Airport development projects in Thailand: a case study of Betong International Airport

Abstract

Building new airports requires extensive investment. In principle, airport development projects should be well-planned and thoughtfully designed. Despite this, the Department of Airports (DOA), a part of the Thai bureaucracy, has allegedly continued constructing remote airports that do not appear economically viable. The reasons for these unexplained projects have also been studied. Political, economic, social, technological, legal, and ecological analyses were used to explore and evaluate the macroenvironmental factors that influence the DOA in initiating project decisions. The newly opened Betong International Airport in the southernmost district of Yala Province was used as a case study. By examining the macroenvironmental setting, the findings showed that the DOA’s bureaucratic culture was the key condition responsible for the flawed and defective layout of the nation’s southernmost airport. This, in turn, made Betong International Airport economically unfeasible for local airlines servicing routes from Betong to other destinations.

Keywords:

• Airport development
• airport management
• airport public administration
• Betong International Airport
• bureaucracy
• Department of Airports
• Nok Air
• Thailand
• Yala

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

SUBJECTS:

• Transport Planning
• Public Management
• Economic Geography
• Transport Geography
• Political Geography
• Planning – Human Geography
• Public Administration & Management
• Tourism Development/Impacts
• Tourism Planning and Policy

1. Introduction

The air transport sector has long been considered a significant contributor to Thailand’s economic growth. In 2018, 15.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) derived revenue from employment was generated in the aviation industry. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), this industry creates at least four million jobs. The Thai government’s air transport liberalisation policy and regional integration schemes under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) umbrella have encouraged increasing air travel rates (Khee-Jin Tan, 2012; Kongsamutr, 2020; Lee, 2019).

Between 2000 and 2019, 30 Thai airline firms entered the aviation market to meet the demands of international tourism (see Darke, 2021; Darke & Vannukul, 2015). Nevertheless, air operators comprise only one segment of the air transport infrastructure. Another major stakeholder is the airport segment (Holztrattner, 2010). The development and expansion of Thailand’s airport network are necessary to accommodate escalating air travel and tourism, particularly in popular tourist destinations.

Kearns (2018) broadly categorised airports into three types: (a) international, (b) regional, and (c) local. In Thailand, the civil and military authorities jointly own and operate numerous airports. For example, the Don Mueang International Airport in Bangkok is a shared-use airport. Even so, Thailand Public Company Limited (AOT) owns and manages most international airports. It is a state-owned enterprise (SOE). The Department of Airports (DOA) is an agency within the Transport Ministry that primarily operates regional and local airports. In addition to civilian passengers and commercial airline carriers, the Royal Thai Air Force and other branches of the Thai Armed Forces may use both types of airports.

Unlike AOT, the DOA is an integral part of the bureaucracy, which, as an SOE, enjoys a certain degree of autonomy in managing international airports. The DOA has a mandate to manage the countrywide network of air transport routes by developing new and existing airports. The key goal is not profitability because DOA management relies partly on government funds. Unfortunately, many DOA-operated airports have neither reached their commercial potential nor fulfilled their entrepreneurial capacity to offer optimum service benefits to passengers. DOA airports are underused, derelict, or abandoned (Elliott, 2010; Wechsler, 2019). This condition is more likely in the case of local airports situated in remote provinces, such as Phetchabun (Onthaworn, 2022).

This study questioned why the DOA has an unsatisfactory record with respect to managing its airfields. The DOA clearly has access to funds because a large budget expenditure is a prerequisite for any investment in airport development projects (Jorge-Calderón, 2021). The authors explored the key condition underlying the inferior management structure of the DOA. As a starting point for the discussion, we analysed recent airport development projects using Betong International Airport (hereinafter, Betong Airport; see Table 1) as a case study. The political, economic, social, technological, legal, and ecological (PESTLE) technique was applied to investigate the key conditions that potentially shape the DOA’s airport management and development projects. Finally, the paper concludes by providing policy recommendations.

Table 1. Airport profile.

Betong International Airport
Country	Thailand
District / Province	Betong / Yala Province
ICAO code	VTSY
IATA code	BTZ
Operator	Department of Airports
Runway dimensions (m)	1,800 × 30
Airlines providing services	Nok Air

Note. Information current as of 18 May 2020; ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization; IATA = International Air Transport Association.

