![Sample our Global Development journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5929/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Global-Development.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Indigenous peoples belong to those societal groups most heavily affected by the impacts of climate change and by governance arrangements on forests. In more recent years they have strived to bring their concerns to the fore in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This paper investigates how indigenous peoples have framed their participation in REDD+, an initiative to protect forests to combat climate change. Indigenous peoples reframed their affectedness that results from their proximity to, and dependence on, forests, into an asset by emphasising their specific knowledge and expertise in managing natural forests. This reframing can be seen as an example of the spread of the ‘affectedness paradigm’ in global (climate) politics that manifests itself across levels. At the UNFCCC, indigenous peoples have managed to expand the recognition of their rights through REDD+ decisions. REDD+ financing initiatives outside the UNFCCC have adopted detailed rules to expand indigenous peoples’ participation. This led to the creation of new spaces of participation, particularly, round tables, that involve indigenous peoples’ organisations in deliberations with governments, as we observe in Latin America. Such participation is an opportunity for indigenous peoples to influence policy processes but there is also considerable risk of co-optation.
Abbreviations: UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; REDD+: ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; FCPF: Forest Carbon Partnership Facility; UNDRIP: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; FPIC: free, prior and informed consent; COONAPIP: Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas de Panamá; AIDESEP: Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest; RIA: REDD+ Indígena Amazónico; CONPAH: Confederación de Pueblos Autóctonos de Honduras; COPINH: Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Populares e Indígenas; CONAP: Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru.
Acknowledgements
The authors express their special thanks to Jan Sändig for his great support and appreciate the support from the UEF’s Center for Climate Change, Energy and Environmental Law (CCEEL).
Notes
1. Geist and Lambin, “Proximate Causes and Underlying Driving Forces.”
2. UN-REDD, http://www.unredd.net/about/what-is-redd-plus.html; see also Levin et al., “The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance.”
3. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention.”
4. The first idea of the instrument had already been formalised in 2007, but its scope was incrementally broadened until 2010 (for an overview of the policy development see Wallbot, “Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations”; and Recio Citation2014).
5. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 71.
6. UN-REDD Programme, http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=download&alias=6207-un-redd-faqs-and-answers-june-2010-1-6207&category_slug=additional-resources-1312&option=com_docman&Itemid=134.
7. Lee and Pistorius, The Impacts of International REDD+ Finance, 5.
8. As it also occurred due to the implementation of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism, see: Rogue, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Climate,” 61.
9. Sikor, et al., “REDD-plus.”
10. See also Schapper, “Climate Justice and Human Rights.”
11. International Labor Organization 2017, 20.
12. Sändig et al., “Affectedness in International Institutions.”
13. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements.”
14. For example Mato, “Transnational Networking and the Social Production”; Schroeder, “Agency in International Climate Negotiations”; Schroeder and van Bremen, “Pueblos Indígenas y Protección de Bosques.”
15. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung.
16. See also introduction to this collection by Sändig, et al., “Affectedness in International Institutions.”
17. On the role of affected groups in other areas of climate and environmental governance, see Toussaint in this collection.
18. This document relies on participatory observation and more than 30 semi-structured expert interviews with party delegates, indigenous peoples, and other civil society representatives at UNFCCC conferences between 2010 and 2012 and participatory observation between 2010 and 2013 reporting from UNFCCC negotiations. The national cases draw on participant observation and interviews with key actors in Honduras and Panama between 2009 and 2013. This research analyses primary and secondary literature to assess UNFCCC decisions, financing initiatives policies and national governments’ views on indigenous peoples vis-à-vis REDD+ implementation. Primary sources include policy briefs, official documents, project reports, and letters sent by indigenous leaders to financing initiatives.
19. Particularly, its “second wave”. Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms,” 66.
20. Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, 49.
21. Glaab et al., “Kritische Normenforschung,” 5–8. It is important to note that the term “governance” in itself has invoked heavy criticism of being inclined to neoliberal politics, missing out on questions of power and domination (see for example Buckel et al., “Staat, Europa und Migrationskontrollen”).
22. Wallbot, “Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations.”
23. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct; and Kuntz, “Aporias”; for more structuralist accounts on critical International Law see Chimni, “A Manifesto”; and Charlesworth et al., “Feminist Approaches.”
