn of African countries showed improvement. Eritrea returns in the 2016 report, with $0.08 million up from 2014’s $0.21 million, which was $0.20 million. Similarly, Ethiopia received $3.98 million, adding $3.27 million over and above the 2015’s $0.71 million. However, Djibouti’s share reduced to $1.78 in 2016, a decrease of almost $2 million compared with 2015. Likewise, Somalia received almost $250 million less than what it had received in 2015, and thus only received $59.63 million in 2016 (TIKA, 2016).

Of Turkey’s nearly $8 billion bilateral ODA for 2017, sub-Saharan African countries received approximately $136 million. Compared to 2016, Turkey’s 2017 bilateral ODA increased by almost $1.8 billion. The Horn of African countries, such as Somalia received $60.64 million, Djibouti $3.47 million, Eritrea $0.54 million, and Ethiopia $5.83 million. Unlike 2016, Eritrea’s share increased by $0.34 million; Djibouti’s share increased by $1.69 million, and Ethiopia received $1.83 million above what it had received in 2016. Somali’s share in 2017 appears to show no fundamental differences (TIKA, 2017). Among other things, the completion of Turkey’s restoration projects is worth noting. In 2017, the restoration of the tomb of the Ethiopian King (Al-Najashi) and the restoration of the sepulchers of 15 companions of Prophet Mohammed were completed. It also includes the work of landscaping (ibid, 159).

In 2018, Turkey’s bilateral ODA increased by almost $0.43 billion, reaching $8.4 billion. Out of 134.82 million dollars in Turkey’s Bilateral ODA to African countries, the Horn of African countries, such as Ethiopia received $0.63 million, Eritrea $0.08 million, Somalia $29.12 million, and Djibouti $14.68 million. The annual share of countries, such as Ethiopia was reduced by more than $5 million in 2018; Somalia only gained half of what it had received the previous year, and Eritrea’s share was reduced by $0.46 million. However, Djibouti received almost $11 million more than it did in 2017 (TIKA, 2018). In 2018, Turkish NGOs helped drill 72 water wells, engaged in health screening, cataract surgeries, and education-relevant activities in Ethiopia (ibid).

TIKA’s 2019 report indicated that Turkey’s bilateral ODA reached nearly $8.5 billion. African countries received about $102 million and from this, Ethiopia received $3.06 million, Eritrea $0.25 million, Djibouti $5.40 million, and Somalia $28.21 million. Compared with 2018, Ethiopia received more than $2.5 million in 2019 and Eritrea received nearly more than $ 0.2 million. Although Djibouti’s share decreased by almost $10 million in 2019, Somalia’s share remained relatively similar. Apart from water and health-related projects, Turkey’s development assistance in 2019 included training selected media personnel and journalists and combating desertification (TIKA, 2019). In 2020, however, TIKA’s report, prepared in Turkish, did not provide details on Turkey’s development assistance program and humanitarian aid to Ethiopia, except briefly reporting the renovation of a primary school named Abadir in Addis Ababa (TIKA, 2020, p. 91).

In the six years of Turkey’s bilateral Official Development Assistance, Turkey’s expenditures were clearly discernable. However, there is hardly any evidence suggesting the same occurance in the Horn of Africa. In other words, Turkey’s bilateral ODA to African countries, including Ethiopia show no clear trajectory. Certainly, there have always been different political and economic factors, such as local, regional, and global, that influence relations between countries. The following graph depicts Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia from 2014 to 2019 (Table 1).

Table 1. Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia (2014–2019).

Source: Author’s sketch based on TIKA’s consecutive reports (2014–2019).

The above graph clearly shows that Turkey’s official humanitarian aid and development assistance to Ethiopia but shows no clear pattern. However, it can be deduced that for approximately four years (2014, 2016, 2017, and 2019), Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia was slightly above $3 million. Still, for the years 2015 and 2018, Ethiopia received the least amount of Turkey’s bilateral ODA, an average of $0.67 million. A simple statistical operation revealed that the mean amount of money Ethiopia received in these six years was $2.97 million and a total of about $18 million from 2014 to 2019. The following table summarizes other observations (Table 2).

Table 2. A descriptive statistics of Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia (2014–2019).

