Towards a critique of the moral foundations of intellectual property rightsFootnote1[1] An earlier version of this article has been presented in the Kosmas Psychopedis Seminar on Theory and Epistemology of the Social Sciences at the Department of Economics at the University of Athens. I would like to thank the seminar participants, especially Nikos Petralias, Manolis Aggelidis, Ioli Patellis, George Faracklas and George Daremas for their constructive comments and suggestions. The article has also benefited from the ideas of Birgitte Andersen and the comments of two anonymous referees of this journal. I am indebted to them for their important contribution.
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