The European Parliament’s contribution to the R2P debate: lessons from the Libyan and Syrian conflicts

Abstract

The first application of the military force element of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), whose objective is to protect populations from four specified atrocities, occurred in 2011 in Libya. Since then, and in particular in the ongoing conflict in Syria, R2P has been mentioned occasionally but not applied to date. This has led to claims that its non-application is a result of the “shadow of Libya”. Over recent years, the international role of parliamentary bodies has vastly expanded, and in particular that of the European Parliament (EP) who acted as a “prime mover” for R2P over Libya in 2011. This study explains why the EP does not call for R2P implementation in the Syrian conflict. It will argue that this differentiation in fact strengthens R2P because it refers to conditions and characteristics that need to be respected if this concept is to be implemented correctly, and, more importantly, if it is to become an accepted international norm in the future.

Keywords:

• European Parliament
• Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
• Libya
• Syria

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank an anonymous referee and the Journal editors for useful comments on a previous draft. The usual proviso about final responsibility applies here too.

Notes on Contributor

Since December 2007, Dr Stelios Stavridis has been an ARAID Senior Research Fellow in the Research Unit on European & International Studies/ZEIS (previously, Unit on Global Governance and the European Union) of the University of Zaragoza in Spain. In the past, he has worked at a number of universities and research centres in the UK, Belgium, Greece, Cyprus and Italy, including at The University of Reading and at King's College London, and, most recently, at the The United Nations University-Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility in Barcelona and at the Institut d'études européennes de Paris 8.

Notes

1. Committee on Foreign Affairs (Rapporteur: Franziska Katharina Brantner) Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the UN principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (“R2P”), A7-0130/2013, 27 March 2013.

2. The Canada-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose report The Responsibility to Protect was published in December 2001 led to a UN General Assembly debate and resolution in 2005 which has been considered to be the basis of R2P since then. Leveringhaus (2014, p. 171) argues that the ICISS version was much stronger on Responsibility to Rebuild than the final UN agreement, thus confirming that reconstruction in Libya has partly failed because of a lack of UN-backed follow-up once the Gaddafi regime had fallen (see below). It is also important to note that R2P is also sometimes implemented “even if [ … ] work is not often framed in these terms” as is the case for instance at the UN Human Rights Council (see for instance, “High Commissioner's statement to High-level Event on implementing R2P in the Geneva context – A focus on prevention”, Geneva, 19 November 2015: http://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16776&LangID=E.

3. “What is the Responsibility to Protect?”: http://www.wfuna.org/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect-%E2%80%93-q-and-a.

4. “The Responsibility to Protect”: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.

5. The R2P literature is replete with references to Just War Theory, see Walzer (1977) and Ceadel (1987). For a post-9/11 effort to update the Just War, see Patterson (2005); see also Leveringhaus (2014).

6. Ranging from: association agreements; agreements on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms; agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation procedures; agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; to agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the EP is required.

7. “impact” is used by Van den Putte, de Ville and Orbie (2015) to describe the EP's role in EU trade policy.

8. European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in particular (P7_TA(2011)0095).

9. See Workshop on Responsibility to Protect – Future Aspects, 8 March 2012, European Parliament, Brussels. Benner (2013, p. 11) also mentions that a similar event was organized by the parliamentary group of the German Green Party in the German Bundestag on 8 June 2012.

10. See Ghanmi and Hakala (2013). On the more recent situation in Libya, see also Varvelli (2014); Haimzadeh (2015).

11. Thus there are two parliaments, one in Tripoli and another in Tobruk, see Libya: Rival parliament leaders hold first meeting, BBC News (16 December 2015): http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35109309.

12. Based on October 2013 interviews with MEPs Gomes and Panzeri (PSE). See also Fred Kaplan, “Libia: las lecciones de Irak”, El País (29 August 2011).

13. Respectively: UN principle of the “Responsibility to Protect”, European Parliament recommendation to the Council of 18 April 2013 on the UN principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (“R2P”) (2012/2143(INI) P7_TA(2013)0180; Recommendation to the Council on the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly European Parliament recommendation to the Council of 11 June 2013 on the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly (2013/2034(INI) P7_TA(2013)0234).

14. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703. On what is needed for Responsibility to Rebuild, see Gómez Isa (2014, pp. 806–807).