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TIKA Bilateral Official Development Assistance	6	5.20	.63	5.83	17.86	2.9767	2.01262
Valid N (list-wise)	6

Source: Author’s calculation based on TIKA’s consecutive reports (2014–2019).

As can be seen from the above table, Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia shows a significant difference, approximately $5 million. The maximum amount was $5.83 million while the minimum amount of Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Ethiopia was less than a million dollars.

Although Turkey’s annual bilateral expenditures have been taking the lion’s share, multilateral platforms have also been deployed. Turkey has been working with international organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). For example, out of Turkey’s $9.37 billion Total Turkish Development Assistance in 2019, $8.46 billion went to bilateral ODA, and it was only $197.8 million that was allotted for multilateral ODA.

Similarly, there have also been ‘private flows’ and this mainly included NGOs and ‘private sector’ involvements in, on the one hand, development, and humanitarian aid, and on the other hand, private sector investments. In relative terms, the contribution of Turkey’s NGOs to Turkey’s Total Development Assistance increased significantly over the years. This is especially true for the years from 2014 to 2018. In this context, Turkish NGOs provided aid in the amount of $368.28 million in 2014; $476 million in 2015; $655.2 million in 2016; $707.6 million in 2017; and it reached $826.5 million in 2018. However, it has significantly decreased in 2019 when it was reduced to $349 million. Furthermore, though less significant, Ethiopia, like any other humanitarian and development assistance targets of Turkey, has been benefiting from Turkey’s multilateral, ‘other official,’ and ‘private flows.’³

Turkey’s humanitarian and development assistance to Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular has been conducted through a plethora of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental organizations. At the forefront are such organizations as the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), the Directorate for Religious Affairs of Turkey (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi), Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), DenizFeneri Aid and Solidarity Association (Deniz Feeri Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği), Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılay), Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF), Yunus Emre Foundation (YEF), Are not There Anyone (Kimse Yok Mu), Medical Researches Association (Tıp Araştırmaları Derneği-TAD), Black Sea Healthcare Professionals Association (Kara Deniz Sağlık Mensupları Derneği-KARSAMED), the Presidency of Disaster and Emergency Management (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı - AFAD), Water for Life (Can Suyu), and others.

Economy: trade and investment

Another important dimension of Ethio-Turkish relations concerns the economy. Obviously, for centuries, Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire have long been business partners. Among other things, coffee has been an important commodity that facilitated trade relations between Ethiopia and ottomans (Orhonlu, 1996). In later periods, however, more systematically organized and robust economic relations were developed between Ethiopia and the Republic of Turkey. Undoubtedly, this was largely facilitated by various visits, cooperation, investment, and trade agreements involving Turkey and Ethiopia.

Some of these included the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and Trade (1993), A Memorandum of Understanding (1997), the Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment (2003), the Protocol on Technical, Scientific, and Economic Cooperation in the field of Agriculture (2007), Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (2005), Ethiopia-Turkey Trade and Investment Forum (2016), the Cooperation in Maritime Agreement (2005), and Agreement to mutual cooperation in the fields of Energy, Mining, and Hydrocarbon (2016) (Dagmawi, 2019). Of these agreements, it is worth noting that out of these agreements, cooperation, and protocols, more than six were signed under the AKP’s rule of Turkey, further cementing the present article’s claim for stronger ties between Turkey and Ethiopia in the post-2000 period.

Trade relations between Ethiopia and Turkey have been growing since the advent of the AKP in Turkey’s political field. Unlike in earlier periods, the volume of trade between Ethiopia and Turkey has grown seven times since 2003. In 2003, the only Turkish company in Ethiopia had five employees.⁴ In 2005, the number of Turkish companies had increased to three. After a decade of work on forging stronger relations, the number of active Turkish companies reached 38 in 2015 (Tinishu, 2015). In other words, over the span of 12 years, investment relations have shown remarkable progress. The trade volume between Ethiopia and Turkey was approximately $421 million in 2013. Yet, this had decreased by about $20 million in 2014, registering only $400 million.⁵ In 2015, the total trade volume returned back to where it was in 2014, reaching $420 million. The following table summarizes the trade balance between Ethiopia and Turkey from 2006 to 2018 (Table 3).

