Isocrates’ Pragmatic Reflective Life at Euthydemus 304d–306e

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of Isocrates in Plato’s Euthydemus, with special attention given to M.M. McCabe’s defense of Socratic philosophy against the sophistic challenges of Euthydemus and Dionysodoros. I defend two main theses: (1) Isocratean philosophy refutes what McCabe calls ‘chopped logos’ (a sophistic theory of logic and meaning) and (2) Isocratean philosophy, like its Socratic rival, is committed to reflection and to the consistency of logoi but, unlike its Socratic rival, it is committed to them for strictly pragmatic reasons. As support for these theses, I argue that Isocrates holds a pragmatic theory of truth, that Isocratean philosophy meets all the requirements of what McCabe calls a ‘reflective commitment,’ and that Isocrates’ particular brand of pragmatism avoids the unscrupulous opportunism that worries McCabe about pragmatism generally. I conclude with considerations about how Isocrates figures into the central themes and drama of the Euthydemus.

KEYWORDS:

• Isocrates
• Plato
• Socrates
• Euthydemus
• pragmatism
• sophists
• truth
• logos

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my gratitude to Marta Jimenez and Andrew Culbreth for their helpful discussions and advice about issues addressed in this paper. I would also like to extend my thanks to Fiona Leigh, who made helpful suggestions for this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 There is a vast literature on identifying this anonymous critic. The general consensus takes it to be either Isocrates or an Isocratean type. The choice between these two options, I believe, does not greatly affect my argument, since even if it is not Isocrates himself, any token that instantiates Isocratean philosophy should have the pragmatism central to my points. See Chance [1992: 200] and Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi [2014: 144–5] for further discussion.

2 Even the choice of ‘euprepeian’ seems tongue-in-cheek or even slightly pejorative. In addition to ‘plausibility’, euprepeia can also mean ‘comeliness’ or ‘majesty’ which connotes that there is a superficial cogency at work, but on closer examination the cogency may dissolve. When Isocrates emphasizes the plausible or anti-epistêmê dimension of his views, he uses eikos and doxa. As far as I’m aware, he never describes his own views as involving euprepeia

3 Peirce invokes this swimming metaphor, I think, to emphasize that the main function of fallibilistic knowledge is to help us carry on with our lives and activities. We are always swimming—or acting generally—under conditions of uncertainty; any conception of knowledge that neglects this condition (e.g., any conception of knowledge that requires exactitude and certainty) misunderstands the main function of truth and knowledge.

4 For Isocrates’ rejection of theoretical sciences and theoretical philosophy, see Antidosis 265–269. There is some literature on Isocrates’ affinities with pragmatism. For starters, see Mikkola [1954] and the review of it in Matson [1957]. More recently, see Schiappa [1995, 2017].

5 All Isocrates translations, with slight modification, are from Isocrates 2000–2004.

6 For more on Isocratean doxa, see Poulakos [2001].