Weaving through the maze of terrorist marriages in Africa’s Sahel region: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) under review

Abstract

The creation of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin(JNIM), a lethal extremist organization, from the merger of many terrorist organizations, including the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Ansar Dine .The Sahel is overwhelmed by the wave of attacks that the group has launched since their merger in 2017, which has resulted in nearly 8,000 fatalities, the displacement of millions of civilians, attacks on government officials and traditional leaders, the closure of thousands of schools, and severely stunted economic growth. Since 2017, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has been blamed for more than 64% of all violent occurrences in the Sahel area, which includes northern Mali and southeast Burkina Faso. The paper’s stated objective is to look into the underlying causes of JNIM’s excessive radicalism in the Sahel.

IMPACT STATEMENT

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) is an Islamist extremist group that operates in the Sahel region of West Africa. It was formed in March 2017 as a merger between several different jihadist groups in Mali, including: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Ansar Dine. JNIM’s primary objective is to establish an Islamic state in the Sahel region, and it has been responsible for a number of high-profile attacks on military and civilian targets in Mali and neighboring countries. The group has also been involved in kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities to fund its operations. JNIM is affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and has received support and training from other jihadist groups in the region. The group is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a prominent Malian jihadist who was previously a leader of Ansar Dine. JNIM poses a significant threat to the stability and security of the Sahel region, and it has been the target of military operations by French and African Union forces. However, the group continues to carry out attacks and maintain a presence in the region.

Keywords:

• Africa
• Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), radicalism
• Sahel
• terrorism
• Jihadist
• Mali

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

SUBJECTS:

• International Politics
• International Relations
• Security Studies - Politics & International Relations

Introduction

Undeniably, terrorism poses as one of the major menaces to Africa and the world’s future. Nonetheless, the development and dangerous outcomes of violent extremist organizations like the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, JNIM, and other extremist groups are the fundamental difficulties undermining tranquility on the globe today (Afriyie et al., 2020). Indeed, violent extremism and terrorism at present pose a rising danger to West African stability, peace, and security, particularly in the already delicate Sahel region (Cenozo, 2020). The region spans across Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, and Senegal. In the Sahel region, countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia are also often included. The name Sahel is derived from the Arabic word for ‘border’ or ‘margin’. Since it forms the southern border with the Sahara, the region was given this name. It is the transitional zone situated between the desert and the more tropical South-Central Africa (Smith, 2008). The nations of the Sahel are among the world’s most deprived. Niger is at the very bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index in 2018, and Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad rank simply above. As of March 2019, 4.2 million individuals have been displaced from their homes in the nations of the Sahel area. This is 1,000,000 more than simultaneously a year ago. Furthermore, brutality has heightened in the previous year, particularly in parts of Mali, the areas surrounding Lake Chad, Burkina Faso, and parts of Niger (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2021). The strain in the Sahel region reached another level in March 2017 due to the amalgamation of the extremist group. The declaration was an exhibition to the global community of how radicals can unite: the birth of Jama’at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), the consolidation of several Al Qaeda groups situated in Mali: Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Murabitoon, and Macina Liberation Front (MLF) also referred to as Katibat Macina (Cenozo, 2020). However, the event of brutalities identified with the JNIM radical Islamist group in the Sahel region explicitly in nations, for example, Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger has increased almost sevenfold since 2017. In reality, the Sahel saw the greatest increase in violent extremist activities of any African region during this period, with over 1,000 violent episodes reported in the previous year. With nearly 8,000 deaths, displaced millions of civilians, attacked government officials, and traditional leaders closed thousands of schools, and severely curtailed economic development, the Sahel is overwhelming from the wave of assaults (Eizenga & Williams, 2020). In the state of northern Mali to southeastern Burkina Faso, violent incidents attributed to Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), account for more than 64% of all occurrences connected to radical Islamist organizationss in the Sahel since 2017 (Eizenga & Williams, 2020). In June 2017, JNIM launched an attack on holiday resorts frequently visited by Westerners outside of Bamako, Mali, and they also claimed responsibility for the large-scale coordinated attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on March 2, 2018. In reality, since the time of its formation, it consistently conflicted with French counter-terrorism forces deployed under Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region. In February 2018, French forces launched three simultaneous attacks in northern Mali on JNIM forces and affiliates, killing more than 20 jihadist fighters and six JNIM leaders. JNIM retaliated by targeting the embassy of the French government and military headquarters in Burkina Faso’s capital. The group has also targeted the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which is a partnership between Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to reduce large-scale terrorist activities in the region. Nevertheless, JNIM conducted its first assault on the headquarters of the G5 Sahel Joint Forces in Sevare, Mali, in June 2018. In Mali, the group has been involved in racial disputes involving local ethnic groups. As a result of the increasing persistence of multiple fatal assaults and kidnappings. The department of state has designated JNIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and also as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group on September 5 2018. What is more interesting is that, on October 4, 2018, it was added to the UN’s list of sanctioned entities. Against this backdrop, the present research seeks to answer the following questions: what are the primary factors that are fueling militancy in the Sahel region? What is the trajectory of jihadism in the African Sahel? It will then seek to answer the question: Who is JNIM? This involves exploring JNIM’s origins, ideology, objectives, recruitment, modus operandi, and sources of funding. In seeking an answer to this question, the paper progresses as follows: Introduction, The ‘shuffle and reshuffle’ of groups and alliances, Objectives and Ideology, Recruitment and Source(s) of Funding, Targets and Tactics. Lastly, it will provide some recommendations on what policies and strategies should be developed in order to address the growing threats in the Sahel.

