The dynamics of securitization and desecuritization in Ethiopia: the case of civil society organizations (CSOs)

Abstract

While Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in the development endeavors of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) prefers to adopt a securitization approach, depicting their activities as a potential danger, counterproductive, amplify the voices of foreign actors, and ‘rent-seeking’. According to reports, CSOs have been characterized and delineated as political humanitarian, driven by self-interest, and as entities that amplify the voices of foreign actors. This study aims to elucidate the processes by which CSOs in Ethiopia were securitized and desecuritized, respectively, by the EPRDF government led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Prosperity Party. The paper explores the securitization and desecuritization dynamics of CSOs in Ethiopia, with a specific focus on the underlying reasons that contribute to these processes. This study also investigates the consequences of the EPRDF securitization measures on CSOs, as well as the potential obstacles faced by CSOs in Ethiopia. The analytical framework utilized in this study is the application of the notion of securitization as proposed by the Copenhagen School (CS). By constructing the data from unrevised documents, the paper characterizes the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization of CSOs in Ethiopia through an interpretive analytical approach.

IMPACT STATEMENT

The primary goal of this research was to investigate the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. Throughout its tenure, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has portrayed Civil Society Organizations as irresponsible selfish servants of their own interests, representatives of foreign governments, advocates for foreign interests, ardent proponents of neoliberalism, political humanitarians, and proponents of color revolutions. Furthermore, CSOs have been viewed as ‘rent-seeking’, counterproductive, and an impediment to the country’s progress. All along its securitization activities, the TPLF led EPRDF used Ethiopia as a shield to defend its referent objects, which included democratic centralism, abiyotawi democracy (revolutionary democracy), and limatawi menigist (developmental state) philosophy. This was worked through constant demonization and securitization of CSOs developmental activities. But starting in 2018, the recently established Prosperity Party (PP) has taken a proactive stance in the effort to depoliticize and desecuritize the CSOs’ development activities.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• securitization
• civil society
• CSOs
• desecuritization
• EPRDF

Reviewing Editor:

• Richard Meissner, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

Subjects:

• International Relations
• Diplomatic History
• Political History
• Race & Ethnicity

Introduction

Throughout the process of constructing a transformative democratic system, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a vanguard coalition, portrayed Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as antagonistic and detached entities. According to Roberts (2019), there was a tendency to perceive alternative political parties, media outlets, and individual activists not as competitors striving for the betterment of the community, but rather as a threat and adversary. The portrayal of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as a menace and adversary was not arbitrary, but rather a deliberate strategy aimed at enhancing the EPRDF’s control over the political landscape of the nation. Similarly, the securitizing actor, namely the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in this particular instance, has employed a strategy of characterizing the engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) as politically driven, hence levying accusations against them. It has been purported that the process of securitizing Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia has involved the criminalization and stigmatization of their operations, employing a discourse that is persistent in nature. The TPLF-led EPRDF employed many terminologies during that period, such as ‘rent seeker’, ‘fanatical neoliberals’, ‘extreme neoliberals’ (Bach, 2011, p. 656), and activists of a color revolution. Moreover, in order to substantiate its securitization move, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) employed the argument that civil society organizations (CSOs) were closely associated with neo-liberal ideology and ‘rentierism’ (Bach, 2011, p. 650; Gebre, 2017, p. 24). Given that, the purpose of this study is to elucidate the processes and reasons by which CSOs in Ethiopia were securitized and desecuritized, respectively, by the EPRDF government lead by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the present Prosperity Party (PP).

This article utilizes a qualitative research design and analytical interpretative technique to investigate the processes of securitization and desecuritization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia under the TPLF-led EPRDF era and the current Prosperity party rule. Analytical interpretation is used as a methodology to reveal the securitization and desecuritization trajectory of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia during the specified period. During the study process, speeches by leaders, news outlets, secondary sources, and other documents are analyzed to reveal the securitization and desecuritization dynamics of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Ethiopia within the defined timeframe.

It is imperative to recognize that despite the presence of a negative disposition towards civil society organizations (CSOs), the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which came into power in 1991, emerged as one of the prominent political coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa that facilitated the participation of CSOs within the country. Given the complex national and regional context, it can be argued that the core ideological principles of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), specifically revolutionary democracy and democratic centralism, have played a significant role in the marginalization of civil society organizations (CSOs). Therefore, one may contend that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has adopted the democratic centralism ideology, which can be considered a significant determinant in its characterization of civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘rent-seekers’ (Bach, 2011, p. 643). As per the analysis conducted by the Center for International Human Rights, the political ideology of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has predominantly centered on the objective of constraining the impact of domestic and international actors that could potentially jeopardize the principles of revolutionary democracy and democratic centralism. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) sees the right base advocacy efforts of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a potential threat, to principles of democratic centralism and revolutionary democracy. Given the prevailing conditions, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) identifies an organization or individual activists as presenting a threat to its political ideology, specifically revolutionary democracy and democratic centralism, it labels them as opponents, individuals seeking personal gain, and potential threats to security. Following this, the political party implements extraordinary measures in order to protect its interests, alleging security considerations (2009, p. 8). Similarly, despite the provision in Article 31 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) affirming that ‘[e]very person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose’, it is not uncommon for civil society organizations (CSOs) to face accusations that their criticisms and objections towards the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in areas such as democratic pluralism and human rights practices are perceived as posing a risk to the nation’s existence.