Table 3. Trade Balance of Trade between Ethiopia and Turkey (2006–2018).

Year	Export to Turkey in Mill. USD	Import from Turkey in Mill. USD	Ethiopia-Turkey Trade Balance
2006	13.16	102.06	−88.90
2007	27.85	147.86	−120.01
2008	38.79	160.93	−122.14
2009	29.38	256.63	−227.25
2010	32.15	226.99	−194.84
2011	44.55	346.73	−302.1S
2012	49.80	499.16	−449.36
2013	77.15	481.62	−404.47
2014	68.02	399.67	−331.65
2015	42.34	515.41	−473.06
2016	23.93	573.54	−549.61
2017	41.82	599.02	−557.20
2018	34.44	321.07	−286.63
Total	523.38	4.630.69	−4.107.3

Source: Dagmawi (2019, p.56).

In 2019, the bilateral trade volume reached $399 million. Turkey’s exports to Ethiopia stood at $378 million, while imports from Ethiopia were nearly $28 million. In 2020, however, Turkey’s exports to Ethiopia were reduced by almost $140 million, although imports from Ethiopia increased by approximately $15 million, reaching $41 million.⁶

Turkey was the second largest investor in Ethiopia, with an investment capital of about $2.5 billion (Sileshi, 2019). As of 2021, there have been more than 200 Turkish companies investing in the construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and chemical sectors in Ethiopia (Schipani and Pitel, 2021). These companies have been involved in investment activity with a financial capability of more than $3 billion and have created more than 30, 000 jobs in Ethiopia (Sileshi, 2019). Of the leading Turkish companies investing in Ethiopia, Yapı Merkezi (construction), Turkish Industry Holdings (granite slab and tile), BMET (electrical and optical cables), MNS (textile), ETUR Textiles (textile), Avante Su (water), Türk Demes Kablo (cable), and the Serdur Group (hotel and furniture) are noted for their investments.

Contemporary challenges to Ethio-Turkish relations

Ethio-Turkish relations in the post-2000 period faced some hurdles. This can be seen in Ethiopia under the TPLF-led EPRDF regime and under PM Abiy Ahmed-led Ethiopia. Under the TPLF-led EPRDF regime, Ethio-Turkish relations had to reckon with unusual challenge. This concerns Erdoğan’s AKP fallout with the Ghulen movement (‘FETO’) and its consequences. Once rebranded as a terrorist organization and banned from Turkey’s public sphere in late 2013, its overseas activities increasingly became the government’s primary business. In other words, as FETO runs international investments, including but not limited to education, in countries such as Ethiopia, Turkey had to reach out to these countries.⁷ It hoped to ban ‘FETO and all of ‘FETO’ affiliated foreign activities. This seemed to have worked to varying degrees in many African countries, including Ethiopia and Somalia. However, this was not achieved without discontent.

Even though the TPLF-led EPRDF regime agreed in principle and even later issued an official letter banning and revoking the license of the Kaynak investment group, which controlled FETO’s schools in Ethiopia, it failed to meet Turkey’s urgency requirement (Tufan, 2018). It took some time before, first, the license of the investment group was revoked, and second, the schools were transferred to the Maarif Foundation, a foundation closely affiliated with Turkey’s government. However, for about three years, this could not materialize, at least until the foundation took over one of the schools from Ethiopia’s Harar town in 2019 and the second from Ethiopia’s Sebeta town in 2021. Still, due to the challenges of unforgiving bureaucracy, shaky political commitment, and, most importantly, the slow-mode operation of Ethiopia’s legal system, Turkey was unable to exert influence to achieve its goals. Undoubtedly, though, Ethiopia’s mismanagement of the ‘FETO’ related conundrum must have been quite upsetting to Turkey’s AKP.