24. Recio, Citation2018.
25. Daase and Deitelhoff, “Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand.”
26. See, e.g. Recio Citation2018; Recio, Citationforthcoming; Savaresi, “The Legal Status”: and Gupta et al., “Indigenous People’s Right to Water under International Law.”
27. Krasner, International Regimes, 16; Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation; Jupille and Snidal, The choice of international institutions; Benvenisti and Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes”; and Drezner, “The Power and Peril.”
28. Orsini, “Multi-Forum Non-State Actors”; Wallbot, “Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations.”
29. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 614.
30. Morris, “Reflections on Social Movement Theory,” 446.
31. Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.”
32. Klotz, Norms in International Relations.
33. But also on other factors, see: Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 619–20.
34. Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries.”
35. The first reference to REDD was included in Decision 1/CP.13 on Bali Action Plan, Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) at para 1(b)(iii) [Decision 1/CP.13].
36. See note 22 above.
37. UNFCCC, “Work Programme on Results”. However, new rules may be adopted at any time by the COP, see Recio Citation2018.
38. Other alternative approaches, such as the Joint Mechanism on Mitigation and Adaptation proposed by Bolivia, are also considered along with results-based payments. Angelsen et al., Analysing REDD+, 381.
39. Including a robust and transparent national forest monitoring system, Cf. Decision 1/CP.16, paras 71–2.
40. Ibid.
41. Decision 1/CP.16, para 73.
42. Decision 9/CP.19, para 5.
43. Leach and Scoones, “Political Ecologies of Carbon,” 2.
44. Aguilar-Støen, “Better Safe than Sorry?”
45. Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix II, Safeguard (e).
46. Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix II.
47. Decision 2/CP.17, para 63.
48. Decision 12/CP.17.
49. See note 47 above.
50. Decision 9/CP.19, para 4.
51. Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, 2 (c). UNGA, “Declaration on the Rights.”
52. See, e.g. UNGA, “Declaration on the Rights,” Art. 27.
53. See note 46 above.
54. Arhin, “Safeguards and Dangerguards”; and Recio Citation2014.
55. Savaresi, “The Legal Status”; Recio, “Transnational REDD+ Rule-making.”
56. Ibid.
57. UNFCCC Parties and Observers, available online at http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php.
58. Wallbot, “Rights, Representation and Recognition.“
59. Campese et al., Rights-Based Approaches; Duyck et al., The Routledge Handbook.
60. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law.
61. Interview with indigenous peoples’ representative to the UNFCCC, December 2010, Cancún.
62. For example, when they emphasised the plural of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ to denote their collective rights beyond aggregated indigenous individuals. Wallbot, “Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations.”
63. Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin, Forest Protection and Tenure Status; and Stevens et al., Securing Rights, Combating Climate Change.
64. Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge, “Impact of Climate Change Mitigation,” 20.
65. Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge, “Impact of Climate Change Mitigation.”
66. See note 22 above.
67. UNFCCC, Issues relating to indigenous people and local communities for the development and application of methodologies, 10 March 2009 (FCCC/SBSTA/2009/MISC.1).
68. Ibid., 3.
69. Interview with indigenous peoples’ representative to the UNFCCC, 25 May 2012, Bonn.
70. Decision 4/CP.15. First, their key role was seen with regards to monitoring and reporting of activities related to REDD+ but eventually it was expanded to REDD+ as a whole.
71. ILO, Convention Nº169.
72. Ibid., Art. 6.1.
73. Linked to the control of financial flows. See: Recio Citation2018.
74. Stakeholder Engagement Guidelines, para 4.
75. Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge, “Impact of Climate Change Mitigation,” para 19.
76. FCPF, FCPF Information Memorandum.
77. Selected by their constituencies, for example, in the UN-REDD Programme the indigenous peoples’ representative is selected by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
78. FCPF, Charter Establishing the FCPF, Art. 10.1(b); and UN-REDD, Terms of Reference, paras 31–35.
79. Recio 2018.
80. However, this inclusion is not a formal requirement and may respond to the availability of experts capable of addressing the complexity of REDD+ issues.
81. Van Asselt and McDermott, “The Institutional Complex for REDD,” 82; Recio Citation2018; and Savaresi, “The Legal Status.”
