Ghana’s 2020 electoral politics: an assessment of the electoral commission

Abstract

The independence of election management bodies is very crucial for the durability and success of every democracy. This paper assessed the independence of Ghana’s Electoral Commission in the conduct of the December 2020 elections using the de jure election management body’s independence framework of institutional, financial, functional and personnel. The paper argues that though the 1992 Constitution guaranteed the independence of the Electoral Commission in all the four crietria, an examination of the institutional design says otherwise. This was exacerbated during the conduct of the 2020 elections through the appointment of the three commissioners, the posture and the behaviour of the officials, perceived bias, total reliance on the executive for budgetary allocations and functional incompetence. As a result, the election suffered credibility and integrity deficits. This has implications for the consolidation of Ghana’s emerging democracy if the dynamics accounting for the lack of independence are not checked and nipped in the bud.

Keywords:

• Electoral politics
• elections
• election management body
• Ghana
• New Patriotic Party
• National Democratic Congress
• Electoral Commission of Ghana

Reviewing Editor:

• Robert Read, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

Subjects:

• Introductory Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Politics & the Media
• Political Behavior and Participation

Introduction

Nothing kindles democracy’s energies, anxieties, hopes, and frustrations like an election. The quality of an election can spell the difference between a cooking fire and an explosion (Penar et al.,; 2016). Elections play a pivotal role in shaping the political destiny of countries not only because of the legitimacy they confer on the political leadership, but also as a peaceful way of resolving competition and differences. The importance of election has made election management bodies (EMBs) to become the focus of scrutiny, monitoring and reform. EMBs must be imbued with credibility and integrity to conduct transparent, free and fair elections whose results are accepted by all stakeholders. Poor electoral management brings about election fraud which results in political alienation, public mistrust, protest, and violence (Penar et al., 2016; The Carter Center, 2014). An effective EMB, responsible for implementing much of the electoral process, can enable the participation of voters and protect the democratic process. Independent EMBs are a helpful device for stabilizing a democracy. However, Makulilo et al. (2015) and van Aaken (2009) have espoused that setting up independent EMBs de jure is no panacea—they also need to be independent de facto, that is, not captured by special interests.

Against this background, the paper assesses the independence of the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana in the conduct of the 2020 general elections deploying the EMB independence assessment framework proposed by van Ham and Garnett (2019), van Aaken (2009) and Cheeseman and Elklit (2020). The criteria identified by these authors are institutional independence, personnel independence, financial independence and functional independence. The key objective of the study is to assess the degree of independence of the EC in the conduct of the 2020 election and the implications for Ghana’s fledging democracy. The significance of this study cannot be overemphasized, as EMBs are critical actors in every democratic process because of their role in the management of elections. Any perceived lack of independence can spell doom for the integrity and credibility of electoral outcomes and its dire consequences for democracy.

The prognosis of the study is that even though the 1992 Constitution guaranteed the independence of the Electoral Commission, the institutional design of the Commission, the utterances of the NPP in opposition to remove Charlotte Osei (the then Chairperson of the Commission), and the subsequent appointments, the posture and behaviour of the leadership of the Commission painted the picture of the Commission as not being entirely independent during the 2020 elections. These coupled with the functional incompetence displayed undermined the credibility and integrity of the 2020 elections despite some modicum of independence in the various dimensions. This has implications for the future of Ghana’s democracy as the political actors and the citizenry would loss trust and confidence in the electoral body and would always be suspicious of its actions and inactions.

For the purpose of chronology and logical flow, the article is structured as follows: theorizing EMBs, literature on EMBs in Ghana, Ghana’s 2020 elections in context and the methodology. It proceeds to examine the performance of the EC in the conduct of the 2020 general election using the four criteria of independence vis-à-vis the mandate of the EC as enshrined in Article 45 of the 1992 Republican Constitution. The paper ends with a conclusion.

Theorizing election management bodies (EMBs)

Before attempting to explain what EMBs are, it is imperative to establish what election management is about. Election management refers to the formulation, application, implementation and evaluation of electoral rules for effective functioning of the political system in a democracy (James et al., 2019). These rules are enacted into law by the legislature and executive and interpreted by the judiciary. The implementation of the electoral laws is highly political as it involves multiple actors including political parties on one part whose overarching objective is to win and maintain political power, the citizenry, election observers, donors, civil society organisations and the electoral commission itself. Due to the contentious nature of elections, it is mostly fraught with tension and if not well managed, can degenerate into conflicts and political instability in states, hence the call for independent EMBs to professionally manage the process for electoral credibility and integrity.

Electoral management covers three sets of related activities which are organising, monitoring and certifying elections results (James et al., 2019). The successful implementation of election laws requires the existence of an election management body (EMB) charged with the day-to-day decision-making on the implementation of the laws, budget, resources and stakeholder engagement for a credible and trustworthy electoral process for electoral outcome acceptable to all the stakeholders (Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020, James et al., 2019).

Electoral management bodies could be referred to as an individual or collection of organisations or bodies with the mandate to “manage some or all the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections” (Catt et al., 2014: 5). Specific tasks of EMBs in the electoral process include determining voter and candidate eligibility, conducting polling, counting and validating votes, boundary delimitation, voter and candidate registration, campaign media and finance monitoring, voter education and post-election dispute adjudication (Catt et al., 2014: 5; Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). In short, EMBs are state institutions legally charged with the responsibility of conducting elections at all levels of the state.

The legitimacy, integrity and credibility of elections are important in nurturing and growing democracies, as a result, it is important for the electoral process and for that matter the EMB to be bureaucratically efficient, politically neutral and accountable to the public (James et al., 2019; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002). These attributes of the electoral process hinges on performance and independence of the EMBs (Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020). Cheeseman and Elklit (2020) espoused that the performance of EMBs borders on their capacity and governance whereas independence deals with both formal and informal autonomy of EMBs from partisan political and other influences. According to Pal (2016), the concept of independence implies that an institution has both freedom from interference and freedom to act within its sphere of authority (Independence of EMBs is discussed later in the article).

Various scholars and institutions have identified various models of EMBs (Pastor, 1999; James et al., 2019; Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020; International IDEA, 2006) among others. The common models enumerated are independent, governmental and mixed.