In the post-2018 context, although Turkey initially appeared indifferent and took what can be considered as a ‘wait-and-see’ approach when the TPLF-led EPRDF regime was replaced by the Abiy Ahmed-led Prosperity Party in Ethiopia, it could not last long as Turkey could not stand the temptation to play some role. After having seemingly assessed the power balance, its strategic interests, and the already running Turkish businesses in Ethiopia, Turkey had to take sides in the devastating war that primarily involved the TLPF forces and Ethiopia’s federal government. Consequently, in the eyes of many observers, Turkey’s multifaceted support of the Abiy-led administration was a game changer, facilitating the defeat of the TLPF forces, which eventually led to the peace deal (Walsh, 2021).⁸

Although the two forces have largely abandoned active violence and started working on building peace through the Pretoria Agreement, representatives of those who fought against Ethiopia’s federal government never stopped blaming Turkey for what they considered uncalled-for participation in Ethiopia’s civil war. Amongst others, Getachew Reda, a member of the executive committee and former spokesperson of the TPLF, Ethiopia’s former Minister of Communication from 2014 to 2016, and the Chief Administrator of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray since 2023, consistently blamed Turkey for supporting PM Abiy’s administration for the killings, rapes, and general destruction of Tigray.

During the war, Getachew said, ‘I don’t know much about President Erdoğan of Turkey’s commitment to help out Abiy Ahmed’s genocidal campaign against Tigray…’⁹and this was followed by another tweet wherein he said, ‘there is little left, Abiy Ahmed’s regime is beyond the pale. No missiles, drones from Turkey, peasant recruits, or airborne units from Eritrea or Ethiopia are going to prevent his total defeat.’¹⁰Also, in an article he wrote for the US-based Foreign Policy magazine, he complained:

Outside powers such as Iran and Turkey have also intensified and prolonged the conflict by providing the Abiy regime with modern weapons, including drones, and the operational expertise needed to run them. In the case of Ukraine, the West is feverishly attempting to arm its military for self-defense. In the case of Tigray, outside powers with an ax to grind against Tigray (such as Eritrea) and those seeking to secure strategic footholds in the region have jumped on the bandwagon with the aggressors.¹¹

Furthermore, according to the political elites of the TPLF, not only was Turkey biased enough in its unwavering support for the Abiy-led forces, but also was allegedly an active participant in the actual combat on the ground. In this connection, around November 2021, Getachew said, ‘We will hunt them whether they are mercenaries or technical experts supporting the Ethiopian government.’ He said these alleged individuals could be from ‘Turkey, China, Israel, or the United Arab Emirates’.¹² All of these and other expressions of discontent over Turkey’s controversial involvement in the Tigray conflict among the TPLF’s high-ranking officials might signal future strains in Ethio-Turkish relations.

What makes this more likely is the implication of a recent development involving key members of the TPLF, Getachew Reda included, and representatives of Ethiopia’s federal government, including PM Abiy, via the Pretoria Agreement signed on November 2, 2022. Among other things, this rapprochement is evolving into political legitimization and reintegration of the TPLF and its political elites into Ethiopia’s national politics and public fields. Consequently, it would be misleading to underestimate the potential negative role the TPLF’s torchbearers play that would undermine Ethio-Turkish relations in the foreseeable future.

A very recent phenomenon that may also pose a strategic challenge to Ethio-Turkish relations has been Ethiopia’s agreement, a memorandum of understanding, with Somaliland to use its Red Sea Port of Berbera.¹³ Turkey is close to Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia is one of Turkey’s most important overseas investment destinations. Mogadishu has viewed Turkey as its existential partner, at least since 2011. Turkey and it affiliated actors have remained vital players in reconstructing state institutions and the country’s infrastructure since 2011. However, Somalia’s current president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, asked Turkey to condemn Ethiopia’s move to work with Somaliland, first, concerning access to the Red Sea, and second, its plan for recognizing Somaliland as another sovereign independent state, which Mogadishu considers its part. In response to Mogadishu’s call, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Öncü Keçeli, said, ‘We reaffirm our commitment to the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia… We emphasize that this situation is a requirement of international law.’¹⁴ While it is expected that Turkey would avoid being sandwiched between the two, it is not unlikely that any miscalculations that upset Ethiopia would put significant strain on Ethio-Turkish relations. It may seem reasonable to think that a landlocked country like Ethiopia would not take lightly any measure, diplomatic or otherwise, that threatens its aspiration for access to the Red Sea.

