Social injustice and public perception of Biafra social movements in the South East Nigeria

Abstract

This study examined social injustice and public perception of Biafra social movements in the south east Nigeria. A cross-section of 1191 participants, comprising 717 (60.2%) males and 474 (39.8%) females, was purposively recruited among members of the public in three southeastern States. Descriptive statistics and linear regression were used to analyse the quantitative data. The results revealed that 89.3% of the variance in Biafra movements resulted from social injustices caused by the State and its institutions and actors (β = 0.95, t = 56.46, p ≤ 0.05). Both theoretical and empirical evidence further indicated that marginalised, excluded and dispossessed ethnic group may have no option but to agitate for their rights and emancipation which may culminate in secession attempts in the long run. The conclusion was that separation from the system that is believed to have persistently nurtured social injustices would be alternatively sought if protests for justice restoration in unfair central political arrangements cannot be effectively addressed, suggesting that secession was not the underlying objective and ideology of the advocates. Seeing that Nigeria’s social structure, combined with political economy, is unjust, maleficent and unbalanced, the policy implications call for inclusive institutional restructuring to reflect equity, justice and fairness in the distribution of power, authority and other vital assets in the national polity.

Keywords:

• Biafra social movements
• political economy
• public perception
• social injustice
• social structure

Reviewing Editor:

• George Mudimu, Development Sciences, Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology, Marondera, Zimbabwe

Subjects:

• African Studies
• Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Sociology & Social Policy

Introduction

Social injustice is widespread and both advanced and advancing societies are adversely affected by this global social problem with visible lifelong negative outcomes (see Abman et al., 2020). Social injustice occurs when someone or a group entrusted with the management and administration of common wealth, authority or power offers preferential treatment to their own group without excuse or justification at the expense of members of another group. It explains the unfair treatment of people or groups within a State, occasioned by opposing religious beliefs, sociocultural identities, gender and ethnic lines. The outcome of social injustice is usually disadvantageous and detrimental to those who experience the occurrence. These include deprived and/or frustrated opportunity structures concerning the distribution of material and human resources, employment, healthcare, education, policing and justice. Social injustice is a manifestation of both relative and marginal social, political, legal and economic exclusions, deprivations, and frustrations that provoke agitation and social movements (for details, see Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021) – this has been a growing concern for many governments throughout the world, including Nigeria.

Contextually, both social injustice and social movement are subjects of activist/radical/critical criminology. Social movement is the sequence of co-ordinated collective action and effort, violent or nonviolent, carried out by people of the same or similar ethnic origin, religion or sociocultural belief who take collective social actions that reflect nationalist ideologies to correct social injustices in the political system of their country. The argument has been that social movement exemplifies a ‘societal level force’ (Maton, 2000) for groups in quest of social justice and empowerment (Tremblay et al., 2017). Although it is a global phenomenon, social or separatist movements do not develop and spread uniformly. Different societies, at different points in history, have experienced negative pulls. For instance, ‘throughout history, separatism has manifested itself in various forms as groups have grown dissatisfied with their governments. Even the ancient Roman Empire—which was synonymous with order, peace, and civilisation in most of its conquered territories—had its Celtic resisters—the Britons and Gauls’ (Renanm, 1882 as cited in Beary, 2008, p. 39).

Nigeria is currently experiencing numerous national problems and challenges, including recurring Biafra social movements. The causes, effects, trends and patterns have over the years received much attention from the media, academia, civil liberty organisations, faith-based institutions and the criminal justice system. A popular argument commonly found in most literature is that the phenomenon is a germinated seed planted by the British administration (Awofeso, 2017; Bamidele, 2009; Duruji, 2009; Ibeanu et al., 2016; Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016; Tamuno, 1970; Nwobashi, 2014). Indeed, the British hegemony partly sowed the seeds of discord and destruction in colonial Nigeria which have germinated and the fruits are being harvested. This it does by instigating and joining forces with the North to undermine the South, particularly the Igbo nation, hoping to sustain its divisive indirect rule policies among the favoured ethnic groups. It was an inroad to exert revenge on the latter for fiercely resisting colonial oppressors and their local advocates and causing the propagation of colonialism to fail woefully. The series of threats of secession by Hausa–Fulani (mainly) and Yoruba and the colonial connivance in downplaying the trends and granting the undue demands of early separatist agitators at the detriment of other federating nations speak volumes (see also Nnam, 2019; Literature Review session for details).

The jubilation associated with the attainment of political independence on the 1 October 1960 was short-lived, as ethnic agitations occasioned by several perceived injustices became widespread and habitual. Several studies have linked the problem to the 1966 pogrom against the Easterners living in Northern Nigeria, which was a precursor to the State-induced ethnic tensions and conflicts that intertwined with other dehumanising factors to trigger the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967–1970 (Achebe, 2012; Adangor, 2017; Adibe, 2017; Alumona et al., 2017; Ibeanu et al., 2016; Ezeani, 2013; Nwobashi, 2014; Onuoha, 2011; Thompson et al., 2016). The two arguments or perspectives are historical, factual; however, they failed to deeply interrogate how the public perceives institutionalised social injustices in relation to the cause-effect of Biafra social movements. There has been a rebirth of similar complaints of entrenched social injustice in recent times because many issues that caused the social discontentment of 1966 and the war in 1967–1970 seem to have been ignored or perhaps not effectively addressed to forestall the reoccurrence of agitations for Biafra. Some of the early predictors of the Biafra movement, such as marginalisation, exclusion, unequal political representations, nepotism and ethnic sentiments, still manifest in present-day Nigeria (Achebe, 2012; Alumona et al., 2017; Duruji, 2009, 2012; Ezemenaka & Adangor, 2017; Ibeanu et al., 2016; Onuoha, 2011; Thompson et al., 2016). The implication is that Biafranism is among the series of sociopolitical movements that have affected the art of governance since independence. In addition to economic reasons, the underlying factors responsible for the formation of this social movement are rooted in the social injustice that pervades national polity (Ikeh, 2021; Nnam et al., 2021).

The body of existing knowledge and literature may contain vital ideas and information that could further help explain the trajectories and aetiological complexities of Biafra social movements. However, from previous studies, there is both a ‘research gap’ – limitations in the previous research – and a ‘knowledge gap’ – what is known and what should be further known for more nuanced analyses and understanding of what is unknown in the Biafra saga. The problem is that very little large-scale empirical research that sampled public opinion on how social injustice frames and gives rise to the escalation in Biafra separatist agitations currently exists (see Ibeanu et al., 2016; Nnam, 2019 for exemption). Nevertheless, the movement has threatened, in most instances, the peace and unity of corporate existence of Nigeria. This calls for more scientific interrogations of the vital cores of social injustice and related predictor variables to understand fully the missing links and proffer lasting solutions to the problem. Although the subject of the Biafra social movement has attracted increasing attention in the research community, data on the topic of interest are limited. Therefore, the line of enquiry of this study is to determine, from the lenses of the public, how social injustices in the central government of Nigeria intensify and sustain Biafra social movements, despite prevailing and excessive State repressions. The study further hypothesised that State social injustices are responsible for the persistent separatist agitations in South East Nigeria.