Expatiating further, the independent model, also called the agency model (Norris, 2015), sees EMBs as arms-length from the executive branch of government. Governmental models, on the other hand, are often election administrators who work from within a government department or ministry. The mixed model refers to countries where both exist, and each have specific functions or oversight over elections in the country. The categorisation of these models is based on a number of attributes such as institutional arrangement, implementation, formal accountability, powers, composition, term of office and budget (International IDEA, 2006). These characteristics are the basis for the assessment of EMBs across the international organisations and the academic community (Makulilo et al., 2015). In the words of Martini (2013), election stakeholders are not concerned about the models, rather, how the EMBs adhere to the principles of integrity, transparency and impartiality in the management of the electoral process to avert the conduct of flawed elections but ensure electoral credibility and integrity. For these principles to occur, the EMBs must have some level of autonomy. The principles espoused by Martini (2013) have given prominence to the independent model of EMBs ahead of the other two models in democracies. EMBs are said to be independent if they are immune from interference from the government and other political actors both internally and externally. In the words of Cheeseman and Elklit (2020), independence of EMBs are critical drivers of public perceptions of electoral integrity. Hence, independence of EMBs directly affects the legitimacy of those political parties and individual politicians who are elected to political offices. They further opined that a compromised EMB undermines the integrity, credibility and legitimacy of electoral outcomes thereby resulting in dissatisfaction of political actors and public distrust in the political process and system.

EMBs as state institutions are designed to ensure predictability and standardization in election management through the shaping and reshaping of the behaviour of the actors in the democratic process based on established rules and regulations (Goodin, 1996; Petit, 1996; Sefa-Nyarko, 2022). The institutional design and operations of EMBs (either government controlled, independent or mixed) in most democracies are enshrined in the constitution. As pointed out above, the independent model is the most favourite and patronized in most democracies. Despite the existence of legal provisions establishing EMBs, their operations are both socially and politically influenced by the actors in the democratic process both positively and negatively because of their penchant to respond to the opportunities and incentives emerging from the institutional design either as a political party in power or opposition (Petit, 1996).

In Ghana, the institutional design of the EMB is set out in Article 43 and its independence in Article 46 (Republic of Ghana, 1992). However, Article 70 enjoins the President to appoint the Chairperson and other Commissioners of the EMB without recourse to filters such as consulting or prior approval via interview or vetting mechanisms. The absence of a filter (say vetting or prior approval) in the appointment process of the top officials of Ghana’s EMB, its reliance on the executive arm of government for budgetary allocation and acting in consultation with the Public Services Commission in other appointments to the EMB cast doubts on its independence. Since the return to multipartyism in 1993, the institutional design of the EMB has resulted in power imbalances between the Executive and the EC because of the unfettered powers of the president to appoint and dismiss (Articles 70 and 195 of the 1992 Constitution). These legal provisions for instance, played to the advantage of the governing NPP during the 2020 elections as three commissioners were removed from office following petitions and other commissioners also due for retirement. All the vacant positions were filled by the President based on Article 70(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution. Based on these and other issues espoused in the study, the relationship between the governing political party (NPP) and the EC during the 2020 electioneering was seen as symbiotic and they were uncritical of each other, whereas the main opposition (NDC) virtually opposing almost all that the EC intended doing with the cases ending at the court.

Studies on EMBs have examined the independence and autonomy of EMBs from different perspectives. For instance, van Aaken (2009) and van Ham and Garnett (2019) suggested four key types of independence: institutional, personnel, financial, and functional, Shein et al. (2020: 17) extended the four points to six by adding accountability and behavioural dimensions. Cheeseman and Elklit (2020) on their part condensed the independence of the EMBs to three namely institutional and leadership, functional and decision making and financial and budgetary. A comparison of Cheeseman and Elklit’s framework to the other authors revealed all pointing to the same indicators in each criterion of de jure independence. Contributing to the independence of EMBs, Pal (2016) postulated that EMBs’ independence could be attained if they were created as the fourth branch of government. This simply refers to making EMBs another arm of government just as the executive, legislature and judiciary to ensure its independence through constitutional entrenchment.

The EMB frameworks developed by these authors are interconnected in that each level of independence is dependent on the other. For instance, the ability of the EMB to effectively take decisions or function effectively, make use of resources (financial/budgetary) and personnel independence all hinges on institutional independence that is the legal regime establishing the EMB and conferring legal powers. Empirically, Cheeseman and Elklit (2020) evaluated the EMBs of Kenya, Albania and Nepal using the three frameworks they developed. Their assessment revealed that the EMBs of Kenya and Albania were not independent while the EMB of Nepal was ranging between moderately independent and not independent. One striking thing about the assessment was that weakness in one criterion of independence affected other areas of independence.

From the above, assessing the independence of Ghana’s Electoral Commission during the 2020 general elections as the pivot around which Ghana’s electoral democracy revolves is imperative in diverse ways. One, the findings will contribute immensely to consolidating Ghana’s fledging democracy as issues of independence and lack of independence will be highlighted and recommendations provided to improve on the Electoral Commission’s work for future elections. Two, the findings will also highlight what worked and did not work in Ghana’s case for comparative analysis purposes with other democracies and their EMBs. Finally, the findings will complement the existing knowledge in the area of EMBs and democracy.

Ghanaian scholarship on election management bodies

Historically, Ghana’s EC evolved as part of the institutional transfer of the superstructure of British colonial rule (Jinadu, 1995). It began as a department under the Ministry of Local Government with the responsibility to supervise elections organized by the colonial government (Ayee, 1998).

Colonial supervised elections were though competitive, however, it was devoid of political manipulations and state controls because of the less sophisticated nature of politics and elections in particular at the time. The relatively congenial electoral environment provided by the colonial government fostered effective competition among the African political parties. The electoral regime was characterized by a relative fairness and agreements on the rules of the game – that were defined and implemented by the colonial government (Debrah, 1998). This was at the core of efficient and credible election management. However, independence of the EC in the immediate aftermath of independence took a nosedive since it was characterized with political controls and manipulations (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 1999) due to the quest of politicians to acquire and maintain political power at all cost.

Ghana since independence in 1957, has practiced the Sole Commissioner system of EMB. For instance, the 1960 First Republican Constitution gave oversight responsibility over elections to the Chief Justice whose appointment was determined and controlled by the President of the Republic. However, the power to determine the outcome of elections was the prerogative of the President. According to Debrah (1998), when the single-party rule was inaugurated in 1964, the Electoral Commissioner had lost his sense of impartiality, independence and neutrality in election management due to the appointing powers of the President.

The overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) gave the opportunity to restore credibility in Ghana’s election management body. To this end, the Justice Akufo-Addo’s Constitutional Commission of 1968 recommended the establishment of an independent Sole Electoral Commissioner with legal autonomy to manage the electoral process (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 1999). Until 1992, the most preferred model of Sole Electoral Commissioner had been experimented under the Second and Third Republics, with mixed resultant outcomes. For example, in 1969, the opposition parties accused V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe; the Electoral Commissioner of colluding with the Progress Party (PP) to ensure the latter’s victory in the 1969 elections. Their concerns were premised on two grounds. First, they alleged that the Commissioner had been used to procure electioneering equipment for Busia’s party, and second, most returning officers appointed were those that had previously worked in the Centre for Civic Education headed by Dr. K. A. Busia (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 1999). On the contrary, Justice I.K. Abban who was appointed as the Sole Commissioner by the Supreme Military Council (SMC) to supervise the 1978 referendum for Union Government (UNIGOV) exhibited courage by not kotowing to the whims and caprices of the military junta (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979: 196). Similarly, the 1979 Justice Kingsley-Nyinah’s Commission demonstrated complete neutrality and impartiality throughout the conduct of the 1979 general elections (Ayee, 1998: 57).

Following both international and domestic pressures on the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which overthrew the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) government under the Third Republic, the PNDC government constituted the Constitutional Experts in 1992 to draft the constitution after the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) had submitted its report. The NCD report and recommendations greatly influenced the return of Ghana to multiparty politics and democracy in 1992. The Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) was hurriedly established to manage and administer the founding elections of the Fourth Republic in 1992, which was characterized with a lot of executive manipulation (Gyampo, 2017; Debrah et al., 2010). The political control of the Consultative Assembly coupled with lack of independence and manipulation by the PNDC military junta of the INEC brought into disrepute the credibility and integrity of the November 1992 presidential elections. As a result, the opposition political parties boycotted the parliamentary elections scheduled for December same year and the authoring of “The Stolen Verdict” by the main opposition political party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The challenges faced in the founding elections and the subsequent establishment of an independent EC by Article 43(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution culminated into series of electoral process reforms geared towards credible and flawless elections. It is instructive to note that NCD did not favour the Sole Commissioner concept kind of EMB because of the fear of manipulation as well as the political activism at the time.

Studies have discussed the success factors and the challenges of the EC (Ayee, 2017; Debrah, 2011), assessment of the EC in specific elections (Gyampo, 2017; Omotola, 2013), electoral process reforms (Gyampo, 2017; Debrah, 2015), citizens’ perception of the EC (Penar et. al; 2016, Gyimah-Boadi et al., 1999).

From the reviews, it could be gleaned that there is no direct study that assessed the independence of the EC in the 2020 general election using the EMBs independence assessment framework enumerated by scholars such as van Aaken (2009); van Ham and Garnett (2019); Shein et al. (2020) and Cheeseman and Elklit (2020). The EMB assessment framework provides a tool for evaluating the independence of EMBs using specific benchmarks such as institutional, financial, functional and personnel to evaluate the independence of EMB. The use of the framework helps to establish how the EMBs performed in each criterion thereby highlighting specific areas that need improvement and those that need sustenance. The framework also helps to amplify the factors accounting for and inhibiting the independence of EMBs. The findings will assist in enhancing Ghana’s democracy and serve as reference point for other democracies across the globe through the echoing of dynamics that entrenched independence and those that downplayed it.

Ghana’s 2020 elections in context

The 2020 elections was one of the significant elections in Ghana’s Fourth Republic for two key reasons. The first is that the 2020 elections could be referred to as the grand finale between Presidents Nana Addo Danquah Akufo Addo (the incumbent president) and former president John Dramani Mahama (incumbent president who lost the 2016 elections). It is described so because both candidates have defeated each other, thus John Dramani Mahama defeated Nana Addo in 2012 and the latter defeating the former in 2016. This raised the stakes high in the 2020 elections compared to others. The second is that, this was an election held in the midst of a pandemic (COVID-19) which changed the dynamics of electioneering activities such as the compilation of voters’ register, exhibition and voting while observing the protocols in order not to get infested by the virus. Politicians also resorted to dolling out food items and COVID-19 personal protective equipment (PPE) to the citizenry among others. This section accounts for circumstances during the electioneering period that warrants research into the assessment of the independence of the EC during the 2020 elections. Series of activities raised the stakes in the 2020 elections. Key among them are discussed below.

First was the dismissal of the electoral commissioner and the two deputies following a petition filed by some employees of the commission and recommendation by the committee chaired by the Chief Justice and the subsequent appointment of Jean Mensah, Eric Bossman Asare and Samuel Tettey as Chairperson and deputies of the Commission respectively. These appointments were severely criticized by civil society organisations, the academia, opposition political parties and the general public as affront to the country’s democracy and governance crisis at the EC considering the perceived biased background of two (Jean Mensah and Bossman Asare) of the appointed personnel (Gyampo & Graham, 2022:5).

The second issue was the compilation of new voters register for the 2020 elections. In the wisdom of the EC, the new compilation would bring about value for money because revision of the existing register which was compiled in 2012 would be more costly. This was again vehemently opposed by opposition pressure and interest groups, think tanks as well as the main opposition political party (the NDC). This resulted in series of demonstrations in Tamale, Kumasi and Accra by the interparty resistance against the compilation of voters register and the lawsuits by the NDC and Mark Takyi-Benson a private citizen at the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court upheld the EC’s positions (Ghana Web, 2020).

On the Election Day, the processes were relatively peaceful with people queuing very early ahead of the 7:00am when the polls were opened while observing the COVID-19 protocols (The Commonwealth, 2020). As usual of Ghana’s electoral politics, there were some cases of electoral malpractices such as allege stuffing of ballot boxes, misconducts by some electoral officers, harassments, voter intimidations, isolated cases of shooting, snatching of ballot boxes among others. There were also cases of malfunctioning biometric verification machines in some of the polling stations (Ghana Web, 2020; Gyampo & Graham, 2022:7). The period following the immediate aftermath of the voting, there were series of press conferences by the NDC claiming victory, warning the EC not to manipulate the electoral figures to subvert the will of the people. There were accusations against the governing party for using the military and vigilante groups affiliated to the NPP to intimidate at constituencies won by the NDC. The NDC further vowed that it would resist any attempt by the government to change the will of the people. In the midst of all these, the NDC urged its supporter to remain calm. The NPP on the other hand also organized a press conference announcing that they (NPP) had won the elections with a huge margin of 52.72% and won the Hohoe parliamentary seat in the Volta Region which is considered the “World Bank” of the opposition NDC (Graphic Online, 2020). The claim of victory by the two dominant parties is not new in Ghana’s political landscape. These have always been the case as witnessed in the 2008 and 2012 elections. The National Peace Council and other identifiable groups in their usual reactionary modus operandi prevailed on the two parties to desist from calling the results because the 1992 Constitution mandates only the EC to announce presidential results (Agbevade et al., 2021).