In general, despite the explicit recognition of the right to association as a democratic right in the 1995 FDRE constitution, the leading coalition in the country, EPRDF, ironically restricted the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to exercise this right. The construction of CSOs was undertaken with the intention of portraying them as entities that oppose humanitarian efforts, impede development, and undermine democratic principles, so posing a threat to national security. The Vanguard coalition eventually implemented a stringent law targeting civil society organizations (CSOs) in 2009. Since the 2005 election, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has implemented various stringent regulations, including but not limited to the 2009 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) proclamation, the anti-terrorism proclamation of 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2009), and the proclamation on the freedom of mass media, among others. Inside the realm of all declarations, the utilization of existential concerns as rhetorical ammunition was employed in a manipulative fashion to legitimize the actions of various organizations inside the nation, particularly civil society organizations (CSOs). Throughout its existence, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had a notable reluctance to entertain other perspectives, whether either from within its own party or from external sources. Thereby, in order to maintain its leading position, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) strategically utilized securitization as a means to weaken the operations of other organizations.

This paper presents a concise overview of the process of securitization and desecuritization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. The discussion is organized into three main sections. Section one explores the underlying motivating elements that have prompted the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to securitize civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. This section delves into the functioning of securitization and the development of misleading images pertaining to civil society organizations (CSOs) within the political context of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). It has been observed that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) employed the political instability following the 2005 general election as a rhetorical tool to vilify and securitize the actions of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. In relation to the 2005 election and subsequent post-election issues, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) consistently leveled accusations against civil society organizations (CSOs) for their alleged partisan involvement. According to reports, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were portrayed as political humanitarians and agents that amplify foreign viewpoints, rather than being perceived as dedicated servants of the public. The EPRDF’s geopolitical importance in countering terrorism in the Horn region has impeded world powers from implementing stringent sanctions against the EPRDF’s securitization efforts. International stakeholders, at the very least, refrained from utilizing their development assistance as leverage to contest the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) securitization measures targeting civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. On the contrary, international stakeholders exhibited a preference for denouncing the securitization measures undertaken by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) against civil society organizations (CSOs) through the utilization of subtle and diplomatic rhetoric. However, it is important to note that global actors lacked the comprehension that the securitization actions undertaken by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) were deeply rooted in its political philosophy and ideology. In relation to the modus operandi of the securitization strategies employed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in dealing with opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs), Jean-Nicolas Bach’s analysis posits:

As (neo)liberalism is EPRDF’s enemy to “fight”, the opposition parties to which it is assimilated become a part of the struggle. Abyotawi democracy [revolutionary democracy] would “fight” against every “enemy” critical against the Ethiopian government. Among these “enemies” figure not only internal dissidents or domestic opposition parties, but also international organizations and non-governmental organizations (Bach, 2011, p. 655).

The latter section of this article examines the implications of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPDRF) securitization measures on the country’s economic, political, and humanitarian development objectives. This section of the paper also highlights the impact of EPRDF’s utilization of exceptional measures against civil society organizations (CSOs) on the dynamics of the relationship between EPRDF and global powers in areas such as aid, democratic building and human rights practices, and government development policies.

The subsequent portion of the article analyzes the process of desecuritization pertaining to the activities of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia subsequent to the assumption of power by Abiy Ahmed’s administration in April 2018, as well as the potential problems that may arise. This section examines the increasing normalization of ties between the newly established Prosperity Party (PP) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). It also discusses the suspension of the 2009 CSOs proclamation and the subsequent reopening of CSOs that focus on rights-based issues. Furthermore, it addresses the potential obstacles faced by international humanitarian and rights-based CSOs under the administration of Prosperity Party (PP).

Hence, the argument made by this paper is that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was engaged in the process of securitizing civil society organizations (CSOs), but the newly formed Prosperity Party (PP) is focused on normalizing and desecuritizing CSOs. The analysis of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) securitization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) is conducted using the securitization concept developed by the Copenhagen School (CS). In this context, the concept is analyzed with reference to the research conducted by Buzan (1998). Therefore, the primary premise of this study posits that the securitization of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) can be attributed to the political ideology and aspirations of the ruling coalition, EPRDF, aimed at consolidating its power and perpetuating its authoritarian regime.

Securitization concept: the Copenhagen School

According to the Copenhagen School (CS), the phenomenon of securitization can be understood as an intensified form of politicization (Buzan, 1998, p 23). According to scholarly literature, the concept of securitization involves the securitizing actor going beyond the established norms and framing the issue as either a unique form of politics or as something that transcends politics altogether (Buzan, 1998, p. 23). Conversely, desecuritization refers to the process where the subject is no longer perceived as a potential security threat and is brought back within the realm of normal political considerations (Balci & Kardaş, 2012, p. 100). The concept of securitization, as explained by the CS, suggests that issues that can be resolved through ordinary political processes might be redefined by the securitizing player in order to bypass the established system of law enforcement. According to Buzan (1998), when a securitizing actor successfully circumvents established procedures or rules by employing an argument regarding the priority and urgency of an existential threat, it can be considered a case of securitization.

