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Applicable Analysis
An International Journal
Volume 102, 2023 - Issue 17
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Research Article

Existence and stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria for discontinuous multiobjective games

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Pages 4899-4908 | Received 31 May 2022, Accepted 06 Nov 2022, Published online: 16 Nov 2022

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