1.1. PESTLE technique

As discussed above, regional and local airports in Thailand are, by and large, government-owned. They operate under the umbrella of the DOA (see Chutiphongdech & Vongsaroj, 2022). Even so, the Thai airport market has not been entirely monopolised by the public sector. For instance, the only airport on Samui’s tourist island is owned and run privately by Bangkok Airways. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the semi-market environment in which the DOA operates. The PESTLE (also called PESTEL) technique (e.g. Cadle et al., 2010; Campbell & Craig, 2005) is a widely used tool for monitoring and analysing an external business macroenvironment.

The PESTLE technique provides an analytical framework for identifying and investigating the political, economic, sociocultural, technological, legal, and ecological settings that influence an organisation’s environment (Sammut-Bonnici & Galea, 2015). This method has been applied in various business and management fields (e.g. Carruthers, 2009) as well as in studies on public administration and public services (e.g. Akman, 2020; Nemeth, 2016; Sridhar et al., 2016). Accordingly, the PESTLE technique is applicable to airport management issues and, more precisely, to airport public administration and planning (Chew et al., 2017; Sabar et al., 2018).

Applying the PESTLE technique to an empirical analysis is straightforward. In a PESTLE analysis, the six key areas or sectors identified above provide guidelines or external factors. Table 2 provides examples of PESTLE factors that managers and administrators can assess (Cadle et al., 2010).

Table 2. Examples of PESTLE factors.

Area	Factors
Political	Introduction of new government initiatives. Roles of intergovernmental organisations.
Economic	Trends in global and regional economies. Fluctuations in foreign exchange rates and trade tariffs.
Sociocultural	Changing social values and cultural norms. Consumer behaviour patterns.
Technological	Transfer speed of technology from concept to implementation. Potential impact of new innovations on the life cycle of existing products.
Legal	Business laws and regulations introduced by national authorities and commissions. International standards enacted by regional and international bodies, such as European Union agencies and the ICAO.
Ecological	Growing concerns over the repercussions of global warming. Emerging campaigns for sustainable development goals.

Note. Adapted from Cadle et al. (2010) and Campbell and Craig (2005); PESTLE = political, economic, social, technological, legal, and ecological; ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization.

2. Methods

This study primarily examined airport management issues; however, it should also be classified as social science research. It analysed aviation social research (see Wiggins & Stevens, 1999) rather than focusing exclusively on management criteria. The methodology adopted was the case study method, which is commonly used in social and managerial research (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003; Stake, 1978). It was conducted according to the specific procedure recommended by Patton and Appelbaum (2003) as follows: (a) identify a suitable topic area to which the intended study chiefly relates; (b) select the case or subject matter to develop and support the topic area; (c) develop an initial analytical lens by reviewing the existing literature; (d) collect and filter data; and (e) analyse the data, discuss the results, and draw conclusions.

2.1. Data collection and analysis

This study relied principally on secondary sources. Secondary sources included news media outlets, scholarly works, and aviation publications. Government information and online data from official websites (e.g. the DOA website) were also used.

The filtered data were evaluated using a ‘structured-focused’ analysis. This study was structured analytically using preset questions. This approach was chosen because the study addressed specific aspects (see Woodwell, 2014). The authors obtained and assessed aeronautical information about Betong Airport through anonymous personal communication with air transport professionals.

3. Results

3.1. Relevant facts of the case

Betong is the capital of Betong District, the southernmost district of Yala Province. It is located two hours and a half away from the provincial capital town by car (approximately 120 km away). The nearest active airfield is Narathiwat Airport, which has a 2,500-m-long runway, located three-and-a-half hours away (approximately 190 km).

The Betong Airport Development Project (hereinafter BTZ Project) is situated 13 km northeast of downtown Betong (Kasemsuk, 2022a). The Thai government approved the BTZ Project in October 2015. The purpose of the project is to resolve transportation obstacles resulting from the district’s remote location and to promote socioeconomic development through tourism (Ministry of Transport [MOT], 2017). A budget of approximately USD 58 million was allocated to construct an international airport with a 1,800-m-long runway. Betong Airport was scheduled to open in late 2020 (Centre for Aviation, 2021).