On the other hand, as noted by Balzacq (2011, p. 2), it is vital to understand that securitization can be ‘discursive and non-discursive; intentional and non-intentional; performative but not ‘an act in itself’. Furthermore, Balzacq (2011, p. 4) defined securitization as follows:

An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertories, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.

The Copenhagen School (CS) posits that the securitization process of a particular issue can be conceptualized into three distinct stages. During its initial phase, many entities such as elites, pressure groups, or other relevant actors are required to engage in a ‘speech act’ aimed at portraying a specific topic as a significant and imminent threat. During this phase, the actor engaged in the process of securitization articulates the securitized issue as a threat that poses a significant risk to a specific object of reference, such as the state, ideology, self-governing system, or any other relevant entity. During the course of their ‘speech act’ aimed at garnering the backing of the audience, the actors involved in securitization endeavor to construct a perception of an inherent and significant threat to the object of reference. The effectiveness of the securitization ‘speech act’ is contingent upon the ability to garner widespread support for the securitized objective among the audience. When the issue of securitization shifted from being primarily discussed by the elite and pressure groups to becoming a topic of interest for the general public, it entered its second phase as a subject that is subject to debate and politicization. Upon the completion of the initial two steps, the subject that is deemed ‘disputed-politicized’ undergoes a comprehensive process of securitization. The ultimate phase of securitization involves the implementation of an emergency and exceptional measure by effectively mobilizing the required resources (Balci & Kardaş, 2012, p. 101; Balzacq et al., 2016; Collins, 2005, p. 570).

While conceptualizing major phases of securitization, Balzacq (2011, p. 8–9) stated the following:

For an issue to be pronounced an instance of securitization, an ‘empowering audience’ must agree with the claims made by the securitizing actor. The empowering audience is the audience which: a) has a direct causal connection with the issue; and b0 has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat. In sum, securitization is satisfied by the acceptance of the empowering audience of a securitizing move.

Likewise, it is evident that the discussions surrounding the perception of existential threats by the actor engaging in securitization revolve around the fundamental nature of security (Buzan, 1998, p. 21) and the inherent attributes that determine whether something becomes a security concern (Buzan, 1998, p. 21) for the object being referred to. The securitization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in this particular context can be primarily attributed to the coalition’s ambition to safeguard its referent object, namely the ideology of revolutionary democracy, and to enhance its overall influence. Hence, one of the motivating factors for the securitization of SCOs in Ethiopia was the way security was understood by EPRDF. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that the manner in which security is comprehended and employed has a tremendous impact on the conduct of political affairs. It is widely recognized that an overemphasis on securitization leads to the emergence of transnational phenomena resembling autism and paranoia (Buzan, 1998, p. 208).

Motivating factors to securitize CSOs in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s primary security risk stems from the emergence of a political environment that is closely aligned with ethnic affiliations within the nation. The correlation between politics and identity poses a significant hurdle to the potential establishment of a harmonious political climate inside the nation. The political structure of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was characterized by various portrayals, conflicting accounts, and inaccurate narratives, resulting in adverse consequences for marginalized political, ethnic, and religious communities. Nevertheless, as civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on addressing and revealing both vertical and horizontal violations of rights, the authorities of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) sought to securitize the actions of these organizations. The relentless securitization move of the vanguard coalition, EPRDF, was to defend its referent objects such as abiyotawi democracy (revolutionary democracy), democratic centralism and limatawi menigist (developmental state) philosophy among others under the name of Ethiopia.

The presence of misleading narratives, inaccurate portrayals, and the prioritization on security within the political ideology of the vanguard coalition, EPRDF, has posed significant obstacles for civil society organizations (CSOs) and other groups focused on human rights in the nation. Despite its controversial policies, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) consistently portrays itself as the primary custodian of democracy within the nation. In relation to this subject, Bach (2011, p. 648) asserted that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) presents its top-down policy as democratic and revolutionary to both domestic and foreign audiences. However, the actual situation on the ground does not align with the EPRDF’s proclaimed principles.

The excessive influence of ethnic divisions within the domestic political landscape of the nation has posed significant obstacles to the progress and humanitarian efforts of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The country’s federal system is formed based on ethnic divisions. This action was undertaken for two primary reasons. Initially, the selection of an ethnic-based political framework was implemented with the intention of subverting the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the concept of Ethiopianness. The second political arrangement, which was based on ethnicity, was implemented with the intention of undermining political resistance against the vanguard alliance, EPRDF, by strategically splitting the political elites based on ethnic affiliations. Ethnic-based federalism has been crucial in enabling the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to effectively suppress opposition groups and maintain political and civilian institutions under its control for around twenty-five years (Bach, 2014, p. 107).