Following the official declaration on December 9, 2020 of the presidential results announcing the candidate of the NPP Nana Addo Danquah Akufo Addo as the victor with 6,730,413, representing 51.595% while John Dramani Mahama trailing with 6, 214, 889 representing 47.366% (Ghana Web, 2020). The EC chairperson indicated that the declared results excluded the Techiman South Constituency with a voter population of 128,018. The EC chair was quick to add, “The difference between the total number of votes between the first and second candidates is 515,524. As a result, even if we added the 128,018 to the results of the second candidate, it would not change the outcome of the Presidential Election. Hence our declaration of the 2020 results without that of Techiman South … If we were to add the results from Techiman South Constituency, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo would obtain 50.8% of the votes and John Dramani Mahama, would obtain 47.873% of the votes”. This is akin to what happened in 2008 where the then EC Chairman Dr. Kwadwo Afari Djan declared the 2008 election results after a runoff which saw Prof. Evans Atta Mills emerged as the winner but indicated that the Tain Constituency was outstanding. The election in the Tain Constituency was held on January 2, 2009 and Mills won with a slim margin of 50.2% while Nana Addo of the NPP garnered 49.8% (Frempong, 2019:267). The declaration of the results and the aftermath admission of functional error by the EC where they admitted “inadvertently using 13,433,573 as the total valid votes cast instead of 13,119,460” generated a lot of brouhaha though the EC insisted that this did not affect the results (Myjoyonline.com, 2020) and the EC altering the results on numerous occasions brought the credibility and integrity of the 2020 elections into disrepute. Consequently, the presidential candidate of the NDC filed a lawsuit challenging the election results at the Supreme Court in accordance with Article 64(1) (Gyampo et al., 2022). This is reminiscent of the 2012 presidential elections petition. The main difference between the two presidential election petitions was that the 2012 petition was quantitative in nature while the 2020 was qualitative. Just as the justices of the Apex Court upheld the 2012 elections after hearing, the Justices did same for the 2020 presidential election petition hearing. Eight citizens died following the 2020 elections, first in the history of the Fourth Republic. The outcome have compelled Gbensuglo (2022) to describe the election as contentious, an election which failed the Fourth Republic of Ghana’s democratic credibility test. The accusations and perceived defense of the EC by the NDC and NPP respectively, the functional errors and admission of error by the EC, the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the three commissioners and the outcome of the 2020 elections calls for an evaluation of the EC’s independence using the EMB independence framework of institutional, financial, functional and personnel dimensions hence this study.

Methodology

The study employed the qualitative approach to research with a purposive sampling technique. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected from 30 respondents with the breakdown as follows: officials of the EC at the national office, one representative each of the 12 parties that contested the 2020 general elections from the national offices (one who attended IPAC meetings). In addition, two representatives each from the two main political parties with representation in parliament and two governance and election management experts. The remaining 10 respondents were randomly selected from the Ayawaso West Wuogon and Shai-Osudoku Constituencies for the purposes of cost and time. These names were sourced from the voters’ roll in the two constituencies. Face to face interview was the main instrument utilized in collecting the primary data. Journal articles, book chapters, official publications and internet sources (interviews and press conferences by key actors of the Electoral Commission of Ghana and major political actors in Ghana’s electoral politics) constituted the sources of secondary data for the study. Data from these sources were reviewed to augment the fieldwork and flesh it out. The secondary sources also brought out some of the nuances, intricacies, complexities and contextual elements at play in the conduct of the 2020 elections thereby enhancing the assessment of the independence of the Electoral Commission. Primary data was collected between March and June, 2021 while secondary data was a continuous one as events unfolded (Bryman, 2008:293).

As part of the processes of content analysis, the interviews, commentary and press conferences of the respondents as well as the literature from secondary sources were hand coded to organize the data into themes for meaning and interpretation (Creswell, 2009:186). Following the coding, words such as independence and lack of it across the four EMB independence assessment framework emerged to form the themes and the basis of thematic analysis for the study. The themes were systematically and objectively analyzed and interpreted to ensure transparency in the study (Bryman, 2008:289). Furthermore, inferences and interpretations were drawn from the themes in the data analysis to assess the EMBs independence in the conduct of the 2020 elections vis-à-vis the constitutional mandate.

Assessment of the independence of the Electoral Commission in the conduct of the 2020 general elections

Independence of EMBs is a complex issue that often proves highly controversial in emerging democracies, especially when elections are contested (Lekorwe, 2006). As a result, assessing the independence of Ghana’s EC during the conduct of the 2020 elections is a herculean and tricky task. Making it even more difficult is the existence of legal regimes such as the 1992 Constitution and Act 145 of 1993 which all provided for the EC’s independence. The core principle underpinning independence is that the commission should be empowered to follow the constitutional, legal, and electoral regulatory framework without political and other interference in its operations (Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020). Independence of EMBs is simply construed as the degree to which EMBs are autonomous and not subject to the dictates of the government (ruling party), opposition political parties and other actors within the political space. EMBs independence is crucial for electoral credibility, integrity, public trust and confidence in the electoral process and outcome. This section is subdivided into four, namely, institutional, financial, functional and personnel independence.

Institutional independence

Institutional independence refers to whether the electoral commission is ‘independent from politics’ (van Ham & Garnett, 2019: 317) in terms of the electoral laws, regulations and the constitution. The indicators of institutional independence are EMB independence from politics formally stated in electoral laws or constitution, EMB decisions can be overturned, and if yes, by whom? and EMB accountable to whom? (van Ham & Garnett, 2019; Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020). The Commission’s autonomy is determined by how it is set up in terms of strength and legal standing. It also borders on how the members of the secretariat are selected, security of tenure. The extent to which the Commissioners is in charge of the organisation. Is the Commission in charge of its own recruitment, promotion, transfer and compensation issues? The EMB is set-up as a distinctive legal entity.

As indicated, the EC of Ghana is a constitutional creation (Article 43(1). Its independence is equally guaranteed. According to Article 43(1) “Except as provided in this Constitution or in any other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission, shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority” (Republic of Ghana, 1992:44). The EC during the 2020 electioneering process demonstrated its institutional independence in diverse ways. Notable instances were; during the run up to the elections, the Minority in Parliament invited the EC Chair on two occasions to brief the Members of Parliament on its preparedness for the election but the EC did not honour any of the invitations (Prime News Ghana, 2020). This largely shows that the EC takes its institutional independence to the extreme. However, what is not known is whether the EC could publicly turn down invitation from the executive during the 2020 general elections because the top three commissioners were appointed by the sitting president who also contested for the presidency. The EC’s institutional independence during the 2020 election was unevenly maintained. As indicated by one interviewee from the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG)

“In the lead up to the 2020 general elections, the EC was more responsive to the executive than the other arms of government the Minority in parliament in particular. Another point of reference was when the National House of Chiefs (this is a body established by Article 271 of the 1992 Constitution) invited the Chairperson of the Commission to brief it on developments, the EC equally failed to honour the invitation. The question that kept lingering in my mind is will the EC turndown same invitations from the executive. This posture is very dangerous to Ghana’s multiparty democracy” (Interview with an Official of the Institute of Democratic Development (IDEG), 2021).

The literature on EMBs honouring invitations from State institutions such as the legislature is mixed. The EC like all public institutions funded by the taxpayer may be required to file accounts; commissioners may be called before a specific ministry, or parliament to explain their actions. These accountability mechanisms are critical because governments have a responsibility to ensure value for money for taxpayers and to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of these institutions. Thus, formal lines of accountability do not necessarily undermine independence (Cheeseman & Elklit, 2020: 10-11). On the other hand, such practices have the tendency to undermine the independence of the EC. In the words of Makulilo (2011), it is important to look both at the legal framework within which EMBs operate and the way accountability works in reality.

As part of the electoral process reform, the EC in 1994 established the Interparty Advisory Committee (IPAC). The IPAC is an advisory body to the EC with decentralized units at the regional and district levels known as the Regional and District Interparty Advisory Committee (RIPAC and DIPAC) respectively. This body has over the years made recommendations which have shaped and improved the electoral process (Debrah, 2015; Gyampo, 2017). However, the EC in asserting its institutional independence in the prelude to the 2020 elections had a frosty relationship with the Interparty Advisory Committee (IPAC) by declaring it unconstitutional and that the EC was not under any obligation to consult it before taking decisions. In some instances, decisions arrived at during IPAC meetings were changed by the EC without recourse to the IPAC before implementation. While clamouring for its institutional independence, the same EC ironically inaugurated the Eminent Advisory Committee to help it address challenges. The declaration of IPAC as unconstitutional amidst the claim of independence while establishing the Eminent Advisory Committee looks unclear. Drawing inference from the above, the EC’s response to institutional independence and accountability is mixed during the 2020 elections because in some instances, it glued to its independence by rejecting invitation from constitutional bodies and ignoring IPAC decisions while it established the Eminent Advisory Committee to counsel it on thorny issues. These inconsistencies makes one wonder whether the EC was genuinely minded about its independence during the 2020 electioneering process.

Another indicator of institutional independence is whether EMB decisions can be overturned, and if yes, by whom? During the 2020 electoral process, the EC made many decisions key among them was the compilation of new voters register with Ghana Card and Ghanaian Passport as the primary identification document and the guarantor system contrary to the hitherto use of birth certificate. The main opposition political party (NDC), individuals and some civil society organisations opposed the decision. In expressing their displeasure, the NDC for instance sued the EC as a body corporate. The NDC averred that the EC lacks the power to compile a new register less than six months into an election. In addition, the commission could “compile a register of voters only once, and thereafter revise it periodically, as may be determined by law” (Citinewsroom, 2020). The NDC also demanded that the EC rescind its decision to amend Regulations 1 sub-regulations 3 of the Registrations of Voters Regulations, 2016 (C.I. 91) to Registrations of Voters (Amendment) Regulations 2020, which barred all existing voter identification cards as proof of identification. According to the NDC, it was “unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever”. In addition, a private citizen named Mark Takyi-Banson also sued the EC at the Supreme Court of Ghana on same issue. The Plaintiff sought a proper interpretation of Article 45(a) of the 1992 Constitutions of the Republic of Ghana, a declaration that the EC’s decision to compile a new voters register was not consistent with Article 45(a) of the 1992 Constitution, and finally challenged the Commission’s ruling out the use of birth certificate and old voters identity cards as identifications for compilations of the proposed new register (Ghana Web, 2020). The Supreme Court however, dismissed both cases, suggesting that existing voters’ ID cards and birth certificates do not prove citizenship, and should therefore be excluded in the compilation of the new voter register as identification document (Ghana Web, 2020). On this score, the EC passed the test of institutional independence because no actor was able to change its decision. The Apex Court, which can rule to change the EC’s decision, rather upheld it.

The institutional design of the EC with respect to the appointment of Commissioners that enjoins the President to appoint was a hurdle to the institutional independence of the EC during the 2020 general election with specific emphasis on how the three key officials were appointed (The Chairperson and the two deputies). During the 2016 electioneering campaigns, some top officials of the NPP criticized the appointment of the then Chairperson claiming she was unqualified and threatened to oust her and have their preferred person if they (NPP) won political power (Gyampo, 2017:105). This threat in opposition was actualized when the NPP assumed the rein of governance. Aside the removal of the three commissioners, the other issue that brought the independence of the EC under scrutiny was the appointment of two of the Commissioners. The Chairperson Jean Mensah prior to her appointment was the Executive Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs (a think tank) where she led a lot of programmes to reform the EC but she was noted for having a soft spot for the NPP (the government in power) and bias towards the NDC. The Deputy Commissioner in charge of Corporate Affairs was also accused of being a patron of the NPP on the University of Ghana, Legon campus. These two major appointments and the posture of the personnel undermined the institutional independence. The institutional independence during the 2020 general elections have been questioned and suspicious. The Executive Director of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD) likened the institutional independence vis-à-vis the appointment of the top officials to a football match.

“if you are going to have a soccer march with 2 teams and the referee is picked single handedly by the captain of one of the teams then the independence of the referee or umpire is called into question. So that is one of the angels we have tended to critique the independence of the EC especially from the executive during the 2020 election process, where the executive is a participant in the electoral game as a president and there were vacancies and in this case three vacancies fell within the tenure of that player and all three vacancies were filled by that player, certainly, under circumstances where the other team that had chosen the previous referee had its referee removed. Under no circumstances, I think the EC went into the 2020 elections with a certain cloud over its head over its independence” (Interview with the Executive Director of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), 2021).

The President as a presidential candidate and a rational being ceased the opportunity and took advantage of the legal and institutional design (without filters) to recruit people to fill the vacant positions. It is worthy of note that the President did not err in the appointment of the Chairperson and the two deputies because the constitutional provision in Article 70(2) were adhered to. However, the threat in opposition to axe the incumbent and following through raises eyebrow and the behaviour of the Commissioners in the build up to the 2020 elections leaves much to be desired. For instance, the Deputy Commissioner in charge of Corporate Affairs said in a live interview that the NDC (biggest opposition party) was a threat to Ghana’s democracy (Citinewsroom, 2019). Leading members of the NDC have described this as unfortunate and failed the institutional independence test of the EC in the 2020 electioneering process. What even aggravated the EC’s lack of institutional independence in the 2020 general election was the regular agreement between the EC and the NPP on all electoral issues and opposition’s disagreement. One of the respondents intimated:

“If you look at the EC since its appointment, it appears that everything that it did, purported to do or propose to do you see the endorsement of the governing party and the objection of the opposition almost on every issue so an observer looking at that as a proxy for independence or actual independence could say that this coincidence is too much” (Interview with the Executive Director of CDD, Ghana, 2021).

Judging from the above, it can be inferred that the EC of Ghana during the 2020 electioneering process was not entirely independent institutionally even though it asserted and gained independence in some areas of operation. Its actions and inactions largely disqualified it from passing the institutional independence test.

Financial independence

According to van Aaken (2009), financial independence refers to the ability of the EMB to have its own accounts (usually in combination with institutional independence), as well as the question of who decides on the budget. The elements of financial independence are how is EMB budget allocated?, who allocates EMB budget?, EMB control over budget? and EMB control over internal organization and staff?

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides for the financial independence of the EC (Republic of Ghana, 1992:47). As such, the EC generated its own budget (but part of the national budget presented by the Minister of Finance to Parliament as required by Article 179(1)), approved by parliament and was in charge of utilization. The EC was also responsible for its day to day administration, staff appointment (permanent and temporary). The EC was also responsible for its procurement activities. In the 2020 election process, the Commission deployed open competitive tendering and best procurement processes. This resulted in reduction in the cost per voter. For instance, while it cost GH¢75.57 ($13) per voter in the 2016 elections, the EC spent GH¢44.66 ($7.7) per voter in the 2020 elections hence, making a total savings of GH¢523,409,980 or $90,243,100 (Myjoyonline, 2021).

However, the key issue, which cast doubts over the financial independence is that the Ministry of Finance, which falls under the executive arm of government, does the disbursement of the EC’s approved budget. For the 2020 elections, the EC budgeted for GH¢ 1.3 billion but, it was reduced to GH¢1.06 billion. This on the face value undermined the financial and budgetary independence of the EC. However, additional amount was added that made the total disbursement GH¢ 1.269 billion still short of the initial budgeted amount (Interview with the Deputy Director, Research of the EC, 2021). The shortfall also had implication for independence under this criterion. The quantum of budgetary allocation has implications for leadership and decision-making autonomy. It is good to note that, for the first time in the Commission’s history, the entire amount was released in a single disbursement and the cost of the election was fully funded by the Government of Ghana as part of the Ghana Beyond Aid Agenda (Interview with the Deputy Director, Research of the EC, 2021). The internal funding of the election was good because elections are sovereign acts of states and all state institutions including the EC must be funded from the consolidated fund; however, some amount of external donor support always helps in making the EC more open, transparent and accountable to other stakeholders like Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), political parties etc. Paradoxically, in 2020 the EC declared that it did not need external funding. This turn of event though good but it did make the EC less independent financially on the executive whose leader was seeking reelection. In practice, whenever, a donor supports the EC financially, conditions such as transparency, accountability etc were inbuilt into the agreement for the donor support. However, that was not the case during the 2020 elections due to absolute state funding. In the words of the leader of one of the anti-government pressure groups,

The EC started dealing with third parties and CSOs with some attitude simply because it did not receive any funding from say United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department for International Development (DfID). This made the EC feel it was free from CSOs, IPAC and other bodies that call for transparency and fairness in elections. This one factor characterized the unhealthy relationship between the EC on one hand and IPAC and CSOs on the other hand on issues of procurement and other operational issues during the 2020 elections (Interview with the Executive Director of Alliance for Social Equity and Public Accountability (ASEPA), 2021).

In a similar vein, the total reliance of the EC on the executive for its budgetary allocation during the 2020 election affected the EC’s independence. In the words of a respondents from the IDEG,

“The receipt of the total budgetary allocation of the EC during the 2020 election hyped the perceived lack of independence of the Commission and partly culminated into the EC and the ruling party almost agreeing on key electoral issues such as new voters’ register, passport and Ghana Card as the only officially recognized document for registration among others” (Interview with an Official of the Institute of Democratic Development (IDEG), 2021)

Whereas the CSOs were lamenting about the total funding of the 2020 elections by the state vis-à-vis the ECs transparency and fairness in the process, a respondent of the NPP (political party in power) averred that

“The government is pursuing the agenda of Ghana Beyond Aid (a slogan for a situation where Ghana will stop receiving foreign assistance) and elections are one of the things of the state that must be funded from the public purse to avoid unnecessary interference in the governance process of the country from external sources” (Interview with NPP member in the Ayawaso Wuogon Constituency, 2021).

Following the total reliance on the Government of Ghana for the funding of the elections and related matters, the EC was unable to pay the 233,632 Temporary Officials made up of Returning Officers and their Deputies, Presiding Officers, Verification Officers, Name Reference Officers as well as COVID-19 Ambassadors for the 2020 elections and was looking up to the Ministry of Finance to release funds for payment. In a press statement, the EC indicated, “it is working with the Ministry of Finance to ensure that the payment is done by the end of April, 2021”. That is four months after the general elections (Citinewsroom, 2021).

Overall, the EC in the 2020 elections was moderately independent financially because there was timely release of financial resources in spite of the shortfall of GH¢0.031billion of the approved financial allocations, it was in charge of its procurement, expenditure, and internal issues. However, it had to rely on the Ministry of Finance for the release of its budgetary allocation and the payment of temporary workers after four months of work.

Functional independence

Functional independence defines the competences an EMB has; or put differently, the level of delegation to the EMB. It is the core or essential tasks including the determination of who is eligible to vote; receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants, conducting polling, counting and tabulating the votes (International IDEA, 2006). The indicators of functional independence are the scope of competences delegated to the EMB?, how many other organizations are involved in organizing, monitoring and certifying elections? According to the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 1992:44), the functions of the Electoral Commission are as follows:

1. to compile the register of voters and revise it at such periods as may be determined by law,

2. to demarcate the electoral boundaries for both national and local government elections,

3. to conduct and supervise all public elections and referenda,

4. to educate the people on the electoral process and its purpose,

5. to undertake programmes for the expansion of the registration of voters, and

6. to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

In the conduct of the 2020 general elections, the EC performed all the constitutional functions except (b) because no electoral boundaries were demarcated (a functional incompetence discussed later). In the lead up to the elections, the EC had challenges bordering on the discharge of its functions particularly the compilation of new register of voters and the emergence of coronavirus. This propelled the emergence of anomic interest group known as the Interparty Resistant against new voters register. This group staged three demonstration in the Northern, Ashanti and Greater Accra Regions against the EC in the performance of its constitutional duty. The largest opposition political party the National Democratic Congress also sued the EC against this exercise and the requirements for registration. The EC intimated that only the Ghana Card and Ghanaian Passport were the only valid documents for registration and people who do not have must get someone who is already registered to guarantee for them. The NDC on the other hand espoused that birth certificate and existing voters ID card should be accepted (Myjoyonline.com, 2020). A seven-member jury chaired by the Chief Justice unanimously ruled in favour of the EC (Myjoyonline, 2020). Thus boosting the functional and decision making independence criterion of the EC.

The EC also rolled out programmes as means of educating the people on the electoral processes and purposes. Notable among them were “Let the Citizens Know” press conference, which started on July 8, 2020. This programme was aimed at updating concerned stakeholders and the public on the new voters’ registration exercise and other election related matters, posters and leaflets on various electoral activities, notice of publication of polls, composition of songs in various local languages played on both radio and television and regular updates on the EC’s website. The EC also expunged 30,000 registered voters from the register. In the words of the Deputy Commissioner in charge of Corporate Affairs, Dr. Bossman Eric Asare, “these people were engaged in infractions. 14,000 were put on the exception list while 16,000 were on the multiple list” (Interview with the Deputy Director, Research of the EC, 2021). The EC also deployed e-governance during the 2020 electioneering period through the use of short code which allowed electorates to verify their registration during the voter exhibition exercise.

The EC also performed its constitutional duty by declaring the winner of the 2020 presidential election results on December 9, 2020. The NPP’s Nana Addo Danquah Akufo Addo was declared the winner with 51.595% while John Dramani Mahama had 47.366% (Ghana Web, 2020). Functional incompetence was displayed. For example, the EC chairperson indicated that Techiman South Constituency with a voter population of 128,018 was excluded because the outcome was being contested. The EC chair was quick to add, “The difference between the total number of votes between the first and second candidates is 515,524. As a result, even if we added the 128,018 to the results of the second candidate, it would not change the outcome of the Presidential Election. Hence our declaration of the 2020 results without that of Techiman South … If we were to add the results from Techiman South Constituency, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo would obtain 50.8% of the votes and John Dramani Mahama, would obtain 47.873% of the votes”. In addition, the declaration was greeted with functional errors with the EC admitting that it “inadvertently used 13,433,573 as the total valid votes cast instead of 13,119,460” while it insisted that it did not affect the final results of the candidates (Pulse Ghana, 2020). Another functional incompetence exhibited by the EC was the altering of the results on its website on numerous occasions. This brought the credibility and integrity of the 2020 elections into disrepute that finally ended at the Supreme Court with the NDC presidential candidate challenging the validity of the declared results.

Most of the contentious issues during the 2020 elections bordered on the functions of the EC and were decided by the Supreme Court. The EC prevailed in all the issues thereby given it 100% functional independence. A respondent at CDD-Ghana postulated,

“The judicial decisions went to the extremes of the spectrum. This was even more pronounced during the election petition where the jury did not allow the EC to mount the witness box to testify. In the 2020 elections, accountability of the EC in terms of its functions was lacking and this created a monster of the EC. Independence and accountability operate in a mirror kind of image of each other; functional independence and accountability were not balanced during the 2020 elections” (Interview with the Executive Director of CDD, Ghana, 2021).

Functional independence of the EC during the 2020 elections was at big risk because the Verification Management System (VMS) was under the total control of STL an Israeli company. However, the EC asserted its functional independence. This was one of the reasons for the compilation of a new voters’ register for the 2020 general elections (Interview with an Official of the Institute of Democratic Development (IDEG), 2021).

The core electoral functions were performed by the EC without sharing the power with any other institution. However, since election was a multi-stakeholder process, the EC collaborated with other stakeholders such as the media, election observers, and political parties among others. All these stakeholders were given accreditation by the EC to observe the elections.

Other functions they performed were in relation to protection against the deadly coronavirus through the provision of PPEs at the polling stations. According to the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO),) (2020) report, COVID-19 safety materials such as thermometer gun (95%); soap and water (94%); hand sanitizer (93%); and scanner wipes (78%) were available at most polling stations. In their estimation, less than 1% of polling stations lacked these protocols.

Electorates interviewed indicated the difficulties they encountered in the registration process such as the verification machines not working, waiting in the sun for their turn to register which resulted in their temperature rising and EC officials asking them to stand aside due to suspicion of having coronavirus. Other views expressed by electorates were challenges in getting their names at their polling stations during the exhibition of the voter register, names at different polling stations on voting day and failure of the verification machines to verify and confirm their identity to vote as well as the interference by polling agents at the centers throughout the electioneering process (voter registration, exhibition of voter register and voting day).

One major area of functional incompetence during the 2020 electoral process was the failure of the EC to create the Guan Constituency. Following the creation of six new regions in 2019, the Oti Region was calved out of the Volta Region. The Guan area was under the Hohoe Constituency in the Volta Region. As a requirement no constituency should cut across two regions and districts hence the need to create the Guan Constituency whose geographical coverage include Santrokofi, Akpafu, Likpe and Lolobi (SALL). The inability of the EC to lay the Constitutional Instrument for the creation resulted in the citizens in these areas not having representation in parliament during the Eighth Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

Evaluating, the EC had the functional independence and it was sustained through the judiciary during lawsuits. What is disturbing during the election under review was the gross functional incompetence and error exhibited by the EC thus its field staff as well as the Chairperson herself which culminated in the presidential election results ending at the Supreme Court for adjudication. The EC in fact had absolute functional independence which it mismanaged.

Personnel independence

Personnel independence refers to the way the highest members of the EMB are appointed, their status and under what circumstances they can be removed. Here, one finds the usual safeguard variables to include appointment for one time only or there may be re-appointment, how are the heads protected against arbitrary removal, do they have the usual immunity of judges, etc (van Aaken, 2009). The test case for personnel independence are numerous. They include who selects EMB members?, EMB members selected based on expertise or partisanship or both?, term length of EMB members?, can EMB members be reappointed?, can EMB members be removed, and if so, by whom?, protection against arbitrary removal? and provisions compatible with other public offices?

The 1992 Constitution provides for permanent tenure for the Commissioners (Article 44(2 and 3) and other employees as well. The process for their removal is complex and laborious. The seeming lack of personnel independence is in the area of appointing other staff of the Commission. For instance, Article 53 though gave power of appointment to the Commission; it does that acting in consultation with the Public Services Commission (Republic of Ghana, 1992:47). Though there is no evidence of lack of personnel independence in this regard, there were widespread allegations that the EC in the lead up to the 2020 election appointed sympathizers of the NPP as both permanent and temporal staff.

Personnel independence of the EC is a problem since the return to multi-party democracy in 1993. According to the 1992 Constitution, the President acting in consultation with the Council of State shall appoint the members of the Commission. The President does not need another body to approve of his nominations. The President can only put people who are loyal to him. Ministers are nominated with the prior approval of Parliament. Chief Justice is appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State and with the prior approval of parliament. Even Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) are appointed with the prior approval of two-thirds majority of assembly members present at the meeting. However, that of the EC is different (absence of filters). Therefore, there is the very high probability that the appointing authority appoints people who are supportive of his actions and inactions. That is where the danger lies. In the 2020 elections, it was terrible, ugly and sad. By the time the president came to power, four out of the seven members of the commission had either been dismissed or retired. Therefore, the president filled four positions. Before the December 2020 elections, he appointed two new commissioners because people had retired. Therefore, by the time of the December 7, 2020 elections, the president who is himself a candidate appointed all members except one and this explains the brouhaha. Hence the questioning of the personnel independence of the EC.

The almost Nana Addo Danquah Akufo Addo appointed commissioners justified the reason why people lacked confidence in the EC and its’ independence as far as the 2020 elections were concerned and the election ending at the court (Interview with the Executive Director of CDD-Ghana, 2021). In another respondent’s view, “the EC tried to be independent as much as possible, however, there were too many incidence or developments leading up to the December 2020 elections that created the impression that the EC was not completely independent” (Interview with an Official of the Institute of Democratic Development (IDEG), 2021).

The circumstances surrounding the removal of the EC Chair and the two deputies and the appointment of same compelled a respondent of the NDC to comment;

“How can these Commissioners be independent of the ruling party (NPP), in fact the current EC is an extension of the election directorate of the NPP. Can’t you see that they agree virtually on everything? The EC is actually in bed with the NPP (Interview with a National Democratice Congress (NDC) official in the Shai-Osudoku Constituency in the Greater Accra Region, 2021).

The EC Chairperson in a rhetorical response stated “If am in bed with the NPP, it’s almost four years, I should have two children with the NPP by now (Adomonline.com, 2019).

The response of the Chairperson to the perceived bias and lack of independence was not in good taste. The Chairperson should have used the opportunity to address the concerns of the NDC and other concerned citizens. The rhetorical response was below the belt because looking at the literacy level in Ghanaians, most citizens might end up misunderstanding the rhetorical response.

It must be indicated that the President Nana Addo complied with the constitutional provision in making the appointments hence personnel independence of the EC in the 2020 elections was high. However, the perceived political inclination of the appointees prior to the appointments (especially the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson, Corporate Affairs) have called the personnel independence of the Commission during the 2020 elections into question. The lack of personnel independence of the Commission was predetermined. In the words of Gyampo (2017:105), “during the 2016 electioneering campaigns, some top officials of the NPP criticized the appointment of the then Chairperson claiming she was unqualified and threatened to remove her and have their preferred person if they (NPP) won political power”.

Conclusion

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana provided for the independence of the Electoral Commission in all the four criteria considered in this study. However, a careful examination of the institutional design revealed that the EC is not entirely independent taking cognizance of for instance the Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 145) (Republic of Ghana, 1993) and Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) (Republic of Ghana, 2016). These perceived lack of independence were amplified during the 2020 elections with the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the three top commissioners, the timing for the retirement of the three out of the four non-executive commissioners and their subsequent replacement. The total reliance of the EC on the executive for budgetary allocation to fund the elections and payments to temporary staff after the elections have watered down the financial independence of the EC. In addition, the series of coincidence between the NPP and the Commission agreeing on all thorny issues such as compilation of voters register, appointment of the three Commissioners pertaining to the 2020 elections and the main opposition the NDC opposing virtually all these issues all point to the fact that the EC was not wholly independent in their operations. Furthermore, the unanimous rulings of the Judges of the Supreme Court though strengthened the functional independence in all election related cases during the 2020 electioneering period, it however occurred at the expense of accountability. This was at its pick during the election petition where the justices ruled against the EC testifying in the witness box.

In the nutshell, the institutional design of the EC, its posture towards other election stakeholders, complete funding by the state and the extreme resultant agreement between the EC and the ruling party portrayed the EC as not entirely independent in the four criteria of independence evaluated by the study as well as the functional incompetence in the conduct of the 2020 elections.

The EC being adjudged as not entirely independent during the 2020 general elections has implications for Ghana’s democracy. The implications are first election stakeholders such as the NDC and others in the political arena may lose faith, trust and confidence in the current EC. This may undermine the integrity and credibility of future elections and Ghana’s path to democratic consolidation. Second, the lack of faith and trust among the actors may hinder the needed cooperation and consensus building which are vital ingredients in the democratic process. For instance, the NDC boycotted the IPAC and submitted electoral reforms to the EC immediately after the 2020 elections which the latter rejected saying the former should seek redress at IPAC (which it had boycotted). There is a tensed atmosphere as the country is fervently preparing for the 2024 general elections.

The EC should try and build bridges with the NDC and the latter should also not take entrenched position. Civil society organizations and moral voices should be objective in their political advocacy to reign in all the political actors. The executive arm of government should give free hand to the EC in all areas of operation and where any vacancy is to be filled at the top echelon, the President should not appoint politically exposed person or party loyalist to further poison the already toxic and polarized political environment. There should be a review of the appointing authority of the President to the EC through the introduction of filters such as broader consultation with election stakeholders, vetting/interviews prior to the appointment etc to give the EC the needed independence.

If these steps are taking, Ghana’s democracy will be strengthened and will be recognized for electoral credibility and integrity among the comity of nations and the independence of the EC will be strengthened.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).