Methodology of the study

To fully comprehend the key factors driving the militancy of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the research methodology employed a literature review approach, consulting existing research on terrorism, internet sources, books, and reports from international bodies on terrorism. The study did not utilize any primary data sources. The data gathered was qualitatively analyzed in an objective manner to investigate the underlying causes of JNIM’s extreme radicalism in the Sahel region. As Morris (2009) noted, drawing from an extensive range of diverse sources enables rich qualitative analysis, allowing for a broad, thorough examination of a phenomenon. It provides a comprehensive, in-depth exploration of the topic under study.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

Defining terrorism is challenging, especially for institutions, states, and even terrorist groups themselves that frequently deal with the term (Tuman, 2003). The concept’s political, emotional, and personal dimensions make it difficult to identify who qualifies as a terrorist. In fact, someone considered a hero in one country could be viewed as an insurgent in another. Drawing from the principles adopted by the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) group, this study will consider terrorism as ‘the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change’. Additionally, in the religious context, the study defines terrorism as ‘political violence motivated by an absolute belief that a divine power has sanctioned and commanded such violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts committed in the name of faith will be forgiven by the divine power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence, one’s religious faith legitimizes violence as long as it expresses the will of one’s deity’ (Martin, 2015), since the primary terrorist groups discussed connect their actions to religious beliefs. The relative deprivation theory proposed by Gurr (1970) backs this study, although there are other lightly tested hypotheses that could support it. This theory will be used to trace the roots of the expanding ferocity of the rebellions, such as that of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). According to Gurr (1970), radical disruptions in a country’s political discourse may be linked to the human perception of being deprived of one’s due merit or right, exacerbated by observing the contrasting lives of others perceived to be in better conditions, fueling an ever-growing motive for terrorist acts. In Gurr’s words, ‘the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity’, as ‘men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate but slow to accept their limitations’.