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has severely affected the Thai economy. In particular, the air transport sector heavily depends on foreign tourism (IATA, 2019). Local and international lockdown restrictions delayed the inauguration of Betong Airport by 18 months (Ahmad, 2022). The first commercial flight was conducted by Nok Air. A Bombardier Q400 turboprop landed at the new airport on 14 March 2022. To emphasise the symbolic significance of this inaugural flight to remote Betong, the passengers included high-ranking officials of the Thai government (Kasemsuk, 2022a).

Despite the inaugural celebration and being the sole airline to operate at the airport, Nok Air unexpectedly cancelled all flights to Betong from its hub at the Don Mueang International Airport less than two days later. It justified its decision to suspend the route on grounds of insufficient passenger demand. The lack of sales rendered the Don Mueang–Betong route economically unviable (Daily News, 2022). Nok Air then requested government compensation for the initial non-profitability of its business ventures. It demanded a 75% revenue guarantee funded by the government to resume services (The Nation, 2022b).

The government agreed to guarantee minimum revenue and partially subsidise the airline’s operational costs (The Nation, 2022a). Since then, the airline has increased its load factor by more than 90% on the Don Mueang–Betong route because of the government’s tourism campaign. However, overall operational costs have not stabilised.

Instead, Nok Air accrued higher opportunity costs. This is because the Q400 turboprop aircraft, which is required for remote routes, takes 1 hour and 45 minutes to reach the destination. Nok Air claimed it lost an estimated $1.1 million in overall revenue within three months of continuing the Betong route (Kasemsuk, 2022b).

Arguably, Betong Airport’s limited capacity is a contributing factor. The airport lacks the capacity to accommodate low-cost airlines and offer full service between Bangkok and remote Betong. In fact, the airport’s aerodrome features demonstrate why it has a limited capacity. These are summarised below (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Location of Betong International Airport.

Note. This map was created using the ArcGIS^® software by Esri.

3.1.1. Airport technical information

The limited capacity of Betong Airport may explain why this remote destination in Thailand’s southernmost region is less attractive to airline operators. Therefore, it is vital to examine the airport’s profile, particularly its key features.

The Thai aviation regulator’s records reveal that Betong Airport was originally classified as a visual flight rules (VFR) airport. Navigation and landing aids were installed, specifically Doppler VHF omnidirectional range (DVOR) and distance-measuring equipment (DME). The navigational signal coverage of the DVOR/DME system was designed to determine the bearings of an aircraft and aid its landing on the runway. Unfortunately, the mountainous terrain around Betong Airport creates several limitations (Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand [CAAT], 2021). This meant that pilots flying to this local airport were restricted to making a visual landing (C.S., personal communication, 16 May 2022). It was not until March 2022, when Nok Air commenced flights that the CAAT also permitted instrument flight rules/VFR aerodrome. Despite this, the status quo remains. Prior restrictions and limitations affecting the approach and landing procedures at Betong Airport still exist (CAAT, 2022b).

Betong Airport has a single runway, which is a common feature of DOA airports. The runway at Betong Airport is 1,800 m long. This length is shorter than that of the runways of other commercially active local airports. For instance, the runway of the DOA airport in the remote province of Nan in northern Thailand is 2,000 m long (CAAT, 2022a). Betong’s runway can accommodate only turboprop aircraft, such as the Bombardier Q400, operated by Nok Air.

The BTZ Project was intended to design an airport with a runway at least 2,100 m long, in conformity with other DOA airports in southern Thailand. This was especially important because of the remote geography of Betong. Betong is one of the most distant regions from Bangkok. A longer runway would allow airlines to operate the Bangkok–Betong route with the single-aisle jet aircraft (e.g. Airbus A320-200 or Boeing B737-800) commonly operated by Thai airline carriers, including Nok Air. Another disadvantage is that Betong Airport does not have fuelling facilities (CAAT, 2022b). This implies that airlines cannot benefit financially from operating the direct route between the capital and Thailand’s southernmost town. The fact that a shorter runway results in a longer distance to the hub in Greater Bangkok does not guarantee optimal profitability. Third, Betong Airport was planned to serve both domestic and international sectors. However, the 1,800-m-long runway provides a limited design structure for accomplishing this goal.