The EPRDF employed a tactic of ethnic division to destroy capable political factions within the country, subsequently implementing a strategy of securitization to weaken and subvert the operations of civil society organizations (CSOs). This decision was made due to the awareness of the TPLF-led EPRDF political entrepreneurs that the unrestricted involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in democratic nation-building endeavors would pose a danger to the undemocratic political framework of EPRDF, known as democratic centralism. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) employed securitization and political marginalization tactics against various political groupings, civil society organizations (CSOs), activists, and religious figures, purportedly in the sake of the nation. In relation to this contention, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde have observed that ‘in a weak state, basic institutions, as well as ideologies, are often challenged, and political violence is extensive; therefore, when the power holders try to make appeals in the name of the state, their authority to do so will be contested more systematically’ (Buzan, 1998, p. 146). As an illustration, the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009, sometimes referred to as the draconian law, resulted in the securitization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and their foreign funding within Ethiopia. Consequently, the foreign money allocated to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) within the nation experienced a reduction. As a result, in Ethiopia, it was anticipated that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) would procure 90% of their funding from domestic sources, while the remaining 10% would be obtained from foreign sources. The imposition of restrictions primarily targeted civil society organizations (CSOs) that focused on democratic and human rights advancements. These included CSOs engaged in activities related to gender and religious equality, the promotion of children’s rights, law and justice, and the advocacy for equal treatment of different nations and nationalities (Feyissa, 2011, p. 804). This approval of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation by the parliament clearly shows the success of the vanguard coalition, EPRDF, in securitizing the activities of civil society organizations in Ethiopia.

In the same tone, it was not unusual that in order to securitize the involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) consistently portrays CSOs as individuals who exploit resources for personal gain, prioritize their own interests, exhibit biased behavior, ‘rent sacker’, and engage in other negative actions. The aforementioned act of securitization through the use of ‘speech act’ is employed purposefully to portray the involvement of specific civil society organizations (CSOs) as a potential menace to the political and social structure of the nation (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805). Similarly, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) implemented a proclamation in 2009 that imposed restrictions on foreign funding for civil society organizations (CSOs) (Cooper, 2018, p. 19). The main rationale behind this action was to safeguard the party’s interest and address concerns regarding potential foreign influence. The fact that most CSOs were financed by foreign donors worsened the situation. Additionally, the EPRDF was able to successfully securitize and limit the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in various domains, including human rights, children’s rights, gender equality, disability rights, and the justice system. Furthermore, throughout its securitization efforts, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) portrayed civil society organizations (CSOs) as agitators, subversive entities, and destructive associations, rather than recognizing them as potential allies that could contribute to the advancement of public goods within the country (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805). In relation to the partisan and subversive function of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as documented in the publication ‘Academic Insights for the Thinking World’ by Oxford University Press (OUPblog), Meles Zenawi, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia and chairman of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), expressed the following ‘speech act’ and/or viewpoint:

These NGOs were initially seen as an antidote to what was seen as the main problem in Africa- the bloated state. This was supposed to be an alternative. You reduce the role of the state, including your social services, and you encourage NGOs to provide as much of the public services as possible. In the end we argue that the NGOs have turned out to be alternative networks of patronage. NGOs have not provided an alternative good governance network (2012).

During a separate instance within his 2002 address and/or speech, made shortly before the official opening of the Africa Development Bank (ADB), Meles expressed his disapproval of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector for utilizing their positions to pursue personal financial gain. Meles further contended that such behavior frequently relied on the practice of patronage (The New Humanitarian, 2002).

The aforementioned points put out by Meles demonstrate the EPRDF’s lack of trust and skepticism in regards to acknowledging CSOs as viable collaborators in the advancement of societal well-being and the common good. In contrast, Meles employed rhetoric that characterized civil society organizations (CSOs) as individuals driven by self-interest and suggested that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have failed to establish a viable network for promoting good governance (Oxford University Press’s Academic Insights for the Thinking World (OUPblog), 2012). This can be interpreted as an attempt to securitize the involvement of CSOs in Ethiopia specifically, as well as across the African continent, through the use of speech acts. Moreover, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) associates the actions of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with the concept of ‘intelligence work’. Similarly, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) contended in 2009 that the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia serves the purpose of advancing the interests of their respective nations (Center for International Human Rights, 2009, p. 4-5). Furthermore, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has effectively employed the strategy of associating civil society organizations (CSOs) with foreign entities in order to create a perception of antagonism towards them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has accused civil society organizations (CSOs) that receive foreign money of harboring covert intentions in their involvement in Ethiopian affairs, primarily aimed at providing a wide range of information, including political, economic, and other aspects, to their outside sponsoring nations. According to the Center for International Human Rights (2009), it was said that foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) primarily offer assistance to Ethiopia as a last resort, and on occasion, they may attempt to leverage this help for ‘political influence’. Nevertheless, this type of representation is primarily employed to capture the audience’s attention and to comprehensively securitize the activity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) within the nation. Similarly, the utilization of a uniform language that characterizes the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘intelligence’ and as serving the interests of their respective nations is employed to amplify the perception of a ‘security threat’ and justify the implementation of exceptional measures targeting CSOs.

