Mixed strategy for power grid resilience enhancement under cyberattack

ABSTRACT

Power infrastructure networks continue to be at risk under natural and anthropogenic hazard events. Cyberattacks targeting power grids aim at magnifying the impacts through damage propagation to other dependent infrastructure network. In this respect, the current study focuses on the “draw-down” phase of power infrastructure network resilience considering different centrality measures to evaluate the robustness of power grids against cyberattacks. The study considers two network representations for the grid based on the network’s topological/connectivity (i.e., unweighted network) and the network’s power flow data (i.e., weighted network). Therefore, the study utilizes the evaluated measures to improve network robustness under cyberattacks, through considering (or not) the proposed mixed strategy. Based on the analyses, network-level vulnerability is quantified considering five different scenarios through evaluating two key performance metrics—Topology and Functionality indices. Nonetheless, applying the proposed mixed strategy to limit the attacker’s access to the network hubs would boost the overall grid robustness.

KEYWORDS:

• Centrality measures
• complex network theory
• cyberattacks
• mixed strategy
• robustness
• vulnerability analysis

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the Canadian Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Resilience under Systemic Risks (CaNRisk) – Collaborative Research and Training Experience (CREATE) program of the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada. Additional support through the INTERFACE Institute and the INViSiONLab of McMaster University is acknowledged.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada; Canadian Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Resilience under Systemic Risks (CaNRisk) - Collaborative Research and Training Experience (CREATE).

Notes on contributors

Mohamed Salama

Mohamed Salama is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Civil Engineering at McMaster University within the NSERC CaNRisk-CREATE program. He obtained his MS degree in 2017 from the Department of Civil Engineering at Cairo University. His research interest is in the area of interdependent infrastructure networks vulnerability assessment, resilience quantification, and systemic risk mitigation strategies. His research focuses on identification and simulation intra/interdependence of complex infrastructure networks under extreme events.

Wael El-Dakhakhni

Wael El-Dakhakhni, PhD, is a professor Director of the INTERFACE Institute for Multi-hazard Systemic Risk Studies at McMaster University. A Fellow of the American Society of Civil Engineers, his expertise is in the area of component- and system-level performance evaluation and risk and infrastructure resilience quantification under extreme events. He has been actively involved in knowledge mobilization to practice through chairing or voting on several codes and standards committees in Canada and the USA. He is a member of the ASCE Risk & Resilience Measurements Committee and the Disaster Response and Recovery Committee.

Michael Tait

Michael Tait, PhD, is the Joe NG/JNE Consulting Chair in Design, Construction & Management in Infrastructure Renewal, and the Director, Centre for Effective Design of Structures, Department of Civil Engineering, McMaster University. His group conducts leading-edge research on system control under extreme hazard. His research has resulted in the development of specialized risk mitigation technologies for both new and existing systems.