Predictors and historical development of separatist agitations in Nigeria

Several factors are responsible for people’s involvement in social movements. The factors range from a dysfunctional social structure and political economy to systemic social injustice that results from deprivation, marginalisation, inequality and other frustrating circumstances. Seeing social justice as opposite of social injustice, Kraynak (2018, p. 3) explained that ‘one of the most powerful phrases in politics is ‘social justice,’ which is widely used in political (social) movements protesting inequality, resisting corrupt and authoritarian regimes, and opposing military interventions that are deemed unjust’. Societal structures are enlivened by social justice, while social injustice is a cog in the wheel of societal stability, peace and progress. Some elements of social justice are visibly lacking in the political economy of Nigeria, and these interact with other structural deficiencies to breed discontentment and eventual protests and social movements. The point at issue is that people who suffer goal blockade and strains driven by a lack of social justice in the social system are predisposed to agitations, motivated to right wrongs, and strived to be liberated.

Accordingly, Ibeanu et al. (2016) and Alumona et al. (2017) further stated that the feeling of unfair treatment, which is a common belief among members of social movements, cannot be ignored or thrust aside in any genuine effort to understand and resolve renewed Biafra movements. The complexities of the reappearance of Biafra separatist agitations can best be explained and understood at the individual and societal levels of analyses using social injustice variables as progressively adumbrated. For instance, both extant and current studies (see Gurr, 1970; Aluko et al., 2022) have theorised that frequent and long-drawn-out frustrations, both at the individual and societal levels, could result in an explosion of protests and agitations. At the societal level (the focal concern of this study), such frustrations can be worsened by the continuous government’s marginalisation of certain groups in key national structures and resources (see also Breuer & Elson, 2017). And, according to Ordu (2017), dissatisfaction displays a ‘collective restlessness’ in the structures of society, particularly in the polity. Depending on the nature and degree of disapproval, the resultant strain causes rebellion and grievances among advocates of social justice. Agitation tends to escalate if the main predictors are the government and political representatives. Arowosegbe (2009) and Ordu (2017) contended that most freedom fighters in Nigeria felt that their regions were not well represented in the central government’s activities. To communicate their discontentment for improvement, groups may engage the government in rebel grievances aimed at establishing self-governance, where justice, equity and fairness will be upheld and sustained. Successive governments have worsened the problem by frequently engaging both military and police combatants to attack nonviolent and unarmed protesting populations.

Nnam et al. (2021) argued that the Nigerian government failed to employ democratic approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in resolving the Biafra social movements from the outset. State repression, labelling and criminalisation have dominated the countermeasures advanced to address the problem, and these have been counterproductive. Haralambos et al. (2008, p. 335) further referred the making of antisocial person (deviant, delinquent or criminal) to both ‘phenomenology’ and ‘interactionism’ frameworks that “emphasise the importance of the way that the law is (made and) enforced, are concerned with the process of labelling individuals as deviants (criminals), and concentrate on studying the subjective states of individuals rather than the structure of society as a whole” which could assist greatly in providing solutions to the recurring problem. Having explored the research background, problem statement and literature on social injustice-separatism causality in some depth, it becomes necessary to review its historical development in order to expand boundaries of knowledge and appreciate how and where the problem began and spread.

Separatist agitation is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, peculiar to Igbo people, and/or originates therefrom. Historically, the first threat of secession was initiated by the Western region of Nigeria shortly before the amalgamation of 1914. Barr Williams Safera and his supporters, for instance, sued the British colonial government, agitating that Yoruba land should not be part of the unification of Nigeria (Bamidele, 2009 as cited in Nwobashi, 2014). Tamuno (1970), and Alumona et al. (2017) linked the act of secession attempts to Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto, who later became the Premier of Northern Nigeria. The Sarduana had in 1914 unequivocally demanded independence for the North, strongly detesting the unification of his region with the Southern protectorate. Conceiving and describing the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates into a unified country as ‘the mistake of 1914’, the monarch and other Hausa leaders threatened to break away from the Union. In 1947, Sir Tafawa Balewa, who later became the Prime Minister of Nigeria, called for the separation of North from the South on the grounds that the latter may perhaps interfere in the growth and development of the former (Nwobashi, 2014).

Most of the early secessionist movements occurred in the 1950s. For instance, the 1950 Constitutional Conference held in Ibadan turned unpleasant when the Emirs of Zaria and Katsina threatened to secede from the rest of Nigeria except 50% of the legislative Seats in the central government were given to their region alone, Northern Nigeria (Alumona et al., 2017). And the British colonial authority was unhesitant to grant this importunate demand at the expense of other regions (Tamuno, 1970; Njoku, 2002; Duruji, 2009; Thompson et al., 2016; Alumona et al., 2017). Sharing similar views, Njoku (2002) and Ezemenaka and Prouza (2016) narrated that the history of separatist threats as instruments of political bargain is a feature of Nigeria’s political evolution. The problem dates back to 16 May 1953 when ‘the Northern region had threatened to secede, following a motion moved by delegates from the South proposing that Nigeria’s independence should be granted in 1956’ (Njoku, 2002, p. 250). The Northern threat of secession had its roots in fears that the region was unprepared to compete politically and economically with the South within an independent, unified Nigeria (Njoku, 2002; Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016). The people of Western Nigeria were not left out of the widespread demand for political autonomy in the 1950s. Awofeso (2017) stated that the Yoruba had, towards the end of 1953, threatened to demand separation from the rest of Nigeria due to the disagreement over the status of Lagos.

As then Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Alumona et al. (2017) contended, the colonial administrators and Nigerians of Northern and Eastern extractions preferred that Lagos remained a nonaligned (neutral) Province. Nevertheless, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and members of his party – Action Group (AC) – demanded it must be in command of the Western regional leadership. The debate was characterised by threats of secession. Their agitations deepened as ‘Chief Awolowo wrote a strong-worded letter to the Secretary of State’ (p. 6), notifying the Office about the right and readiness of the West (Yoruba land) ‘to decide whether or not they will remain in the proposed Nigerian Federation’ (Tamuno, 1970, p. 570 as cited in Alumona et al., 2017, p. 6). The Action Congress, under the headship of Chief Awolowo, followed up its demands to the 1954 Constitutional Conference held in Lagos, where the party strongly advocated that freedom of secession by any region should be included in the Constitution of Nigeria (Alumona et al., 2017). But the opposition party, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) that was headed by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, opposed the idea. It was then collectively resolved that no section of the Constitution, even as amended, should contain secession clause (Tamuno, 1970). On the part of Eastern Nigeria, the first attempt to break away from the federation was led by Chief Michael Okpara, then Premier of the region. Seeing imminent foul play in the federal elections of December 1964, Chief Okpara explicitly warned that the Eastern region would secede from Nigeria if they went ahead to rig the election in the Western region. Following the completion of the general election in 1965 were allegations of massive rigging and falsification of results against the NCNC, which accentuated the calls for secession by Easterners (Tamuno, 1970; Alumona et al., 2017). But the threat was immediately dropped without pacification or compensation which other regions enjoy when they threaten.

At its Seventh Annual Conference of 1954, the Ibibio nation demanded a separate State for the people of Ibibio, Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers Provinces before 1956. They resolved that, if their demand was not granted, they would declare themselves a Sovereign State (Udoma, 1987; Njoku, 2004; Nwobashi, 2014). There was also the existence of separatist struggles in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. The popular and violent among these movements took place in Tiv nation. In 1964, the Tiv rebelled against the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) for alleged failure to grant their demand – the creation of Middle Belt region. Nigeria experienced its first, real, violent and full-scale post-independence secession barely 1 month and a week after the 15 January 1966 coup. The revolutionary action was spearheaded by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, who on the 23 February 1966 declared the Niger Delta Peoples Republic under the social movement ‘Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF)’. Boro and his men courageously engaged the Nigerian army in a fierce battle which lasted for 12 days in the creek of Niger Delta before they were overpowered (Boro & Tebekaemi, 1982; Adangor, 2017; Awofeso, 2017; Ordu, 2017). This shows that separatist agitation is not limited to Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). Other separatist groups such as Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa People’s Congress (APC) and the like also exist (Okonta, 2012; Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016; Osisanwo & Akano, 2023a, 2023b; Aminu, 2024).