The primary objective of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its officials did not prioritize the safeguarding of human and democratic rights of the public. Rather, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had shown a greater level of enthusiasm in presenting civil society organizations (SCOs) as a security concern to its target audience. However, it is evident that the issue of securitizing civil society organizations’ (CSOs) involvement became increasingly prominent during the 2005 election. Following the election, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and certain media outlets under state control had disseminated discourse regarding the subversive role of civil society organizations (CSOs). The portrayal of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a subversive entity was predominantly linked to the phenomenon known as color revolution. On May 10, 2010, a media outlet affiliated with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) published an article titled ‘Colour Revolution and the Fourth National Election’ (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805). In the course of its discourse, Addis Raey posited that:

International NGOs well known for decorating themselves with attractive human rights adjectives have been conducting extensive campaign since February. That is why we said we are under the volley of fire of the colour revolutionaries, for they have been issuing a new statement before we even finish reading the first. Fortunately their barrages have thus far been in vain as the objective and subjective conditions in Ethiopia do not support colour revolution (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805).

The aforementioned statement provides a clear illustration of how the functional actor, namely Addis Raey media, adeptly promotes and presents the securitizing actor’s, specifically the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), portrayal of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a potential menace to the nation’s security. Furthermore, the aforementioned quotation clearly illustrates the portrayal of CSOs as ‘distant other’, ‘enemy’ and hostile, rather than as partners who collaborate for the betterment of society and the advancement of human rights and democratic principles.

Within the realm of securitization dynamics, certain issues exhibit a higher degree of politicization, while others are subject to a greater level of securitization. However, the most concerning aspect is the complete securitization or depoliticization of a certain issue. In the context of absolute securitization, any kind of public discourse can be readily transformed into a securitized issue, so conferring complete legitimacy upon the actor responsible for securitization. When full depoliticization occurs, certain issues are not effectively deliberated and resolved through public discourse (Watson & Burles, 2018, p. 434). Hence, the homogenized securitization narrative employed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in relation to civil society organizations (CSOs) poses a risk to the open public debates of individuals facilitated by CSO platforms.

Similarly, the Ethiopian government’s developmentalism policy approach has been utilized by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to securitize and stigmatize the involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) within the nation. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) characterizes the actions of civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘anti-developmental’ by linking their involvement with the ideology of neoliberalism. The utilization of the developmentalism agenda by political entrepreneurs inside the EPRDF has effectively restricted and weakened opposition movements both domestically and internationally. Developmentalism was employed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as a strategy to persuade both international and regional stakeholders in their efforts to stigmatize civil society organizations (CSOs). Opposition organizations were shown as being against the progress of development (tere-limat). Therefore, through the strategic utilization of developmentalism, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) endeavored to shape the mindset of the target audience. According to Bach (2011, p. 648), the political philosophy of developmentalism espoused by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) implies that all sectors of society, including civil servants, the private sector, opposition political groups, and civil society organizations, are expected to align themselves with the principles of development. In this manner, individuals or groups who expressed disapproval towards the political ideology of EPRDF’s developmentalism were categorized as ‘anti-developmental’ and/or ‘rent-seeking’ (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805). Consequently, they were subjected to securitization, leading to the implementation of exceptional measures to counteract their actions. According to Bach (2011, p. 648), it was also contended by Jean Nicolas Bach that the ‘revolutionary democracy’ of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) signifies the rejection of any alternative political undertaking.

Hence, the developmentalism rhetoric of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was not only articulated with the objective of achieving development and improving the overall well-being of the populace. Rather, EPRDF’s developmentalism concept, which was heralded following the 2001 reform (tehadiso) scheme of the coalition, was introduced to engulf internal political pluralism. The developmentalism narrative was employed to depict and legitimize any opposing group as anti-development (tere-limat), hence categorizing civil society organizations (CSOs) in a similar manner. According to Gebresenbet (2014, p. 70), in the course of implementing its strategy of ‘otherization’, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) consistently employs the dichotomy of ‘Lematawi’ (developmental) and ‘Kiray Sebisabi’ (rent collector/seeker) for the private sector, civil society organization and other to maximize its power and domination.

Ramification of securitizing CSOs

Within the realm of politics and security relations, a securitizing actor employs a strategy wherein a political matter is elevated beyond its usual political context in order to garner genuine public backing and addresses an issue that is universally recognized as a significant concern. The increased autonomy granted to the actor responsible for implementing security measures may potentially create conditions conducive to bias and marginalization. In the same way, EPRDF’s strategy of securitization towards civil society organizations opens the door for approved human and democratic rights breaches. Furthermore, it facilitated the untold neo-patrimonial system within the coalition. The securitization effort undertaken by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) posed a significant threat to the country’s development due to the following three reasons.

Initially, the restrictive and oppressive legislation enacted by the TPLF-led EPRDF has impeded the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to fully engage in the developmental endeavors of the nation. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) demonstrated a confrontational stance towards Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) through the enactment of the Charities and Society Proclamation in 2009. The issuance of the proclamation posed a threat to civil society organizations (CSOs), which in turn had cascading negative consequences for the efforts to strengthen the capability of local political, economic, and social resources inside the country. The EPRDF’s increasingly authoritarian and oppressive measures towards civil society organizations (CSOs) posed a danger to the local community’s ability to leverage their inherent advantages through collaboration with CSOs. Nevertheless, the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in a free and engaged manner plays a crucial role in monitoring the activities of governments and financial sectors. This is particularly important in economically disadvantaged nations, as the support provided by these institutions of democracy is vital for the sustained advancement of the economy (Nega & Milofsky, 2011, p. 34).