15. What follows also draws from informal and unstructured interviews by the author with several MEPs (2) and EP Secretariat officials (4) in Lisbon in June 2012 and in Athens and Brussels in September and October 2013. The MEPs were Ana Gomes and Pier Antonio Panzeri, both very active on the Arab Spring, and respectively rapporteurs for Libya and for Syria (in the case of Panzeri together with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the former dealing with the ENP's Eastern dimension and the latter with its Southern one, including Syria).

16. This figure is from Christos Stylianides, Francesc Cortada, ‘Tú salvas vidas’, El País, 25 February 2015, pp. 31–32. Stylianides is the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management. For the most recent figures, see The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website: www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html.

17. On the EU and Syria, see Seeberg (2015).

18. Morris (2013, p. 1280): “Russia insisted to fellow Council members that ‘the situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience’” (p. 1275 quoting verbatim from the relevant UN document S/PV6627). See also p. 1276.

19. See in particular: Benjamin Barthe, “Les huit guerres de la Syrie”, Le Monde (14 March 2015); Natalia Sancha, “Quién es quién en el tablero de la guerra siria”, El País (27 January 2016); Barah Mikail, “Posibles implicaciones regionales de la guerra en Siria”, Desafíos para la política exterior europea en 2014, FRIDE, Madrid, pp. 31–38. See also Javier Solana, “El veto a Siria y sus implicaciones geopolíticas, El País (10 October 2011); Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Final de partida en Siria”, El País-Domingo (20 October 2011); Sami Naïr, “El peligro sirio”, El País (23 November 2011); Christophe Ayad, Stéphane Foucart, “La Syrie, le crève-cœur du secrétaire géneral”, Le Monde (27 August 2015); Le Monde editorial (18 September 2015), “Syrie: Le drôle de jeu de M. Poutine”; Mathieu Rey, “L‘etat islamique est aussi la créature du baasime”, Le Monde (8 November 2015).

20. John-Paul Ford Rojas, “Muammar Gaddafi in his own words”: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838644/Muammar-Gaddafi-in-his-own-words.html (The Telegraph, 20 October 2011).

21. This question is not addressed in this study. In the case of Libya, the appearance of Daesh/Islamic State has also further complicated its post-2011 reconciliation and reconstruction phase.

22. As referred to in minutes of the meeting of 20 June 2013, Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights, Union for the Mediterranean-Parliamentary Assembly, Document CoPo_PV(2013)0620, p. 3, Brussels.

23. https://twitter.com/supportsyrians/status/695258954952220672. See also his interview in Le Monde (27 August 2015). For a recent review of developments in Syria, see Bauchard (2015).

24. Although some have questioned if the Assad regime was the only user of chemical weapons, this study does not enter this debate as the 2013 Russian-brokered agreement only covered Assad's chemical weapons. For more, see Seymour M. Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”, London Review of Books 36(8), pp. 21–24, 17 April 2014.

25. EP Document RC-B7-0413/2013.

26. The author would like to thank Irene Fernández Molina (then of the College of Europe-Natolin Campus) for additional empirical research on the case of Syria.

27. www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fi/pressroom/content/20120614IPR46888/html/MEPs-call-on-Syrian-opposition-to-unite-in-preparing-for-post-Assad-regime.

28. In full: Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces which is the biggest and most significant Syrian opposition grouping in exile.

29. For instance during the Plenary sessions of 7 April 2011, 7 July 2011, 15 September 2011, 27 October 2011, 15 December 2011, 16 February 2012, 12 September 2012, 22 May 2013 and 23 October 2013, respectively, see: European Parliament resolution of 7 April 2011 on the situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen; European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 on the situation in Syria; European Parliament resolution of 15 September 2011 on the situation in Syria; European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2011 on the situation in Egypt and Syria, in particular of Christian communities; European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2011 on the situation in Syria; European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012 on the situation in Syria; European Parliament Joint Motion for a Resolution on Syria (PPE, S&D, ALDE and ECR Groups) – B7-0425/2012 & 0435 & 0438 & 0439, 12 September 2012.

30. Motion for a resolution on the situation of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries – B7-0199/2013 & 0222 & 0226 & 0227 & 0228, 22 May 2013; Motion for a resolution on the situation of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries – B7-0199/2013 & 0222 & 0226 & 0227 & 0228, 22 May 2013.