Another challenge worth mentioning is related to investment and the challenges that it faces. In Ethiopia, many Turkish investors consistently complained of various setbacks, causing long-term investment plans and plants to close down prematurely. These investors mentioned factors, such as ‘painful constraints in the electric power supply, foreign exchange crunch, raw material shortages, poor infrastructure, and inadequate human resources.’¹⁵ Like any other developing country in Africa, Ethiopia presents many challenges to foreign investors. This can include a daunting bureaucracy, massive corruption, political instability, violence, inability to synchronize national investment laws, failure of investment law implementation, and others (Alemayehu & Guta, 2022).

Two points are worth highlighting for Turkish investors in Ethiopia. The first has been the issue of human resources, business plans, finance, and organizational mismanagement. As one Ethiopian investment consultant observed, ‘All companies in the country face challenges. However, Turkish companies are failing as they have an additional internal problem, which is mismanagement.’ The same was the testimony of Ethiopia’s investment commission’s commissioner, Abebe Abebayehu, who said, ‘Most of the companies have management problems.’(ibid) Ethiopia’s leading business-focused magazine also reported that Turkish companies ‘have a major shortcoming-mismanagement.’ (ibid)

The other challenge, albeit less common, is related to bad investment practices among Turkish investors. One of the most incessantly recycled among Ethiopia’s major media outlets in 2016 was the scandal associated with Turkey’s billionaire İmam Altınbaş and his co-investor, Seyfettin Koçak.¹⁶ Ethiopia’s most famous magazine reported that these Turkish investors, who used to run Else Industrial Development Plc, ‘failing to pay close to one billion birr loan they have secured from the Development Bank of Ethiopia, has left the country in a rather unceremonious manner.’¹⁷ It went on to explain that ‘The two personalities also managed to escape the country without settling millions that they owed to cotton suppliers.’(‘bid) They have also ‘failed to pay taxes in millions’ and ‘allegedly damaged some of the factory’s property, such as destroying the system that monitors machine integration.’ The Development Bank of Ethiopia had ‘informed Immigration Authorities to stop the two investors from leaving the country at the time. However, the efforts bore no fruit.’ Unfortunately, those cotton suppliers ‘who failed to collect their payments are still languishing in court seeking justice.’ (ibid)

In short, although Ethio-Turkish relations remain strong, there remains much to be done: first, to help preserve the already promising but susceptible fragile relations, and second, to further enhance and move beyond the current state of relations. In Ethiopia, among other things, much work is needed to facilitate the investment environment for foreign investors, including Turkish investors, with all the necessary incentive packages and regulatory mechanisms. When it comes to Turkey, Turkey’s involvement in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict needs a reappraisal for its potential and actual implications for Ethio-Turkish long-term strategic partnership and relationships. Regardless of its positive role for the Abiy-led forces in the conflict, it did not necessarily please others who, albeit in the conflict, were equally Ethiopians, including key members of the TPLF. Accordingly, unless Turkey plans to rectify this with some sort of remedial intervention, no doubt the repercussions might be felt sooner than later-impacting Ethio-Turkish relations in some ways.

Concluding remarks

Modern Ethio-Turkish engagement, as a relatively new phenomenon, is largely due to the advent of the AKP in Turkey and the TPLF-led EPRDF regime in Ethiopia. As the data presented above show, unlike in the 1990s, Ethio-Turkish relations have gained momentum since 2002. Bilateral trade, humanitarian aid, development assistance, and investment rose markedly after the AKP came into power in Turkey. Before 2000, the two countries were internally busy and could not forge lasting and stronger relations. Since 2002, however, Ethio-Turkish relations have expanded significantly, particularly in fields such as humanitarian aid, development assistance, trade, and investment.