82. See also Wallbot and Rosendal, “Safeguards, Standards and the Science-Policy Interfaces of REDD +.”
83. FAO, “Latin America Doubled Its Agricultural Emissions.”
84. Sieder, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and the Law,” 303.
85. Latin American Indigenous Forum on Climate Change 2010.
86. COICA, “There Is No REDD+.”
87. Ibid.
88. Alonso, “Colombia, Ecuador y Perú.”
89. COICA, “REDD+ Indigena Amazonico-RIA.”
90. RIA projects, https://es.mongabay.com/2018/07/peru-reserva-comunal-amarakaeri-redd-indigena-amazonico/, see also: https://www.dw.com/es/colombia-ecuador-y-per%C3%BA-apuestan-por-incluir-un-enfoque-ind%C3%ADgena-en-la-gesti%C3%B3n-de-los-bosques/a-19275495.
91. Hall, “Getting REDD-y,” 195.
92. Recio Citation2016.
93. Recio TGCC Panama Citation2015.
94. Civil society organisations and indigenous peoples requested withdrawal of the second draft proposal to present to the FCPF because it suffered ‘from a non-consulted process, devoid of technical and scientific support and social and political viability, ignoring the rules of the social and environmental safeguards’ (El Salvador, “Salvadoran National Indigenous Coordinating Council (CCNIS)”).
95. Zelli et al., REDD in Peru, 46.
96. Ecuador, “Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas.”
97. Recio Citation2018.
98. Recio Citation2016.
99. See note 93 above.
100. Zelli et al., REDD in Peru.
101. The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP), different to the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP), rejected REDD+ implementation if not adapted to indigenous peoples’ priorities. AIDESEP required budget allocation to enhance land rights of indigenous peoples by e.g. demarcating lands and recognising indigenous practices. Zelli et al., REDD in Peru, 46.
102. Ibid., 53; and AIDESEP, “Se conformó la Mesa Nacional de REDD.”
103. Recio Citation2016; and UNDP, “En el marco del proceso REDD Gobierno.”
104. Agreement signed between SERNA, ICF, SEDINAFROH, INA and CONPAH on 9 January 2013, see Recio Citation2016. This bill has been criticised for not contemplating a veto right to indigenous peoples.
105. Recio Citation2015, at 3, 13.
106. Law 37/2016. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=102800.
107. E.g., in Panama, indigenous peoples groups declared that they were quitting the REDD+ project. See: Recio Citation2015.
108. At the international level, also concerns remain on the representativity of those who negotiate for indigenous peoples and more generally for transnational communities of civil society actors. Challenges for indigenous peoples include defining the collective to represent, for there exists no universal formal definition of an indigenous person (individual) or indigenous peoples (collective). Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, José R. Martínez Cobo has provided two conditions for identification of indigenous peoples: self-definition as indigenous and recognition as indigenous by the community with which he or she identifies. See also Fontana and Grugel, “Reflections from the Bolivian Case.”
109. Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management, Gender Integration in REDD+, 7.
110. Krause et al., “Evaluating Safeguards in a Conservation Incentive Program”. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Mujeres Indígenas en América Latina: Dinámicas Demográficas y Sociales en el Marco de los Derechos Humanos, 111.
111. Ibid.
112. See note 44 above.
113. FCPF and UN-REDD, Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement, para 10.
114. Cáceres, “Rechazo de COPINH al R-PP.”
115. World Bank, “Letter to Berta Cáceres (COPINH).”
116. Jodoin, Forest Preservation in a Changing Climate, 56, arguing that multilateral support provided national actors an opportunity to press their governments to adopt legal norms to protect their rights. See also Recio 2018.
117. See also Fontana and Grugel, “Reflections from the Bolivian Case.”
118. For example, see Gover, “REDD+, Tenure and Indigenous,” 104–105.
119. See also in this collection: Hasenclever and Narr, “The Dark Side of the Affectedness-Paradigm”; and Chimni, “The Limits of the All Affected Principle.”
120. See: Schramm and Sändig, “Affectedness Alliances.”
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Linda Wallbott
Linda Wallbott is a postdoctoral Political Scientist/International Relations researcher with a focus on norm research and Global Environmental Governance. In her work, she focuses on the empirical and normative aspects of UN negotiations, particularly on climate change and biodiversity. She has conducted extensive research in Central America and South East Asia on sustainability transformations related to land use and renewable energies.
Eugenia Recio
Eugenia Recio is a Ph.D. researcher at the University of Eastern Finland Law School. Since 2009, she has attended international climate and REDD+ negotiations, particularly with the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Her research work includes a dozen of publications and comprises more than 15 years of experience on the ground in environmental and forest law in Latin American and Caribbean countries.