Background on the jihadism trajectories in the Sahel region of Africa

The longest-reigning tyrant in the Arab world, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, was attacked by local militias in Sirte on October 20, 2011. (France, October 24, 2011). Some of the strong security systems in the Sahel countries—Libya, Mali, Niger, and (to a lesser extent) southern Algeria—were devastated by the assassination of Gaddafi and the fall of his government. New instability has emerged in the Sahel since the fall of his administration as a result of the division, compromise, or failure of governments. This has given radical entrepreneurial organizations plenty of possibilities to organize and impede the restoration of more stable states and communities (Laremont, 2013). Numerous armed groups have grown as a result of the crises in the Sahara-Sahel region.A number of them, according to Sergei Boeke (2016), had relocated to southern Algeria, eastern Mauritania, northern Mali, southwestern Niger, and, more recently, northern Burkina Faso by 2016. These groups exhibit a ‘continuous resurgence and realignment of Jihadist armed groups that have widened their functional reach further south - across northwest African borders, where they meddle in and interact with already existing disputes - and increased the barriers for regional permanence’, according to the study by Raineri and Strazzari (2017). In this complex and fractured environment that spans southern Algeria, northern Mali, and southwestern Niger, a multitude of actors are at play. The most prominent and significant terrorist organization in the Sahara-Sahel continues to be AQIM (now known as Jama’atNusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM). The Algerian Civil War served as the foundation for AQIM. The year 1998 saw the founding of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA) efforts to concentrate attacks on military and governmental targets as well as its increasingly militant and exclusivist tendencies have drawn criticism. In order to seek the possibility of expanding its financial sources and learning about new areas for trade, preparedness, and recruitment, GSPC sought to increase its presence in the Sahara.This effort was initially led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former member of GIA who had fought in Afghanistan, and he came from Chaânba, a local Saharan Arab. Although AQIM was unable to formally announce Belmokhtar’s death, he was purportedly killed in an airstrike in Libya in 2016. However, a regional intelligence source claims that Belmokhtar could still be alive today. In early 2007, the GSPC officially changed its name to AQIM after making an official oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2006. The GSPC and AQIM stood for the idea of a demonstrable transcontinental Islamist presence in the region. They have also looked to local ties, basic governance, and military pressure to create a stable environment in which to operate and, occasionally, manage the region. Despite having a large recruitment pool and operating all across the Sahel, AQIM is currently most dominant in Mali, notably in the provinces of Kidal and Timbuktu. The first kidnapping operation started in 2003 after the GSPC established themselves in southern Algeria, particularly in northern Mali (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). GSPC also launched its initial assault on the Lemgeity military outpost in Mauritania in 2005. By the beginning of 2007, it had started carrying out attacks in Algeria while continuing to ingratiate itself into northern Mali society through marriage, business ties, and increasingly local recruitment. Despite persistent allegations to the contrary, the group’s kidnapping activities persisted throughout the occupation of northern Mali and afterwards, providing the majority of the group’s revenue. These operations were financed by the smuggling of cigarettes and drugs. Although AQIM and the West African Movement for Unity and Jihad (MUJAO) parted ways in October 2011, AQIM still had a considerable influence over northern Mali’s administration in 2012. In Timbuktu, it had an exceptionally strong presence. AQIM strengthened its forces after Operation Serval as a result of a number of losses, notably Abu Zeid, the Katibat Tarek Ibn Ziyad leader who was killed in combat with French and Chadian forces in 2013. It continued to launch significant attacks against French, Malian, and UN forces up until the creation of JNIM and kept a significant presence in Timbuktu and the adjacent area, from Anefis to Kidal, and along the Algerian border. Al-Mourabitoun, which rejoined AQIM in 2015, has also been responsible for a number of attacks by AQIM in Bamako, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. Yahya Abou el Hammam, the Saharan emir and co-founder of JNIM, was killed in a French operation north of Timbuktu, which was one of AQIM’s most recent big defeats. It continues to have a sizable presence, particularly in the Timbuktu region, and the capability to conduct operations (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). The extremist organization Al-Mourabitoun (the sentinels), which was established in January 2013 by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as Khalid Abu al-Abbas), was founded by Al-Mulathameen (the hidden ones), one of its precursor organizations, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Both organizations in 2013 were AQIM offshoots (Dentice, 2018). Al-Mourabitoun supports an extremist ideology centered on territorial military authority and interpretations of Islam that are extremely fundamentalist. The group was a major factor in the attacks on the tiguentourine gas complex in Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013, as well as on Western targets in Arlit and Agadez, Niger, in May 2013. (Oxford Analytica, 2016). Belmokhtar and al-Mourabitoun remained in AQIM’s sphere of influence prior to their official readmission to the group in the spring of 2015. This was despite the conflicts that existed within the organization’s leadership and internal division. Undoubtedly, Belmokhtar confirmed the union of Al-Mourabitoun with AQIM and formally swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2015. Al-Qaeda in West Africa (AQWA), a cohesive Islamist organization seeking to thwart the emergence of IS in the area, was the newly formed organization (Joscelyn, 2015). Due to this new collaboration, the organization was able to oversee more than 100 assaults in just 2016 alone. In order to become JNIM in March 2017, Al-Mourabitoun combined with the Macina Liberation Front, the AQIM Sahara branch, and Ansar Eddine.The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa is a significant terrorist organization that is also active in the area (MUJAO). The organization was founded in 2010 by two former AQIM commanders, Ahmed el-Tilemsi and Hamad el-Khairy, who left the organization and took a sizable number of its members with them. Initially, the terrorist organization was primarily composed of Algerian and Arab jihadists, but it quickly grew to include fighters from all over the Sahel region. Up to 2013, the group had ties to AQIM and was based in southern Algeria, Mali, and Niger (Lacher & Steinberg, 2015) The military activities carried out by MUJAO and AQIM during the Malian conflict in 2012–2013 are well known. According to a 2016 Stanford University survey, while a portion of MUJAO is associated with Al-Mourabitoun, another portion helps to develop the Saharan Islamic organization known as the Sons of Islamic Justice.

AnsarEddine also dominates the Sahel’s jihadist environment (Defenders of Religion). Iyadag-Ghali (actual name Shayk Abu Fadl), amid the unrest in northern Mali in 2011–2012, founded this Tuareg–Jihadist group. Ag-Ghali is a key player in this group and one of the most well-known Jihadist-Salafist individuals in the area. In the 1990s, Ag-Ghali oversaw the Kidal region’s Tuareg separatist uprising against the Mali government. After the ceasefire in 1996, Ag-Ghali was in touch with the Malian government, and in the 2000s, he was appointed a Malian diplomat. Ag-Ghali converted to Islamism and developed as a significant link between the Tuareg and Arab components of AQIM while residing in Saudi Arabia from 2005 to 2008. (Gaffey, 2016). AnsarEddine, a terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaeda that is centered in northern Mali, has announced the implementation of Sharia throughout the country, distancing itself from the secessionist goal of the nationalist Tuareg organizations (Filiu, 2014). In 2015, the organization expanded its network in Mali’s central and southern regions, according to Zenn Jacob (2015), by forming new Jihadist organizations like the Macina Liberation Front and the katibat Khalid IbnWalid. Additionally, the Saharan-Sahel Jihad split up in 2015, and a new organization associated with ISIS was created as a result. One of these groups is the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is run by Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a close supporter of Belmokhtar and a former spokesperson for al-Mourabitoun. In an announcement in October 2016, the IS news agency Amaq accepted the allegiance of the Katibat al-Mourabitoun led by al-Sahrawi, renaming it as ISGS (Heras, 2015). The Sahrawi group is active in eastern Mali, close to the Liptako-Gourma tri-state boundary. The Pentagon asserts that Amud al-Sahrawi was accountable for the October 2017 ambush in Niger that resulted in the deaths of four American soldiers close to the nation’s borders with Mali and Burkina Faso (Dentice, 2018). If the establishment of the IS Sahara branch poses a direct danger to Al-Qaeda in West Africa, then the establishment of JamaatNusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) indicates that AQIM is aiming to forge an alliance with the Islamic Front in order to impose Sharia law in the area. The new group is still connected to Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda (Weiss, 2017). Under the aegis of AQIM, JNIM mostly operates in Mali and the Sahel and these countries that is Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have been blamed by JNIM for a slew of attacks on local police stations, Sahelian troops, and the military bases of foreign peacekeepers since the second half of 2017. The new coalition is led by Iyadag-Ghali, the founder and former extremist of AnsarEddine and an important player in the Malian crisis. Ag Ghali stated in April 2017 that JNIM’s goal is to ‘merge and enhance the presence of armed organizations in the region in order to build a stronger organization dedicated to following a Salafist jihadist strategy’, thus reviving the former ‘Sahilistan’ or ‘Islamic Legion’ initiative in the area.