Furthermore, it is evident that the concept of security, both as a theoretical construct and as a political instrument, serves as a mechanism to cultivate a state of apprehension throughout society. Furthermore, it can be utilized as a method to engage in undemocratic practices by adopting tactics such as political exclusion, social exclusion, and the implementation of repressive extraordinary measures. The securitization practice employed by the totalitarian regime within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been identified as destructive, negligent, and exclusionary. This practice has posed challenges for civil society organizations (CSOs) in their efforts to implement effective policy measures to address community issues. The government’s implementation of the securitization act not only infringes upon the country’s freedom of association, but also engenders a pervasive sense of apprehension and unease across society. This assertion holds validity as it is observed that when the authoritarian regime perceives a particular Civil Society Organization (CSO) to be in opposition to the ‘revolutionary democracy’ rhetoric of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), governmental entities at various tiers grant them unrestrained power to intimidate and suppress both individuals and collectives into silence. Moreover, the utilization of scarecrow political technology by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has posed a challenge to the cultivation of diverse political ideologies and impeded social discourse within the society. Hence, the existence of such distressing political practices exerts a lasting influence on the formulation of policies within the nation, proving resistant to easy eradication.

In relation to the utilization of scarecrow political technology by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in its dealings with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Temesigen Zewude, the chairman of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, provided an explanation stating that the primary objective of the vanguard alliance was to establish a ‘one-party state’ (McLure, 2009). Temesigen asserts that the aforementioned agenda might be characterized as a form of domination ‘…a single part agenda; all the other stuff is simply window dressing. The agenda is to stifle these voluntary public movements that are known to assist the democratic process, the situation of human rights and all other advocacies are vital and necessary…they just do not want to see this. The EPRDF cannot survive in that kind of environment’ (McLure, 2009).

When doing an examination of the relationship between the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia, it is important to consider the third potential consequence of the securitization of CSOs, which warrants additional investigation: the counter-securitization efforts undertaken by both domestic and international populations. The growing marginalization and misrepresentation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia have led to heightened attempts to counteract the securitization framing of CSOs by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This involves adopting a discourse that challenges the EPRDF’s portrayal of CSOs as ‘rent-seeking’ or ‘political humanitarian’ entities, among others (Feyissa, 2011, p. 805). So, in its counter-securitization move, on October 13, 2008, Human Rights Watch, for instance, presented the draft law of charities and societies proclamation as ‘draconian’ and ‘repressive’ legislation. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch, in its counter-securitization endeavor, characterized the proposed legislation as a ‘blunt instrument’ that would primarily result in the erosion of the already constrained capacity of Ethiopian civil society actors to engage in government criticism or independent action (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

Similarly, the Embassy of the United States of America in Addis Ababa offers its counter-securitization ‘speech act’ in response to the securitization measures used by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) against civil society organizations (CSOs). According to the embassy, it has been observed that the legislation in question imposes limitations on the operations of civil society and hampers the ability of international partners to contribute to Ethiopia’s development endeavors. Furthermore, the embassy expressed its apprehension regarding the securitization efforts undertaken by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) against civil society organizations (CSOs). This development has the potential to limit the assistance provided by the United States government to Ethiopia, specifically in the areas of democracy promotion, civic engagement, protection of human rights, conflict resolution, and advocacy for marginalized segments of society (McLure, 2009). In reaction to the counter-securitization act and in order to further conceptualize the legitimacy of the government’s securitization action over civil society organizations (CSOs), the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) authorities contended that it is the responsibility of the state, rather than externally supported groups, to safeguard human and democratic rights. Similarly, Berhanu Adelu, the former head of Meles’s cabinet, contended that ‘we need social development’ and ‘we invite NGOs to do this work, but it is not their role to protect the rights of citizens. That is the role of governments. It’s an internal issue’(McLure, 2009).

Furthermore, it is crucial to note that international donors providing global development aid had preexisting doubts regarding the loyalty and commitment of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in successfully allocating and distributing development aid to the intended beneficiaries. These concerns led to an investigation and a subsequent response by the donors, who sought to counteract the securitization of civil society organizations (CSOs) by the EPRDF. The initial interaction between the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and international donors lacked a foundation built on faith and trust. Consequently, international donors formerly relied on civil society organizations (CSOs) as intermediaries to allocate development assistance to the relevant communities. This approach was adopted due to a lack of confidence in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)’s ability to effectively and faithfully distribute the development aid to the intended communities. Similarly, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) views the actions of international donors with caution, since it harbors concerns that these donors may pose a potential danger to its political power. This recurring pattern of mistrust and suspicion has a significant impact on the involvement of international donors in the socio-economic and socio-political progress of the nation.

Reportedly, the growing cooling of the relationship between the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and international donor organizations led to a decline in EPRDF’s diplomatic ties with Scandinavian nations. In relation to the increasingly strained relations between the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and international funders, Feyissa has asserted that ‘donors watered down their conditionality, save some of the Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden who have strongly criticized what they consider EPRDF’s deteriorating human rights. EPRDF retaliated their action expelling six Norwegian diplomats in 2007, and closing the Ethiopian embassy in Sweden in 2010’ (2011, p. 802-803). The securitization of civil society organizations (CSOs) that focused on the promotion of human and democratic rights had a significant impact on the relationship between the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and international funders. Ultimately, the circumstances prompted actors from outside the region and continent, particularly those from the political ‘West’, to participate in the process of countering the securitization efforts undertaken by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) against civil society organizations (CSOs).

