- David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1751), sections 7 and 8. Many editions exist.
- See John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green, 1843), Book III, Chap. 5; Book VI, Chap. 2.
- Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York:. Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1934), pp. 249–267.
- A representative statement of the “comparison of policy systems” position may be found in Allan J. Lichtman, and Daniel M. Rohrer, “A General Theory of the Counter-plan,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 12 (1975), 72–73. In general, this position holds that policy argument consists of a comparison of competitive responses to a given, situation. Not all adherents to, this point of view, however, would dismiss questions of causality. Cf. Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
- William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 1. An early formulation of the “covering law” approach may be found in Carl G. Hempel, “The Function of General Laws in History,” Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), 35–48. For a discussion of the “covering law” approach to scientific inquiry in communication, see Charles R. Berger, “The Covering Law Model in Communication Inquiry,” paper presented at the Speech Communication Association convention, Houston, Texas, December 29, 1975.
- The notion that causation refers to human intervention in a situation, since only people can make choices, is adapted from R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
- Dray, p. 100.
- Raymond Aron, Introduction to the philosophy of History, trans. George J. Irwin (1938; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), p. 166.
- W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 198.
- On the relationship between a person arid his acts, see Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson and Parcell Weaver (Notre Dame, Ind. University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 293–305.
- P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 125.
- Dray describes the first sort of explanation as a “how-possibly” causal explanation and the second as a “why-necessarily” explanation. Dray, pp. 164–169. His terminology will be employed here.
- Cf. Karl R. Wallace, “The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (1963), 239–249.
- Nowell-Smith, p. 105.
- The premises for such a proof would consist of what Farrell has described as “social knowledge.” See Thomas B. Farrell, “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 (1976), 1–14. See also Robert L. Scott, “On Viewing Rhetoric as Ep:stemic: Ten Years Later,” Central States Speech Journal, 27 (1976), 258–266, esp. pp. 260–263.
- Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 3. A similar position is criticized in Wayne C. Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).
- In “The Meaning of Inherency,” Kruger argues that it is not possible to solve problems without eliminating their causes. His conclusion is sound, but not in the sense of eliminating the antecedent or first cause. A problem or phenomenon may become functionally autonomous long after the antecedent cause has passed from the scene. Instead, the sustaining cause should be the focus of attention. Cf. Arthur N. Kruger, “The Meaning of the Inherency,” Gavel, 45 (1963), 46–47, 54; reprinted in Counterpoint: Debates about Debate (Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1968), pp. 88–92.
- Lee Hultzén, “Status in Deliberative Analysis,” The Rhetorical Idiom, Ed. Donald C. Bryant (1958; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), pp. 97–123.
- See, for example, Kruger, “The Meaning of Inherency”; Robert P. Newman, “The Inherent and Compelling Need,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 2 (1965), 66–71; David A. Ling and Robert V. Seltzer, “The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 7 (1971), 278–283; Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop and Donn W. Parson, “The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 10 (1974), 229–240; Allan J. Lichtman and Jerome R. Corsi, “The Alternative-Justification Case Revisited: A Critique of ‘The Problem of Inherency,’” Journal of the American Forensic Association., 11 (1975), 145–147; Goodnight, Balthrop and Parson, “Response to ‘A Critique of “The Problem of Inherency’,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 12 (1975), 46–48; J. Robert Cox, “Attitudinal Inherency: Implications for Policy Debate,” Southern Speech Communication Journal, 40 (1975), 158–168.
- Kenneth M. Strange III, “Inherency: Motives in Structure,” paper presented at the Central States Speech Association convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 2, 1976.
- A corollary of this view is that, ultimately, all inherency is attitudinal in nature, since all valid inherency arguments can be traced back to motives. This assumption is at odds with the point of view implicit in Ling and Seltzer, that atttudinal inherency somehow is a “special” type.
- Walsh, p. 200. Walsh proceeds to claim that this difficulty does not make it impossible to make informed judgments about motives.
- The problem of structural value statements embodied in law is discussed in Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson, “The Problem of Inherency,” pp. 230–231. On the symbolic aspects of legislation, see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
- These risks include the risk of unforseen consequences and the risk of premature commitment to a position. On the question of risk, see Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., “Some Reflections on Argumentation,” Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation, Eds. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), pp. 1–9.
- On this transportation of the means-ends relationship, see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, pp. 270–278.
- See the articles by Ling and Seltzer and and by Cox cited in note 19.
- See, for example, Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith, “Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58 (1959), 203–210; J. Merrill Carlsmith, Barry E. Collins and Robert L. Helmreich, “Studies in Forced Compliance,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4 (1966), 1–13. For a general review of research on “counterattitudinal advocacy,” see Gerald R. Miller and Michael Burgoon, New Techniques of persuasion (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 50–101.
- To achieve social change, Wilson believed, might require “giving other people as a condition of acquiescence something that they want. The total package becomes much bigger, and a single change tends to be embedded in a cluster of simultaneous changes.” James Q. Wilson, “An Overview of Theories of Planned Change,” Centrally Planned Change, Ed. Robert Morris (New York: National Association of Social Workers, 1964), p. 22.
- Booth, esp. Chap. 1.
- For example, it was argued that Medicaid functioned primarily to cause more demand chasing after the same supply of medical care, with the result being an increase in the cost of care generally. See Robert Stevens and Rosemary Stevens, Welfare Medicine in America: A Case Study of Medicaid (New York: Free Press, 1974). A similar argument could be advanced that housing programs served primarily to bid up the cost of housing generally.
- David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 168.
- Cohen and Nagel, p. 270.
- John Hospers, An Introduction to philosophical Analysis, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 317.
- Cf. Maurice Natanson, “The Claims of Immediacy,” Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation, Eds. Maurice Natason and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), pp. 15–16. Natason believes, however, that immediacy does offer claims susceptible to argument if willingness to risk the self through confrontation is evident.
The Journal of the American Forensic Association
Volume 13, 1977 - Issue 4