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) association with the underlying structural factors that give rise to violent extremism

The structural underpinnings of violent extremism will be thoroughly examined in this section, along with an in-depth examination of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin’s (JNIM) identity and nature.

What are the violent extremism structural underpinnings?

Violent extremism in the Sahel has generally been associated with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and the concept of a ‘global jihad’ since the early aftermath of 9/11 attacked on U.S world trade center in 2001.On top of that, Seung-Whan Choi (2021) asserts that terrorist attacks have become more widespread and lethal since September 2011. But among the numerous potential ‘root causes’ of the phenomena, religion is one of the most contentious: while it is undoubtedly connected to violent extremism, it is not a threat in and of itself (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2014). According to Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown (2022), suicide attacks, which are the deadliest and destructive tactic employed by terrorist organizations, may also be motivated by altruism, transcendentalism, and/or religion. However, Religion in the Sahel only serves as a framework for violent responses to the structural problems that the region faces and serves as an indicator of identity for group violence. As a result, in order to effectively combat violent extremism in the Sahel and go beyond a purely religious perspective, local context-specific, cultural, social, environmental, and economic factors must be discovered. Out of the numerous factors, it can be argued that the following four are primarily to blame for the issue:

Poor governance and the presence of conflict

Most significantly, jihadist organizations engaged in the area increase their recruitment efforts by targeting underprivileged populations in practically uncontrollable regions. The Sahel region suffers from a wide range of problems, with impunity, harassment, and arbitrary violence being especially prevalent in its peripheral areas. The issues are significantly made worse by poor governance and governments’ inability to address local and national needs, and the remoteness of the border regions makes them an ideal breeding ground for extremist violent beliefs. In addition, according to Seung-Whan Choi’s (2022), the author reported that when top officials exploit their authority to create divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on ethnic grounds, it also serves as a breeding ground for extremism. This approach may result in severe and oppressive measures against marginalized ethnic groups, such as police brutality, torture, and even genocide. Nationalist leaders may utilize such actions to display their power, which could lead to dissatisfaction among targeted groups, potentially leading to terrorist activities. Additionally, more remote communities are exposed to violence from both jihadist groups and counterterrorism forces, as well as abuse (real or perceived) from government authorities, due to the largest military deployment of both regional and foreign forces operating in the border areas to counter smuggling and other criminal activities (Ilardo, 2020). Several studies demonstrate that violent extremism in the Sahel region primarily results from local conflicts and poor governance since people there nearly universally have little faith in the political system, the military, or the police (Raineri, 2018). Seung-Whan Choi and James Piazza (2016) also assert that the marginalization of ethnic minority groups from politics significantly contributes to civil conflicts, uprisings, and extensive political violence. Several case studies have underscored the importance of political exclusion in fostering the emergence of terrorist movements, gaining community backing for terrorism, and perpetuating terrorist activities. On the other hand, given their capacity as defenders of unofficial norms and institutions at the community level, religious leaders are accorded a fair amount of respect. This combination, particularly in vulnerable, conflict-affected communities, opens the door for potential short-circuits in ad hoc local governance practices that could completely forgo formal democratic structures and make it easier for violent extremist organizations to provide alternative sources of safety and essential services while also gaining acceptance. (Ilardo,(2020).

Socio-economic marginalization

The assumption that socioeconomic marginalization and violent extremism are causally related is broadly accepted and it appears to find more support in the Sahel. Social and economic inequality, particularly when it overlaps with inter- or intra-ethnic cleavages, is one of the main factors contributing to the spread of violent extremism in the countries in the Sahel region of Africa, to varying degrees. Not only that, according to Seung-Whan Choi (2019), one possible reason for women’s participation in suicide missions may be influenced by adverse economic conditions. This suggests that anger, frustration, and hopelessness arising from financial difficulties may prompt women to take part in these missions.