The authors argued that the inexpedient planning and design of Betong Airport are the basic reasons for poor project management. Thus, careful investigation is required to understand why the DOA designed such a flawed and imprudent plan.

3.2. PESTLE analysis

Given the relevant facts about the case study outlined above, this section assesses the macroenvironment of the DOA in general and the BTZ Project in particular. It identifies the PESTLE factors that influenced the DOA’s Betong Airport construction project.

3.2.1. Political

As the DOA is a government body, various political forces may have negatively influenced high-ranking department officials. These political forces can appear in several ways. In principle, the DOA is a state bureau entrusted with the Thai government’s objectives. Its role is to implement the government’s airport development policies. This involves preparing project proposals in line with the agenda and policies prescribed by the cabinet.

Key documents on the government’s policies and plans directly and indirectly mention the BTZ Project. These include the 12th National Economic and Social Development Plan 2017–2021 and the Ministry of Transport Strategic Plan 2017–2021 (MOT, 2016; National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB], 2016). At the national government level, the BTZ Project was a scheme under the government’s broader agenda to develop the economic potential of border towns and improve the interconnectivity of those regions. The DOA is a key agency assigned to implement this plan (NESDB, 2016).

At the ministerial level, the BTZ Project was projected to link the main transport corridors (MOT, 2016) and encourage economic prosperity. These economic aspects are discussed in detail later in this article. However, it should be noted that the construction of Betong Airport was not solely related to economics. It was about politics in general and national security in particular. Yala is one of Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, which foreign journalists and scholars commonly refer to as the ‘Deep South’.

Thailand’s Deep South has become a ‘failed state’ over the past two decades. Thai defence and law enforcement authorities inadequately ensure law and order, especially in remote areas. The situation in the southern borderlands was very aptly and precisely described as a ‘quagmire of violence’ (see Jitpiromsri et al., 2018). Therefore, the construction and development of a DOA airport in Betong fulfilled the political objectives of promoting socio-political development and enhancing political stability (MOT, 2017). These aims were envisioned as crucial elements in making the ‘stability, prosperity, and sustainability triangle’ (SPST), whose raison d’être is to restore law and order in the Deep South through economic empowerment and social improvement (Nuchpiam & Prateeppornnarong, 2020).

The political incentive for operating the DOA airport is to stimulate mass tourism in Betong. Tourism populations are expected to contribute to an environment of political stability and peace in the Deep South. Nevertheless, this projected outcome is uncertain. The mere existence of an airport could result in a cul-de-sac trap. The current reality is that the public generally perceives the southernmost borderlands as perilous, which could dissuade people from travelling to Betong even if a legitimate air service is available (Sanglee, 2022).

Aside from the abovementioned factors, Thai bureaucratic culture—notably characterised by conservatism, departmentalism, and agency-based recognition and awards (Sumano, 2020; Vichit-Vadakan, 2011)—ostensibly shaped the DOA, the body assigned to complete the BTZ Project. In the context of the Thai bureaucracy, the performance of an entity is evaluated on a singular basis. Only the individual accomplishments of the entity are considered. This means that a lack of coordination among state bureaus seriously hinders the implementation of effective policies (Vichit-Vadakan, 2011). Moreover, high-level civil servants are ordinarily inclined to compete with each other to satisfy politicians (or the military junta in power). They may resort to unethical conduct by hastily responding and implementing their political campaigns to secure promotion opportunities or gain higher budget allocations (Nishizaki, 2006, 2008). The authors argue that such a scenario presumably occurred during the planning and implementation of the BTZ Project. This would undoubtedly be detrimental to the operation of any airport in Thailand’s Deep South region.

