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Abstract
Gallagher poses a phenomenologically-inspired challenge to a classical metaphysics of nature which is associated with contemporary natural sciences. This metaphysics can be reconstructed in terms of two distinct commitments: reductionism and individualism. This comment on Gallagher’s [Citation2019] article attempts to show how a revision of the classical metaphysics can be made intelligible in light of those two commitments. It requires a strong interpretation of the ecological framework for understanding cognition. Such a revision would give agency a central place in the revised metaphysics of nature.
Notes
1 Indeed, on certain agency theories of causation (e.g., Menzies and Price [Citation1993]), I can see it being argued that scientific practice has implicitly relied on such a picture all along.
2 I take it then that Gallagher won’t be satisfied with Hohwy’s [Citation2019] assurance that the phenomenological notions which interest him can be accounted for in a predictive processing framework, since Gallagher [Citation2019] seems convinced by a strong interpretation of these notions whereas Hohwy is inclined to deflate them.