31. European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2011 on the situation in Egypt and Syria, in particular of Christian communities (P7_TA(2011)0471).

32. Resolutions adopted on 17 June 2010.

33. For instance, European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2003 on the conclusion of an Association Agreement with the Republic of Lebanon (P5_TA-PROV(2003)0019), which states in its Point E that “welcoming the withdrawal of a part of the Syrian troops and hoping that those still stationed in the country will, in the future, also leave by virtue of an agreement with the Lebanese government ( … )”.

34. For instance: The murder of Hamza Ali al-Khateeb in Syria (Press Release, Brussels; 1 June 2011, emphasis added).

35. Syria's Assad must go, and Libya's resources must benefit all Libyans, say MEPs – Plenary Session External relations − 15 September 2011. See also Sanctions against the Syrian regime! (Press Release, Brussels – 19 August 2011).

36. Condemnation for the deadly repression in Syria (Press Release, Brussels – 22 April 2011).

37. Debates, European Parliament, 12 June 2012.

38. These are examples quoted by Weiss (2012, pp. 115–116 and 118).

39. Debates, European Parliament, 12 June 2012.

40. Debates, European Parliament, 4 July 2012.

41. Debates, European Parliament, 12 June 2012.

42. European Parliament Joint Motion for a Resolution on Syria (PPE, S&D, ALDE and ECR Groups) – B7-0425/2012 & 0435 & 0438 & 0439, 12 September 2012. A point reiterated later, for instance in May 2013 (Motion for a resolution on the situation of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries – B7-0199/2013 & o222 & 0226 & 0227 & 0228, 22 May 2013). In that respect, see also the AFET Committee draft report on R2P – 2012/2143(INI) (Rapporteur: Franziska Katharina Brantner), 5 February 2013; AFET Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly – 2013/2034(INI) (Rapporteur: Alexander Graf Lambsdorff), 5 June 2013.

43. Texts adopted, European Neighbourhood Policy, working towards a stronger partnership: EP's position on the 2012 progress reports – B7-0484/2013, 23 October 2013.

44. Debates, European Parliament, 12 June 2012; Debates, European Parliament, 4 July 2012.

45. The numbers do not take into consideration if MEPs intervened in both debates, hence the use of “interventions” and not “MEPs” amounting to those numbers.

46. “Le ministre des Affaires étrangères propose d’interdire le recours au veto en cas de crime de masse”, Libération, 4 October 2013. See also, Laurent Fabius, “Un compromiso sobre el derecho de veto”, El País, 5 October 2013.

47. As quoted in Wouters, De Man and Vincent (2011, p. 22). See also a revival of this proposal in 2015 at The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect's website: www.globalr2p.org/publications/, in particular the views by Simon Adams (21 January 2015) and by Gareth Evans (4 February 2015).

48. European Parliament recommendation to the Council of 18 April 2013 on the UN principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (“R2P”), Text adopted on 18 April 2013 at the Strasbourg Plenary, p. 9.

49. Point 6, European Parliament resolution of 12 February 2015 on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and Syria, in particular in the IS context (2015/2559(RSP)). On the wider question of legitimacy and the UN, see also Morris and Wheeler (2007).

50. See in particular, Kaarbo and Kenealy (2014). It is interesting to note that recent, admittedly short, studies have come to opposing conclusions on the wider implications of the House of Commons vote on Syria: thus, whereas Kaarbo and Kenealy (2014, p. 3) claim that one should not read “any deep structural shift in parliamentary authority” into it, Longo argues the opposite: “military operations abroad will [now] require the preventive approval of Parliament” (Longo, 2013, p. 4). On Libya, for the German Bundestag see Miskimmon (2012), and for the Italian Parlamento, see Croci and Valigi (2013).

51. See “Enforcing the Responsibility to Protect: the role of Parliament in safeguarding civilians' lives”, Resolution adopted by consensus by the 128th IPU Assembly (Quito, 27 March 2013) based on the IPU First Standing Committee on Peace and International Security, Report C-I/128/R of the same name (3 December 2012).

52. See Commons Hansard – Debate on Syria (29 August 2013).

53. Resolution 2170 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting, on 15 August 2014.

54. European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the systematic mass murder of religious minorities by the so-called “ISIS/Daesh” (2016/2529(RSP)).