3.2.2. Economic

The construction of the DOA’s Betong Airport began in 2015 when the Thai economy was sluggish. The aviation sector underperformed, partially because the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) issued a red-flag status over Thailand’s poor aviation safety supervision records (Prasirtsuk, 2016). The ICAO eventually removed the red flag in 2017 following rounds of safety inspections (The Sunday Nation, 2017). Thailand’s overall GDP per capita growth increased from 2.7% in 2015 to 3.9% in 2018. However, the COVID-19 outbreak reversed the prospects for further growth. The GDP fell to 2% in 2019 and then to -6.3% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

Let us now review the economic potential of Betong since the aim of the BTZ Project was to build a small commercial airport in the remote southernmost district of Yala. Betong has had a better economic outlook than many of its peer districts in Thailand’s Deep South. This advantage is partly due to geographical factors: Betong shares a border with Malaysia’s Pengkalan Hulu town in the state of Perak. This proximity enables Betong to benefit from cross-border economic activities (Lord & Tangtrongjita, 2014). Betong is a notorious nightlife hotspot where the illicit sex trade is the main attraction (CTN News, 2019). In 2018, half a million foreign travellers arrived in Betong by land from Pengkalan Hulu (Promchertchoo, 2019). The fact that approximately 70% of the entrants were Malaysians and Singaporeans highlights the fact that regional tourism rates currently exceed those in other parts of the world. The growth rate of international tourism has remained secondary.

Still, Betong is truly a revenue generator for the Deep South region, regardless of the type of tourist destination. This commercial activity has made the border town the crux of the Thai government’s Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) economic corridor. The IMT-GT is a sub-regional initiative launched in 1993 to promote cross-border trade and regional infrastructure links between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Krainara & Routray, 2015). The Thai government intends to integrate Betong Airport’s transport and other service purposes with the policy objectives of the IMT-GT (Wangsri & McNeil, 2020).

3.2.3. Sociocultural

Betong is isolated from the capital district of Yala. According to a 2018 government report, the resident population of Betong was approximately 50,600. Of the total population, 52.9% were Muslim, 46.4% were Buddhist, and the remaining 0.7% belonged to other religions (Yala Provincial Health Office, 2018). It appears that the demographic structure has contributed to a lower rate of insurgent attacks against Betong than in other parts of the Deep South region. This perceived safe environment for tourists (Yee, 2022) was a deciding factor in the DOA’s decision to build a local airport.

3.2.4. Technological

New engineering technologies that enhance the efficacy of airport layouts and operations have been continuously developed in Thailand and other countries. However, recent technological innovations do not appear to have significantly impacted DOA airport planning and design.

The DOA is a government bureau that has chosen to continue utilising its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to build new airports. It tends to utilise ready-made airport development blueprints regardless of the specific and individual requirements of a new airport and its geography. The construction and equipment of airport facilities are similar in both regional and local DOA airports. This uniformity is impractical for remote airports that have limited budgets and adverse geographical features. The construction of Betong Airport illustrates this error. The DOA built the airport in a mountainous location, even though the topography significantly limits the coverage of DVOR/DME landing aids.

3.2.5. Legal and ecological

Almost all airport operators worldwide comply with national and international aviation laws. The DOA’s airport management remains solid in this category. Several regulatory bodies have monitored the DOA’s new airport development projects. They oversee activities ranging from aerodrome planning to aerodrome infrastructure and operations.

At the national level, the DOA airports must follow the rules, regulations, and ordinances enforced by the CAAT. The DOA also abides by certain orders promulgated by select committees appointed by the cabinet and the cabinet member in charge of air transport affairs (Kovudhikulrungsri & Pompongsuk, 2020). In addition, the DOA is a government bureau with the mechanics of a Public Service Obligation (PSO) to provide air transport infrastructures as part of its development policy packages. Therefore, reaping profits from airlines and passengers is not considered imperative.

At the international level, the DOA is legally obligated to comply with the regulations and standards enacted by the ICAO Council and its related mechanisms, such as the ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (see Salih, 2021). It must ensure that its airports meet the minimum requirements prescribed by aviation laws. Failure to comply may result in Thailand being red-flagged by the ICAO again (Kovudhikulrungsri & Pompongsuk, 2020). This has severely affected the country’s air transport sector.