On the opposite side of the spectrum, there exists a worldwide fear regarding the potential ramifications of securitizing Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Additionally, there is a rising unease surrounding the increasing suppression of human rights within the nation. These factors have contributed to the intensification of counter-securitization efforts at the domestic level against the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Beyene Petros, for instance, a prominent figure in the opposition movement within the nation, expressed disapproval of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s decision to restrict civil society organizations. According to McLure (2009), Beyene argued that the charities and societies proclamation served as a tool employed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to suppress those who possessed the ability to engage in the process of democratizing Ethiopia. Furthermore, Beyene posited that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) deliberately employed securitization tactics to restrict the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs). This strategic approach was motivated by the ruling party’s unwavering commitment to promote revolutionary democracy and establish a communist system that would endure unchallenged for the next three to four decades, shielded from scrutiny, criticism, or public awareness.

Nevertheless, while facing local and international opposition to its securitization efforts, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) continued to restrict political freedoms and vilify civil society organizations (CSOs) by labeling them as ‘rent seekers’, proponents of neoliberalism, obstructers of political progress, adversaries of constitutional norms, or other derogatory labels. Furthermore, the vanguard coalition made efforts to mitigate the increasing criticisms by employing terminology such as ‘growth and transformation’ (Feyissa, 2011, p. 791), ‘developmental state’, ‘developmentalism’ (Gebresenbet, 2014, p. 70), and various other phrases. However, it is evident that both the ‘developmentalism’ and ‘transformation’ discourses, along with other approaches, failed to assist the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in effectively countering the widespread opposition activities. In due course, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was ousted from its position of authority just on the eve of announcing the attainment of a complete parliamentary seat majority. Following this, the recent administration led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali nullified the 2009 charities and societies proclamation and desecuritized Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) participation in Ethiopia.

Desecuritization and prospects

The transition of power in 2018 from the TPLF-led EPRDF to the so-called Medemer ideology marked a significant shift in Ethiopia’s political landscape. This change resulted in a departure from the previous practice of labeling civil society organizations (CSOs) and opposition parties as adversaries or antagonistic entities, hence leading to a drop in their vilification and demonization. During his first address to parliament, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed characterized opposition groups as ‘competitors’ (tefokakari) who foster diverse perspectives (Teshome, 2018). The current circumstances contribute to the incremental restoration of civil society organizations’ interactions with the newly formed administration. In alternative terms, the portrayal of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as politically motivated actors, engaged in humanitarian efforts, counterproductive activities, and acting as lobbyists for foreign governments, has gradually diminished in prominence within media discourse and the decision-making processes of the nation. This shift can be interpreted as a significant move towards desecuritization, wherein the perception of CSOs as a threat to stability has diminished.

The act of liberalizing the political landscape of a nation invariably has positive outcomes in the advancement of democratic consolidation. It is not unexpected that the normalization of relations between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the government, regardless of the associated costs, yields significant benefits in the context of political transition and democratic development within the nation. Civil society organizations (CSOs) consistently possess a vested interest in the facilitation of democratic consolidation and societal metamorphosis. If, for any reason, the newly appointed leaders engage in practices that undermine the independent involvement of civil society organizations, it is important to acknowledge that this will have significant consequences for the progress of democratization and the international perception of the country. Ethiopia, being a prominent diplomatic center in Africa and hosting various international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, has the potential to serve as an exemplar for democratic institutions and practices at both continental and sub-regional levels. To achieve this, it is crucial for Ethiopia to learn from the errors made by previous administrations regarding civil society organizations (CSOs) and other related matters.

In a similar vein, in the context of the interactions between desecuritized civil society organizations (CSOs) and the government, Bilen Asrat, the executive director of the Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations Forum (ECSF), posited that the amendment of the stringent 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation occurred as political reforms became evident (Civicus, 2020). Furthermore, Bilen argued that the recent legislation eliminated limitations on financial support for civil society organizations and facilitated the return of international entities to Ethiopia (Civicus, 2020). Human Rights Watch (2019) expressed a positive outlook regarding the potential reconciliation between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the government. The organization acknowledged notable advancements, specifically in relation to the amendment of the Charities and Societies Proclamation, a regulatory framework governing the activities of civil society. One could argue that the statement made by the executive director of ECSOF, as well as the aspirations expressed by Human Rights Watch, not only suggest the potential for improved ties between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the government, but also highlight the global recognition of the need of advocating for marginalized individuals.

The United Nations human rights experts have also observed that the recently implemented civil society proclamation exhibits significant advancements. Nevertheless, some concerning sections were incorporated into the document during its amendment by the Council of Ministers in Ethiopia. These modifications pertain to the Civil Society Agency Board, which raises concerns about its autonomy being compromised and its authority expanded to dissolve groups. Initially, the authority to exercise this function was exclusively bestowed upon the founders of organizations or the Federal High Court (2019). In its elaboration on the matter, the United Nations (UN) human rights experts emphasized that the dissolution of an organization represents the most severe kind of limitation on the right to associate. They said that such dissolution should only be allowed following a comprehensive court procedure, whereby all avenues for appeal have been exhausted (UN Human Rights, 2019).