Over and above that, Seung-Whan Choi and Shali Luo (2013) argue that sanctions can backfire by provoking terrorist retaliation, as they may embolden individuals who have suffered economic hardship to turn to terrorism as an avenue to seeking revenge. Furthermore, sanctions can provide an opportunity for rogue leaders to manipulate the impoverished populace by presenting sanctions as a threat to their economic wellbeing and national sovereignty, potentially exacerbating terrorist activities. Having said that, the so-called ‘opportunistic membership’ of violent extremist groups, which is a particularly helpful notion for understanding the situation in the Sahel, is the justification, given the pervasive unemployment or underemployment throughout the region, especially among young people. Although there is not much proof that wealth inequality causes violent extremism, there is reason to think that if inequality is combined with social or ethnic conflicts, it could lead to increased polarization of the populace against other groups or the perceived ‘majority’ (Fair et al., 2018.) Additionally, in 2015, Seung-Whan Choi reported that industrial growth has varying impacts on different types of terrorism. While it may suppress domestic and international terrorism, it could also promote suicide terrorism. Nevertheless, different violent extremist groups in the Sahel have found success in recruiting new members by offering socioeconomic incentives and exploiting class, ethnic, and racial prejudices. In Nigeria, for instance, Boko Haram established a microfinance system offering loans to support the small business endeavors of new members, while in Mali, organizations like MUJAO and AQIM have been able to connect their Islamist narrative to regional social issues by, among other things, claiming that customs duties, tolls, and tariffs are against Allah’s will (Cooke & Sanderson, 2016). In societies with especially rigid social hierarchies, extremist groups frequently use divisions between groups, such as landowners and herders or the elders and the so-called ‘cadets sociaux’ (those subject to age-based chieftaincies, especially women and children), to lure new members by promising alternative routes for greater social mobility.

Cultural tautness and gender relationships

The attraction to and eventual rejection of violent extremist ideologies are significantly influenced by norms, beliefs, and values, gender relations, and other factors (Gelfand et al., 2013). It is not unexpected that attraction tends to be the most likely outcome when normative systems are especially rigorous, as they are in the Sahel. To put it another way, it is believed that violent extremism is positively connected with the presence of inflexible gender roles and cultural tightness, or the degree to which a community is constrained by laws and conventions (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2014). Given the cultural diversity of the Sahel, it is at least problematic to analyze violent extremism through cultural lenses, and failing to acknowledge this restriction would be unduly simplistic. Despite this, shared cultural patterns can be seen across Sahelian boundaries, particularly those cultural factors that have been linked to more frequent and more intense expressions of extremist violence (Ilardo, 2020). Nigeria and Burkina Faso, for example, exhibit notably high levels of power distance as well as heightened masculinity and machismo, according to a cross-country study on cultural values and behavioral patterns. When these two factors come together, inflexible gender roles and low gender equality follow. For instance, as in the case of the Fulani communities, an ethnic group is present in all the Sahel countries and characterized by a very hierarchical society. These social constructs around gender result in considerable importance attributed to the ‘warrior virtues’ of masculinity while associating femininity with family subordination or mere parental authority (Ilardo, 2020). In this framework, this is visible throughout the entire Sahel region, depicting that, gender relations significantly influence men in joining violent extremist groups while at the same time encouraging women, among the main victims of extremist violence, to actively provide supplies, shelter and information to support the fighters.

Climate change

The Sahel regions are currently being negatively impacted by climate change, which is an urgent concern. Attacks have escalated recently as a result of several circumstances, including widespread hunger and poverty, a lack of strong political authority in the Sahel region, bad governance, and socioeconomic disadvantage and poverty. Climate change, however, is a significant factor that could surprise us in several ways. In fact, a wealth of studies show that climate change does not act as a third factor that can be fully separated from state fragility and hunger, but rather as a factor that contributes to both. That is to say, the effects of a variety of other factors are multiplied by the threat that climate change poses. Due to its excessive reliance on agriculture, the Sahel region has seen an increase in hunger and malnutrition as a result of desertification and extreme weather events brought on by climate change. In the Sahel region, floods and droughts have gotten worse and less predictable since the 1970s. In the Sahel region, 80% of families are living below the poverty line, and they depend on their land for survival, thus making unpredictable weather patterns a major problem. The incapacity of the governments of these states to provide enough help in the face of widespread famine and climate change has additionally permanently harmed popular perceptions of the state as the crisis stretches farther and farther throughout the Sahel. These perception have gotten worse as a result of the local conflicts (Malle, 2020). The states most in danger of violence brought on by climate change include those with a history of conflict, those where at least 40% of the population dependent on agriculture, and those where at least 20% of the population is disenfranchised from politics, as reported by Africanews, in a 2018 study. All three requirements are found to be experienced by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Extremist organizations in these states prey on the numerous young people who have been uprooted from their homes and have lost faith in their governments. Militant organizations believe that this mass of refugees and disadvantaged people are more susceptible to being seduced by terrorist ideology, which can create the space for these extremist organizations to step in to fill the power vacuum left by the Sahel region’s disastrous climate change ripple effect which increased instability. The Sahel is ‘a tragic masterclass on how war and severe weather interact with each other’, according to the World Food Programme, which has declared the region’s highest level of emergency, Level 3 (Malle, 2020).