Airport operators in developed nations have embraced recent international trends in favour of stricter environmental standards. Examples of new airport quality standards include carbon dioxide emission reduction standards and noise abatement measures (Malathi, 2012). However, the DOA has not implemented ecologically friendly guidelines for managing regional and local airports. The guidelines may have formed a component of aeropolitical governance but are not yet binding aviation laws.

4. Discussion

The PESTLE analysis of the DOA in general and the BTZ Project in particular provided some clues as to why the BTZ Project has been prone to problems since its inception. Specifically, the authors postulated what has most likely happened: a ready-made airport development blueprint was prepared as an integral part of the department’s SOPs and then used by DOA officials. These measures were undertaken even though a pre-planned aerodrome model did not fit the geographical conditions of the southernmost Betong region, nor did it suit the economic and political goal of promoting the SPST in the Deep South region. It is the authors’ opinion that the DOA official in charge probably considered the BTZ Project to be merely another routine job assignment. In other words, the macroenvironment of the project demonstrated Thai bureaucratic culture—specifically, the DOA’s organisational culture—as the probable root cause of the flawed and imprudent airport layout in Betong. This pivotal condition, a mix of combined macroenvironmental factors, has made Betong Airport economically unviable or an inconvenient ‘workplace’ for airline carriers to consider.

Unsound aerodrome planning has had a profound negative effect on the performance of the small Betong Airport. Airport performance is ordinarily rated based on key economic measurements, which include (a) the revenue structure, (b) revenue generation, (c) the cost structure, (d) cost efficiency, and (e) profitability (Graham, 2014). The application of these indicators demonstrates that Betong Airport (as of mid-2022) has no capacity to generate profits independently based on the current design and facilities. Examples of aeronautical revenue sources include landing, aircraft parking, and air traffic control fees (Graham, 2014). These fees typically generate an airport’s income; however, the DOA waived them as incentives for Nok Air and other carriers to operate the Betong route. Hence, it is fair to say that Betong Airport has exhibited poor economic performance.

Some might argue that the BTZ Project could be regarded as a kind of loss-making remote airport, mostly citing serving the public as justification for its construction and operation (see Merkert, 2017). Remote air services require both operational feasibility and overall profitability because no airline is legally or morally bound to the mechanics of a PSO. Building airports, where airlines cannot operate profitably, is hardly justified.

Considering all the foregoing evidence, it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the hasty and ill-advised organisational culture embedded in the DOA and the wider Thai bureaucratic system has greatly contributed to the defective planning of the BTZ Project. These unfavourable outcomes have led to the economic unviability of the newly opened Betong airport. This study revealed substantive shortcomings in the DOA’s airport management and development systems. These conditions might explain the growing number of underperforming and underused DOA airports across Thailand.

4.1. Study limitations

The authors acknowledge the limitations of this study. First, the macro-external environment of a certain organisation or a specific project is not static but changes over time. Second, the application of the PESTLE technique refers only to a selected case study. Finally, the interpretation of the collected data and information is fairly subjective and can sometimes be misleading because of insufficient information. Given these limitations, the findings presented herein should be considered preliminary.

5. Conclusion

This article began by questioning why the DOA develops and manages its local airports. The position of the authors is that the manner in which the DOA develops and manages airports does not ensure optimal efficiency or profitability. Betong International Airport is one of the DOA’s more recent airport construction projects. It is a small international airport situated in the southernmost part of Yala, which is a remote region. Betong Airport has an impractical airfield layout that accommodated its first commercial flight from Bangkok in March 2022. Nok Air is the sole air operator. To the public’s surprise, Nok Air suspended its Betong routes within 48 hours of its inaugural flight. This explains the economic loss caused by insufficient passenger demand. This article discusses the Betong Airport Project as a starting point for examining the macroenvironment surrounding the DOA.

Analysing the Betong Airport case is not an easy task because the airport operator is neither an SOE nor a private company. Instead, Betong Airport has been built and managed solely by the DOA, a government bureau with PSO missions. Therefore, the authors used analytical tools and methodologies applicable to both airport management and public administration. The DOA entity falls between these two domains. The authors argued that the PESTLE technique is analytically feasible for discussion. The PESTLE technique was used to identify a set of macroenvironmental influences surrounding the case study to search for a pivotal condition potentially shaping the DOA in general and the BTZ Project in particular.