From the preceding arguments, it is clear that the initial indigenous seeds of social movement in Nigeria were not sowed by the Igbo. Quite a good number of calls and threats of separation, and even outright secession like in the case of the NDVF under Boro, predate Biafra separatism which began in 1967. The problem did not, for all intents and purposes, begin with the Igbo. The declaration of Sovereign State of Biafra on the 30 May 1967 and its sustenance up to the middle of January 1970 was a product of necessity. It was a necessary evil to embrace in defence of inescapable continuous lethal threats to human security and social justice in all their ramified implications (see also Forsyth, 1972; Omotola, 2009a, 2009b; Achebe, 2012; Ezeani, 2013). Nigeria, as in other African countries with ineffective and flawed political and legal systems, has continued to witness separatist agitations of different dimensions and magnitude.

Theoretical premise

There is no single complex social problem involving human actors as major predictors that can best be analysed using a single theory. A synthesis of different but compatible perspectives, theories, models, approaches or constructs is analytically profound and generally preferred in criminal investigations. The theoretical premise(s) of this study is integrative – weaving social discontent theory (Gurr, 1970), frustration-aggression theory (Dollard et al., 1939), relative deprivation theory (Blau and Blau, 1982), tyre burning theory (TBT) (Aluko, 2023) and integrated separatist agitation theory (ISAT) (Macpherson Uchenna Nnam, 2019) to form a connected explanatory whole. The intention is to provide a deeper and dialectical thesis of the complexities of Biafra social movement for a better understanding and preventive control plans. Social injustice gives rise to what Robert Gurr, since over five decades, termed ‘social discontent’ which results from the apparent inconsistency between people’s ‘value expectations’ – goods and conditions citizens consider as their lawful entitlements, and their ‘value capabilities’ – goods and conditions the citizenry believe they are capable of accomplishing if or when given a level playing field with regard to legitimate opportunity structures (see also Nnam, 2014).

Noteworthy is the fact that mere dissatisfaction does not often lead to social movements. Rather, the act of self-determination, whether violent or nonviolent, occurs when the frustration of people’s progression is excessive and unnecessarily prolonged with impunity, as in the case of Biafra’s apologists against the government of Nigeria. Gurr (1970) recognised in his extant study the fact that people or groups are at high risk of revolting when they feel short-changed and deprived of ‘value capabilities and expectations’ in comparison with other people and groups in society. The emphasis is on frustration, which finds expression in or through a ‘collective shared discontent’ behaviour (group agitations) against a political regime. Since the demands of Biafra supporters have always been misinterpreted by the Nigerian government as acts of terrorism and treasonable felony, supporters feel more discontented and frustrated (see also Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021; Osisanwo & Iyoha, 2020). It is worthy to note at this point of review that liberation struggles and State repressive approaches to suppress them are not limited to Biafra in the South East. Similar State violence, albeit incomparable to that unleashed on advocates of Biafra activism, are being meted out to Oduduwa secessionists in Yoruba, South West (Osisanwo & Akano, 2023a, 2023b; Aminu, 2024) and Niger Delta secessionists in South South (Omotola, 2009a, 2009b; Ordu, 2017).

With particular reference to the Niger Delta, as in other regions of Nigeria with similar secessionist agitations, Ordu (2017, p. 36) indicated that such unnecessary criminal charges and State repressions contribute in no small measure to ‘trigger off (more) frustrations which, in most cases, manifest in aggressive behaviour’. Therefore, the hawkish policy of ‘getting tough on liberation agitators’ and other insensitivities and ills of the government are ‘the basic elements instigating the freedom fighters to (sometimes) involve themselves in one form of violence or another’ (p. 36). Such indiscriminate application of repressions as military offensive may cause the introduction of violence into a hitherto nonviolent expression of discontentment, or intensify its proportion if the expressed dissatisfaction was violent and thus leave enduring negative psychosocial impacts, even after normalcy and peace have been restored. This clearly mirrors the predictions of Aluko’s (2023) ‘Tyre Burning Theory’ (TBT) and their relevance to the study of protests. Like other deconstructed and applied theories, especially integrated separatist agitation theory of social movement, TBT is novel and draws from the gradations of social injustice and dissatisfaction therefrom which makes the problem to recur and degenerate over time. It explains the gradual degeneration of peaceful protest for social justice to violent protest and the ensuing destruction of lives and property. Linked to the protest is a symbolic burning of tyre on the streets, and a ‘few days after peacebuilding had been attained, the burnt tyre symbols will serve as evidence and remembrance of such protest to members of the public’ (see also Aluko, 2018 as cited in Aluko, 2023, p. 38).

Persistent frustration may result in discontentment, which can deteriorate and result in ‘burning of tyres’ – protests or collective actions against authorities, institutions perceived to be responsible for the occurrence. It is evident that, when expectations are in the negatives or not forthcoming without acceptable justification from the withholder(s), different acts of nonconformity, including rebellion and secessions, are bound to be employed as a means to actualise the expected goal. These views intersect deeply with the assumptions of other theories, such as frustration-aggression and relative deprivation, to further explain how the social injustices meted out to individuals and groups could lead to frustration and consequent aggressive responses. Supporting social injustice as a strong predictor of Biafra social movement is frustration-aggression Theory. FAT emphasised that ‘the occurrence of aggressive behaviour (say Biafra separatist agitations) always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression’ (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 1). Frustration being ‘an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response’ (p. 7), is seen as an external force and condition that hinders people or groups from reaching their set goals, which offers great promise for a detailed and critical analysis of the nexus between social injustice and Biafra advocacy.

Certain activities of the government are not only frustrating, but also steadily identified as social injustices, which give rise to the idea of seeking self-independence by the affected region. Examples of frustration-induced conditions include the protracted issues of unequal political representation and appointments, marginalisation and undemocratic responses to lawful agitations (see Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021). Responding to frustrating circumstances aggressively does not necessarily produce detrimental outcomes regarding the attainment of separatist goals. However, some studies reveal that what influences the severity and outcome of violent reactions following frustrating circumstances are their ‘instrumental value’ – the extent to which the aggression, violent behaviour contribute to surmounting the dissatisfactions (Buss, 1963, 1966; Thompson & Kolstoe, 1974; Breuer & Elson, 2017). Even earlier frustration-aggression theorists like Ichheiser (1950) presented that some aggressive acts resulting from frustration are better explained and understood as defence. The fact that aggression can be functional, as in the case of Biafra separatist movements, has been implicated by the fact that is tied to frustration (see also da Gloria, 1984; Achebe, 2012).