Who is Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)?

Discussions in this section will focus on the ‘shuffle and reshuffle’ of groups and alliances, Objectives and Ideology and source(s) of Funding for the JNIM. The various methods adopted to operate and potential targets will also be highlighted in this section.

The ‘shuffle and reshuffle’ of groups and alliances

In the Sahel, the JNIM coalition started with four AL-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant groups: The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The merger was announced in a video posted on March 2, 2017, which included the leaders of the four organizations announcing the formation of JNIM. Amado Diallo, also known as Amadou Koufa [MLF Commander], b) AQIM Sahel Chief and Deputy, DJamel Okacha and Abderrahman al-Sanhaji respectively, c) AAD Leader Iyad Ag Gali (Abu al-Fadhel), finally d) Deputy leader of Ould Nouini Muhammad AL-Mourabitoun, affirmed the foundation of JNIM (under Mukhtar Balmokhtar). Because the respective heads represented Arab jihadists from the Maghreb and Sahel, Fulani and Tuaregs, the organizations’ composition was significant. The diversity of ethnic and regional representation has created the illusion of a single community, which has far-reaching implications. In fact, each of these subgroups has its own set of interests, regional influences, and inspiration sources. Iyad Ag Ghali of Ansar Dine and Amadou Koufa and Katiba Serma of the FLM, a less dynamic FLM branch-off led by Abu Jalil al-Fulani, are currently leading JNIM. JNIM is headed by Iyad Ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar Dine. After the National Organization for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist movement in northern Mali, refused to name him as its leader, he created Ansar Dine in 2011. Ag Ghali, the Tuareg equivalent of the simple Ifoghas, hails from the Kidal region of northern Mali, where he took part in the Tuareg uprising in the 1990s. He created an alliance with AQIM and MNLA in 2012 as head of Ansar Dine, and declared northern Mali an Islamic State in May of that year. Ansar Dine and AQIM Sahara had defeated Tuareg separatists in Kidal and Timbuktu, respectively, by July 2012. For most of 2012, ultra-Islamic factions dominated northern Mali before advancing south into the more populous central provinces (Eizenga & Williams, 2020).

However, Upon the Malian government’s request, a military intervention, jointly conducted by French and African forces under the name Operational Serval, commenced in January 2013. This operation successfully led to the scattering of militants to rural areas, where they sought shelter in the challenging and expansive terrain of northern Mali. Since then, Ag Ghali has hired Ansar Dine fighters to build a political enclave in northern Mali and among the country’s many armed groups. After Ansar Dine was dispersed following Operation Serval, Koufa began promoting radicalism in central Mali. Koufa, a Fulani from Niafunké, Mali, reportedly became radicalized after meeting Pakistani missionaries of the Dawa sect in the 2000s. Koufa used local problems exacerbated by Fulani herders to rally support while simultaneously pushing for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy. With the help of local relatives, Koufa successfully cultivated following in central Mali in 2015. As the leader of the FLM, Amadou Koufa launched the deadliest rebellion of all JNIM parties in an attempt to shake existing traditional experts and spread his Sharia-based ideology into central Mali. Through its affiliation with Ansaroul Islam, a radical Islamic group in Burkina Faso created by one of Koufa’s disciples, Ibrahim Dicko, the FLM’s activities and presence spread to northern Burkina Faso. Following Deco’s death in 2017, extremist Islamist militants expanded their operations on the Burkina Faso-Niger border, utilizing existing criminal networks. Other remnants of Islam: Ansaroul reintegrated with the FLM when it went south from central Mali into northern and north-central Burkina Faso. FLM has had a lot of success in these densely populated areas, thanks to a larger pool of potential recruits and sales. Experts estimate that JNIM-affiliated groups earn between $18 and $35 million per year, mostly through the extortion of transit routes under their control, artisanal mining societies, and, to a lesser extent, ransom kidnappings (Nellemann et al., 2018). JNIM has never had a large local support base in the Sahel, despite its association with AQIM. Consequently, even in Algeria, where it first developed its regional significance is dwindling. Meanwhile, the ambiguity surrounding the status of AQIM Sahara and al-current Mourabitoun emphasizes JNIM’s importance. By presenting a rallying front that belies the numerous hardships each group experiences, the JNIM coalition provides stability, order, and authority, as well as an untouchable myth. Since 2016, violence and accompanying deaths in the Sahel have escalated at an almost exponential rate FLM is the sole cause, and their ties or connection to the JNIM alliance obscure the group’s rising popularity and limit the scrutiny it receives from international and regional powers (Eizenga & Williams, 2020).