By examining the macroenvironment of the BTZ Project, local bureaucratic culture—that is, a nine-to-five routine, simply adhering to SOPs—appeared to be highly influential in framing the DOA’s airport management and development decisions. These decisions include those related to the approval and implementation of aerodrome planning and design. The reality is that Thai bureaucratic culture is highly institutionalised within the DOA and wider bureaucracy. This may explain why the BTZ Project was sanctioned with an ill-designed layout.

To be precise, the reasons for this are hastiness, imprudence, and departmentalism. Hastiness and imprudence stem from officials or other individuals wishing to appease or satisfy those in power. Such conduct involves implementing political campaigns quickly to obtain promotions or more budgetary allocations, which reflects a mindset that discourages individualism so that one repeats a pattern or routine of work and SOPs. All these factors resulted in the construction of Betong Airport based on a flawed and faulty design. The airport has a 1,800-m-long runway, the short length of which discourages airline carriers from operating a route from Bangkok. The lack of competing airlines is not economically feasible for remote airfields.

As of this writing (i.e. May 2022), the DOA-operated Betong Airport does not seem to have a bright future. Airline carriers such as Nok Air have found that flying the Betong route bestows an overall commercial burden rather than a profit-making benefit (Kasemsuk, 2022b). Solutions are required to improve the performance of Betong Airport. The best way to make the southernmost airfield economically viable for airline firms would be to build a runway extension. The current runway must be extended to 2,100 m or longer to accommodate the larger jet aircraft widely used by Thai airlines (i.e. A320-200 and B737-800). During the construction of the runway extension, the DOA should waive aeronautical charges to encourage airline carriers to continue operating their respective Betong routes.

The DOA is a state bureau whose central mission is not profit-making; however, utilising budgets prudently and efficiently is a responsibility and is meant to be a norm. In other words, the DOA is not supposed to deliver flawed and defective ‘airport products’, such as the aerodrome planning and design of the Betong Airport. Hence, there is a great need to reengineer the DOA. Below are some initial policy recommendations for improving work culture, SOPs, and personnel management.

The rectification of SOPs and personnel management is more likely to be successful; however, it takes time to yield outcomes. Thailand has very few higher education institutions that offer degrees in airport administration and management. This has resulted in a limited number of qualified airport managers and specialists in the DOA and Thai civil bureaucracy. Therefore, the government should allocate more international scholarships and send a new generation of air transport officials abroad to obtain degrees in airport management and engineering. Concurrently, DOA officials must receive more airport design and operation training from specialised bodies, such as the ICAO Secretariat and Singapore Aviation Academy. It is equally important to end the futile practice of using premade ‘one-size-fits-all’ SOPs and to employ condition-specific approaches instead.

Rectifying Thai bureaucratic culture is the final and most difficult recommendation. The authors acknowledge that this policy recommendation is abstract and probably not within the bounds of practicability. Notwithstanding that, culture significantly impacts the quality of government services such as public service delivery and bureaucratic competency (Porcher, 2021). Thus, while the authors submit that the preceding thesis and policy recommendations are debatable, their submission seems to be supported by their case study of the DOA’s Betong International Airport.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This study was partially supported by the Thammasat University Research Unit in History and International Politics [Grant No. 5/2565].

Notes on contributors

Kiraphat Khianthongkul

Kiraphat Khianthongkul is a Lecturer at the Institute of Metropolitan Development, Navamindradhiraj University, Bangkok. Prior to joining Navamindradhiraj, he taught at Thaksin University in southern Thailand. His research interests include local governance, public finance, and public policy.

Poowin Bunyavejchewin

Poowin Bunyavejchewin is a Tenured Senior Researcher at the Institute of East Asian Studies, Thammasat University, located in suburban Bangkok. He also serves as the Head of the University’s Research Unit in History and International Politics. His research interests include Asia-Pacific security, regional multilateralism, Thai foreign policy, Thai boys love (BL) media, and aviation social science.