Undoubtedly, Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistance to Ethiopia has helped the country and its citizens in many ways. However, these activities are mainly Turkey’s future investments, with significant short-to long-term functional outcomes. The trade balance has been widening since 2006 in the sphere of bilateral trade. In 2006, the trade balance was (-) 88.90 million USD, and the gap became significant in 2020, reaching almost 290 million USD. Despite this, Turkey wanted to increase its trade with Ethiopia. This can happen, as the Turkish ambassador to Ethiopia Ms. Yaprak Alp pointed out if there is a room for ‘a preferential trade agreement between Turkey and Ethiopia.’ (Addis, 2021)

In the same interview with Turkey’s Anadolu Agency, she explained, ‘We need a preferential trade agreement where tariffs will be lowered and, in some cases, abolished; where we can have more trade; where we can import more coffee and sesame from Ethiopia.’ (ibid) This way, she concludes, ‘we want Ethiopia to win as much as Turkey.’(ibid) In other words, while Ethiopia needs to develop the necessary infrastructure to attract and retain investors, Turkey must rethink its strategic interventions abroad and their implications for foreign relations, including Ethio-Turkish relations.

Disclosure statement

The author confirms there is no potential conflict of interest in this article.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from upon request.

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Notes on contributors

Mukerrem Miftah

Dr. Mukerrem Miftah is an Assistant Professor of Policy Studies at the Ethiopian Civil Service University (ECSU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is also currently serving as the Director of Research Grant and Partnership at ECSU. He has published numerous articles and a book in the areas of Ethio-Turkish Relations, Islam and Muslims in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Identity Politics and Political Transition in East Africa, and Religion and Civilization.

Notes

1 TIKA’s annual reports available from 2004 until 2020 lack coherence. One major factor is that while reports from 2004 up to 2013 lacked country-specific quantitative data for Turkey’s humanitarian aid and development assistances overseas, reports from 2014 until 2019 provide more detailed, quantitative, and segregated data. Again, TIKA’s 2020 report lacked segregated quantitative data.

2 This is very important as it also relates to one of the challenges standing in Ethio-Turkish relations in post-2000 period. It will be detailed in the upcoming sections.

3 See TIKA’s consecutive reports.

4 See, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, Turkey). (nd). Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia.Accessed from https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-ethiopia.en.mfa (accessed on Monday, May 10, 2021).

5 Anadolu Agency. (2015).Turkey seeks $500 million n trade volume with Ethiopia. Accessed from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-seeks-500-mn-trade-volume-with-ethiopia/81637 (Monday, May 10, 2021).

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, Turkey) (See above).

7 The movement used to run over 2000 educational institutions worldwide. (Mukhtarli, 2016).

8 See also, New York Time’s article “Foreign Drones Tip the Balance in Ethiopia’s Civil War” from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html (February 4, 2023).

9 See Getachew Reda’s tweet (August 2, 2021). https://twitter.com/reda_getachew/status/1422192541101928453 (February 4, 2023).

10 See Getachew Reda’s tweet (August 2, 2021). https://twitter.com/reda_getachew/status/1422192546344849410 (February 4, 2023).

11 See Getachew Reda’s commentary (2022). The World Must Condemn Human Rights Abuses in Tigray as It Does in Ukraine. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/ethiopia-tigray-russia-ukraine-abiy-putin-human-rights-abuses/ (February 4, 2023).

12 See the Reuters (November 12, 2021).Tigrayan forces say they will ‘hunt down’ foreign mercenaries. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-say-will-hunt-down-foreign-nationals-aiding-ethiopia-war-2021-11-12/ (February 4, 2023).

13 See Al Jazeera (January 12, 2024). Ethiopia signs agreement to use Somaliland’s Red Sea port. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/1/ethiopia-signs-agreement-to-use-somalilands-red-sea-port (Jan 12, 2024).

14 See Somali Guardian (January 4, 2024). Turkey takes sides with Somalia after Ethiopia-Somaliland Red Sea access deal. Retrieved from https://somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/turkey-takes-sides-with-somalia-after-ethiopia-somaliland-red-sea-access-deal/ (January 12, 2024).

15 See Addis Fortune (February 16, 2019). The Turkish Dilemma. Retrieved from https://addisfortune.news/the-turkish-dilemma (Feb 5, 2019).

16 See Addis Fortune (December 27, 2016). Factory Owners Skip Town, Investors Cry Foul.

https://addisfortune.net/articles/factory-owners-skip-town-investors-cry-foul/ (February 6, 2023).

17 See The Reporter (May 12, 2018). Foreclosed Turkish textile revived by creditor https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/5363/ (February 6, 2023).