Objectives and ideology

In any event, JNIM’s primary goals are to drive Western forces out of the region and establish a global Islamic emirate. The group declared that it opposes France and its Western allies, particularly UN forces, who have been stationed in Mali since the start of Operation Serval in 2013. JNIM’s ideology and goals are particularly in line with the international Salafi-jihadi heritage of dividing the world into two diametrically opposed groups, one fighting the other until one is suffocated. This tradition claims to be fighting to unite Muslims in North and West Africa, to remove secular governments from the region, and to replace them with puritan Islamic governments (Bukarti, 2018). The merging of different AQ partners into JNIM is in accordance with AQ’s new ‘Solidarity’ focal point of activity as a way to apply Sharia law completely and viably in regions that were not completely controlled by jihadists. The new JNIM leaders announced in a video release that they intend to fight the crusader enemy as a united front. Nevertheless, JNIM’s military plan, according to Ghali, is to extend its territory and train militants to attack JNIM’s adversaries albeit maintaining good connections with local people (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2018).

Recruitment and source(s) of funding

The overall number of fighters in JNIM is estimated to be between 1,000 and 2,000 (Australian National Security, 2018). JNIM recruits’ members by taking advantage of loopholes in Mali’s northern and central areas, as well as surrounding regions, caused by inadequate management, performance of the economy, and social circumstances. In terms of recruitment methods, it takes advantage of ethnic and social divisions, instability and disgruntlement with government tyranny, corruption, and inability to provide services (Australian National Security, 2018).

Many of the group’s financial resources were inherited from AQIM and other member organizations, and the organization deployed well-established income-generating strategies via its affiliates and contacts. Abduction and extortion are believed to provide a significant percentage of JNIM funding. Another important source of JNIM coins is contrabandist and traffickers, who pay ‘taxes’ for safe transit through the JNIM-controlled regional territory. As demand in Europe grows, some analysts believe that promoting cocaine trafficking is quickly becoming JNIM’s most profitable source of income (Constellis, 2018).

Besides, JNIM has continuously profited from the flood in illegal human exploitation lately, which has been connected to the precarious expansion in migrants endeavoring to enter Europe. The community is also known to participate in other forms of taxation of local communities in its area of jurisdiction in exchange for products and services. These services fundamentally include ‘security’ and ‘governance’; however, they can likewise incorporate ‘education’, ‘electricity’, and ‘health care’, among other things. Another source of income is donations from foreign supporters, especially donations from non-governmental organizations such as charities, many of which have religious missions. Before the consolidation that established JNIM, it was believed that Qatari and Saudi charities were supporting AQIM in Mali in 2013 and that several people in Western European countries had previously been detained for monetary donations to the organization. It was also speculated in the past that AQIM had received governmental funding. The Algerian government, for instance, has recently blamed Iran and Sudan for supporting the group. Despite the fact that JNIM is currently thought to be eligible for indirect sources of funding, state-funded aid is questionable (Constellis, 2018).

Targets and Tactics

JNIM’s prior targets included Malian soldiers, UN forces, tourist destinations, and French counter-terrorism forces, who were dubbed the organization’s historic enemy. JNIM deployed suicide bombers, burned vehicles, held hostages, and engaged in fire fights. The militant group assaulted a resort outside of Bamako and assaulted the French consulate and armed force central command in the capital of Burkina Faso. JNIM carried out its first assault on the G5 Sahel headquarter in Mali in June 2018, in response to the establishment of the G5 Sahel to orchestrate regional counter-terrorism operations (Africanews, 2018). In March 2018, the organization produced a high-quality film that emphasized the breadth of its activities, the strength of the training camp, and paid acknowledgements to the leaders. JNIM has also been involved in ethnic tensions in the community. In central Mali, JNIM fighters fought alongside the Fulanis in a conflict with the Bambars. The Malian army supports the Bambaras’ military efforts against the US, Sweden, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Niger, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, according to the organization

Conclusion

Ultimately, this article has investigated the factors relating to the upsurge in terrorist activity, especially by the JNIM in the Sahel region, as well as the implications for resolving the conundrum. In fact, the prevalent insecurity factors in the blueprint of vulnerable regions have caused immeasurable losses to the progress of the Sahel, which is already facing challenges. The rapidly growing number of these groups, which are generally based on climate change, poverty, inequity, and marginalization, have primarily advanced parochial interests and engaged in businesses that undermine the rule of law, as argued by A.V. Dicey. From a broader perspective, terrorism poses a major threat to a country’s pace of maturity. From this perspective, if a conscious and concerted effort is not taken to nip the JNIM faction and general terrorism in the bud, the arduous experimentation at democracy and development in the Sahel may encounter impediments. According to the research, the spread of radical Islamic extremism in Sahel regions is a multifaceted phenomenon caused by outside ideological influences and looting, induced by socio-economic marginalization, the presence of conflict and weak governance, which leads to government mistrust, cultural tightness, gender relations and most importantly, climate change. The significant and pressing issue of climate change is having an impact on the Sahel and Maghreb regions of North and West Africa. Weather pattern changes in these regions are contributing to desertification and ongoing drought. Given the convergence of factors identified, we recommend the following measures:

Recommendations

This research offers four main strategies to contain the situation, based on the origins of the Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and other militant operations in the Sahel. These recommendations are: poverty reduction strategies, enhanced education policies, negotiations, leveraging public trust in religious organizations and leaders through interfaith programming and finally, Climate-focused Solutions