It is important to acknowledge that conflicts of interest may arise between government entities and civil society organizations (CSOs) that advocate for rights-based causes, including but not limited to children’s rights, the rights of different nations and ethnicities, women’s rights, disability rights, and others. The conflicts of interest between the government and civil society organizations (CSOs) that are founded on rights can be attributed to a lack of understanding and effective communication between the middle and lower-level executive organs. Moreover, the intricate domestic political landscape of the nation may serve as an additional catalyst for miscommunication and discord between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the government. Provided that, how CSOs in focus manage these intricate problems and secure the objective of human and democratic rights promotions remains a serious challenge.

Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the potential role and involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the promotion of human rights, democratic rights, and development initiatives, as well as in addressing the economic challenges faced by communities, is expected to surpass the shortcomings experienced by CSOs in the country during the 2010s. However, it is important to consider the potential issues that may occur as a result of policy reform and the inherent organizational structure of both the government and civil society organizations (CSOs).

Conclusion

This essay aims to analyze the processes of securitization and desecuritization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia. The analyses have posited that while civil society organizations (CSOs) have made significant contributions to development initiatives and the promotion of democratic dialogue in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) tends to depict the activities of CSOs as ‘rent-seeking’, counterproductive, and detrimental to the country’s development and stability. CSOs have been seen as selfish servants of their own interests, representatives of foreign governments, advocates for foreign interests, ardent proponents of neoliberalism, political humanitarians, proponents of color revolutions, and several other characterizations. The initial impetus behind the vanguard coalition, EPRDF, expressing a negative depiction of civil society organizations (CSOs) can be attributed to its political doctrine of revolutionary democracy. Similarly, the ideological attributes of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) tend to hastily portray any organization holding divergent ideas as adversaries, displaying a hostile and alienating attitude towards them. Hence, the political ideology of ‘otherization’ adopted by the TPLF-led EPRDF can be identified as a significant catalyst for the securitization of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The securitization actions of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), with a focus on ‘otherization’, were carried out in an institutionalized manner, particularly after the implementation of the political reform program known as tehadiso in 2001. This securitization action has significant consequences/implications for limiting Civil Society Organizations’ involvement in empowering citizens in democratic development.

The securitization of CSOs participation in Ethiopia by the EPRDF was also driven by the coalition’s aspiration to consolidate its dominating position and expand its authoritarian regime. In order to implement its authoritarian regime, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) utilized the strategy of democratic centralism as a means of exerting control. However, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) advanced unfounded portrayals and subjected civil society organizations (CSOs) to increased security measures by utilizing ‘developmentalism’ as a means of exerting influence (as leverage). Hence, any form of critique, including that from those affiliated with or endorsing the party, was perceived as opposing progress and subjected to securitization, where civil society organizations’ developmental activities were victims of the same labeling.

The purported landslide political setback experienced by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in significant urban areas during the 2005 general election served to intensify the party’s apprehension. The heightened levels of fear and anxiety inside the party exacerbated the tendency of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to marginalize and securitize civil society organizations (CSOs) and political opposition groups to an unprecedented degree. In 2009, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) implemented a series of stringent proclamations, including the Charities and Society Proclamation, the Anti-terrorism Proclamation, and the Proclamation against Mass Media.

The securitization discourse employed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in relation to civil society organizations (CSOs) has resulted in significant consequences, including the erosion of CSOs’ capacity to engage in development initiatives across all regions of the nation. Additionally, the potential impact of the totalitarian system’s securitization inattentive of civil society organizations (CSOs) on the country’s policy development is worth considering. This assertion holds validity as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in offering valuable input and identifying deficiencies by performing various research endeavors.

Throughout these advancements, the newly formed Prosperity Party (PP) has been actively engaged in the process of depoliticizing and desecuritizing the development operations of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The decision made by the PP can be interpreted as a positive step towards fostering democratic growth and facilitating the progress of the nation. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that potential problems may develop from the policy reforms and organizational structures of both government and civil society organizations (CSOs). However, it is of greater importance to examine how Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) confront potential obstacles and ensure the security of their developmental roles inside the country. At last but not least it is vital to remark that the authors’ academic background, which is history, challenged them while developing the theoretical framework of this work.

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Notes on contributors

Nigusu Adem Yimer

Nigusu Adem Yimer is Assistant Professor (Ph.D.) of History at Jimma University, Jimma, Ethiopia. Nigusu holds a Ph.D. from the Department of History at Sakarya University, Turkey. His research focuses on the modern history and contemporary relations between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Nigusu has written several articles focusing on the interstate relations of the Horn of Africa and has publications in internationally reputable journals. Apparently, Nigusu is a contributor to a magazine named Politics Today.

Turgut Subaşi

Turgut Subaşi is Associate Professor (Ph.D.) of History at Sakarya University, Turkey. His researches mainly focus on the history of the Ottomans. Turgut has many publications at high caliber journals that mainly focus on the history of the Ottomans.