Ibeanu et al. (2016) argued that economic frustration and poor state–society relations are responsible for the persistence of Biafra apologists’ agitations for self-rule. These authors believe that Biafra separatism is a political expression of the economic frustrations of young people. The same source further explained that these frustrations are, however, perceived by the agitators as stemming from the marginalisation of the South East in national economic life and placements. It is possible that contracting economic opportunities in the region, which has seen a very high level of unemployment even among the highly educated youth population, accounts for the proneness of the area to separatist agitations. This is deepened by the perception that other parts of the country are unduly privileged by the federal government (Ibeanu et al., 2016); hence, leading to social injustice and discontentment. Ezemenaka and Prouza (2016) affirmed that the struggle for a separate republic (Biafra) is the expression of discontentment and frustrations held in common by collective members of relatively ‘homogeneous’ societies like the Igbo nation of Southern Nigeria. The duo added that the disappointments expressed by the people of this region through the Biafra social movement are not always and inherently violent but can take on violent dimensions when (the frustrations are institutionalised) and prolonged. In furtherance of their arguments, the authors stressed the following:

The primary grievances among those who struggle for Biafra vary, and some of these variations manifest in what the people of Biafra feel they deserve, such as good standards of living in society, or else what they hope to achieve if such demands are not met, such as separation from Nigeria in order to address these issues through a new government of their own—one which shows due concern for its people. (Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016, p. 95)

The foregoing is where social discontent, tyre burning and frustration-aggression theories significantly overlapped and joined forces with relative deprivation theory to further elucidate the Biafra social movement-social injustice nexus for in-depth understanding and case management, leading to damage control and harm reduction. The theory of relative deprivation is extant, old but relevant, as can be seen in the pioneer works of Stouffer et al. (1949), Davis (1959), Runciman (1966) and Flynn (2009), with an emphasis on paternal or group deprivation, which explains the collective dissatisfaction expressed in the group context over abnormalities. Applying this theory to the subject of discussion, the indication is that agitation tends to occur when certain ethnic groups within one unified country are in constant deprivation of their constitutional rights and hence are not comfortable with the situation, especially when is unduly extended and practiced unchecked. Ezemenaka and Prouza (2016) explained that people deprived of things of high importance or necessity in their society – such as status, money, rights and justice – tend to join social movements with the hope and expectation that their grievances and dissatisfaction will be addressed.

The theory of relative deprivation cannot be discussed without acknowledging its contemporary reincarnation and currency, which is attributed to Judith Blau and Peter Blau – the two scholars who introduced the theory into sociology and criminology in 1982. Blau and Blau (1982) arrived at the relative deprivation theory after a systematic integration of variables, concepts, views and constructs from social disorganisation and anomie theories. Upholding the views of these theorists, Nnam (2014) contended that the marginalised in society may feel dispossessed and resentful when they compare their conditions to those of the political/ruling class, who, in most cases, are blamed as the cause of lower class deprivations and disadvantaged positions in society. The implication is that ‘subalterns’ (the marginalised, oppressed in context) can protest in defence! Blau and Blau (1982) reiterated that affected individuals or groups may begin to have misgivings about a system that has cultivated economic and social disparities and hindered their opportunities for making progress. The frustration arising from ‘relative (and absolute) deprivation’ is a precursor to the rebirth of separatist agitations in Igbo land.

The majority of theories advanced by practitioners, researchers, policymakers and scholars to explain the phenomenon of Biafra and its advocates are largely of Western origin, while there is insufficient engagement with theoretically driven research specifically on African separatist or social movements (see Englebert, 2015; Nnam, 2019 for exception). Nnam (2019) particularly propounded a theory specifically on the subject matter, and the theorist termed it ‘Integrated Separatist Agitation Theory (ISAT)’ of Biafra social movements. The thesis of ISAT is nuanced in activist/radical/critical criminology and was developed by integrating the core tenets of social discontent, relative deprivation, frustration-aggression and social conflict/political economy theories into a single overarching theory. Its underlying principles foregrounded the variables explored in this study (see Table 2 in the Results Section for details), and they are:

1. People from marginalised ethnic groups are more likely to participate in social movements than those from non-marginalised ethnic groups;

2. People who feel frustrated and consequently are discontented with political regimes resulting from system-induced economic hardships and deprivations may embark on radical social movements as a collective social defence mechanism;

3. Social movement is a revolutionary action taken by the electorate against the political/ruling class with a view to restoring social justice and the rule of law that have been thrust aside;

4. Frustration, to a large extent, results in aggression, and all aggressive behaviours (social movements) diminish frustration. It then follows that social movement is one of the many ways not only to show disapproval of certain policies, but also to whittle down their resultant negative effects;

5. Social movements, similar to other forms of social conflict, are inevitable. It only gains notoriety and/or becomes a recurring decimal once State repression (i.e., military and police actions) is preferred to democratic conflict resolution approaches;

6. People originally take to social movements to draw government’s attention to their plight and not really to secede from the Union. Agitation only culminates in secession attempts or outright secession when the State and its institutions continue to be unresponsive and indifferent to the demands of the agitating groups; and

7. Unjust and parochial social structure and political economy of a country provide social movement advocates a strong basis to persist and justify their actions and even win more public sympathy and support (Nnam, 2019, pp. 66–67; see also Nnam et al., 2021, p. 4).

Consequently, the structure of Nigerian society is characterised by a system and processes of discriminatory distribution and inequitable allocation of wealth, income, material resources, power, rewards and opportunities. Other characteristics include mass poverty, acute deprivation and political marginalisation amidst enormous national wealth, as well as State domestication, manipulation, and repression of the populace (see Eteng, 2009). The situation can result in the kind of agitation being witnessed by the Nigerian State at this point in time. In closing, the continuum, correlates and compatibility of the five integrated theories considerably overlapped. They revealed profound intersections that significantly minimised possible weaknesses and rather reinforced the strengths of either preceding and/or succeeding theories to further establish their relevance in analysing the problem and supporting the findings. While deconstructing the theories, intersecting ideas emerged; the common premise holds that the deprivation of social justice produces frustrating circumstances that make victims to feel discontented with the resulting aggressions which manifest in the ‘symbols of burnt tryes’ – protests or social movements.

Methods

Design, study frame and sample size

This study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design to examine what triggers and sustains Biafra social movements, and it was conducted in the South East geopolitical zone of Nigeria, which is made up of five States: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. Located in the Southern part of the country, the people of this region belong to the Igbo ethnic group, where a significant part of the Nigeria/Biafra War was fought. The South East is the rallying point and foothold of Biafra protagonists, as well as where most of the separatist protests and demonstrations take place, and from where the social movements spread to other Biafra-supporting geopolitical zones such as the South South. However, Abia, Anambra and Ebonyi were chosen for this study. In particular, Abia and Anambra were selected because of the increasing incidence of Biafra separatist agitations in the States at the time of this study, which spanned over four months (April–August 2019), and to narrow the scope and setting to a manageable size for convenience, timely and successful completion. Ebonyi is the only State in the zone where Biafra separatist groups and activities are not much pronounced when compared to others and was chosen to make the data collection more objective, balanced and for comparison of inferences.

The target population consisted of adult male and female inhabitants of the South East. According to the 2016 FGN’s projected census, the population of this region is 21,955,400 (Population Projection of Nigeria, 2016). The distribution was as follows: Abia State (3,727,300), Anambra State (5,527,800), Ebonyi State (2,880,400), Enugu State (4,411,100) and Imo State (5,408,800). However, as previously stated, only the States of Abia, Anambra, and Ebonyi were covered, with a study population of 12,135,500. Since States in Nigeria are made up of Local Government Areas (LGAs), a purposive sampling technique was used to select three LGAs from each of the three States: (1) Abia: Aba North, Aba South and Umuahia North; (2) Anambra: Onitsha North, Onitsha South, and Awka South; and (3) Ebonyi: Afikpo North, Abakaliki and Ezza South.

Demographic features of the participants indicated that males were 717 (60.2%) while females were 474 (39.8%). Their ages were categorised thus: 18–25 years: 150 (12.6%), 26–33 years: 320 (26.9%), 34–41 years: 301 (25.3%), 42–49 years: 216 (18.1%) and 50 years and above: 204 (17.1%). The marital status of the participants showed that 540 (45.3%) were married, 414 (34.8%) were single, 230 (19.3%) were separated and 7 (0.6%) were divorced. The participants’ occupational status revealed the following values: 81 (6.8%) farmers, 208 (17.5%) civil/public servants, 221 (18.6%) trader/business persons, 175 (14.7%) artisans, 105 (8.8%) taxi/keke (tricycle) drivers, 90 (7.6%) Okada (commercial motorcycle) drivers, 257 (21.6%) students and 54 (4.5%) unemployed. The religious affiliation showed a predominance of Christians with 1101 (92.4%), followed by 73 (6.1%) African Traditional Religion (ATR) and 17 (1.4%) Muslims. Furthermore, the highest educational qualification showed that 141 (11.8%) possessed First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC), 254 (21.3%) had Ordinary Level (O’Level) certification, 155 (13.0%) had Ordinary National Diploma/National Certificate in Examination (OND/NCE), 266 (22.3%) obtained Bachelor of Science (BSc), 145 (12.2%) had Master of Science (MSc) degree, 126 (10.6%) had Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree and 104 (8.7%) had no formal education.

In specific terms, civil/public servants, farmers, students/youths, traders/businesspersons, artisans/skilled workers, taxi drivers/’Keke’ (commercial tricycles) riders and ‘Okada’ (commercial motorcyclists) were the target population. These persons were selected as the target audience because they cut across the ranks of the public population and are on the receiving end of the government’s social injustices and the outcomes of separatists’ agitations, when compared to other populations. Thus, they are in a better position to provide necessary information on the subject of social injustice and public perception of Biafra social movements in Nigeria. The nine LGAs, the three States, as well as their respective populations, are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Selected States, their local government areas and population.

State	LGA	Population
Abia	Aba North	140,000
	Aba South	559,900
	Umuahia North	292,300
Anambra
	Onitsha North	166,600
	Onitsha South	181,500
Ebonyi	Awka South	250,900
	Afikpo North	207,300
	Abakaliki	198,100
	Ezza South	176,800
Total		1,947,599

Source: 2016 federal republic of Nigeria population projection.

The selection of these States and LGAs was purposively done because pro-Biafra activities are on the increase in the chosen locations, and this paved the way for in-depth information and data to be generated. By purposive sampling, we mean locating a sample ‘based on the researcher’s skill, judgment and needs’ (Hagan, 2005, p. 139). However, this type of nonprobability method, similar to any other technique, has inherent weaknesses. According to Kara (2017, p. 70), ‘purposive sampling is where researchers use their own judgment (based on well-known characteristics) about which participants will make the greatest contribution to the research. Again, this is best used alongside other types of sampling to reduce bias’ (p. 70). However, because it is cumbersome to cover all the participants in the LGA population (i.e. 2,173,400 persons), it was necessary to determine the sample size for this study (Wushe & Shenje, 2019). With the estimated target population of 2,173,400, sample size was calculated to give a 95% confidence level, a margin of error of + or –5%, using Taro Yamane’s (1967) formula to select respondents from the population frame at the regional level: $$n=\frac{N}{1+N{e}^2}$$ where n = corrected sample size

N = Population sizee = level of precision/Margin of error at <0.05

Therefore, the sample size was calculated for each State by totalling the three LGAs sampled under each State: Abia (992,200 participants), Anambra (599,000 participants) and Ebonyi (882,200 participants). These three values were calculated independently using the following formula:

Abia State

n = 992,200/1 + 992,200 (0.05)²n = 992,200/1 + 992,200 (0.0025)n = 992,200/1 + 2480.5n = 992,200/2481.5n = 399.84, which is approximately 400 respondents

Anambra State

n = 599,000/1 + 599,000 (0.05)²n = 599,000/1 + 599,000 (0.0025)n = 599,000/1 + 1497.5n = 599,000/1498.5n = 399.73, which is approximately 400 respondents

Ebonyi State

n = 582,200/1 + 582,200 (0.05)²n = 582,200/1 + 582,200 (0.0025)n = 582,200/1 + 1455.5n = 582,200/1456.5n = 399.73, which is approximately 400 respondents

Thus, the sample for this study included 400 participants per State: Abia (400), Anambra (400) and Ebonyi (400), totalling 1200. This represents the sample size of the participants, in which copies of the questionnaire were administered. Delice (2018) explained that keeping the sample size very high is not the best in terms of accessibility, which is why a sample size of 1,200 and 2,173,400 population size is deemed reasonable, adequate and suitable for the study. Furthermore, researchers (see Baykul, 1999; Ross, 2004; Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2006) believed that, if parametric statistics are to be utilised in data analysis, recruiting 30–500 participants should be a sufficient sample size, which was the case in our study, as 400 respondents were recruited from each of the three sampled States.

Data collection and settings

Data for this study were collected using a structured questionnaire, designed following a modified Likert format, with a four-point scale: strongly agree (SA), agree (A), strongly disagree (SD) and disagree (D). Ethical approval was obtained from the Department of Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences Research/Postgraduate Boards, University of Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria. The researcher was employed at Walter Sisulu University as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in 2024 while this research was conducted in 2019. He was then a PhD candidate at the University of Calabar where the permission to carried out the study was granted. This was supported by a formal letter of informed consent attached to the first page of the questionnaire for the participants’ approval by ticking ‘Yes’ against the ‘No’ option. Through formal research procedures and, sometimes, using informal approaches – as the need arose – each of the identified respondents was clarified about the purpose of the study, the need to participate, and their free and informed consent obtained through the attached letter. The confidentiality and anonymity of their identity and responses were guaranteed before administering the instrument. Copies of the questionnaire were administered to the respondents by one-to-one delivery and were retrieved in the same manner immediately after completion. For participants with no formal education or semi-literate, the instrument was read in English language and interpreted in Pidgin English and Igbo language for them to answer, choose an option.

The instrument was divided into two sections of A and B. Section A comprised demographic variables, such as gender, age, marital status, educational qualification and occupation. Section B looked at the public perception of Biafra separatist movements which was measured with a-4-item statement, and the variables included ‘The killing of Biafra agitators’, ‘Government response to Biafra agitation is extreme’, ‘Wanton destruction of lives and property’ and ‘Political apathy in the South-east’. The participants were asked to respond to the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with both the preceding and succeeding statements, following a-4-point Likert scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree and 4 = strongly agree. Social injustice was assessed using 14 items/statements, namely, ‘collective victimisation of the Igbo group by the government’, ‘bad governance and government policies’, ‘political marginalisation’ and ‘selective and arbitrary federal appointments. Other variables measured are ‘widespread insecurity and threat to national and human security’; ‘greed and desperation to have independence at all costs’; ‘the October 1 2017 quit notice issued to the Igbo living in the North by Northern youths’; ‘indifferent attitude of the federal government towards the quit notice’; ‘unjust and unbalanced political economy and social structure’; ‘widespread state repression and human rights violations’; ‘political vendetta and hate politics’; ‘indifferent attitudes of government towards general public safety in Nigeria, especially in the North, at the expense of non-Northerners’, ‘the government’s refusal to negotiate with the agitators’; and ‘widespread corruption among policymakers’.

Data analysis

The copies of the completed and retrieved questionnaire were subjected to data cleansing, management and scrutiny. Each copy of the collated, sorted and edited questionnaires was assigned a unique code and serial number to establish its population category in terms of LGA and States and to ensure scientific standardisation. At the end of this exercise, it was found that 9 participants did not correctly fill out their allotted questionnaires and hence they were expunged from the study. This meant that the final copies utilised for statistical analysis was 1191, representing a return rate of 99.3%. Computer software, particularly Microsoft Excel, was used to capture the sorted questionnaires, which were thereafter transferred to IBM SPSS Statistics version 23 (Armonk, NY). The data were scored using a modified Likert 4-point-scale. Owing to the nature of variables measured, descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentiles were used for the preliminary analysis of the sociodemographic data and social injustice variables to place the analysis in perspective and for clarity and explicitness, as evident in the preceding paragraphs while linear regression was used to test the study hypotheses.

Results

The responses in Table 2 regarding the social injustices that were responsible for the resurgence and persistence of Biafra separatist agitations in the South East of Nigeria revealed that 335 (28.1%) of the respondents strongly agreed that the predictor of this collective action was connected to collective victimisation of the Igbo group by the federal government. From the same table, 367 (30.8%) agreed that the Igbo nation faced collective victimisation by the State. On the contrary, 273 (22.9%) and 216 (18.1%) strongly disagreed and disagreed on that score, respectively. The respondents who strongly agreed that bad governance and government policies were responsible for Biafra movement was 334 (23%). Those who agreed to this factor were 358 (30.1%), while 280 (23.5%) and 219 (8.4%) of them strongly disagreed and disagreed each.

Table 2. Public perception of predictors of Biafra social movements.

Items	SA	A	SD	D
Collective victimisation of the Igbo group by the government.	335 (28.1)	367 (30.8)	273 (22.9)	216 (18.1)
Bad governance and government policies.	334 (28.0)	358 (30.1)	280 (23.5)	219 (18.4)
Political marginalisation.	347 (29.1)	368 (30.9)	264 (22.2)	212 (17.8)
Selective and arbitrary federal appointments.	333 (28.0)	366 (30.7)	274 (23.0)	218 (18.3)
Widespread insecurity and threat to national and human security.	339 (28.5)	367 (30.8)	268 (22.5)	217 (18.2)
Greed and desperation to have independence at all cost.	223 (18.7)	275 (23.3)	338 (28.4)	355 (18.7)
The 1 October 2017 quit notice issued to the Igbo by Northern youths.	342 (28.7)	367 (30.8)	268 (22.5)	214 (29.8)
Indifferent attitude of the government towards the quit notice.	333 (28.0)	365 (30.6)	275 (23.1)	218 (18.3)
Unjust and unbalanced political economy and social structure.	349 (29.3)	353 (29.6)	274 (23.6)	215 (18.1)
Widespread State repressions and human rights violations.	338 (28.4)	360 (30.2)	271 (23.1)	218 (18.3)
Political vendetta and hate politics against the Igbo nation.	335 (28.1)	367 (30.8)	308 (22.6)	220 (18.5)
Indifferent attitude of government towards general public safety in Nigeria, especially in the North, at the expense of non-Northerners.	339 (28.5)	363 (30.5)	269 (22.6)	220 (18.5)
Government’s refusal to negotiate with the agitators.	339 (28.5)	368 (30.9)	270 (22.7)	214 (18.0)
Widespread corruption among policymakers.	334 (28.0)	364 (30.6)	274 (23.0)	219 (18.4)

Field survey, 2019.

Respondents who strongly agreed that selective and arbitrary federal appointments were the reason for the resurgence of Biafra movements were 333 (28%), those who also agreed on this point were 366 (30.7%), and those who strongly disagreed and disagreed with this factor were 274 (23%) and 218 (18.2%), respectively. Data gathered also revealed that 339 (28.5%) and 367 (30.8%) strongly agreed and agreed, each that widespread insecurity and threat to national and human insecurity were responsible for the reappearance of Biafra separatist agitation. Conversely, 268 (22.5%) respondents strongly disagreed and 217 (18.2%) disagreed. The respondents who strongly agreed that greed and desperation to secure Biafra independence at all costs was the reason for the perpetuation of Biafra movements were 223 (18.7%) and other responses read: Agreed: 275 (23.1%), strongly disagree: 338 (28.4%) and disagreed: 355 (29.8%).

In response to the 1 October 2017 quit notice issued to the Igbo people by the Northern youth as an underlying factor responsible for the revival of the Biafra separatist agitations, respondents who perceived this threat to be the predictive factor were distributed in this order: strongly agree: 342 (28.7%), agreed: 367 (30.8%), strongly disagree: 268 (22.5%) and disagree: 214 (10.1%). Additional data revealed that the government showed an indifferent attitude towards the quit notice given to the Igbo in 2017. The results are presented thus: strongly agree: 333 (28%), agree: 365 (30.6%), strongly disagree: 275 (23.1%) and agree: 218 (18.3%). The respondents who attributed the problem to unjust and unbalanced political economy and social structure were represented as follows: strongly agree: 349 (29.3%), disagree: 353 (29.6%), strongly disagree: 274 (23.6%) and disagree, 215 (18.1%).

Attributing the widespread State repression and human rights violations in Nigeria to the cause of Biafra movement, the table further revealed the following evidence: strongly agree: 338 (28.4%), agreed: 360 (30.2%), strongly disagree: 271 (23.1%) and agree: 218 (18.3%). Regarding political vendetta and hate politics as a causative factors, the results showed: strongly agree: 335 (28.1%), agree 367 (30.8%), strongly disagree: 269 (22.6%) and agree: 220 (18.5%). The results revealed a causality that was linked to the indifferent attitude of government towards general public safety in Nigeria, especially as it affects the lives of non-Northerners in the North. The results were rather negative: strongly agree: 269 (22.6%), agree: 220 (18.5%), strongly disagree: 339 (28.5%) and agreed: 363(30.5%). Also, the respondents made the following observations regarding the refusal of the federal government to negotiate and dialogue with the agitators as the reason for the prolonged Biafra revolution: strongly agree: 339 (28.5%), agreed: 368 (30.9%), strongly disagree: 270 (22.7%) and agreed: 214 (18%). Accounting for the widespread corruption among policymakers (politicians), the following results were obtained: strongly agree: 334 (28%), agree: 364 (30.6%), strongly agree: 274 (23%) and agree 219 (18.4%).

Test of hypotheses

Table 3 presents the summary and fit statistics for the hypothetical statements proposed in the study. The linear regression results revealed that social injustices yielded a coefficient of multiple correlation (R) of 0.945, which suggests a strong and positive association between social injustice and the perception of Biafra social movements. In other words, the higher the level of social injustice experienced by people from the South East, the greater the impetus for the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra. The results further showed a multiple correlation square (R²) of 0.893, which implies that 89.3% of the variance in perception of Biafra separatist agitations was accounted for by the effect of social injustices. Arguably, the remaining 10.7% variance could have been as the result of other factors outside the area covered in this study. Next, the regression coefficients, intercept, significance level, and intercept are in the model. It was found that the linear regression estimates the linear regression function to be y = 11.10 + 0.49* x, meaning that an increase in one unit of x also results in an increase of 0.49 units of y. The t-test finds that both the intercept and variable are highly significant (p < 0.05); thus, it is observed that they are significantly different from zero.

Table 3. Linear regression table ascertaining contributing influence of government’s social injustices as being responsible for Biafra social movements.

	Perception of Biafra social movements
Variable	Model 1 β	B	P	95% CI
Constant	11.10	<0.05	[10.72, 11.49]
Social Injustice	0.49	0.95	<0.05	[0.48, 0.50]
R	0.945
R^2	0.893
F	9902.74
t	56.46
Sig.	<0.05

N = 1191; CI: confidence interval; p < 0.05.

From the regression results, investigation of the contributing influence between the federal government’s social injustices on the Biafra social movements among participants was carried out using standardised tests. Subsequently, a linear regression analysis was conducted to substantiate the suspected predictive relationships. The estimated regression model was Biafra social movements score = 11.10 + 0.49* social injustices, with an adjusted R² similar to the main R² and 89.3% being highly significant with p < 0.05). As a consequence, it did not only show a positive and direct linear relationship, but also concluded that, for every additional social injustice score carried out on the agitators, the Biafra social movements score will increase by approximately 0.49 units. The implication is that the hypothesis, which stated that social injustices of the federal government were responsible for Biafra social movements, was retained.

Discussion

The research findings revealed that social injustices found in the national political structures of Nigeria were responsible for the emergence and reemergence of Biafra social movements in the South East Nigeria. Social injustice was identified to include collective victimisation and re-victimisation, bad governance and government policies, political marginalisation, selective and arbitrary federal appointments, frequent military attacks on Biafra protesters, among others. These findings are consistent with evidence found in the reviewed literature and theoretical lenses, which indicated that movements for self-rule result from a disproportional power distribution within a State, especially when certain ethnic groups, are marginalised, excluded from power relations, economy and other key national structures (Cederman et al., 2010; Ibeanu et al., 2016; Alumona et al., 2017; Kraynak, 2018; Nnam et al., 2021). These and other variables explored (see the Results Section for details) have significant connections with recurring Biafra activities. For instance, most participants (89.3% of the variance) directly linked the upsurge in separatism to the accumulated and prolonged frustration and deprivation (see also the theoretical premise). Coincided with crucial insights presented in the literature and predictions of the integrated theoretical framework (see Dollard et al., 1939; Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Blau & Blau, 1982; Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021; Aluko, 2023), the findings revealed that the prolonged deprivation and frustration by the government is intense, with serious implications for the unity and progress of Nigeria. The unjust sociopolitical structures and governments’ preference for military actions to democratic conflict resolution procedures make the art of ‘burning tyres’ (separatist agitation, social movement) more rife and cyclical.

Further findings revealed that the majority (i.e. 90%) of the social injustice components were well above 50%, or average. For instance, the variable of political marginalisation ranked highest on the scale, as 715 (60.03%) participants agreed with the reality of the Biafra social injustice phenomenon. This finding is consistent with that of Ezemenaka and Prouza (2016) and predictions of the integrative theoretical anchor parsimoniously drawn from five interrelated theories (social discontent, tyre burning, frustration-aggression, relative deprivation and integrated separatist agitation theories). Both theoretical and empirical evidence affirmed that the struggle for a separate republic of Biafra is the expression of discontentment and frustrations held commonly by members of the Igbo group of South East Nigeria. Discontentment and frustration can only emerge when marginalisation is included in the social equation. The predictions of the theoretical leanings, particularly frustration-aggression theory (Dollard et al., 1939), social discontent theory (Gurr, 1970) and ISAT (Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021), strongly support the study outcome that frustration results in ‘burning byres’, aggravated anger that manifests in sociopolitical protests (Aluko, 2013) as a defence mechanism or survival strategy. Examples include the determined effort to separate from the Union, which propagates social injustice by joining group movements, such as MASSOB, IPOB, OPC, APC, NDVF and Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, MEND (see also Okonta, 2012; Ezemenaka & Prouza, 2016; Nnam, 2019; Osisanwo & Akano, 2023a, 2023b; Aminu, 2024)

A related result revealed the existence of threats to human security and peaceful coexistence as a significant number of the participants, 709 (59.53%), agreed that the 1 October 2017 quit notice issued to the Igbo by Northern Nigerian youths and the government’s substantial unresponsiveness to this national threat constitutes social injustice. While exploring the problem from the dynamics of ‘State repression and escalation in Biafra social movements’, Nnam et al. (2021) corroborated the present research’s account of some counterproductive approaches and countermeasures advanced by the State to address the phenomenon recently. These include excessive and undemocratic repression, ethnic profiling and criminalisation of groups protesting their rights instead of addressing the causes (see also Osisanwo & Iyoha, 2020). As previously stated, these ‘emphasise the importance of the way that the law is (made and) enforced, are concerned with the process of labelling individuals as deviants (criminals), and concentrate on studying the subjective states of individuals rather than the structure of society as a whole’ (Haralambos et al., 2008, p. 335). Similarly, for instance, 707 (59.36%) participants agreed that ‘government’s refusal to negotiate with the agitators was the third factor in the social injustice equation, which further (re)kindles Biafra agitations. This particular finding was followed by ‘widespread insecurity and threat to national and human security’ as the 4th most important contributor to social injustice, with 706 (59.28%) participants accenting to this value.

Empirically, four different factors were tied to the issue of social injustice and implicated in the renewed agitation for Biafra. The research findings indicated that enduring social harm and psychological pain caused by institutionalised social injustice and other forms of anomalies within the government are the basic factors instigating IPOB members and other related bodies who are agitating ferociously for Biafra. The result further confirms the basic tenets of integrated separatist agitation and tyre burning theories (see Nnam, 2019; Aluko, 2023) that revolutionary action is taken in the face of structural injustice that creates systemic inequalities and other largescale disadvantages for a particular ethnic group. Since the victims lack political willpower to better their worth in society, there is high propensity for them to draw government’s attention to their plight through street protests. The primary goal is usually to dethrone social injustice and enthrone social justice, but may culminate in secessionist movements when this approach fails. The findings also mirrored the outcomes of Ibeanu et al. (2016), and Alumona et al. (2017), who at various times attested that the feeling of unfair treatment, lack of justice and other maltreatments meted out to the Igbo, as well as the failure of successive governments and their institutions to address the sudden increase in ethno-national protests are strong predictors of separatist movements in Nigeria. While examining the problem from the lens of TBT, Aluko (2023, p. 38) critically theorised that the constitutional rights of citizens to:

“Challenge” the State (by protesting social injustice) helps to strengthening the institutions of the State, ensure check and balance, promote stability of the State and the gelling together of members of the community over a just cause. Be it peaceful or violent protests, the end results is the reassessment of government decisions and evaluations of the people’s requests.

As supported by the results of previous studies (see Goetz, 2001; Ekpenyong, 2011; Aluko et al., 2022) and theories (see TBT, Aluko, 2023; ISAT, Nnam, 2019), the empirical evidence from this research showed that the problem is foregrounded in different patterns of conflict arising from the interaction of political, economic and social instability fuelled by bad governance and State hawkish policies, including regular application of lethal repressions and military offensives, over restorative justice. This is exemplified by the marginalisation of the Igbo in mainstream politics and governance, as well as the national distribution of both material and human resources. Ahmed (2015) opined that interregional differences, alienation, uneven economic development, and ethnic, political, cultural and social exclusions are major instigators of most ethnic conflicts and problems, including social movements. Marginalisation can occur in the form of deprivation, exclusion, and other indices of social injustice that invariably increase ethnic tension and agitation to correct a dysfunctional political system (see Table 2 and ISAT, TBT and relative deprivation theory for details). In further support of the findings, Nwobashi (2014) observed that the repeated incidence of separatism in Nigeria is directly associated with deprivation and exclusion of some ethnic groups by the government and its functionaries. This accounts for the reasons Ellah (1982), Suberu (1991), and Ibeanu et al. (2016) stated that the Igbo elite has repeatedly argued that the area has been grossly shortchanged in State creation exercises, resource allocation (both human and material), and federal political appointments and representation.

As evident in the research findings, there is no gainsaying that prolonged alienation, deprivation and discontentment, which usually manifest as aggression and frustration symbolised in TBT, add to the unending protests for Biafra. Nnam (2014, p. 175) confirmed the perspective of Blau and Blau (1982) in their relative deprivation theory, as reechoed by Siegel (2008), which posits poisted that ‘people who feel deprived because of race or economic class eventually develop a sense of injustice and discontent. The less fortunate will begin to distrust the society that has nurtured social inequality and obstructed their chances of progressing by legitimate means’. In Nigeria, as implicated in the results and engaged theories (see Tables 2 and 3; theoretical premise for details), there is discernible faulty democratic governance and hate body polity in place. From the research findings, again, Nigeria is a society where the government is insensitive to human plight; selective in law enforcement and justice delivery; sabotages the tenets of human security, rule of law and social justice; and swayed by official corruption. Generally, a significant level of correlations and continuum exists between the variables explored in this study. The reviewed literature and theories are mutually inclusive and logically reinforced the findings of this research, as the three components shared common outcomes by accounting for the problem from the analytical lens of social injustice essentials.

The study also found that the people of South East Nigeria are socially, politically, and economically disconnected from mainstream national politics and instead face political vendetta, hate politics and selective federal appointments in addition to widespread corruption among national policymakers (politicians). Consequently, continued exposure to these debilitating conditions will invariably spur victims to call for radical protest and resistance in order to restore justice or be granted political independence if the factors that trigger the problem cannot be substantially and satisfactorily addressed (see also Achebe, 2012; Ezeani, 2013; Adibe, 2017; Nnam, 2019; Nnam et al., 2021; Aluko et al., 2022; Aluko, 2023). People are pushed to contemplate social movements in a country with a weak economic base, such as Nigeria, whose internal structures are characterised by structural violence, inequalities and deeply ingrained corruption leading to unemployment, acute deprivation of the masses, permanent scarcities, inflation, mass poverty and alienation (Eteng, 2009, 2015). Those who are seriously affected by these challenges may have no option but to protest for positive change or be allowed to separate from the source of their problem if nothing meaningful can be done to salvage the situation.

Conclusion and policy implications

The Biafra social movement is linked to many contending issues, including frustration and aggression, which stems from collective victimisation, marginalisation and social exclusion of the Igbo people from the political economy and social structure of Nigeria. The social injustices heightened shortly after independence, and the agitations therefrom resulted in the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967–1970. Since then, successive governments have presented indifferent attitudes towards improving remote and immediate causes of the agitation and war. This negligence has a significant impact on the subsistence of the struggle to date. The conclusion is that the government is either incapable or unwilling to address the issues that led to the persistence of this social phenomenon. The situation has created additional challenges and confounded the plight of the Igbo, who still suffer marginalisation, alienation, deprivation, excessive repression and hawkish policies on social movements, and the use of military and paramilitary personnel to further attack and suppress the population.

Several State-induced social injustices were responsible for the recurrence of Biafra separatist agitation. A common premise observed in the findings of this study is that secession has never been the main concern of Biafra agitators or people of Igbo origin. Again, right from its earliest inception, the movement has shown much concern for the restoration of social justice and the rule of law to improve the dignity of man and his living conditions, irrespective of ethnic origin, class and religion. This problem is directly linked to excessive deprivation, frustration, aggression, discontentment, and termination (eased off) through radical social movements as a ‘requite action’, which could be contextually described as revolutionary action and survival strategy advanced by ‘subalterns’ (the marginalised, oppressed group in society). However, social injustices and other undemocratic activities have recorded an exponential increase in the polity, forcing dissent groups within and outside the South East region, such as MEND, NDVF, Oduduwa and Arewa (see Omotola, 2009a, 2009b; Osisanwo & Akano, 2023a, 2023b; Aminu, 2024), to protest for freedom.

Quite naturally, people are bound to agitate for their rights when confronted with unending structural violence and strains. They will feel dejected and unwanted in a country that claims to be an indivisible political/legal entity, where, as the rule of law and social justice demands, every region should have equal rights and privileges. Accordingly, separation from the system that is believed to have persistently nurtured social injustices would be alternatively sought if the protests for justice restoration in unfair central political arrangements cannot be effectively addressed, suggesting that secession was not the underlying objective and ideology of the advocates. Seeing that Nigeria’s social structure, combined with political economy, is unjust, maleficent and unbalanced, the policy implications call for inclusive institutional restructuring to reflect equity, justice and fairness in the distribution of power, authority and other vital assets in the national polity. A reduction in social injustices in Nigeria’s entire social structure and political economy to a tolerable level, if not outright elimination, will guarantee sustainable public safety and peaceful coexistence. In the absence of this, however, people may have no option but to fight their way out of the dilemma.

Given the nature, degree, frequency and seriousness of the spread of Biafra social movements, any preventive or control measure that precludes certain salient issues of social injustice, as identified in this study, can only be a palliative rather than a panacea. Thus, adequate and serious attention is needed to restructure Nigeria’s political economy and social structure. Taking this approach will help immensely to provide a timely and pragmatic framework for addressing longstanding unattended issues relating to social injustice, as progressively presented. Further implications for policy and practice should focus on utilising the dividends of democracy, douse these agitations, and ensure sustainable development through popular participation and inclusivity, and increase in social capital and social bond to improve public wellbeing and cohesion. Of the five States in South East Nigeria, three were covered in this study using a quantitative method (questionnaire instrument only). The researcher particularly advocates for more research on such perceptions of social movements and secessionist agitations from other parts of the country for more balanced responses and to further validate the data generated from the epicentre of the crises.

Ethical standards and informed consent

The study was approved by the Department of Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences Research/Postgraduate Boards, University of Calabar, Cross River, Nigeria. This was supported by a formal letter of informed consent attached to the first page of the questionnaire for the participants’ approval by ticking ‘Yes’ against the ‘No’ option. The researcher was employed at Walter Sisulu University as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in 2024 while this research was conducted in 2019. He was then a PhD candidate at the University of Calabar where the permission to carried out the study was granted.

Disclosure statement

The author declared that he has no potential conflicts of interest.

Data availability statement

All data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. The items included the raw data of the study obtained from fieldwork and stored in IBM Statistical Package software version 23.

Additional information

Funding

The author received no financial and nonfinancial support for the research.

Notes on contributors

Macpherson Uchenna Nnam

Dr Macpherson Uchenna Nnam is the immediate past Head of Department of Criminology and Security Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Nigeria—a position he held for four consecutive tenures due to his extraordinary diligence, leadership capacity and probity. He earned his BSc in Sociology and Anthropology, MSc Criminology with specialisation in kidnapping, and PhD Criminology with specialisation in radical/critical criminology. His other areas of specialisations, research niche and cognate expertise with evidence include, but are not limited to, Radical Social Movement and Activism, Qualitative Research, Social (In)justice, Terrorism, Crime Theory Deconstruction (Theoretical Criminology), Intelligence and Security Studies, Police Science, Crime Analyses, Drug-Crime Nexus, Correctional Studies (Prison Science), Sociology of Crime, Gender and Crime, Psychology of Crime, Women Offenders, and African Criminology. MU Nnam is an established scholar and researcher of multidisciplinary background and integrative prolific writer, with superlative pedagogical skills, evidence of outstanding research capacity, and a wide variety of analytical competencies. This Consultant Criminologist, Security Expert and Criminal Justice Practitioner is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Walter Sisulu University, South Africa. Macpherson Uchenna Nnam is a recurring name and referenced institution in the international research and scientific community with 65 publications (1 edited book, 8 book chapters, and 56 journal articles) to his credit. Of the 56 articles, 37 are published in journals indexed in the Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics, and 4 in Scopus/SCImago (i.e. 41 articles are published in topnotch journals), while 15 were published in other categories of local and international outlets.