The use of education as a weapon against terrorism is possible. To begin with, improved education in all regions of the countries where these terrorist organizations operate will be a damaging tool that promotes terrorism and extremist ideologies. Following the violence, anti-terrorism became widely supported as a social strategy. The education sector should adopt this plan in two ways, according to this study. First, education projects addressing socioeconomic disparities and marginalization must be implemented, such as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and other Sahelian nations; this will go a long way toward restoring indigenous settlers’ faith in the government and lessening their anger toward the state. Secondly, education should be targeted at community members who are isolated (Afriyie, 2019). Young people joining militant groups will be reduced as a result of courses meant to develop counter-terrorism ideologies and increase their technical and professional abilities. In addition to these two, counter-terrorism education programs can be implemented in a variety of institutions, including the media, schools, churches, and communities, to provide people with an alternative to violence and to reassure marginalized groups about the issues on which the government intends to focus in the Sahel (De Silva, 2017).

Negotiations are another strategy to combat terrorism. To combat terrorism in the Sahel, the government may take a strategic approach to engaging with terrorists. Negotiating with terrorists is unacceptable to the democratic entity because it feels that terrorism legitimizes the insurgents’ acts and denigrates those who seek peace. It is also thought to give scary speed and thwart international efforts to combat terrorism (Afriyie, 2019). Proponents of the negotiating approach, on the other hand, argue that, when necessary, these democratic actors will submit to negotiation. Following the attack on 10 Downing Street in 1991, the British government appears to have succumbed to the IRA’s demands. In 1988, the Basque Country and Liberty organizations in Spain blew up shops in a similar fashion. In light of these hypocritical actions, the governments of the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, as well as other countries, can negotiate with Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which is weak but willing to work for peace and stability (Neumann, 2007).

In the Sahel, economic imbalances have been a significant reason for violence. In the Sahel, poverty is widespread. This crisis should be addressed by investigating long-term solutions to the Sahel’s poverty epidemic. However, there are three main frames within which this can be accomplished. First, governments in the Sahel can implement livelihood initiatives for uneducated adolescents and women through skill training and acquisition. Individual entrepreneurial enterprises will be funded, and artisan work will be studied. Second, in the Sahel, primary (agricultural) enterprises can be formed. This will necessitate empowering potential entrepreneurs to make the most of their limited resources and abilities. Finally, the government can make improvements to the private sector in order to attract more idle youth. In addition, the public sector can be expanded to hire additional people (Afriyie, 2019).

Also, the study strongly recommends leveraging public trust in religious organizations and leaders through interfaith programming, given that religious institutions already have established and well-respected peacebuilding platforms at the village, communal, and national levels (OECD). Further, since most West Africans place more trust in religious leaders than local or regional government authorities, making religious institutions crucial regional partners would be helpful. Where appropriate, international organizations should encourage initiatives for interfaith discussions and venues at all societal levels where Christians, Muslims, and traditional actors can unite to show unity and use their combined voices to effect constructive change. International organizations should also assist current interfaith initiatives to portray the present war in the Sahel as one rooted in external nonstate actors exploiting past ethnic disputes for their own gain rather than as a religious conflict (Catholic Relief Services 2021).

Lastly, despite the fact that much research has connected climate change to an increase in violence and geopolitical instability, none of the programs to combat terrorism in the Sahel region have included it in their prospective solutions (Malle, 2020). In view of this, the study strongly recommends that, the international community should, first and foremost, push the countries in the region under discussion to incorporate climate change into their respective national security plans. The majority of the nations in the region do not list climate change as a danger in their national security strategy, according to the Global Security Defense Index. As a result, there will be a greater understanding of the relationship between stability and security and the dangers posed by climate change in the region (Meltzer, 2013). In order to prepare and help their states as they continue to experience harsher weather connected to climate change, Sahel governments have started investing in adaptive social protection programs during the past year. These initiatives include a system of financial transfers to those that depend on agriculture and are hence most sensitive to climate change. Over time, cash transfers reduce the possibility that disadvantaged families will exchange their assets for critically required products like infant formula. Although the introduction of these programs is encouraging, much more must be done in order to effectively address the current threat. The effectiveness of the significant global investment in battling terrorism in the Sahel has been compromised by the focus of international aid on military rather than climate action. The terrible increase in terrorist attacks in the area is unequivocal proof of the need for international action that directly addresses climate change. As its effects become irreversible, the connection between terrorism and climate change is becoming irrefutable (Malle, 2020)

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Frederick Appiah Afriyie

Dr. Frederick Appiah Afriyie is the founder and the Senior Research Fellow at the Research Center for Analysis and Security Studies (RECASS); a think tank research organization in Ghana. He holds a PhD degree in International Law from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, a Master of International Business from Wuhan University, both from China, and a Bachelor of Science in Accounting from University of Professional Studies Accra from Ghana. His research interests include Economic Sanctions, Terrorism, and Conflict and Peace studies. His most recent articles were published in the Conflict Studies Quarterly, Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, and Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies.